A Freeze as the Entry Point, Denuclearization as the End Goal: 

A Realistic Approach to the North Korean Nuclear Stalemate

Young Joon Choi

Former Vice Minister of Unification 

Visiting Professor

Institute for Far Eastern Studies 

Kyungnam University

Recent international attention has been dominated by instability in the Middle East, including the confrontation between the United States and Iran. Even the war in Ukraine has at times receded from public attention. Meanwhile, the North Korean nuclear issue has virtually disappeared from the international agenda. Ballistic missile launches in violation of United Nations Security Council resolu-tions no longer generate serious debate, much less collective action.

Yet the issue’s disappearance from headlines does not mean that it has been re-solved. North Korea has continued to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities while international scrutiny and pressure have weakened. Pyongyang now pre-sents its nuclear forces as a permanent foundation of its national status and secu-rity, while portraying demands for denuclearization as an infringement on its constitution and sovereignty. [1]

The key question, therefore, is where the issue is heading, what risks may emerge if the current situation continues, and what can realistically be done in circumstances where a comprehensive solution is not immediately available.

What Has Changed Since 2017?

In 2017, the Korean Peninsula faced a severe crisis. North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test and launched intercontinental ballistic missiles, while the United States warned of a strong military response. Nevertheless, the United States, China, and Russia still shared a basic understanding that North Korea’s nuclear development posed a serious threat to the international non-proliferation regime. China and Russia joined the remaining members of the Security Council in unanimously adopting Resolutions 2371, 2375, and 2397, which significantly strengthened sanctions against North Korea. [2]

South Korea also maintained channels of communication with Pyongyang and sought to mediate between North Korea and the United States. These efforts contributed to the first US–North Korea summit in 2018. The negotiations ultimately failed, but an international consensus still existed that North Korea’s nuclear development could not simply be ignored.

The conditions in 2026 are substantially different. North Korea no longer treats its nuclear program as a temporary bargaining instrument. It regards nuclear weapons as an irreversible basis of national status and expects any future talks with the United States to proceed on that premise.

Russia’s position has also changed fundamentally. In March 2024, Russia vetoed a draft UN Security Council resolution that would have extended the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts monitoring sanctions implementation and violations. In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and expanded their military and security cooperation.[3] The sanctions remain in force, but a central mechanism for investigating violations has disappeared. Having benefited from North Korean military support in the war in Ukraine, Moscow has little incentive to pressure Pyongyang.

China continues to support peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, political dialogue, and, in its broader official position, denuclearization. It is nevertheless reluctant to support additional sanctions or pressure, viewing the issue increasingly through the wider context of strategic competition with the United States and expanded trilateral security cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Japan.[4]

The United States must simultaneously address Ukraine, the Middle East, and strategic competition with China. Although denuclearization remains an official objective, North Korea has fallen lower on Washington’s list of immediate priorities. President Donald Trump’s personal interest in Kim Jong Un could create an opening for dialogue, but leader-to-leader relations alone cannot resolve a problem that has become far more complex.

North Korea now defines inter-Korean relations as relations between two hostile states. As a consequence, South Korea has seen a significant erosion of the leverage it previously exercised in its role as a mediator. 

The present stalemate therefore reflects not merely an absence of dialogue, but a transformation of the international political structure that once made cooperation possible.

Why Continued Nuclear Expansion Cannot Be Ignored

North Korea has actively exploited these changes. It has gained economic bene-fits and diplomatic support through military cooperation with Russia while maintaining a degree of economic stability through its ties with China. The Bank of Korea estimates that the North Korean economy grew by 3.5 percent in 2025. [5] Although such estimates are necessarily uncertain, they suggest that Pyong-yang is not facing an economic crisis severe enough to compel a return to nego-tiations.

This does not mean that North Korea will remain permanently satisfied with iso-lation. Sustained economic development and industrial modernization will even-tually require broader trade, access to capital and technology, and greater inte-gration into the international economy. North Korea may therefore retain a long-term interest in sanctions relief and improved relations with the United States, even while refusing to relinquish its nuclear weapons.

The longer the international community remains inactive, the greater the risk that North Korea’s nuclear status will come to be treated as an established reality in diplomatic and military planning, even without formal legal recognition. As North Korea gains greater confidence in its nuclear deterrent, it may increasingly view itself not as a weak state in Northeast Asia, but as a strategic power capable of directly challenging the United States. Such confidence could intensify its opposition to the defense policies of South Korea and Japan and encourage Pyongyang to believe that nuclear deterrence provides greater latitude for con-ventional provocations.

At the same time, calls for indigenous nuclear weapons or stronger nuclear-deterrence arrangements are likely to grow in South Korea and Japan. Such de-velopments could provoke responses from China and Russia, encourage further North Korean military expansion, and accelerate a regional arms race. Because Northeast Asia is also home to critical semiconductor and advanced-technology supply chains, persistent military instability could have consequences far be-yond the region, affecting the global economy.

The Real Choice: A Verifiable Freeze or Uncontrolled Expansion

Under present conditions, a comprehensive and immediate solution is difficult to envision. North Korea has no intention of surrendering its nuclear arsenal. The United States has limited capacity to devote sustained diplomatic resources to the issue. Russia has little incentive to encourage negotiations, while China is un-likely to support pressure strong enough to threaten the stability of the North Korean regime.

If the international community merely repeats the objective of complete denu-clearization without pursuing intermediate measures, however, North Korea’s stockpiles of fissile material, warheads, and delivery systems will continue to expand. A policy that preserves its principles in rhetoric while allowing the ac-tual threat to grow cannot be considered successful.

The immediate objective should therefore be to freeze  the further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.

Such a halt would not mean recognizing North Korea as a legitimate nuclear-weapon state or abandoning the goal of denuclearization. Rather, it would con-stitute an interim measure designed to prevent further deterioration, reopen ne-gotiations through verifiable steps, and create a pathway toward eventual reduc-tions and dismantlement.

The objection is obvious: a "freeze" approach could appear to tolerate North Korea’s existing arsenal and provide Pyongyang with additional time to consol-idate its nuclear status. That risk is real. Yet the practical choice today is not be-tween immediate denuclearization and a stop. It is between a verifiable halt and the uncontrolled expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. A situation in which warheads and fissile material continue to increase without agreement or monitoring cannot be safer than one governed by a properly designed and veri-fiable halt.

A Phased and Verifiable Process

A freeze approach to North Korea’s nuclear program should be pursued in stages. An initial agreement could suspend nuclear tests and intercontinental bal-listic missile launches. A subsequent phase could extend the freeze to fissile-material production facilities and place limits on further increases in North Ko-rea’s nuclear arsenal. Later stages could include declarations of nuclear facilities and materials, verification measures, reductions, and ultimately dismantlement.

Verification would be essential. Any agreement would require procedures capa-ble of confirming not only the suspension of tests and missile launches but also the operational status of major facilities involved in the production of nuclear material.

North Korean compliance could be met with phased and reciprocal measures, including humanitarian assistance, limited economic cooperation, temporary suspension of selected sanctions, and steps toward improved political relations. Such measures should be reversible in the event of North Korean violations of the agreement.

South Korea and the United States must uphold denuclearization as the ultimate objective while recognizing the need for intermediate stages. A freeze ap-proach should be jointly designed not as an alternative to denuclearization, but as the beginning of a gradual process leading toward it. 

A Multilateral Approach Involving China and Japan

Creating the conditions for a freeze will require more than simply waiting for direct talks between North Korea and the United States. These two countries re-main the central parties, but neither currently appears ready to invest fully in a serious negotiating process. Neighboring countries should therefore help create an environment conducive to the resumption of talks.

China views North Korea as a strategic buffer and as an asset in its broader competition with the United States. However, the unlimited expansion of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities does not necessarily serve China’s inter-ests. It strengthens the rationale for U.S. alliances, closer trilateral military coop-eration, and more frequent deployments of American strategic assets to North-east Asia. It also increases the risk of nuclear proliferation among China’s neighbors.

It would be unrealistic to expect Beijing to exert severe pressure on Pyongyang solely for the purpose of denuclearization. Nevertheless, South Korea and China share limited but important interests in preventing instability, regional nuclear proliferation, and an uncontrolled arms race. Seoul should demonstrate that con-straining further North Korean nuclear expansion also serves China’s broader security interests.

Japan could provide an additional, though secondary, channel of engagement. The 2002 Japan–DPRK Pyongyang Declaration established principles for re-solving historical and outstanding issues, normalizing diplomatic relations, pro-moting economic cooperation, and addressing nuclear and missile concerns through dialogue. [6] The abduction issue and Japanese domestic politics signif-icantly constrain engagement, but the prospect of normalization and economic cooperation could still provide North Korea with incentives.

South Korea should not view improved Japan–North Korea relations as a threat. Instead, it should use such engagement as another means of reconnecting North Korea with the international community and reducing tensions.

This approach does not require the immediate restoration of a comprehensive multilateral framework. Rather, it would connect overlapping bilateral and mul-tilateral channels involving South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and North Korea. Its purpose would be to halt further nuclear expansion and create conditions under which North Korea could return to negotiations.

A Longer Road May Be the Safer Road

The North Korean nuclear problem is urgent, but it cannot be resolved quickly. Attempting to leap across a chasm where no bridge exists may leave the situa-tion even more dangerous. If complete denuclearization cannot be achieved im-mediately, the international community must identify a longer but more realistic path forward.

South Korea cannot remain passive simply because direct inter-Korean dialogue is currently blocked. It should maintain close coordination with the United States while working with China and Japan to create an external environment in which renewed negotiations become possible.

Denuclearization remains the indispensable ultimate goal. However, the legiti-macy of that objective does not by itself make every pathway toward it realistic. The international community must first halt further nuclear expansion, build confidence through verification and reciprocal measures, and then proceed gradually toward reductions and dismantlement.

A freeze approach to North Korea’s nuclear program is not the destination. It is the entry point through which negotiations can resume. Only by passing through that entrance and traveling a long and difficult road can the international community ultimately reach denuclearization.

[Notes]

1. In June 2026, Kim Yo-jong rejected the G7’s call for North Korea’s denuclearization, de-scribing it as a violation of the country’s sovereignty and constitution. She also character-ized North Korea’s nuclear status as irreversible and non-negotiable. Source: Reuters, “North Korea’s Kim Yo-jong condemns G7 call for denuclearization as violation of sover-eignty,” June 18, 2026 (accessed August 3, 2026).

2. In response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities in 2017, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolutions 2371, 2375, and 2397, imposing increasingly stringent sanctions. Sources: United Nations, “Resolution 2371 press release,” August 5, 2017 (accessed August 3, 2026); United Nations, “Resolution 2375 press release,” Septem-ber 11, 2017 (accessed August 3, 2026); United Nations, “Resolution 2397 press release,” December 22, 2017 (accessed August 3, 2026).

3. In March 2024, Russia vetoed a draft UN Security Council resolution that would have ex-tended the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts supporting the Security Council’s North Ko-rea Sanctions Committee. In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed the Treaty on Com-prehensive Strategic Partnership. Sources: United Nations, “Security Council Fails to Ex-tend Mandate for Expert Panel Assisting Sanctions Committee on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” March 28, 2024 (accessed August 3, 2026); President of Russia, “Rus-sia–DPRK Talks,” June 19, 2024 (accessed August 3, 2026).

4. China continues to emphasize peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and advocate a political settlement of the issue, while its stated policy remains focused on denuclearization and dialogue rather than intensified pressure. Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Nuclear Arms Control,” July 23, 2024 (accessed August 3, 2026); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on May 28, 2026,” (accessed August 3, 2026).

5. The Bank of Korea estimated that North Korea’s real gross domestic product increased by 3.5 percent in 2025. Because North Korea does not publish comprehensive national accounts data, this figure represents an external estimate. Source: Bank of Korea, “Gross Domestic Product Estimates for North Korea in 2025,” July 31, 2026 (accessed August 3, 2026).

6. The 2002 Japan–DPRK Pyongyang Declaration addressed the normalization of relations, historical and outstanding bilateral issues, economic cooperation, regional security, and nu-clear and missile-related concerns. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan–DPRK Pyongyang Declaration,” September 17, 2002 (accessed August 3, 2026).