Proposals for Multilateral Discussions on Ending the War on the Korean Peninsula and Establishing a Peace RegimeJu-yeon Lee Northeast Asian History FoundationAt the ceremony commemorating the 81st anniversary of Liberation Day, President Lee Jae-myung stated, “We will embark on a journey to end the war and transform the unstable armistice regime on the Korean Peninsula into a peace regime,” thereby calling for multilateral discussions aimed at formally ending the war and establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. President Lee also explained that such multilateral discussions could lead to effective measures to halt North Korea’s nuclear development. In other words, he signaled that a multilateral framework could ultimately contribute to achieving both peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.Regarding Lee’s proposal for multilateral discussions, experts have offered both positive and negative assessments. From a positive perspective, such discussions could help break the prolonged deadlock in inter-Korean dialogue and provide a starting point for renewed engagement. Furthermore, the participation of relevant countries could help manage potential crises on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. In particular, given that recent international conflicts have tended to erupt and escalate rapidly, sometimes as a result of miscalculation or unintended developments, multilateral discussions are viewed favorably for their potential to reduce the risk of military conflict.On the other hand, a critical perspective expresses skepticism about the prospects for multilateral talks. This skepticism stems largely from the failure of the Six-Party Talks in the past to produce substantive results, with the negotiations yielding largely declaratory outcomes. Furthermore, there is concern that security instability on the Korean Peninsula could actually worsen if such talks were to face strong opposition from the United States, which has traditionally been South Korea’s principal security partner.However, despite the debate between proponents and critics, the Lee Jae-myung administration’s proposal for multilateral talks can be viewed as having more potential benefits than drawbacks. This is because, among the various approaches to bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table to address issues of peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, a multilateral dialogue framework currently appears to be one of the most promising options.Of course, judging from Unification Minister Jeong Dong-young’s assertion that four-party talks involving South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China should follow the U.S. decision to scale back South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises, and that efforts to promote such talks are necessary, it appears that these four countries would be the principal participants in the proposed multilateral discussions.So, is establishing a consultative mechanism in the form of four-party talks the right approach to advancing peace on the Korean Peninsula? Compared with the Six-Party Talks (South Korea, North Korea, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan) held in the past, the principal advantage of the four-party talks (South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China) is that, with fewer stakeholders involved, the parties would be able to focus on and address the core agenda items more effectively. For instance, organizing a six-party talks would require complex coordination of the schedules of representatives from all six countries, as well as the selection and preparation of a suitable venue, potentially resulting in substantial administrative burdens and costs. Furthermore, reducing the number of stakeholders through a four-party format could make decision-making on key issues more efficient.In particular, if issues such as Japan’s abductee problem are incorporated into the broader agenda, it could become more difficult to maintain a clear focus on peace on the Korean Peninsula. Consequently, if the multilateral discussions pursued by the Lee Jae-myung administration take the form of four-party talks, a negotiating forum could be established relatively quickly, providing a basis for institutionalizing future multilateral discussions and, above all, potentially achieving tangible results more rapidly.While it is true that the four-party format offers significant advantages, the four parties—South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China—would not be sufficient for multilateral discussions aimed at promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula and throughout Northeast Asia. In particular, conducting multilateral discussions without Russia appears inconsistent with the current geopolitical realities of Northeast Asia and the broader international security environment. Of course, as noted earlier, it is difficult to deny that the Six-Party Talks in the past failed to produce tangible results. However, given that Russia–North Korea relations have effectively reached the level of a military alliance amid the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, excluding Russia would significantly constrain efforts to engage North Korea.Furthermore, as the aftermath of the Russia–Ukraine war has deepened divisions within the international community and geopolitical tensions between the South Korea–U.S.–Japan and North Korea–China–Russia alignments have become increasingly entrenched in Northeast Asia, it is necessary to move beyond simply establishing an agenda for peace on the Korean Peninsula and consider creating a consultative mechanism dedicated to peace and stability in the broader Northeast Asian region. From this perspective, including Japan in the multilateral discussions would be more reasonable than excluding it.Of course, there are significant challenges to immediately reconvening the Six-Party Talks under the current circumstances. Above all, given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, establishing a multilateral platform that includes Russia remains highly contentious. Furthermore, with President Putin’s recent visit to the Kuril Islands, Russia–Japan relations appear to be entering an increasingly confrontational phase. In other words, as noted above, establishing a multilateral dialogue framework would itself be extremely difficult under the current circumstances.Therefore, I propose establishing multilateral talks in a phased and gradual manner. First, because restoring a channel of communication with North Korea is of paramount importance, we should initiate dialogue through a four-party format involving South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China. Then, if we succeed in institutionalizing the four-party talks as a regular forum, we should consider expanding the framework into broader multilateral formats, such as “4+1” or “4+2.” In other words, we should distinguish between the four core parties—South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China—and additional participants, such as Russia and Japan, and gradually broaden the framework.There is a Korean proverb that says, “Too many cooks spoil the broth.” In other words, even if the Six-Party Talks are reconvened, they could potentially produce undesirable or counterproductive outcomes. However, another Korean proverb says, “Even a sheet of paper is easier to lift together,” while an African proverb states, “Alone we go fast, but together we go far.” In short, from a long-term perspective, we must establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula—and, by extension, a durable peace and security framework in Northeast Asia—through the creation of a multilateral dialogue framework.

Halting North Korea’s Nuclear Program and Building a Peace Regime on the Korean PeninsulaJong-cheol ParkVisiting Research Fellow Institute for Unification Studies1. President Trump’s Signals for Dialogue and Diplomatic CalculationsWith President Trump recently sending a series of conciliatory messages to North Korea, attention is increasingly focused on the prospects for resuming U.S.-North Korea dialogue. On August 17 (local time), President Trump expressed openness to the possibility of dialogue with North Korea during a question-and-answer session with reporters at the White House. Just one day earlier, he announced that he had instructed the Department of Defense to significantly scale back U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises, citing concerns that they could send the wrong signal to North Korea.On August 15, President Trump posted on social media a photograph of his June 2019 meeting with Chairman Kim Jong-un at Panmunjom. On August 17, he posted a digitally altered image highlighting his positive relationship with Chairman Kim, sending a series of conciliatory signals toward North Korea. These actions can be interpreted as deliberate gestures aimed at creating conditions for the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue.Behind these gestures toward North Korea may also lie a broader calculation aimed at achieving a diplomatic breakthrough. Given the limited diplomatic progress the Trump administration has made in the Russia-Ukraine war and in U.S.-Iran ceasefire negotiations, President Trump may view renewed engagement with North Korea as an opportunity to secure a tangible foreign-policy achievement. In particular, with the U.S. midterm elections approaching in November, there is a possibility that the administration will seek visible diplomatic results on issues related to the Korean Peninsula.2. North Korea’s Advancing Nuclear Capabilities and Evolving StrategyAfter more than three decades of development and negotiations, North Korea is not a nuclear-weapon state recognized under international law, but it is widely assessed to have developed a de facto nuclear weapons capability. For North Korea, nuclear weapons are no longer merely a bargaining instrument but a core component of its strategy for regime survival and national security. Building on its nuclear capabilities, North Korea seeks to reinforce its national identity, enhance its international standing, and secure strategic advantages on the Korean Peninsula.North Korea’s strategy toward South Korea has also undergone a fundamental transformation. Pyongyang has institutionalized a “two hostile states” framework that defines South Korea not as a partner for dialogue and reunification but as a hostile state. This hostile posture has further severed inter-Korean relations and increased instability on the Korean Peninsula. As inter-Korean relations have deteriorated and crisis-management mechanisms have become increasingly ineffective, the risk remains that an accidental military incident could escalate into a broader confrontation.At the same time, North Korea is strengthening its international position by deepening comprehensive military and economic cooperation with Russia while maintaining and expanding its ties with China. Stronger North Korea-Russia relations and continued engagement with China help mitigate Pyongyang’s concerns about international isolation while increasing its leverage in potential negotiations with the United States. Furthermore, North Korea has adopted an approach commonly described as “Engage the U.S., Isolate the South” (tongmi, bongnam), seeking security guarantees and sanctions relief through direct negotiations with Washington while keeping the door to inter-Korean dialogue largely closed.3. Lessons and Outlook for North Korean Nuclear NegotiationsThe U.S.-North Korea summits in Singapore in 2018 and Hanoi in February 2019 provide important lessons for assessing the prospects for future nuclear negotiations. In particular, the Hanoi summit ended without an agreement because the two sides failed to bridge fundamental differences over the scope, sequencing, and reciprocal measures associated with denuclearization. While the United States sought a comprehensive approach to denuclearization, North Korea favored a phased and partial process in which the dismantlement of selected nuclear facilities would be exchanged for sanctions relief.Since the breakdown of the Hanoi summit, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have advanced significantly. Its stockpile of nuclear warheads and fissile materials has grown, its missile capabilities have improved, and the legal and institutional foundations underpinning its nuclear forces have been further developed. As a result, any future negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program will begin under conditions substantially more difficult than those that prevailed in 2018–2019.North Korea now treats its possession of nuclear weapons as an established fact and rejects negotiations premised on immediate denuclearization. At the same time, it is demanding sanctions relief, an end to what it characterizes as U.S. military pressure and hostile policies, the suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, guarantees for regime security, and the normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations.Consequently, even if U.S.-North Korea dialogue resumes, it will be difficult to pursue a comprehensive settlement aimed at immediate and complete denuclearization. A more realistic approach would be to first halt further advances in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, reduce military tensions, and then pursue a gradual process to reduce the nuclear threat.4. Phased Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issue and Transition to a Peace RegimeGiven that North Korea has, in effect, become a nuclear-armed state and that the nuclear issue is intertwined with a range of complex factors—including security concerns, sanctions, regime guarantees, U.S.-North Korea relations, and inter-Korean relations—it will be difficult to resolve the issue in the short term. While maintaining complete denuclearization as the long-term objective, a more realistic strategy would be to first halt further advances in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and then pursue a gradual reduction of the nuclear threat.To this end, a phased roadmap could begin with a suspension of nuclear and missile testing, followed by restrictions on the production of fissile materials, a phased reduction of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, and ultimately complete denuclearization. At each stage, concrete reciprocal measures should be developed that link verifiable North Korean actions with corresponding steps by the United States and other parties, including sanctions relief, reductions in military tensions, security assurances, and the normalization of relations.The key variable in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is the state of U.S.-North Korea relations. Without meaningful progress in dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang, it will be difficult to achieve a breakthrough on the nuclear issue or advance a durable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. U.S.-North Korea dialogue should serve as an entry point for broader peace-building efforts, while inter-Korean dialogue can help mediate, broaden, and institutionalize this process. South Korea should play the role of a “pace-setter” by helping create an environment conducive to U.S.-North Korea negotiations while simultaneously restoring inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation, thereby ensuring that improvements in U.S.-North Korea relations contribute to stability and peace across the Korean Peninsula.Furthermore, efforts to address the North Korean nuclear issue and transition toward a peace regime should proceed in parallel. The two processes are closely interconnected. A virtuous cycle should be established in which progress on the nuclear issue generates momentum toward a peace regime, while progress toward a peace regime reduces North Korea’s security concerns and thereby creates more favorable conditions for addressing the nuclear issue.5. South Korea’s RoleIn this context, it is noteworthy that President Lee Jae-myung highlighted the need for effective measures to halt the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and to advance the transition toward a peace regime in his August 15 commemorative address. This reflects the need for a pragmatic approach that, while maintaining the ultimate objective of complete denuclearization, first addresses the immediate and growing nuclear threat and links its reduction to the broader process of establishing a peace regime.South Korea should use major diplomatic opportunities—including the United Nations General Assembly in September and the APEC Summit in China in November—to strengthen strategic communication and policy coordination with relevant countries. By building greater consensus among major powers, including the United States and China, Seoul should seek to create a diplomatic environment conducive to halting further advances in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, facilitating the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue, and advancing discussions on a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.Ultimately, South Korea’s national strategy should pursue two complementary objectives: substantially reducing the North Korean nuclear threat and institutionalizing peace on the Korean Peninsula. Because a complete resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue will likely require a prolonged process, the immediate priority should be to manage and contain the nuclear threat while establishing institutional mechanisms to reduce the risk of military conflict and accidental escalation. Through such an approach, South Korea can reduce geopolitical risks on the Korean Peninsula and build a more stable strategic environment conducive to sustainable peace, security, and national development.

The Excellence of K-Defense: Lessons from the Ukraine CaseHyungsuk KimAdjunct ProfessorGraduate School of Defense ScienceHansung University1. IntroductionThe world is running short of interceptor missiles. Reuters reported on August 7, 2026, that the United States had already consumed roughly 65 percent of its Patriot interceptor stockpile during that year alone.[1] Conditions elsewhere are no better. The U.S. Army has nearly exhausted its stocks of long-range strike missiles, including ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) and PrSM (Precision Strike Missile), while South Korean industry reports indicate that Patriot and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) inventories have declined by more than 60 percent.[2] Armin Papperger, chief executive of Germany’s Rheinmetall, estimates that rebuilding allied inventories to normal levels will take at least two years.[2]The fact that the country with the world’s largest defense budget cannot resupply itself quickly enough is more than a procurement problem. It raises a harder question: What does modern warfare actually demand of an air defense system, and how many nations are capable of meeting that demand?This paper addresses that question using daily strike data from the Russia-Ukraine air war, covering the period from September 28, 2022, through August 14, 2026. The analysis proceeds in four steps. It first establishes what a sustained war of attrition requires of air defenses. It then identifies which types of attacks defeat those defenses. Next, it explains why so few countries can supply what is needed. Finally, it shows how Korea has already demonstrated, in practice, that it can.2. The Math of AttritionThe figures used throughout this paper come from a publicly available dataset that compiles the daily engagement reports issued by the Air Force Command and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.[8] These are operational reports rather than audited statistics, and the author has reorganized them by weapon type, year, and individual salvo. They should therefore be understood as indicative of scale and trends rather than as official accounting.On that basis, more than 134,000 missiles and drones have been launched against Ukraine since the war began, and the annual volume has risen steeply. Ukraine recorded 1,157 launches in 2022, 4,815 in 2023, and 14,112 in 2024. By 2025, the figure had reached 58,777—roughly 50 times the 2022 total—and the 2026 count stood at 55,579 by mid-August. Figure 1 plots this growth against the intercept rate achieved specifically against ballistic missiles, and the divergence between the two lines is the central finding of this paper.Figure 1. Attack Volume and Ballistic Missile Intercept Rate: 2022-2026Volume alone, however, understates the problem because intercept performance varies enormously by threat type. Table 1 sets out the cumulative record. Ukrainian defenses stopped 76.5 percent of Shahed-type loitering munitions and 72.0 percent of cruise missiles, but only 21.1 percent of ballistic missiles. In other words, these defenses cope reasonably well with cheap, high-volume threats but remain structurally weak against the fastest and most demanding ones. The final row of the table exceeds the sum of the rows above it because several minor categories, including guided bombs and a small number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, are not listed separately.Table 1. Intercept Rates by Weapon Type: September 28, 2022 - August 14, 2026Nor has this weakness eased over time. As Figure 1 shows, the ballistic missile intercept rate fell from 46.2 percent in 2023 to 16.8 percent in 2024, recovered modestly to 24.0 percent in 2025, and slipped again to 9.6 percent in 2026. Over a period in which attack volume grew nearly fiftyfold, performance against the most dangerous class of weapon did not improve; it merely fluctuated. One conclusion follows directly: current interceptor supplies cannot keep pace with sustained, high-intensity warfare.3. What Kinds of Attacks Defeat Air DefensesThe aggregate figures conceal a sharper pattern that emerges only when individual salvos are examined. The dataset separately records fourteen attacks involving multiple missile types, and sorting these salvos by composition reveals the contrast shown in Table 2.Table 2. Intercept Rates for Combined Salvos by CompositionThe difference is striking. When Russia combined cruise and air-launched weapons such as the Kh-101, the Kalibr, and the Iskander-K, Ukrainian defenses intercepted 88.4 percent of the incoming rounds. That is a higher rate than either category achieved on its own. When ballistic missiles were added to the mix, however, the intercept rate collapsed to 37.2 percent, and in two of those salvos, not a single round was stopped.The lesson is not that combined attacks are inherently harder to defeat. Rather, it is that the presence of ballistic missiles, rather than the mixing itself, is what breaks through a defense. Fourteen salvos is admittedly a small sample, and the percentages should be interpreted with that in mind, but the direction of the result is consistent with the cumulative figures in Table 1.A second pattern reinforces the point. Ballistic missiles fired in ones and twos were intercepted only 8.5 percent of the time, whereas salvos of eleven or more were intercepted at a rate of 34.5 percent. This may appear counterintuitive, but the likely explanation is straightforward: large salvos are typically directed at Kyiv and other population centers where interceptor batteries are concentrated, while isolated launches often strike locations outside dedicated ballistic missile defense coverage. Capability alone, therefore, does not determine outcomes. Coverage and magazine depth do.The identity of the missiles involved gives this analysis particular significance for the Korean Peninsula. Table 3 breaks down the ballistic missile total by type, and the third and fourth rows deserve close attention. Ukrainian reporting uses the compound designation Iskander-M/KN-23 when Russian and North Korean short-range ballistic missiles cannot be distinguished from one another, and the KN-23 is a North Korean weapon. Taken together with the rounds identified as KN-23 outright, 372 of the 1,204 ballistic missiles fired at Ukraine—roughly three in ten—belong to a category in which a North Korean weapon may be involved. Against a defense network built around Patriot, those rounds were intercepted about a quarter of the time.Table 3.  Ballistic Missile Intercept Rates by TypeThat table describes the same class of weapon that Korean air defenses were built to counter, and this is where South Korea’s position differs from that of most other producers. For other countries, defeating short-range ballistic missiles is one requirement among many. For Korea, it has been the organizing principle of air-defense development for decades. Cheongung-II, Cheongung-III, and L-SAM were not designed for an export market and later adapted to address this threat. They were designed specifically to counter this threat, and the market followed.4. The Bottleneck Is Industrial, Not FinancialIf the demand is now clear, the obvious response would be to build more interceptors. The Patriot shortage shows why that is harder than it sounds—and why the constraint is industrial rather than financial.In September 2025, the U.S. Army awarded Lockheed Martin a multi-year contract worth $9.8 billion for 1,970 PAC-3 MSE (Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement) interceptors, the system’s principal interceptor, and followed it in April 2026 with a further $4.7 billion to accelerate production. Together, these awards aim to more than triple annual production capacity, from roughly 600 missiles to about 2,000. Yet Lockheed Martin increased production by only 60 percent over the preceding two years, reaching a record 620 missiles in 2025. At that rate, the new target remains distant.[1]Efforts to widen the industrial base have encountered the same obstacle. A plan to raise U.S. interceptor production from about 500 to more than 750 missiles a year by expanding licensed production in Japan stalled because of a shortage of seeker units supplied by Boeing. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries builds roughly 30 PAC-3 rounds a year and could, in principle, double that figure, but it was unable to do so while the seeker bottleneck persisted.[3]The implication is uncomfortable. When the country with the world’s largest defense budget and deepest industrial base cannot expand output on demand because of a single constrained component, the capacity to build advanced weapons quickly, reliably, and at scale is genuinely scarce. Competitiveness in air defense is therefore not a matter of technology alone. It requires design capability, stable production lines, a resilient supplier network, and close coordination among government, the military, and industry, all operating together and at speed. Few countries possess all four.5. What South Korea Has Demonstrated: Precision, Speed, and ScaleSouth Korea is one of the few countries that has recently demonstrated that it can.Precision. In March 2026, an assessment by Ahmed Sharif, a military analyst in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), attracted wide attention. Sharif reported that during the opening days of the U.S.-Iran conflict, Iran launched 137 missiles at targets in the UAE, including American bases, and that the country’s layered air defense network destroyed 132 of them, an intercept rate of 96 percent. Including drones, the network stopped 327 of 346 incoming weapons, or 95 percent.[4]That network comprises Patriot, THAAD, Israel’s Arrow, and South Korea’s Cheongung-II, a medium-range system also designated M-SAM (Medium-range Surface-to-Air Missile). The 96 percent figure therefore describes the combined performance of all four systems, not that of Cheongung-II alone, although some South Korean outlets have since reported it as a measure of the Korean system’s performance by itself.[5] The distinction matters for accuracy, but it does not diminish the underlying point. This marked the first combat employment of a South Korean-exported weapon system, and evidence from actual combat carries a weight that no brochure can match.South Korea is building on that result. Cheongung-III, a successor designed to engage ballistic missiles at higher altitudes, entered development under a 2025 contract with the Defense Acquisition Program Administration,[5] while L-SAM (Long-range Surface-to-Air Missile) is being fielded as the upper tier of a layered architecture. Read against Section 3, the purpose of that architecture is unmistakable: the layer South Korea is now building is precisely the one that failed in Ukraine.Speed. South Korea’s K9 howitzer program in Poland offers the clearest illustration. Poland signed an initial contract for 212 K9A1 howitzers with Hanwha Aerospace in August 2022, and the first 24 units arrived just four months later, in December of that year.[7] Meeting that schedule owed less to factory capacity than to the ability of government, the military, and industry to operate as a single team.[6] Poland has since expanded its order to 364 units across two contracts, establishing the K9 as a mainstay of its artillery force, with provision for as many as 672 units under the original framework agreement.[7]Scale. Cheongung-II has generated approximately $9.5 billion in cumulative export orders for South Korea.[5] The UAE signed the first major contract in January 2022, worth about $3.5 billion for ten batteries, followed by Saudi Arabia and Iraq with agreements worth roughly $2.9 billion and $2.6 billion, respectively.[4] Negotiations with Qatar and Kuwait could add close to $2 billion more.[5] Taken together, these are not the marks of a single fortunate sale but evidence of a durable industrial capability.Precision, speed, and scale—each demonstrated in combat or delivery records rather than in projections—are capabilities that few countries can claim to possess.6. Beyond Arms Sales: Toward Genuine PartnershipThe logical next step for South Korea is not a series of one-off transactions but lasting partnerships, and the Poland program already indicates the form they should take. Immediate requirements are met with finished systems built in Korea. Local production, MRO (maintenance, repair, and overhaul) cooperation, and progressive supply-chain localization then follow in sequence.[6][7]This model does more than serve the customer. It addresses the structural problem identified in Section 4 because distributing production across more countries reduces the risk that a single national bottleneck can leave the world short of air defense systems.Such partnerships complement the U.S.-led alliance supply system rather than competing with it. Where American industry cannot meet demand in sufficient volume or within the required timeframe, Korea can, drawing on proven performance and rapid production. The benefit extends beyond any single buyer, since a more diversified supplier base makes allied deterrence more resilient as a whole.7. ConclusionThree findings converge. Modern attrition warfare demands volume, speed, and precision simultaneously, and the Ukrainian record shows what happens when that demand goes unmet—above all against ballistic missiles and where coverage is thin. Very few countries can close that gap. Even the world’s largest defense budget is currently constrained by an industrial base that cannot be expanded on demand.South Korea belongs to that small group, and not merely by an accident of timing. The systems now drawing interest abroad were developed to address the most demanding version of the problem described by the Ukrainian data, and they are produced by an industrial base that has repeatedly delivered at speed and scale. Combat performance in the Gulf, deliveries to Poland within four months of the initial contract, and a $9.5 billion order book are three independent measures of the same underlying capability.What follows is a question of role rather than capacity. The world is not short of air defense designs; it is short of producers able to build them in the quantities and on the timelines that sustained conflict now requires. Korea has demonstrated that it can. For allied nations seeking to strengthen and diversify their air defense capabilities, the partner they are looking for is already in the field.[1] "Patriot Missile Shortage Deepens As Global Demand Outpaces Interceptor Production," TheDefenseWatch.com, August 8, 2026 (citing Reuters, August 7, 2026; includes PAC-3 MSE contract values and production-capacity figures). https://thedefensewatch.com/military-ordnance/patriot-missile-shortage-interceptor-production/[2] Kim Hyun-jung, "US Missile Stockpiles Running Low: Korean Defense Firms Fill the Global Supply Gap," MTN (Money Today Broadcasting), August 11, 2026. https://v.daum.net/v/20260811060706009[3] Vadim Kushnikov, "U.S. Patriot Missile Production Hampered by Boeing Component Shortage," Militarnyi, July 21, 2024 (citing Reuters). https://militarnyi.com/en/news/u-s-patriot-missile-production-hampered-by-boeing-component-shortage/[4] Jung Han-gyeol, "Korean-Made Cheongung-II, Exported to the UAE, Intercepts Iranian Missiles in First Combat Use," Money Today, March 3, 2026. Won-denominated contract values converted at approximately 1,450 won to the dollar. https://www.mt.co.kr/politics/2026/03/03/2026030319073899508[5] Kim Ji-hyun, "'A Surprising Hit Rate': Cheongung-II Draws Growing Interest After $9.5 Billion in Exports," Money Today, June 27, 2026 (updated August 11, 2026). https://www.mt.co.kr/industry/2026/06/27/2026062613402352093[6] Kang Eun-ho (Professor, Jeonbuk National University; former Commissioner, Defense Acquisition Program Administration), "Poland Surprised by Rapid K9 Deliveries: 'A True Defense Partner'," Hankook Ilbo, August 11, 2026. https://www.hankookilbo.com/news/article/A2026081014290002438[7] Yoon Tae-hee, "'364 Korean K9s': Poland's Emergency Purchase Becomes Its Main Artillery," Now News (Seoul Sinmun), July 6, 2026. https://nownews.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20260706601006[8] Petro Ivaniuk, "Massive Missile Attacks on Ukraine" (Kaggle dataset, compiled from daily reports of the Air Force Command and General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine), version accessed August 15, 2026. https://www.kaggle.com/datasets/piterfm/massive-missile-attacks-on-ukraine 

North Korea’s Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Peace on the Korean Peninsula: AI, Asymmetric Strategy, and Deterrence Stability                    Hee-soo YoonSenior ResearcherInstitute for Unification and PeaceSeoul National UniversityFrom Declaration to Plan: The Legacy of the 9th Party CongressAt the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in February 2026, North Korea identified intelligent weapons systems—including “various AI-enabled unmanned attack complexes”—as key priorities under its five-year national defense development plan. The regime also claimed that artificial intelligence had been incorporated into the 600-millimeter multiple rocket launcher unveiled shortly before the Party Congress. These developments are difficult to dismiss as a one-time demonstration of technological capability. In 2024, Kim Jong-un ordered the integration of artificial intelligence into unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). During his inspection of the Unmanned Aerial Technology Complex in March 2025, he designated unmanned systems and artificial intelligence as “sectors that must be given top priority and developed” as part of the modernization of the armed forces. Since 2024, Rodong Sinmun has repeatedly cited foreign assessments characterizing artificial intelligence as the “third revolution” in military affairs, following gunpowder and nuclear weapons.The key issue is the degree of institutional and strategic consolidation that has already taken place. As political discourse, institutional arrangements, and defense planning have advanced at different rates, the 9th Party Congress effectively formalized these developments within the framework of national planning. The fact that these ambitions have been incorporated into a formal plan suggests that they will be accompanied by resource allocation and organizational restructuring. It also means that progress over the coming years is likely to become increasingly observable.How this development is interpreted will shape the parameters of the policy response. If North Korea’s efforts are viewed primarily as an attempt to close a technological gap, the response may focus largely on managing that gap. But North Korea’s militarization of artificial intelligence is better understood as the latest technological manifestation of a strategic logic that has evolved over decades to compensate for its structural inferiority in conventional military power. If that assessment is correct, the appropriate response must be strategic rather than merely technological.Why AI? The Technological Extension of Asymmetric StrategyA central principle of asymmetric warfare is that material superiority does not, by itself, determine the outcome of a conflict. A weaker state can offset an adversary’s superior capabilities by targeting its vulnerabilities, increasing the costs of military action, and employing strategies that exploit asymmetries in the way each side conducts warfare. North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, missiles, and cyber capabilities as the Korean People’s Army’s three principal asymmetric capabilities is broadly consistent with this logic.It is important, therefore, not to misunderstand the role of artificial intelligence in this context. For a relatively weaker state, AI does not necessarily represent an entirely new category of military capability. Rather, it functions as a “force multiplier” that can improve the effectiveness of existing asymmetric capabilities while increasing operational ambiguity. This amplification operates through at least three mechanisms.The first is cost-effectiveness. Low-cost unmanned systems can generate favorable exchange ratios when employed against much more expensive conventional platforms. The second is greater accessibility. The proliferation of commercial drones, sensors, and open-source AI models enables states to develop capabilities in selected areas without possessing a sophisticated indigenous defense-industrial base. The third is a potential shift in the escalation threshold. AI-enabled cyber operations and unmanned aerial systems can complicate attribution and make it more difficult to determine an adversary’s intent, thereby creating greater opportunities for low-intensity activity in the gray zone.Debates over autonomous weapons systems have traditionally focused on the capabilities and risks associated with technologically advanced states. Yet similar concerns arise when actors seek to maximize asymmetric effects by combining relatively inexpensive commercial technologies. Recent scholarship has increasingly shifted its focus from the question of “who possesses the most advanced models” to the question of “who can select and combine the most effective capabilities under resource constraints.” This dynamic is particularly relevant to North Korea, where severe resource limitations may actually encourage the selective adoption of low-cost, high-efficiency technologies.Cyber, Unmanned Systems, and Nuclear Command and Control: Three Dimensions of IntegrationIn the cyber domain, North Korea maintains a substantial operational force distributed across organizations such as Unit 121 of the Reconnaissance General Bureau and the Command Automation Bureau of the General Staff Department. Its strategic objectives can broadly be understood as compensating for conventional military weaknesses, generating coercive leverage at relatively low cost, and earning foreign currency in an environment of international sanctions.The qualitative dimension of these capabilities is changing as they become increasingly integrated with artificial intelligence. Numerous reports have documented the use of generative AI to automate phishing content, create deepfakes for identity spoofing, facilitate fraudulent remote IT employment schemes, and provide real-time AI assistance during infiltration attempts. The $1.5 billion in cryptocurrency reportedly stolen in the February 2025 Bybit hack, together with estimates that North Korean cyber operations generate approximately $2 billion annually in cryptocurrency-related theft, suggests that these activities should not be viewed simply as isolated criminal enterprises. Rather, they appear increasingly integrated into a broader system for generating revenue outside the formal international financial system—a kind of “shadow state treasury” designed in part to circumvent sanctions.AI can further enhance the efficiency of what lies at the core of asymmetric cyber strategy: exploiting vulnerabilities. It can expand the scale of attacks, make it easier to evade detection, and increase the credibility and sophistication of social-engineering operations.In the domain of unmanned systems, progress has continued since the 8th Party Congress in 2021, when the intelligent transformation and unmanned modernization of military equipment were identified as priorities under the Five-Year Plan for the Development of Defense Science and Technology. In March 2025, North Korean state media reported that Kim Jong-un had observed performance tests involving “AI-enabled” suicide and reconnaissance drones. Publicly released footage showed suicide drones striking simulated targets resembling South Korean L-SAM launchers, K1 tanks, and U.S. Stryker armored vehicles. This raises the possibility that some of these systems incorporate rudimentary target-recognition capabilities based on visual or shape recognition.The asymmetric value of AI-enabled drones lies partly in the unfavorable cost-exchange ratio they can impose on the defender. Large-scale deployment of relatively inexpensive drones can force the defending side to expend substantially more expensive interceptor systems. If autonomous navigation and target recognition become feasible even in environments where satellite navigation is degraded or jammed, some of the U.S.-Korea alliance’s advantages in electronic warfare could be partially offset. North Korea’s reported acquisition of counter-drone and electronic-warfare tactics through its involvement on the Ukrainian battlefield adds another variable to this assessment.The area with potentially the most serious strategic implications is nuclear command and control (NC2). According to an internal North Korean military directive reportedly obtained in August 2025, the General Staff instructed the Strategic Forces to develop a phased plan for an AI-based integrated management system covering the storage, deployment, and command of nuclear weapons, as well as nuclear counterstrikes.Such a concept is rational within the logic of asymmetric deterrence. One of the principal vulnerabilities of North Korea’s nuclear posture is its potential exposure to decapitation strikes. If a retaliatory capability could be exercised without direct intervention from the leadership, the regime could strengthen its confidence in the credibility of assured retaliation. At the same time, however, such automation introduces a classic “out-of-the-loop” risk: a communications failure, sensor malfunction, or erroneous warning could be misinterpreted as evidence of a decapitation strike and potentially trigger premature nuclear use.These three areas are closely connected to a fourth dimension: internal political control. The collection of behavioral data through the Kwangmyong Network, the deployment of facial-recognition systems at airports and railway stations, and the accumulation of biometric information across the population as North Korea moves toward electronic identification systems rely on technological foundations similar to those supporting the regime’s external intelligence and military operations.This convergence suggests that North Korea’s AI strategy may serve a dual purpose: strengthening the regime’s internal resilience and expanding its asymmetric military capabilities externally. The same data, algorithms, and technological infrastructure can potentially support both functions.Between Intent and Capability: Neither Overestimating nor Underestimating the ThreatOverestimating North Korea’s capabilities can itself generate policy errors. Of the three basic components of AI development—algorithms, data, and computing resources—North Korea faces particularly significant constraints in computing capacity and electricity supply. Export controls on advanced semiconductors restrict its access to high-performance computing resources, while its limited domestic ICT manufacturing capacity means that it remains dependent on external sources for servers, networking equipment, and other critical infrastructure.As of 2020, North Korea’s total electricity generation was less than 5 percent of South Korea’s, making it difficult for the country to maintain the reliable power infrastructure required for sustained large-scale AI training. Accordingly, publicly reported North Korean AI research appears to place considerable emphasis on algorithmic optimization as a means of reducing the impact of infrastructure constraints. Examples include multi-object tracking, lightweight speech synthesis, and intonation recognition.This approach reflects an effort to convert structural constraints into asymmetric technological adaptation. At the same time, it makes external assessment more difficult because the actual performance and operational maturity of these systems are often difficult to independently verify.At this stage, it is therefore reasonable to characterize North Korea’s military AI capabilities as entering a phase in which strategic intent is being formalized while partial capabilities are being accumulated. Yet the incompleteness of those capabilities should not be mistaken for an absence of risk.The very articulation of an intention to integrate AI into nuclear command and control can function as a strategic signal. It has implications for how North Korea perceives the ROK-U.S. alliance’s Kill Chain concept and can complicate allied deterrence calculations even before such systems achieve full operational deployment.Moreover, the potential transfer of automation, deception, and unmanned-systems technologies from Russia, combined with North Korea’s ability to exploit logistics, financial, and technology channels through China and other intermediaries, could accelerate the transition from experimentation to operational capability.The central policy challenge, therefore, is to avoid two opposing errors: underestimating North Korea’s ability to adapt emerging technologies for asymmetric purposes and overestimating the maturity of its underlying AI capabilities. The more consequential question is not whether North Korea can immediately match the most advanced AI powers. It is whether Pyongyang can selectively integrate relatively inexpensive AI-enabled technologies into its existing nuclear, cyber, and unmanned-warfare capabilities in ways that alter the strategic balance.If the answer is yes, the implications for deterrence stability on the Korean Peninsula are substantial. The policy response should consequently focus not only on maintaining technological superiority but also on preserving crisis stability, strengthening resilience against AI-enabled attacks, establishing clear communication mechanisms, and ensuring that greater automation does not inadvertently lower the threshold for military escalation.In this sense, North Korea’s military adoption of artificial intelligence should be understood less as an isolated technological development than as an extension of its longstanding asymmetric strategy. The central challenge for South Korea and the United States is to ensure that technological innovation does not undermine the fundamental objective of deterrence: preventing conflict while preserving the ability to manage crises before they escalate beyond control.How Is Deterrence Being Undermined?The challenges posed by North Korea’s integration of artificial intelligence into its military capabilities can be summarized in three distinct but mutually reinforcing ways. The most immediate challenge is the growing uncertainty surrounding attribution. If AI enables the automation of critical stages of an attack while minimizing identifiable human involvement, the “cost-benefit calculation of a rational actor”—a fundamental premise of retaliatory deterrence—can break down when attribution becomes uncertain or impossible.The second challenge is the destabilization of the escalation ladder. When the pace of military decision-making accelerates beyond the capacity of human decision-makers to fully assess available information, the risk that an accidental or unintended incident will rapidly escalate to higher levels increases. This risk is particularly acute on the Korean Peninsula, where limited strategic depth leaves decision-makers little time to distinguish between deliberate attacks, accidents, and false alarms. Moreover, excessive reliance on advanced technologies could gradually alter perceptions of nuclear weapons, which have traditionally served primarily political and psychological deterrent functions, by making them appear more usable as military instruments. Such a development could progressively weaken the normative barriers against nuclear use.The third challenge is a deepening asymmetry in deterrence. South Korea and the United States may be required to develop increasingly sophisticated and costly defensive capabilities, while North Korea could impose significant pressure on those capabilities through relatively inexpensive technologies. Under such conditions, the possibility of an “attacker’s advantage” cannot be dismissed. It is important to recognize, however, that these three challenges do not operate independently. Uncertainty over attribution can undermine the ability to manage escalation, while escalation risks can increase the costs of defense and thereby further deepen the asymmetry in deterrence. This structural interdependence lies at the core of the challenge posed by North Korea’s military adoption of AI.A Timeline for Response: Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term PrioritiesIn the short term, the most urgent priorities are to rebalance the cost-exchange ratio and expand the range of early-warning indicators. The current model of relying on high-cost interceptor systems to counter relatively inexpensive drones is unlikely to be sustainable over the long term. South Korea and the United States should seek to lower the cost of defense through a layered combination of lower-cost interception capabilities, AI-enabled detection and identification, electronic warfare, and directed-energy systems.At the same time, the allies should establish mechanisms for identifying emerging capabilities before they reach operational maturity. North Korea’s research and development trends in video and audio AI, advances in lightweight algorithms, and efforts to secure computing resources and critical components through alternative procurement channels could serve as early-warning indicators for adjusting sanctions enforcement, export controls, and supply-chain monitoring.In the medium term, the analytical and policy focus should shift from individual weapons systems to the underlying functions they perform, while attribution capabilities appropriate to the AI era should be institutionalized. As long as North Korea’s AI-enabled capabilities rely on common functions across cyber operations, unmanned systems, and command and control—including target identification, automated intrusion, and decision-support functions—a response architecture divided strictly by operational domain will leave significant structural vulnerabilities.What is required is an integrated assessment framework capable of treating these capabilities as interconnected components of a broader threat ecosystem. Moreover, effective retaliatory deterrence depends on rapid, credible, and reliable attribution. Expanding ROK-U.S. joint cyber exercises, strengthening real-time intelligence- and information-sharing mechanisms, and deepening cooperation with the private cybersecurity sector would help strengthen the technical foundations of credible deterrence.In the long term, two broader questions will become increasingly important: South Korea’s role in shaping international norms and the degree of strategic autonomy it can realistically maintain. Although an international consensus is emerging that human judgment should not be displaced in decisions concerning the use of nuclear weapons, the more subtle and systemic risks created by integrating AI throughout command-and-control architectures have received comparatively less attention. These risks include the possibility that AI-mediated information flows could distort a national leader’s situational awareness or compress the time available for deliberation during a crisis.South Korea therefore has an opportunity to participate in these debates not merely as a rule-taker or beneficiary of emerging norms, but as an agenda-setter. At the same time, strategic autonomy in AI should be understood realistically. For middle powers that cannot fully secure independent access to data, computing capacity, advanced semiconductors, and critical digital infrastructure, pursuing technological self-reliance can easily become another form of external dependence.Just as North Korea is developing asymmetric capabilities while relying to varying degrees on Chinese and Russian technology, infrastructure, and procurement networks, South Korea is also embedded in—and therefore exposed to—the technological ecosystems of major powers. Strategic resilience will consequently require not isolation from those ecosystems, but greater diversification, redundancy, and the capacity to make independent decisions within them.From Managing the Environment to Shaping ItNorth Korea’s militarization of AI is not simply a question of the performance of individual weapons systems. It represents a potential challenge to the underlying structure of deterrence itself. Because AI-enabled capabilities may begin to alter an adversary’s strategic calculations before they achieve full operational maturity, there is little justification for waiting until these technologies are fully deployed before developing an appropriate response.At the same time, an excessive response based on an inflated assessment of North Korea’s capabilities could lead to inefficient resource allocation, unnecessary escalation, and an avoidable arms competition. What is required instead is a calibrated approach that continuously assesses the gap between North Korea’s strategic intentions and its actual capabilities and adjusts the intensity of the response accordingly.More fundamentally, however, the nature of the response must evolve. A reactive, management-oriented strategy that responds to technological developments only after they emerge will struggle to address the next generation of capabilities developing in the gray zone between conventional conflict and peacetime competition.South Korea should therefore move beyond simply managing the technological environment created by others. It should acknowledge the realities of external technological dependence while developing its own clearly defined response frameworks, operational guidelines, and long-term roadmaps. At the same time, Seoul should seek to contribute actively to the development of international norms governing deterrence, crisis management, human control, and the responsible use of AI in military affairs.Only by combining technological resilience with strategic initiative can South Korea move from managing the emerging security environment to helping shape it.

The San Francisco AI Declaration: New Horizons for the U.S.-Korea Alliance in an Era of Technological Competition                    Eui-haeng ChoSeoul Theological UniversityThe global economy is undergoing a profound structural transformation. Free trade and market-driven efficiency—once the defining principles of globalization—are being reshaped by fragmented value chains, geopolitical tensions, and intensifying competition among nations for leadership in critical and emerging technologies. Today, economic security is inseparable from national security, while securing strategic technology supply chains and shaping global technology standards have emerged as critical challenges with direct implications for national resilience and competitiveness.Amid intensifying U.S.-China competition over leadership in the global artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced technology ecosystem, the recently announced “San Francisco AI Declaration” carries significant strategic, economic, and geopolitical implications. The declaration goes beyond articulating a vision for future technologies. It points toward a new economic paradigm for the AI era in which technology, industry, data, energy, and international cooperation are increasingly interconnected within a single, complex global supply-chain ecosystem.The relationship between the United States—which remains at the forefront of global technological innovation—and South Korea—which possesses formidable manufacturing and production capabilities—must now move beyond its traditional focus on defense and security, as well as conventional trade and investment. The U.S.-Korea alliance should evolve into a comprehensive economic security and digital-industrial partnership that jointly strengthens supply chains for strategic industries—including semiconductors, shipbuilding, and AI—while promoting greater interoperability among digital regulations, infrastructure, and industrial ecosystems.1. The Limits of Catch-Up Strategies in Frontier Technologies: The Case for a Real-World AI HubIn the global AI ecosystem, the United States and China enjoy substantial advantages based on their access to massive pools of capital, proprietary frontier AI models, vast amounts of data, and highly skilled technical talent. Against this backdrop, if middle powers focus primarily on quantitative catch-up strategies—such as attempting to replicate large language models (LLMs) or competing solely on algorithmic development—they risk incurring enormous costs while potentially undermining the areas in which they possess genuine comparative advantages.The distinctive value of the San Francisco AI Declaration lies in its effort to connect South Korea’s world-class manufacturing capabilities and advanced semiconductor production base with its broader AI strategy. The AI revolution extends well beyond software development. Its success will increasingly depend on access to large-scale computing capacity, the integration of data centers and energy infrastructure, and the ability to deploy AI rapidly across the physical economy.The most pragmatic and effective economic strategy is therefore to position South Korea as a global AI collaboration platform and hub capable of developing and supplying “Physical AI” technologies and the hardware infrastructure required to support next-generation AI. This can be achieved by leveraging Korea’s world-class memory semiconductor capabilities, high-speed digital infrastructure, and extensive advanced manufacturing base.South Korea’s institutional agility and highly developed digital environment also provide an attractive testbed for global companies seeking to validate AI technologies in real-world commercial and public-sector settings. A demand-driven strategy that accelerates AI adoption across society—including manufacturing, logistics, public administration, education, healthcare, and social services—could substantially increase the dynamism and scale of Korea’s AI ecosystem.2. Preventing the Concentration of AI-Driven Growth and Building a Sustainable AI-Based SocietyThe productivity gains and economic benefits generated by AI also carry the risk of creating new forms of economic concentration, particularly if the gains from technological development accrue disproportionately to a small number of dominant platform companies or other market incumbents. Excessive economic concentration can weaken institutional checks and balances, exacerbate social inequality, and create conditions that undermine political pluralism and democratic resilience. If the benefits of AI are not broadly distributed across society, the long-term social and economic value generated by technological progress will inevitably be diminished.Accordingly, the concept of an “AI-Based Society” emphasized in the declaration can serve as an important institutional framework for mitigating the adverse effects of economic concentration and ensuring that the benefits of AI-driven growth are broadly shared. An “AI-Based Society” should function as a universal framework that ensures that differences in access to AI technologies—and in the ability to use and benefit from them—do not become new sources of discrimination or inequality.This requires robust guarantees of basic rights and opportunities, including access to education and healthcare, while ensuring that no segment of society—including small and medium-sized enterprises, small business owners, and vulnerable populations—is left behind. Such an approach is essential not only for preventing excessive economic concentration but also for preserving political pluralism, social cohesion, and democratic resilience.This framework is also consistent with the broader goal of international cooperation to develop responsible, trustworthy, and human-centered AI. The international community must guard against the excessive concentration of AI capabilities in the hands of a small number of countries or large corporations, which could create significant asymmetries of power. It must also address the risks associated with the use of automated systems in high-stakes decision-making, including military operations. Establishing international norms grounded in the principle of the common good will therefore be essential to ensuring that AI remains subject to appropriate human oversight and accountability.3. U.S.-Korea Strategic Partnership for Revitalizing Manufacturing and Integrating Technology EcosystemsThe United States needs reliable technology and manufacturing partners as it seeks to revitalize its advanced manufacturing base and realign global supply chains to enhance resilience and strategic security. By combining U.S. strengths in basic science, research and development (R&D), and software with South Korea’s manufacturing and production capabilities, the two countries can build more resilient supply chains capable of withstanding geopolitical and economic shocks.In the semiconductor sector, technological security should be strengthened by establishing mutually reinforcing production and supply chains for high-performance memory and AI semiconductors, both of which are essential to AI data centers and advanced computing infrastructure. In advanced manufacturing sectors such as shipbuilding and steel, cooperation with South Korea—given its highly developed industrial infrastructure, engineering expertise, and advanced manufacturing capabilities—can contribute to the revitalization of U.S. manufacturing capacity while strengthening broader economic and national security.At the same time, meeting the enormous energy requirements of AI will require parallel cooperation in next-generation nuclear power, clean energy, and critical-mineral supply chains, with a particular emphasis on diversification and resilience.However, there are clear limitations to an approach that measures U.S.-Korea industrial cooperation primarily in terms of headline investment figures or the number of production facilities established in the United States. Genuine supply-chain resilience and industrial competitiveness require a comprehensive operational framework that extends beyond investment to include the exchange of specialized personnel, technological interoperability, data and certification systems, and stronger linkages between the defense and commercial industrial bases.At the same time, both governments should work to minimize the policy uncertainty and compliance costs that companies face during the restructuring of global supply chains. As trade and investment rules become increasingly complex—including local-content requirements, rules of origin, subsidy eligibility criteria, and restrictions on foreign investment—close U.S.-Korea policy coordination will be essential to reducing business risks. The two governments should also promote greater transparency and nondiscriminatory treatment of cross-border data flows.4. Expanding the U.S.-Korea Alliance into a Comprehensive Industrial and Digital PartnershipThe ROK-U.S. alliance has historically functioned primarily as a military and defense partnership designed to preserve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. In an era defined increasingly by technological competition, however, the alliance must expand beyond its traditional role and evolve into a broader framework for cooperation in AI, digital infrastructure, and strategic industrial technologies.Consistent with the vision outlined in the San Francisco AI Declaration, South Korea should not remain merely a consumer of advanced technologies or a contract manufacturing base. Rather, it should position itself as an indispensable provider of critical infrastructure for the global AI ecosystem and as a global testbed for demonstrating and validating the real-world value of emerging technologies.The United States, for its part, should recognize South Korea’s manufacturing capabilities and broader technology ecosystem as those of a trusted, strategic, and increasingly indispensable partner. This will require reducing unnecessary regulatory barriers and developing a digital cooperation framework that facilitates the movement of talent, data, technology, and investment between the two countries.If South Korea and the United States establish close strategic cooperation across the full spectrum of digital and strategic industries—including AI, semiconductors, shipbuilding, and energy—while maintaining the alliance’s traditional security foundation, the two countries can better withstand global supply-chain disruptions while advancing the shared objectives of economic prosperity and technological security.Strengthening a U.S.-Korea digital and industrial alliance by combining the complementary capabilities of both countries is not simply an economic opportunity. It is a strategic imperative in an era of global value-chain restructuring and intensifying technological competition.

In an Era of Two Koreas, Coexistence Must Precede UnificationJin-Tae HwangProfessor of North Korean StudiesDongguk UniversityNorth Korea’s “hostile two-state theory” has fundamentally challenged a long-standing premise of inter-Korean relations. In late 2023, Kim Jong Un defined inter-Korean relations not as a special relationship between compatriots pursuing unification, but as a relationship between “two hostile states, two states at war.” Since then, North Korea has reorganized institutions and policies related to unification and has increasingly defined South Korea as a hostile state, reshaping its national identity and inter-Korean policy accordingly. This should be understood not simply as a tougher policy toward South Korea, but as a broader effort to institutionalize relations with South Korea as those between two separate states.How, then, should South Korea respond? This does not mean that Seoul should simply accept North Korea’s hostile two-state doctrine. Nor is it sufficient to continue repeating the unification paradigm of the past. What is needed instead is to prepare for coexistence between the two Koreas, taking seriously the possibility that their separation into two states may persist for the foreseeable future. In this regard, the experience of Romania and Moldova offers a useful point of reference.Cooperation Without UnificationRomania and Moldova share a history, language, and cultural traditions. Yet following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moldova became an independent state, and the two countries developed as separate sovereign states. Political separation, however, did not mean a complete rupture of their historical and cultural ties.Romania quickly recognized Moldova’s independence and established diplomatic relations. Since then, the two countries have built institutional foundations for cooperation in areas including investment, transportation, aviation, and railways. At the same time, they have maintained their historical and cultural connections through Romanian-language education, scholarships, and cultural programs.What is particularly noteworthy is that the two countries did not have to resolve the question of unification before developing cooperation. Political debate over unification with Romania continues in Moldova. Yet regardless of whether unification occurs, the two countries have expanded cooperation in areas such as the economy, infrastructure, energy, and education. Following Romania’s accession to the European Union, their relationship further evolved, with Romania supporting Moldova’s European integration. In the energy sector, the two countries have also worked to connect their gas infrastructure, helping Moldova reduce its dependence on Russian energy.The important lesson is that sharing a common history and identity does not necessarily require two countries to become one. Conversely, being separate sovereign states does not make cooperation impossible. A shared identity and separate statehood can coexist. This is an important point for rethinking inter-Korean relations.Until now, inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation have largely been understood as steps toward unification. Inter-Korean dialogue, economic cooperation, and humanitarian exchanges have often been justified as stages in the broader process of national reunification. But as North Korea rejects this very paradigm of unification and emphasizes its separate statehood, it is becoming increasingly difficult to envision the future of inter-Korean relations through the existing framework alone.Does cooperation become impossible if unification is no longer the ultimate goal? The experience of Romania and Moldova suggests otherwise. If political and constitutional questions are separated from functional cooperation, it is possible to build a dense network of cooperation between two states even without agreement on unification.South Korea’s North Korea Policy Should Treat Coexistence as a Goal in Its Own RightThis offers a first lesson for South Korea: unification and coexistence do not necessarily have to be placed on the same timeline. Unification can remain one possible long-term future for Korean society. But when and how it might occur is difficult to predict. By contrast, the possibility that the two Koreas will continue to exist as separate political communities for a considerable period is one that policymakers must realistically take into account. The task, therefore, is not to do nothing until unification becomes possible, but to manage relations between the two Koreas and reduce the risks of war and conflict in the meantime.Peaceful coexistence should therefore be established as a distinct policy goal, rather than treated merely as a subordinate objective of unification.Coexistence does not mean recognizing or endorsing North Korea’s political system, nor does it mean accepting its hostile two-state doctrine. Rather, it is a pragmatic strategy for managing conflict and preventing confrontation so that two political communities with different political systems and state identities can coexist over an extended period.From this perspective, the success of inter-Korean relations need not be measured solely by how much closer the two Koreas have moved toward unification. It should also be measured by how effectively they have reduced the risk of military conflict, addressed humanitarian issues, cooperated on environmental and disaster-related challenges, and established institutions capable of maintaining communication during times of crisis.Institutionalizing Practical Areas of CooperationA second priority is to institutionalize practical forms of cooperation that can continue to function regardless of changes in political relations. One reason inter-Korean relations have repeatedly swung between engagement and rupture is that cooperation itself has been overly dependent on the broader political relationship. When summits and political agreements have led to improvements in relations, cooperation has expanded; when relations have deteriorated, most exchanges have been suspended.The experience of Romania and Moldova points to a different possibility. Even while political disagreements and differences over history and identity have remained unresolved, the two countries have steadily developed practical institutions for cooperation in education, infrastructure, energy, the economy, and culture. The key is not that their disagreements have disappeared, but that they have managed, to some extent, to separate areas of conflict from areas of cooperation.A similar approach is needed between the two Koreas. Climate change and natural-disaster response, forests and the environment, infectious diseases and public health, food security, and humanitarian assistance are areas in which both sides have tangible interests while remaining relatively removed from ideological and systemic competition. Floods and droughts in North Korea and the degradation of its forests, for example, are not problems that can be regarded as entirely unrelated to South Korea. Cooperation in these areas should not be treated as an agenda to be pursued only after inter-Korean relations improve. Instead, the necessary institutional infrastructure should be prepared in advance so that cooperation can function even when political relations are strained.When direct political dialogue between the two Koreas is difficult, international organizations and multilateral frameworks could also provide alternative channels. The suspension of bilateral relations does not necessarily mean that all possibilities for cooperation must disappear.In the Era of the Hostile Two-State Doctrine, South Korea Needs a New Grammar of RelationsOf course, the experience of Romania and Moldova cannot simply be transplanted onto the Korean Peninsula. The historical processes through which the two countries became separate states and the international environments in which they developed are very different from those of the two Koreas. The Korean Peninsula remains divided after more than seven decades of military confrontation, while North Korea’s nuclear weapons program adds another layer of complexity. The strategic interests of major powers, including the United States, China, Russia, and Japan, are also deeply intertwined with inter-Korean relations. For these reasons, the Romanian-Moldovan experience should not be replicated as a policy model for the Korean Peninsula.Its importance lies elsewhere: it expands the range of possibilities through which we can think about the future of inter-Korean relations.Until now, the future of the two Koreas has often been presented as a choice between two alternatives: unification or confrontation. Yet there is a third possibility—two states that remain separate for an extended period while developing practical forms of cooperation. This is institutionalized coexistence.North Korea’s hostile two-state doctrine poses a serious challenge to the traditional unification paradigm. But it need not necessarily be interpreted as a declaration of permanent hostility. North Korea’s current policy does not determine every possibility for the future. Its approach toward South Korea has changed in response to domestic politics and the international environment. There is therefore no reason to assume that the current state of hostility will last forever. The more important question is what we prepare for in the meantime.Preparing for unification and preparing for coexistence are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, building institutions for long-term coexistence may also be essential for preserving the possibility of future unification. If channels of communication remain open, mechanisms for crisis management are in place, and the two sides accumulate experience in addressing shared problems, they will have greater room to respond to future political changes.South Korea’s North Korea policy should therefore move beyond the binary of unification and division in the era of the hostile two-state doctrine. It should acknowledge the reality of two separate states without normalizing hostility; recognize different political systems without closing the door to cooperation; and keep the possibility of unification open without treating coexistence merely as a waiting period on the road to it.The most important lesson that Romania and Moldova offer South Korea is not a model for achieving unification, but a way of managing separation while building institutions for coexistence.In an era of two Koreas, that is what South Korea must prepare for before unification.

An Assessment of the “Prioritize Halting North Korea’s Nuclear Program” Approach                    Seung-hyun LeeDankook UniversityUnification Minister Chung Dong-young recently proposed a “peace-first” approach and a strategy that prioritizes halting the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear program as the guiding direction for the South Korean government’s North Korea policy. At a press conference held shortly before the first anniversary of his appointment, Minister Chung stated, “We have effectively moved away from the previous administration’s ‘denuclearization first’ approach and CVID (Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Denuclearization) and shifted toward a ‘peace-first’ approach,” adding that “we are working to develop a strategy that prioritizes halting North Korea’s nuclear program under a peace-first framework.”Emphasizing the reality that North Korea’s nuclear buildup continues, he asked, “Can we afford to keep postponing action and losing valuable time?” Minister Chung’s central concern is that, with dialogue with North Korea currently suspended, making denuclearization a precondition for dialogue could make it difficult for negotiations to begin in the first place. He has argued that both the United States and China have, in practice, moved away from a strictly “denuclearization first” approach and that restoring dialogue with North Korea should be the immediate priority.President Lee Jae-myung’s proposed phased approach of “suspension–reduction–elimination” is consistent with this framework. President Lee has advocated a pragmatic approach that would first halt further advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, followed by a process of reduction and, ultimately, elimination. He has noted that simply preventing the further production of nuclear materials and the continued development of ICBM technology would itself represent a meaningful contribution to international security.This proposal raises an important question: If complete denuclearization of North Korea is not realistically achievable in the near term, can halting the further expansion of its nuclear capabilities serve as a practical starting point on the path toward denuclearization? This question lies at the heart of the debate over an approach that prioritizes halting North Korea’s nuclear program.Between the Goal of Denuclearization and RealityThe international community’s stated long-term objective regarding the North Korean nuclear issue remains complete denuclearization. There is, however, a significant gap between this objective and the current reality. North Korea views its nuclear weapons not as temporary bargaining instruments but as a core component of its national security and regime-survival strategy. It is also intensifying efforts to institutionalize its status as a nuclear-armed state. At the same time, the international community, including the United States and South Korea, continues to uphold the principle that North Korea cannot be formally recognized as a nuclear-weapon state.The fundamental problem is that, while these positions remain deeply at odds, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continue to expand. In the past, the international community largely pursued a framework of “rewards in exchange for denuclearization.” Under this approach, economic and diplomatic benefits would be provided in return for the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program. Yet North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continued to advance even during periods when negotiations were suspended or had stalled.What may therefore be required is not a change in the ultimate objective of denuclearization, but a reconsideration of the sequencing and strategy for achieving that objective. The central question is which approach is more realistic: continuing to demand complete dismantlement while North Korea’s nuclear weapons and fissile-material stockpiles grow in the absence of negotiations, or first halting the further expansion of its nuclear capabilities and then proceeding incrementally toward reduction and dismantlement. The argument for prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program begins from this premise.To properly assess this approach, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by “halting” North Korea’s nuclear program. It cannot simply mean refraining from conducting additional nuclear tests. The central objective would be to constrain the further production of nuclear weapons and fissile material and prevent both the quantitative and qualitative expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.In practical terms, the proposal would involve resuming negotiations with immediate objectives such as suspending further nuclear tests, halting additional production of fissile material, preventing the transfer or export of such materials, and constraining further development of ICBM capabilities. In other words, “suspension” should not be understood as a single measure, but rather as a set of measures designed to halt the ongoing expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and thereby contain the growth of the nuclear threat.The principal practical advantage of this approach is that it could prevent the problem from becoming more severe. Even if the complete elimination of North Korea’s existing nuclear arsenal is not immediately feasible, it may still be possible to limit the amount of fissile material and the number of nuclear warheads that North Korea can produce in the future.If the production of fissile material continues unchecked, the number of North Korean nuclear warheads is likely to increase. If the development of delivery systems proceeds unchecked, North Korea’s nuclear strike capabilities will likewise become more sophisticated. Conversely, if further production of fissile material and the continued development of nuclear weapons systems can be constrained, the pace at which the threat expands can at least be slowed.This is also significant from a military perspective. If the growth of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities can be halted, South Korea and the United States would gain greater visibility into the scale of the future threat they face. Greater predictability could reduce the risk of miscalculation, inadvertent escalation, and disproportionate responses. From this perspective, prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program should be viewed not simply as a diplomatic compromise, but as a strategic risk-reduction and stabilization measure.At the same time, this approach raises a critical question: What should be done with the nuclear weapons and fissile materials North Korea already possesses? Critics argue that simply halting further production while allowing North Korea to retain its existing arsenal could amount to tacitly accepting its status as a nuclear-armed state.This concern cannot be dismissed. If North Korea were to treat “suspension” as an end in itself rather than as a temporary measure leading toward denuclearization, the outcome could actually be counterproductive. The suspension of North Korea’s nuclear program therefore cannot be regarded as the ultimate objective.Instead, suspension must be explicitly linked to subsequent steps. Once the production of fissile material is halted, declaration and verification should follow. Thereafter, the reduction of fissile-material stocks and nuclear warheads should begin. Ultimately, the process should lead to the dismantlement of nuclear facilities and the elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, clear policy objectives and timelines must be established for what constitutes “suspension.” Suspension should be a condition for advancing to the next stage, rather than an endpoint in itself.Another critical question concerns North Korea’s willingness to accept such an approach. North Korea has repeatedly stated that it will not accept denuclearization as a precondition for negotiations. Instead, it has defined its nuclear forces as a core element of national security and has increasingly sought to consolidate its status as a nuclear-weapon state. Against this backdrop, it remains uncertain whether Pyongyang would accept the concept of “suspending its nuclear capabilities as the first step toward denuclearization.” Even if North Korea were to agree to a suspension, it would likely interpret such an arrangement not as the first step toward denuclearization, but as the beginning of an arms-control process based on mutual nuclear constraints.This is precisely where the greatest challenge in negotiations with North Korea lies. If South Korea and the United States envision a sequence of “suspension → reduction → elimination,” while North Korea envisions “recognition of its nuclear status → arms control → improved relations,” the two sides could sit at the same negotiating table while pursuing fundamentally different end states. Accordingly, if the South Korean government intends to pursue a strategy that prioritizes halting North Korea’s nuclear program, it must also carefully consider how Pyongyang is likely to interpret and respond to the proposal.Simply persuading North Korea will not be sufficient. The objective should be to create conditions under which North Korea calculates that halting the expansion of its nuclear capabilities at a defined level and improving relations with the international community would better serve its interests than pursuing an open-ended nuclear buildup.A central concern within the international community is whether “a freeze would effectively amount to recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status.” This question, however, should also be considered from another perspective. The realistic choices facing the international community are not necessarily limited to “immediate and complete denuclearization” on the one hand and “a prior suspension of North Korea’s nuclear program” on the other. If the current negotiating deadlock continues, North Korea may continue expanding its nuclear capabilities without any agreement, verification mechanism, or meaningful constraints. In that circumstance, the practical choice may increasingly be between a verifiable limitation on the growth of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and their continued unchecked expansion. It is difficult to argue that the latter would produce a safer Korean Peninsula or a more stable international security environment.If North Korea’s nuclear arsenal continues to grow, pressure on South Korea and Japan to strengthen their own military capabilities will increase. The United States would face growing demands to reinforce extended deterrence, while China and Russia could also adjust their security postures in response. The result could be an intensifying arms race across Northeast Asia. The strategic significance of prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program lies precisely in its potential to interrupt this cycle of action and reaction.We should also broaden our perspective on the North Korean nuclear issue. It is no longer solely an inter-Korean issue. The expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is closely connected to the ROK-U.S. alliance, the U.S.-Japan alliance, China’s regional security strategy, and Russia’s strategy in the Far East. In particular, as military cooperation between North Korea and Russia deepens, North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities are becoming increasingly relevant to both European and Indo-Pacific security.Accordingly, the argument for prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program should be developed not merely as a proposal for improving security on the Korean Peninsula, but as a broader strategy for reducing international nuclear risks and strengthening strategic stability. Halting the further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities could reduce military risks on the Korean Peninsula, limit incentives for nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia, mitigate potentially destabilizing arms competition among regional powers, and help preserve the credibility of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.From this perspective, prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program becomes a policy approach of broader international significance, rather than simply another North Korea policy. For such an approach to succeed, a strong strategic consensus between South Korea and the United States will be essential. Seoul must maintain the ultimate objective of denuclearization while working with Washington to establish a shared understanding of a phased and realistic pathway toward that objective. This is why recent discussions between South Korean and U.S. leaders on the North Korean nuclear issue are particularly important.The United States, too, cannot ignore the reality that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have already reached a significant level. A new approach is needed to determine how negotiations can be restarted while preserving the principle of complete denuclearization. South Korea’s role should not be to dilute the U.S. commitment to denuclearization, but to propose a negotiating framework within which that principle can be pursued in practice.A strategy that prioritizes halting North Korea’s nuclear program is unlikely to succeed through U.S.-North Korea negotiations alone. China retains considerable influence over North Korea, while Japan possesses important potential economic leverage through the prospect of normalizing relations with Pyongyang and expanding economic engagement. South Korea should therefore leverage a broad range of diplomatic channels, including those with China and Japan, while anchoring these efforts in close coordination with the United States.Seoul should explain to Beijing that an unconstrained North Korean nuclear buildup could accelerate an arms race and increase the risk of nuclear proliferation across Northeast Asia. With respect to Japan, South Korea can emphasize that improved Japan-North Korea relations and expanded economic cooperation could provide additional incentives for Pyongyang to modify its behavior.Viewed from this broader perspective, prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program is not merely a proposal for U.S.-North Korea negotiations. It can serve as a regional risk-reduction strategy designed to improve strategic stability across Northeast Asia.The argument for prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program is not an argument for abandoning denuclearization. Rather, it reflects a practical consideration of how to make the goal of denuclearization viable once again under current conditions. For the sake of peace on the Korean Peninsula, strategic stability in Northeast Asia, and the integrity of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, what is needed now is not to wait for a perfect solution, but to prevent risks from escalating further. First, halt; then verify; then reduce; and ultimately, dismantle. A serious consideration of the “priority halt” approach to North Korea’s nuclear program should begin with this premise.

The $950 Billion Digital Agreement and the U.S.-ROK Digital Alliance               Ki-ho HanResearch professorAjou Institute of Unification StudiesThe New Geopolitical Landscape of Big Tech: The G2 BifurcationThe global technology ecosystem is no longer governed primarily by market mechanisms; instead, it has become a central arena for geopolitical and macroeconomic competition. At the heart of this systemic shift lies the multidimensional rivalry between the United States and China. Driven by the imperative to secure its industrial and defense supply chains and preserve technological primacy, Washington has deployed a formidable array of stringent export controls, domestic manufacturing incentives and requirements, and exclusive minilateral frameworks. Concurrently, Beijing is pursuing a strategy of extensive vertical integration through state-backed initiatives, directing substantial public capital toward the development of indigenous large language models, quantum computing, and mature-node semiconductor technologies.This G2 technological bifurcation has fundamentally altered the strategic calculations of middle-power technology economies. Artificial intelligence and advanced semiconductor technologies are no longer merely commercial commodities; they have become dual-use technologies and foundational pillars of contemporary national power. In this increasingly fragmented and nationalistic digital landscape, isolation has become increasingly synonymous with strategic obsolescence. For an advanced technology hub like South Korea, navigating this volatile environment requires an unprecedented degree of diplomatic agility—specifically, the capacity to leverage existing transpacific frameworks while avoiding becoming caught in the geopolitical crossfire. It is within this precarious context that the bilateral relationship must be fundamentally redefined, moving beyond a traditional military deterrence framework toward a comprehensive, legally grounded economic-security partnership.The San Francisco AI Declaration: A $950 Billion MilestoneThe recent state visit to the United States by South Korean President Lee Jae-myung culminated in a significant development that could reshape the global digital landscape for years to come. Anchored by the “San Francisco AI Declaration,” Seoul and Washington unveiled an unprecedented $950 billion framework for cooperation in AI and semiconductors. This strategic initiative would deepen the two countries’ longstanding military partnership by expanding cooperation into a more integrated and forward-looking technological relationship. Far from being a symbolic memorandum of understanding, the accord brings together substantial private-sector commitments and government-supported initiatives designed to strengthen both countries’ positions across the global AI supply chain.The scale of this industrial mobilization encompasses multiple layers of the digital economy. In the semiconductor and foundry sectors, Samsung Electronics and Broadcom formalized a strategic $200 billion framework focused on next-generation memory integration and advanced foundry development. At the same time, SK hynix secured a historic $500 billion long-term agreement with NVIDIA, establishing a substantial pipeline for high-bandwidth memory (HBM) and next-generation AI accelerators.This hardware cooperation is complemented by major investments in infrastructure and applications. Consortia from both countries pledged to develop more than 5 gigawatts of aggregate data-center capacity, deploying approximately 2 million advanced NVIDIA B200 GPUs. Within this framework, SK Telecom is partnering with NVIDIA and Amazon Web Services to accelerate the development of regional gigawatt-scale computing centers, while Naver secured a $10 billion joint initiative, backed by Brookfield Asset Management, to develop global “AI factories” expanding from Asia into Europe. In addition, Hyundai Motor Group and NVIDIA announced the creation of a standardized Robot Reference Platform to support physical-AI innovation, alongside collaborations with Waymo on autonomous-vehicle technologies. To strengthen the talent pipeline, Samsung SDS and Anthropic entered into a strategic partnership to jointly develop thousands of enterprise-grade AI engineers capable of supporting the growth of next-generation enterprise software markets.The Strategic Calculus of InterdependenceFor the United States, this broad partnership could help address a critical, long-standing strategic vulnerability: the separation of software innovation from hardware manufacturing. While Silicon Valley remains a global center of algorithmic innovation, software development, and venture capital, the United States faces constraints in the domestic manufacturing capacity needed to support the hardware-intensive expansion of generative AI. By integrating South Korea’s substantial semiconductor fabrication capabilities and advanced foundry expertise more closely into its technology ecosystem, Washington can strengthen the resilience of its hardware supply base and reduce its exposure to external supply disruptions.Conversely, the agreement could provide South Korea with enhanced access to the world’s largest technology market, expanded sources of capital, and advanced AI software and computing technologies. This deeper integration could help Korean companies secure more reliable access to critical computing resources, including high-performance GPUs, while reducing their exposure to supply-chain bottlenecks. By participating in the development of next-generation chips and shared gigawatt-scale data centers, South Korea could move further up the global value chain—from a major component and manufacturing base toward a more integrated role in the global AI ecosystem. This would create a mutually reinforcing relationship in which American AI software and Korean semiconductor manufacturing capabilities become increasingly interconnected.The Pitfalls of Asymmetry: Avoiding Technological SubjugationHowever, any rigorous analysis of this landmark agreement requires an objective assessment of its inherent systemic risks. While the narrative of a shared digital partnership may be diplomatically appealing, the significant asymmetry in power between a global superpower and a middle-power technology economy cannot be ignored. Historically, when a middle-sized technological power integrates its core industrial capabilities too closely with those of a dominant superpower, it risks becoming vulnerable to the transactional dynamics of great-power competition. For South Korea, the ultimate concern is that the $950 billion agreement could inadvertently evolve into a source of excessive economic dependence, gradually constraining the autonomy of domestic companies and limiting Seoul’s strategic room for maneuver.The primary area of risk lies in the potential erosion of South Korea’s hard-earned “digital sovereignty” and its domestic AI capabilities. South Korea is among the relatively small number of countries that have developed and maintained indigenous search engines, localized large language models, and major digital platforms that operate independently of U.S.-based technology companies. If cooperation with American technology companies is structured without appropriate legal and institutional safeguards, Korean firms could risk becoming increasingly concentrated in lower-margin manufacturing roles—effectively becoming the “foundry workers” of the AI era—while the higher-margin, intellectual-property-intensive algorithmic layer becomes increasingly dominated by U.S. companies.Furthermore, the principles of genuine economic security require that South Korea’s corporate expertise and accumulated industrial capabilities not be systematically transferred under the guise of “joint R&D” or supply-chain transparency requirements. There is a very fine line between reciprocal technology exchange and the gradual erosion of a country’s core industrial competencies. If Seoul accommodates Washington’s expanding regulatory requirements or export-control measures without adequate safeguards, Korean companies could see their strategic autonomy constrained. This could limit their ability to engage freely with alternative global markets and pursue an independent technological trajectory consistent with South Korea’s national interests.Conclusion: Charting a Path Toward True ReciprocityThe U.S.-Korea digital partnership, catalyzed by President Lee Jae-myung’s San Francisco AI Declaration, represents a significant opportunity to deepen bilateral cooperation and reshape the countries’ roles in the global technology ecosystem. It could help both countries strengthen the resilience of their technology supply chains, accelerate innovation in areas such as physical AI, and contribute to the development of shared standards for safe and equitable technological development. Yet the long-term success of this partnership will depend on how it is implemented. It should be governed by clear principles of mutual respect, reciprocal benefit, and appropriate safeguards for each country’s technological capabilities and strategic interests.To prevent this relationship from evolving into a condition of structural technological dependence, South Korean policymakers and corporate leaders should pursue a sophisticated dual-track strategy. They should deepen cooperation with U.S. capital markets and software ecosystems while simultaneously safeguarding the country’s proprietary data, domestic AI capabilities, and supply-chain resilience. Washington, too, should recognize that a strong, independent, and economically vibrant South Korea is a more valuable and sustainable partner than one that becomes excessively dependent on U.S. technology and markets. Only when both countries engage as mutually indispensable partners, with their respective interests and strategic autonomy respected, can this digital partnership fulfill its potential as a foundation for long-term stability and innovation.

The Evolution of Freedom Shield and the Future of the ROK–U.S. Alliance: Lessons from the Past Two Years and Future Challenges               Euilim JinAssociate Research FellowKorea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA)1. IntroductionOn July 1, the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that preparations for the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise, scheduled for August, were proceeding as planned.⑴Although the announcement was brief and issued in response to reports that a high-level meeting between ROK and U.S. military officials had been postponed, its message was clear: preparations for the annual combined exercise remain on schedule, and close coordination between the two allies continues.ROK–U.S. combined military exercises are a cornerstone of the alliance’s deterrence posture, serving both to prevent conflict on the Korean Peninsula and to maintain the readiness required to conduct combined military operations in the event of a contingency.⑵ By integrating computer-simulated Command Post Exercises (CPX) with Field Training Exercises (FTX), these exercises enable the ROK–U.S. Combined Forces to validate their capability to conduct theater-level operations across multiple domains, including land, maritime, air, space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum. Ibid. As recurring alliance activities, they demonstrate the credibility of the combined defense posture while strengthening alliance cohesion and enhancing interoperability.In particular, Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS), conducted during the second half of each year, integrates the ROK government’s national emergency preparedness exercise, Ulchi, with the ROK–U.S. combined military exercise, Freedom Shield (FS). Over time, both the scale and operational complexity of UFS have steadily expanded. This year’s UFS is scheduled to begin with a Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) on August 11, followed by the main exercise phase.⑶ Against this backdrop, this paper examines the evolution of ROK–U.S. combined exercises—including UFS—over the past two years, evaluates their key achievements, and explores the role of UFS in shaping the future development of the ROK–U.S. alliance.2. Assessment and Recent Changes in ROK–U.S. Joint ExercisesA review of ROK–U.S. combined exercises over the past two years indicates that these activities have evolved beyond routine annual training events, adapting systematically to a changing security environment. Rather than relying on fixed exercise structures, the allies have continuously refined exercise objectives, scenarios, and operational priorities to address emerging threats and strengthen combined readiness.The 2024 UFS exercise focused on responding to North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities by incorporating scenarios involving missile attacks, GPS jamming, cyber operations, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Field training exercises were significantly expanded, while the participation of additional United Nations Command (UNC) member states further strengthened the exercise’s multinational dimension. Overall, the 2024 UFS enhanced operational proficiency through expanded field maneuver training and improved the allies’ ability to respond comprehensively to complex, multidomain provocations. In addition, monitoring by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) reaffirmed that the exercise was conducted in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, underscoring its longstanding annual and defensive nature.⑷The 2025 UFS further enhanced operational realism by incorporating lessons from recent conflicts into its exercise scenarios while conducting integrated combined and joint operations across the land, maritime, air, space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum domains. In addition, the United Nations Command facilitated the direct participation of personnel from several member states. The exercise strengthened the alliance’s combined deterrence and defense posture by validating its ability to conduct multidomain operations in response to evolving security challenges. Although the overall scale of the exercise remained comparable to previous years, 20 of the 40 planned field training exercises were postponed and conducted at a later date.⑸Most recently, the 2026 Freedom Shield (FS) exercise emphasized enhancing operational realism by incorporating lessons learned from ongoing conflicts into exercise scenarios while validating combined operational readiness. ROK and U.S. military authorities assessed that the exercise marked an important milestone in advancing preparations for the conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) in accordance with bilateral agreements between the two governments.⑹Taken together, recent combined exercises reveal several notable trends.First, the scope of these exercises has expanded significantly. Emerging operational domains—including space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum—have become integral components of exercise planning, while evolving battlefield challenges, such as unmanned aerial systems, have been incorporated into training scenarios. This reflects a sustained effort to align alliance training with the increasingly multidomain character of modern warfare.Second, the participation of United Nations Command member states, together with oversight by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, demonstrates that UFS has evolved beyond a purely bilateral ROK–U.S. exercise into one with a broader multinational dimension. At the same time, these mechanisms reinforce the exercise’s longstanding annual schedule and its fundamentally defensive character.Third, recent combined exercises have increasingly incorporated procedures to assess and validate progress toward the conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control. This development reflects the evolution of alliance exercises from merely demonstrating combined defensive readiness to serving as a practical mechanism for preparing and validating the future ROK–U.S. combined defense architecture.3. The Evolution of the ROK–U.S. Alliance and UFSROK–U.S. combined exercises constitute one of the alliance’s most enduring institutional mechanisms, supporting a security partnership that has been sustained for more than seven decades. Through decades of recurring combined training, the allies have developed and reinforced critical capabilities, including operational interoperability, institutional trust, and combined readiness. As discussed above, Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) has not remained a static exercise; rather, it has continuously evolved in response to changes in the regional security environment and the growing complexity of North Korea’s military threats, while strengthening deterrence and defense on the Korean Peninsula.The evolution of UFS has been driven primarily by shifts in the strategic environment both on and beyond the Korean Peninsula. Recent changes in U.S. strategic guidance, together with lessons drawn from contemporary conflicts, have further highlighted the importance of ROK–U.S. combined exercises and the need for their continued adaptation. Historically, the primary mission of the ROK–U.S. Combined Forces has been to deter North Korean aggression and defend the Korean Peninsula. However, as recent U.S. strategic guidance places greater emphasis on broader regional missions—including strategic competition with China, potential contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, and the protection of critical maritime lines of communication—policy discussions have increasingly examined whether the operational role of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) could expand accordingly.⑺At the same time, preparations for the conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) have entered a more advanced phase. As this process progresses, the ROK and the United States are entering a new period of alliance adaptation, requiring both governments and their militaries to adjust their combined defense posture in response to an evolving strategic environment while preserving the alliance’s core mission.These developments also present new challenges for UFS. As U.S. defense strategy continues to evolve and the transition toward conditions-based OPCON proceeds, future exercises will need to adapt their operational scenarios, force employment concepts, and training objectives accordingly. At the same time, UFS must remain firmly anchored in its fundamental purpose: maintaining a credible combined deterrence and defense posture on the Korean Peninsula.Looking ahead, it is important to emphasize that the ultimate purpose of UFS is not to prepare for war for its own sake, but to prevent conflict through credible deterrence and sustained military readiness. Strong deterrence and effective tension management on the Korean Peninsula are complementary—not competing—objectives. As the strategic environment continues to evolve, policymakers and military planners must continue to assess how ROK–U.S. combined exercises can best adapt to emerging security challenges while remaining a cornerstone of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and a central pillar of the future ROK–U.S. alliance.⑴ Su-ju Park, “South Korean and U.S. Military Authorities: ‘Preparations for August Joint Exercise UFS Proceeding as Planned,’” Yonhap News TV, July 2, 2026.⑵ Su-on Choi, “The Strategic Value and Policy Considerations of ROK–U.S. Joint Exercises,” Security Strategy FOCUS, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, January 15, 2026.⑶ Gyu-jin Shin, “ROK–U.S. ‘Freedom Shield’ Exercise Set to Proceed with Reduced Field Maneuvers,” Dong-A Ilbo, July 22, 2026.⑷ Jang-wook Lee, “Achievements and Future Tasks of the 2024 ROK–U.S. Joint Exercise ‘Freedom Shield (UFS),’” ROK Angle, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, September 10, 2024.⑸ Hyun-ho Lee, “ROK–U.S. Combined 2025 UFS Exercise Concludes… Some Field Maneuver Training Postponed to Next Month,” Seoul Economic Daily, August 28, 2025.⑹ U.S. Forces Korea and Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint ROK–U.S. Briefing on the 2026 FS Exercise,” February 25, 2026.⑺ Yonhap News, “Trump’s New Indo-Pacific Strategy: Selective and Focused on Taiwan… Will Demands for South Korea’s Role Intensify?” December 6, 2025.

Moving Beyond Disputes toward a Future-Oriented Partnership: Korea–U.S. Digital Trade Issues               Hongyeol KimPh.D. in Information SociologyAdjunct ProfessorDuksung Women's University IntroductionDigital technology is rapidly reshaping the global economic system and transforming the traditional paradigm of international trade, simultaneously creating vast new markets while generating increasingly complex conflicts of interest. Whereas trade disputes in the past largely revolved around tangible goods and tariff barriers, today's major conflicts increasingly concern borderless data flows, platform dominance, and control over digital infrastructure across borders and industries. These developments are unfolding worldwide and are closely intertwined with intensifying competition for technological leadership among nations, as well as a growing emphasis on advancing national interests.Countries around the world now face a critical historical moment. They must address domestic digital challenges in a forward-looking manner to protect the rights and interests of their citizens, strengthen data sovereignty, and promote the development of future-oriented strategic industries. At the same time, they must resolve sensitive digital disputes with major trading partners in ways that advance the mutual interests of all parties involved.This challenge is becoming increasingly evident in relations between South Korea and the United States, two countries that have long maintained a strong military and economic alliance. In recent years, disagreements over digital trade and regulatory issues have become more pronounced. The U.S. government has characterized certain South Korean regulatory initiatives as trade barriers that disadvantage American Big Tech companies and has ap-plied pressure through trade channels. South Korea, however, maintains that these measures represent a legitimate exercise of regulatory sovereignty aimed at protecting market fairness, consumer rights, and the security of its domestic digital ecosystem.This column examines four major digital issues between South Korea and the United States, focusing on the background of each issue, the central points of contention, the differing perspectives of the two countries, and potential areas for mutually acceptable compromise. Based on this analysis, it also offers policy recommendations on how Seoul and Washington can move beyond current disputes and build a foundation for sustainable coop-eration and shared prosperity in the digital era.Case 1. Restrictions on the Overseas Transfer of High-Precision Map DataThe first, longest-standing, and one of the most symbolically significant digital disputes between South Korea and the United States concerns South Korea's restrictions on the overseas transfer of high-precision map data. Cit-ing the unique security challenges arising from its status as the world's only divided country, the South Korean government has maintained strict re-strictions on the overseas transfer of high-precision digital map data at a scale of 1:5,000, arguing that such information could reveal the locations of sensitive national security facilities.In response, U.S. technology companies, including Google, have strongly criticized these restrictions, arguing that they constitute a major non-tariff trade barrier and represent a form of "Galápagos-style" regulation that pre-vents foreign companies from providing global-standard services in the Ko-rean market. They contend that restricted access to high-precision map data hampers the provision of services such as Google Maps-based in-vehicle navigation, advanced autonomous driving technologies, and global loca-tion-based services (LBS).Since 2007, Google has sought permission to export 1:5,000-scale high-precision map data, but the Korean government rejected the request, citing concerns that military bases and other security facilities could be exposed if the data were combined with satellite imagery. The government subsequent-ly proposed establishing servers in South Korea as an alternative, but Google declined the proposal.In 2016, Google submitted another application to export the data. The Committee for Deliberation on the Overseas Export of Surveying Results, which includes officials from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the National Intelligence Service, among others, approved the request on the condition that security facilities be blurred and the dis-play of coordinates be restricted. However, Google did not accept these conditions, and the request was ultimately denied. Later, after the Trump administration identified South Korea's restrictions on map-data exports as a non-tariff trade barrier and raised the issue in the context of reciprocal tariff negotiations, Google submitted a new application in February 2025 and filed a supplementary application in February 2026 in response to the gov-ernment's request for additional information. In February 2026, the Korean government approved the transfer subject to several conditions, citing the need to strengthen the infrastructure for future industries and reduce fric-tion in global trade.Until a final agreement was reached, the issue repeatedly appeared on the agenda of ministerial-level meetings and working-level negotiations be-tween the two countries' trade authorities, remaining unresolved for many years. Rather than allowing the dispute to escalate into a prolonged con-frontation, South Korea and the United States engaged in sustained dia-logue and close consultations to develop practical technical solutions. Ulti-mately, the two sides reached a carefully negotiated compromise that ad-dressed security concerns while accommodating technological innovation.Under the agreement, a domestic partner operating under Korean law would first process the data on servers located in South Korea. Only after this process would map information deemed free of security concerns be exported for navigation purposes, subject to review and approval by the South Korean government. The parties also agreed that sensitive locations and imagery, including military bases and other major national security fa-cilities, would be thoroughly obscured through measures such as mosaick-ing when South Korean territory is displayed on global services such as Google Maps and Google Earth.Ultimately, this case illustrates how technical safeguards can provide a prac-tical compromise in situations where national security concerns intersect with the demands of global digital services, avoiding both the unconditional relaxation of regulations and a blanket ban on data exports.Case 2. The Debate over Network Usage Fees for Global Big Tech CompaniesThe second case concerns the ongoing domestic and international debate over whether global Big Tech companies should contribute to the costs of the digital infrastructure necessitated by the enormous volumes of traffic they generate. This issue has become a major global controversy, not only in South Korea but also within the European Union (EU). The European Commission has formally examined whether Big Tech companies that gen-erate substantial network traffic should share the costs of network invest-ment to ensure the sustainability of digital infrastructure, and it has explored the possibility of establishing an institutional framework for this purpose through public consultations. However, the legislative process has faced challenges due to differing views between telecommunications-oriented countries, such as France and Italy, which support such measures, and other member states that oppose them.The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the use of video streaming and online services, resulting in a significant increase in traffic generated by global content providers (CPs) such as Netflix and YouTube. In response, Korean Internet service providers (ISPs) and members of the National Assembly began actively pursuing legislation that would require foreign Big Tech companies to pay network usage fees, arguing that these companies gener-ate substantial revenues while contributing little or nothing to the costs of expanding and upgrading network infrastructure.South Korea's three major telecommunications operators—SK Telecom, KT, and LG Uplus—have argued that global Big Tech companies effectively benefit from domestic infrastructure without adequately sharing the associ-ated costs. Given that YouTube and Netflix account for a significant share of internet traffic in South Korea, they contend that these companies should also contribute to the costs of maintaining and upgrading telecommunica-tions networks. Domestic content providers such as Naver and Kakao, meanwhile, already bear substantial network-related costs, leading to con-cerns that exempting global Big Tech companies from comparable obliga-tions creates market distortions and places domestic firms at a competitive disadvantage. Rather than imposing a uniform legal obligation through leg-islation, the Korean government has emphasized voluntary negotiations among the relevant parties while continuing policy discussions aimed at mediating disagreements over network usage fees.The U.S. side, meanwhile, has strongly opposed such proposals in defense of the interests of American companies. The U.S. government and major technology companies argue that Korean consumers already pay Internet service providers (ISPs) legitimate fees for Internet access, and that impos-ing additional network usage fees on content providers would amount to double charging, potentially undermine the principle of net neutrality, and create an unfair digital trade barrier in violation of the non-discrimination principles of the Korea–U.S. Free Trade Agreement. South Korea, by con-trast, argues that telecommunications infrastructure constitutes critical pub-lic infrastructure and that it is fair and reasonable for major global compa-nies that generate massive volumes of traffic and place substantial demands on network capacity to bear at least part of the costs of maintaining and up-grading that infrastructure.Although the two sides hold sharply divergent views, practical solutions ex-ist that could prevent the dispute from escalating into a broader trade con-frontation. Rather than creating diplomatic friction by unilaterally imposing network usage fee requirements through legislation, more pragmatic ap-proaches could be explored. One option would be for global CPs to expand their CDN and caching infrastructure in South Korea, enabling content to be delivered closer to end users while reducing traffic burdens on interna-tional networks and certain domestic network segments and allowing com-panies to directly share the costs of the necessary infrastructure. Another possibility would be to encourage companies from both countries to jointly establish a "Digital Infrastructure Co-Growth Fund" and make voluntary contributions to next-generation 6G and network infrastructure projects, thereby creating a more sustainable foundation for compromise.Case 3. Online Platform Regulation (Online Platform Act and the Ex Post Presumption Approach)The third case concerns online platform regulation, including the proposed Online Platform Act and amendments to the Fair Trade Act adopting an ex post presumption approach. These measures are intended to prevent abusive conduct by dominant platform companies and foster a fairer digital ecosystem. The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) and the National Assembly initially considered introducing a "prior designation" system, similar in some respects to the European Union's Digital Markets Act (DMA), under which major platform companies would be designated in advance and subjected to special regulatory obligations. However, amid strong opposition from various stakeholders, the policy direction shifted toward amendments to the Fair Trade Act that would allow a company's market-dominant status to be presumed after certain legal violations have occurred.Nevertheless, major U.S. technology companies and business organizations immediately expressed strong concerns. The Office of the U.S. Trade Rep-resentative (USTR) argued that, even after the shift toward an ex post pre-sumption approach, the proposed thresholds based on factors such as reve-nue and user numbers would effectively target leading U.S. technology companies, including Google, Apple, and Meta, raising concerns about dis-criminatory regulation and prompting broader opposition from the United States. In particular, U.S. stakeholders argued that the measures could con-stitute a non-tariff trade barrier targeting American companies and poten-tially conflict with the non-discrimination principles of the Korea–U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), warning that the legislation could lead to in-creased trade friction between the two countries.Interestingly, the regulatory proposal has also generated diverse perspec-tives and competing interests within South Korea's political and business communities. Some domestic civil society organizations, small-business groups, and opposition politicians argue that prompt legislative action is necessary to protect small businesses and consumers from abuses of market power by dominant platforms. By contrast, some segments of South Ko-rea's technology industry and academic community have expressed con-cerns that such regulations could constrain domestic platforms such as Nav-er and Kakao, weaken incentives for innovation, and ultimately produce the unintended consequence of allowing large foreign e-commerce compa-nies—including Chinese platforms that may circumvent or otherwise avoid the regulatory framework—to gain greater market share in South Korea.Although the controversy has generated strong criticism and opposition both domestically and internationally, it also presents an opportunity to reach a more sophisticated compromise through sustained and substantive dialogue. The U.S. administration, Congress, and antitrust authorities are themselves engaged in significant antitrust litigation, regulatory actions, and legislative debates aimed at addressing concerns over the market power and potential abuses of major technology companies in the United States. Therefore, if the Korean government avoids adopting an overly broad pre-sumption that effectively shifts the burden of proof, enhances procedural transparency in developing the regulatory framework, and demonstrates a clear commitment to enforcing the law fairly and objectively without dis-criminating against companies from either country, it may be possible to minimize trade friction while establishing a balanced regulatory framework that promotes fairness in the domestic digital market.Case 4. Privacy and Consumer Regulation of Platform Companies (The Coupang Case and Related Issues)The fourth case concerns privacy and consumer protection regulation of platform companies, including the Coupang case, which has recently emerged as one of the most sensitive and contentious digital trade issues af-fecting the governments and industries of both countries. South Korean regulatory authorities have conducted intensive investigations into Coupang, a U.S.-incorporated company listed on the New York Stock Exchange, over allegations involving the manipulation of search rankings, the use of employees to post product reviews, and practices that allegedly encourage consumers to subscribe to paid memberships while making cancellation more difficult—commonly referred to as "dark patterns."The authorities have imposed fines amounting to hundreds of billions of won and pursued criminal referrals, leading to heightened tensions and concerns regarding regulatory disputes between the two countries. In par-ticular, the U.S. House Judiciary Committee issued an interim report char-acterizing the Korean government's investigations and sanctions against Coupang as discriminatory treatment of an American company. More re-cently, in late July 2026, Republican Representative Michael Baumgartner of Washington State introduced legislation that would restrict entry into the United States for foreign government officials who discriminate against American companies or potentially impose removal measures against such officials, further intensifying concerns over the issue. The lawmakers spe-cifically cited the KFTC's investigations into Coupang, alleging that Korean authorities had discriminated against an American-linked company through numerous investigations and thousands of requests for documents.The issue initially arose from legitimate domestic policy objectives: protect-ing consumer rights in South Korea's e-commerce market, preventing un-fair commercial practices, and establishing a fair competitive market order. However, when viewed from the U.S. perspective, the development of the issue and its major points of contention have led to the perception that the Korean government targeted an innovative company with substantial U.S. capital investment and imposed excessive and opaque domestic regulations that allegedly diverge from global standards.The issue is increasingly evolving beyond a matter of domestic competi-tion-law enforcement into a potentially significant diplomatic and political dispute between South Korea and the United States, with possible implica-tions for the investment environment affecting South Korean companies operating in the United States. Looking objectively at possible future devel-opments, it cannot be ruled out that the U.S. administration may raise plat-form regulation issues, including the Coupang case, as formal agenda items in future negotiations concerning reciprocal tariffs or broader trade ar-rangements. Such issues could potentially be used as leverage to pressure South Korea to substantially revise or reconsider digital regulations that Washington views as excessive.The most realistic and sustainable way to address such a highly sensitive and contentious issue is for South Korean regulatory authorities to substan-tially strengthen the procedural legitimacy, transparency, and predictability of regulatory enforcement in accordance with international standards. South Korean competition and administrative authorities should transparently dis-close regulatory guidelines, investigative procedures, and criteria for calcu-lating fines, thereby demonstrating that enforcement measures are not dis-criminatory actions targeting foreign-invested or U.S.-listed companies, but rather universal consumer-protection measures applied consistently and equally to all businesses.At the same time, South Korea should consider establishing a permanent public-private consultative mechanism to encourage platform companies to voluntarily correct potentially deceptive practices and strengthen consumer protection measures. Such a mechanism could help reduce regulatory un-certainty and mitigate political and diplomatic concerns in the United States regarding legal sanctions and regulatory enforcement.ConclusionThe four major digital issues examined above vividly demonstrate the com-plexity, dynamism, and potential volatility of the digital economic relation-ship between South Korea and the United States today. Depending on the nature of each issue and the maturity of the dialogue surrounding it, some cases have reached mutually acceptable compromises and can be regarded as largely resolved, while others remain unsettled and continue to evolve amid significant disagreements.The issue of restrictions on the overseas transfer of high-precision map data provides a positive precedent in which national security concerns were carefully balanced against the needs of technological innovation, ultimately leading to a resolution through dialogue and the implementation of tech-nical safeguards. By contrast, ongoing issues such as network usage fees for global technology companies and online platform regulation, including the Online Platform Act, remain unresolved because the industrial interests and regulatory approaches of the two countries continue to diverge, creat-ing significant challenges for trade authorities in both countries.Nevertheless, issues such as network usage fees and the Online Platform Act may ultimately be addressed through constructive policy coordination and carefully designed legislation consistent with global standards and emerging regulatory trends, particularly as concerns over the social respon-sibilities and market power of major technology companies are also receiv-ing increasing attention among economists and policymakers in the United States.By contrast, privacy and consumer regulation involving U.S.-listed plat-form companies, including the Coupang case, is closely intertwined with broader concerns in the United States regarding the regulatory treatment of American companies and trade-related issues, including reciprocal tariff ne-gotiations. Addressing such issues therefore requires a high degree of polit-ical and diplomatic judgment, as well as substantial time and sophisticated diplomacy to reconcile competing interests and reduce tensions.Nevertheless, as noted above, the two countries should seek common ground by demonstrating that the essence of the Coupang case lies not in discriminatory treatment of a U.S.-listed company, but in the consistent ap-plication of universal consumer protection principles. The key point that should not be overlooked is that the expansion of the digital economy should not become a source of conflict between the two countries, but ra-ther a new engine of growth and cooperation for both the Korean and U.S. economies in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.Given the structure of global value chains, South Korea and the United States cannot build a sustainable digital economy by excluding one another. South Korea should avoid both unconditional deregulation and an uncom-promising pursuit of narrow national interests. Instead, it should adopt a balanced approach that firmly protects technological capabilities and legiti-mate national interests while actively leveraging the foundations of "mutual prosperity": transparent institutional governance and sustained high-level strategic dialogue. By using these tools to address U.S. concerns while safeguarding the fairness and integrity of South Korea's domestic market, the two countries can create the conditions for a genuine win-win partner-ship and shared prosperity in the expanding digital economy.

MASGA and a New Vision for South Korea as a Responsible Maritime Power               Taejoon KimProfessor EmeritusKorea National Defense UniversityPrologue: Why South Korea's Nuclear-Powered Submarine Program Has Become an International IssueSouth Korea's nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) is no longer merely a national defense issue. With the emergence of MASGA (Make American Shipbuilding Great Again), the discussion surrounding a Korean SSN has expanded beyond defense policy to encompass alliance strategy, the international order, and Indo-Pacific maritime security. The central question is no longer whether South Korea should acquire an SSN, but what strategic value and international responsibilities such a capability can deliver.Originally conceived as an initiative to revitalize the U.S. shipbuilding industry, MASGA is evolving into something far broader. It is increasingly taking shape as a new alliance platform that integrates industrial capacity, advanced technologies, resilient supply chains, and maritime security. This evolution reflects a fundamental transformation in the nature of modern alliances, in which industrial capability has become an essential pillar of strategic power.Within this evolving strategic environment, the significance of South Korea's SSN is also being redefined. Rather than being viewed merely as a military platform, it is increasingly recognized as a strategic capability that can strengthen allied maritime security, safeguard critical sea lines of communication, and contribute to maintaining a free, open, and stable maritime order.Important questions nevertheless remain. Can a South Korean SSN coexist with the global nuclear non-proliferation regime? Can it earn the confidence of the international community? These concerns are both legitimate and necessary. They should be addressed through transparent governance, responsible operational principles, robust safeguards, and full compliance with international law and non-proliferation norms.South Korea has earned the trust of the international community not by pursuing nuclear weapons, but by consistently upholding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), cooperating closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and demonstrating its commitment to international law. Guided by these principles, a South Korean SSN should be understood not as a symbol of nuclear armament, but as a trusted instrument of Responsible Maritime Deterrence.This article does not seek to make the case for the military necessity of a South Korean SSN. Instead, it addresses a more fundamental question: Why should the United States and the international community regard a South Korean SSN as a strategically valuable capability, and how can it contribute to the future of the U.S.–ROK alliance, Indo-Pacific maritime security, and the international order?Ultimately, MASGA represents far more than an initiative to revitalize the U.S. shipbuilding industry. It reflects the evolution of industrial cooperation into strategic alliance-building. Within this broader transformation, South Korea's nuclear-powered submarine should be understood not simply as a military platform, but as a strategic milestone in the country's emergence as a Responsible Maritime Power.Ⅰ. Why MASGA Represents a New Alliance PlatformMASGA (Make American Shipbuilding Great Again) was originally conceived as an industrial cooperation initiative aimed at revitalizing the U.S. shipbuilding industry. Today, however, its strategic significance extends far beyond that original objective. It is evolving into a broader alliance platform that integrates industrial capacity, advanced technologies, resilient supply chains, and maritime security within a unified strategic framework. In doing so, MASGA illustrates how the U.S.–ROK alliance is evolving beyond a traditional military partnership into a future-oriented alliance founded on shared industrial capabilities, technological innovation, and strategic resilience.This transformation reflects a broader shift in the international strategic environment. National security can no longer be sustained by military power alone. Advanced shipbuilding, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and resilient supply chains have become strategic assets that shape deterrence, operational readiness, economic resilience, and national competitiveness. Shipbuilding, in particular, has reemerged as a critical strategic industry that underpins naval power, maritime operations, and the long-term resilience of defense and commercial supply chains.The United States is increasingly confronting this new reality. Although it continues to maintain the world's most powerful navy, constraints in shipbuilding capacity and in maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) capabilities have emerged as significant strategic challenges. South Korea, by contrast, possesses world-class shipbuilding technology, advanced industrial capacity, and internationally recognized expertise in naval construction, ship maintenance, and fleet sustainment. Its expanding role in supporting the maintenance and repair of U.S. Navy vessels underscores the strategic value of these capabilities.These complementary strengths are transforming MASGA from an industrial cooperation initiative into a framework for developing shared strategic capabilities. Traditionally, alliance burden sharing focused primarily on how allies should divide defense costs and military responsibilities. The emerging model, by contrast, places greater emphasis on Alliance Capability Sharing by integrating each ally's industrial, technological, and production strengths into collective strategic capabilities.This evolution naturally leads to Strategic Capability Integration, in which industrial capacity, advanced technologies, maritime operational capabilities, intelligence assets, and maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) systems are brought together within a unified strategic architecture. This is the central strategic significance of MASGA. Its value lies not merely in revitalizing the U.S. shipbuilding industry, but in transforming complementary national strengths into enduring alliance capabilities.Ultimately, MASGA should be understood as far more than an economic initiative to support the U.S. shipbuilding industry. It represents a next-generation alliance platform through which the United States and South Korea can integrate industrial capacity, advanced technologies, and maritime security to strengthen their collective strategic capabilities. Within this evolving framework, South Korea's nuclear-powered submarine should be understood not as an instrument of unilateral military expansion, but as a core strategic capability that reinforces the alliance's collective maritime security and long-term strategic resilience.Ⅱ. Why Does the International Community Need South Korea's SSN Capability?Discussions surrounding South Korea's nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) have traditionally focused on national security, particularly the growing nuclear and missile threats posed by North Korea and the need to strengthen maritime deterrence. While these concerns are entirely legitimate, they do not address a more fundamental question: Why should the United States and the broader international community also regard a South Korean SSN as strategically valuable?The answer lies in the changing nature of the Indo-Pacific security environment. Today, the principal challenge is not simply the growing military power of any single state, but the preservation of a free, open, and stable maritime order. China's rapid naval expansion, North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile capabilities, and the increasing strategic importance of global supply chains and critical sea lines of communication (SLOCs) have transformed maritime security into a shared strategic responsibility for the international community.It is within this strategic context that South Korea's role has become increasingly significant. As MASGA evolves beyond an initiative to revitalize the U.S. shipbuilding industry into a broader alliance platform, South Korea's world-class shipbuilding industry, advanced naval construction capabilities, and globally recognized maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) expertise have emerged as strategic assets for the alliance. South Korea contributes not only industrial capacity, but also operational capabilities that strengthen collective maritime security.A nuclear-powered submarine represents a natural extension of this evolving partnership. Far more than an offensive weapons platform, it enables sustained underwater operations, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), enhanced maritime domain awareness (MDA), the protection of critical sea lines of communication (SLOCs), combined naval operations, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Its strategic value lies not in offensive power, but in its ability to strengthen allied maritime security across peacetime, crisis, and conflict.The waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula constitute one of the Indo-Pacific's most strategically significant maritime regions. They are where the naval activities of North Korea, China, and Russia intersect, and where critical sea lines of communication connecting the United States, Japan, and the wider Indo-Pacific converge. Within this geopolitical environment, a South Korean SSN should be understood not as a weapon directed against any particular country, but as a strategic capability that enhances maritime domain awareness (MDA) and strengthens allied deterrence.Its contribution extends well beyond the U.S.–ROK alliance. Like South Korea, Indo-Pacific partners and European allies share a common interest in safeguarding freedom of navigation, securing global supply chains, and preserving a free, open, and stable maritime order. Through intelligence sharing, combined exercises, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) cooperation, and coordinated maritime operations, a South Korean SSN can reinforce the maritime security network among democratic nations.Ultimately, South Korea's nuclear-powered submarine should be understood as more than a national military asset. As MASGA evolves from an initiative to revitalize the U.S. shipbuilding industry into a broader alliance platform, a South Korean SSN likewise becomes more than a national capability. It emerges as a shared strategic asset that strengthens allied maritime security, enhances collective deterrence, and contributes to preserving a free, open, and stable Indo-Pacific maritime order.Ⅲ. Why Can the International Community Trust South Korea's SSN Program?As discussed in the previous chapter, South Korea's nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) should be understood not merely as a national military capability, but as a strategic asset that can strengthen allied and international maritime security. Strategic value alone, however, is not sufficient to secure international confidence. The central question is whether such a capability can operate in full harmony with the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Ultimately, the issue is not one of military power, but of trust; not of technology, but of responsibility.A nuclear-powered submarine is fundamentally different from a nuclear weapon. It is propelled by a nuclear reactor rather than armed with nuclear explosives. Nevertheless, the use of nuclear propulsion and the management of nuclear fuel inevitably raise legitimate concerns about nuclear proliferation. Those concerns should not be dismissed; rather, they should be addressed through transparent governance, credible institutions, rigorous safeguards, and strict adherence to international law and non-proliferation norms.South Korea has consistently demonstrated its commitment to these principles. Despite facing persistent nuclear threats from North Korea, it has never pursued nuclear weapons. Instead, it has faithfully upheld the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), cooperated closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and maintained a strong record of responsible nuclear governance. This longstanding commitment provides the foundation for international confidence in South Korea as a responsible strategic partner.The development of a South Korean SSN should continue to reflect these same principles. Its nuclear propulsion program must remain clearly separated from any nuclear weapons program, operate in full compliance with the international non-proliferation regime, and ensure transparent nuclear fuel management in close cooperation with the IAEA. The true value of a South Korean SSN lies not in the power of its reactor, but in the credibility of the principles, institutions, and safeguards that govern its operation.To reinforce international confidence, South Korea should clearly commit itself to five fundamental principles.First, it will neither develop nor possess nuclear weapons.Second, it will continue to fully comply with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).Third, it will actively cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on safeguards, verification, and transparency measures.Fourth, it will maintain transparent nuclear fuel management and ensure the highest standards of operational safety in accordance with international norms.Fifth, it will operate its nuclear-powered submarine as a non-nuclear strategic capability dedicated to strengthening allied deterrence and enhancing international maritime security.By adhering to these principles, South Korea's SSN would reinforce rather than undermine the global non-proliferation regime. More importantly, it would demonstrate that a responsible democratic nation can maintain credible deterrence while fully complying with international norms. In doing so, South Korea would offer an international model for reconciling national security requirements with non-proliferation commitments.In today's international order, trust is earned through actions rather than declarations. Nations are judged not by what they promise, but by what they institutionalize and consistently practice. Ultimately, the success of South Korea's nuclear-powered submarine program will depend less on technological sophistication than on transparent governance, responsible operations, and sustained international cooperation.Only on this foundation can South Korea's SSN become a trusted strategic asset. Only then can the Republic of Korea firmly establish itself as a Responsible Maritime Power worthy of the international community's trust.Ⅳ. How Can South Korea's Nuclear-Powered Submarine Contribute to Maritime Security as a Strategic Public Good?The international community does not evaluate military capabilities solely by their size or technological sophistication. More importantly, it assesses whether such capabilities contribute to preserving the international order and advancing collective security. Freedom of navigation, secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and resilient global supply chains are not the interests of any single nation alone; they are strategic public goods that benefit the international community as a whole.Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has played the leading role in providing these strategic public goods by safeguarding freedom of navigation and protecting critical maritime trade routes. Today, however, the rapidly changing security environment in the Indo-Pacific, combined with China's expanding naval capabilities, has made it increasingly difficult for any single nation to shoulder this responsibility alone. The future of maritime security therefore depends on democratic allies integrating their strategic capabilities and sharing responsibility for preserving a free and open maritime order.This is precisely where MASGA acquires its broader strategic significance. Having evolved beyond an initiative to revitalize American shipbuilding, MASGA now serves as a platform for integrating the industrial, technological, and operational strengths of the U.S.–ROK alliance. South Korea's nuclear-powered submarine should be understood within this broader strategic framework—not simply as a national military capability, but as a potential contribution to the provision of maritime security as a strategic public good.A South Korean SSN is not intended simply to enhance national military power. It is a strategic platform capable of sustained underwater operations, continuous maritime surveillance, anti-submarine warfare, protection of critical sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and support for combined naval operations. Its greatest contribution lies not in offensive capability alone, but in strengthening the collective capacity to preserve a secure and stable maritime order.The Indo-Pacific has become the center of global trade and energy transportation. Any disruption to its maritime routes would affect not only regional economies, but also global markets and international supply chains. Maritime security in this region has therefore become a shared responsibility requiring sustained cooperation among allies and partner nations.South Korea occupies a pivotal position within this maritime environment. Supported by a world-class shipbuilding industry, advanced naval capabilities, and an increasingly integrated alliance with the United States, South Korea is well positioned to make a meaningful contribution to international maritime security. Within the evolving framework of MASGA, a South Korean SSN can serve not merely as a national military asset, but as a strategic capability that strengthens cooperation among allies and enhances collective maritime resilience.Such a role, however, cannot be fulfilled through military capability alone. It requires continued respect for international law, full compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), transparent cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and responsible operational standards. Only under these conditions can South Korea's SSN become a trusted instrument of Responsible Maritime Deterrence and make a lasting contribution to preserving a free, open, and secure maritime order.Ultimately, the objective of South Korea's nuclear-powered submarine program is not simply to build a more capable navy. Its broader purpose is to help safeguard maritime security as a strategic public good while strengthening the collective capabilities of allies and partners. In this sense, South Korea's SSN represents more than a national military asset; it is a strategic platform that can contribute to the future architecture of international maritime security cooperation.Epilogue: A Responsible Maritime Power Is No Longer an Option but a Strategic ImperativeThis article has argued that MASGA represents far more than an initiative to revitalize American shipbuilding. It embodies the evolution of industrial cooperation into a new alliance platform that integrates industrial capacity, advanced technology, maritime security, and shared strategic responsibility. Within this broader transformation, South Korea's nuclear-powered submarine should be understood not merely as a national military capability, but as a strategic asset that strengthens the collective maritime security of the alliance and the international community.In the twenty-first century, no single nation can preserve the international maritime order alone. Freedom of navigation, secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and resilient global supply chains have become shared responsibilities requiring sustained cooperation among like-minded nations. The future of maritime security will therefore depend not only on military strength, but also on the willingness of allies to share capabilities, responsibilities, and strategic leadership.South Korea is well positioned to assume such a role. Having earned international confidence through its consistent adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), close cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and steadfast respect for international norms, it possesses the credibility necessary to make a meaningful contribution to global maritime security. Guided by these principles, a South Korean nuclear-powered submarine can become not a symbol of military expansion, but a trusted strategic asset supporting a free, open, and stable maritime order.Ultimately, the significance of South Korea's nuclear-powered submarine extends well beyond the acquisition of a new naval capability. It represents South Korea's readiness to assume greater responsibility for international peace, alliance cooperation, and collective maritime security. Responsibility does not diminish national power—it completes it. As South Korea advances toward becoming a Responsible Maritime Power, its nuclear-powered submarine should be remembered not merely as a weapons system, but as a strategic platform embodying a new national vision: one that combines credible deterrence, responsible governance, and a lasting commitment to preserving the international maritime order.

On the Threshold of Renewed U.S.–North Korea Dialogue:Recommendations for a Pragmatic Approach Prioritizing a Freeze on North Korea's Nuclear Program               Min HongSenior Research FellowKorea Institute for National Unification (KINU)A New Chapter in Leader-to-Leader DiplomacyDuring a press briefing following his return from Europe and the G7 Summit on June 19, President Lee Jae-myung stated that the North Korean nuclear issue was the most extensively discussed topic in his meeting with President Donald Trump. According to Lee, President Trump expressed frustration over the prolonged stalemate in U.S.–North Korea relations and suggested that the time may be ripe to reengage in dialogue with Kim Jong-un. Trump also reportedly acknowledged that completely halting North Korea's nuclear development is unlikely to be achievable in the near term and indicated that a phased approach should therefore be considered.President Lee advocated a pragmatic strategy that North Korea could realistically accept, emphasizing that "the North Korean nuclear issue cannot be approached in the same manner as other nuclear challenges." He proposed a phased process beginning with an immediate suspension of additional fissile material production. According to Lee, President Trump responded that he would give the proposal careful consideration. Lee also encouraged Trump to take a leading role in pursuing a peaceful resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue, drawing a parallel with his diplomatic efforts to address conflicts in the Middle East.To fully understand the significance of this exchange, it is important to consider the broader strategic context. At its Ninth Party Congress in February, North Korea formally redefined inter-Korean relations as those between "two hostile states," describing this shift as an irreversible historical choice. In March, Pyongyang further institutionalized its status as a "nuclear-armed state" through a constitutional amendment. Subsequently, at an expanded meeting of the Party's Central Military Commission in July, the regime designated the qualitative and quantitative expansion of its nuclear forces as an operational priority for the military.Against this backdrop, North Korea has effectively foreclosed the prospects for meaningful inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation. Under these circumstances, facilitating direct U.S.–North Korea engagement while ensuring that South Korea's strategic interests are reflected in the process remains one of Seoul's few viable policy options. Equally important, the trust and communication demonstrated between President Lee and President Trump during this visit constitute valuable diplomatic assets in their own right.The Strategic Rationale for a Phased ApproachPresident Lee's proposal reflects an increasingly pragmatic approach to the North Korean nuclear issue. While reaffirming denuclearization as the long-term objective, it acknowledges that achieving this goal in a single step is unrealistic. Instead, it proposes beginning with a freeze on North Korea's nuclear program, followed by subsequent measures implemented through a phased process designed to sustain peaceful coexistence.This approach reflects the recognition that the longstanding strategy of "denuclearization first, compensation later," together with more than three decades of sanctions and pressure, has failed to halt North Korea's nuclear advancement. Indeed, North Korea's nuclear capabilities have expanded most rapidly during periods when negotiations broke down.From a practical perspective, suspending additional fissile material production would cap the future growth of North Korea's nuclear arsenal, thereby slowing the expansion of the threat. If a comprehensive settlement is unattainable in the near term, preventing the problem from becoming more severe represents a rational interim objective. Such an approach could also help reduce military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and lower the risk of inadvertent escalation by consistently signaling that South Korea seeks peaceful coexistence rather than confrontation. In this sense, the proposal represents a meaningful departure from an approach centered primarily on coercive pressure and offers a more practical framework for managing current security risks.Assessing North Korea's Strategic CalculusThe success of such an approach, however, depends on an accurate assessment of North Korea's strategic objectives. Most importantly, Pyongyang no longer seeks negotiations in which its nuclear weapons serve as the principal bargaining chip.At the Ninth Party Congress, North Korea explicitly rejected the denuclearization framework and excluded South Korea from what it considers the appropriate framework for negotiations. Instead, Pyongyang has shifted toward a model of U.S.–North Korea relations in which both sides engage as de facto nuclear powers, focusing on reducing mutual threats, preventing military conflict, and improving bilateral relations.The March constitutional amendment, which further institutionalized North Korea's status as a nuclear-armed state and constitutionally affirmed Kim Jong-un's command authority over the country's nuclear forces, reflects this broader strategic shift. From Pyongyang's perspective, nuclear weapons are no longer viewed as bargaining leverage but rather as a permanent foundation of its national security and foreign policy.Consequently, if a proposal to prioritize a freeze on North Korea's nuclear program continues to treat denuclearization as the central negotiating objective, North Korea is likely to focus instead on issues related to the bilateral relationship—including military confidence-building, threat reduction, and the removal of what it characterizes as hostile policies—while excluding its nuclear capabilities from substantive negotiations.Accordingly, even if another U.S.–North Korea summit were to materialize, policymakers must first recognize and manage a fundamental asymmetry: the two sides are no longer negotiating within the same conceptual framework. Before substantive negotiations can begin, they must first address the mismatch in their respective assumptions regarding the purpose, scope, and agenda of future dialogue.This does not imply that President Lee's proposal should be dismissed. Rather, it underscores the need for a broader, long-term strategic framework to ensure that individual policy initiatives are neither subsumed within North Korea's preferred negotiating framework nor exhausted without producing lasting strategic gains. If Pyongyang has already shifted toward a framework centered on threat reduction and coexistence, South Korea must develop a strategy that fully accounts for this evolving environment while advancing its own strategic objectives. Effective policy must begin with an accurate assessment of the changing strategic landscape and translate that assessment into a coherent course of action.Beyond the North Korean Nuclear Issue: Toward Expanded Strategic StabilityMore fundamentally, the North Korean nuclear issue can no longer be viewed as a problem confined to the Korean Peninsula. Through its expanding military cooperation with Russia and the deployment of troops in support of Moscow's war effort, North Korea has become increasingly embedded in the broader European security environment. At the same time, intensifying strategic competition among the United States, China, and Russia—combined with rapid advances in artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons, space capabilities, and cyberspace operations—has transformed Northeast Asia into a focal point where military, political, and technological competition increasingly converge.North Korea's nuclear development is therefore not simply a product of its domestic security calculations but also a reflection of broader shifts in the international balance of power. Consequently, any strategy that focuses exclusively on changing North Korea's behavior through denuclearization negotiations is likely to encounter significant structural limitations.South Korea's strategic framework should therefore move beyond the traditional linear linkage between denuclearization and improved inter-Korean relations. Instead, it should adopt a broader concept of expanded strategic stability—one that manages not only the nuclear dimension but also the broader military, technological, economic, and geopolitical environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula.Such a strategy begins by recognizing the interaction among global, regional, and theater-level security dynamics and by incorporating these overlapping strategic layers into policy planning. It must also seek to promote stability across multiple domains, including nuclear deterrence, conventional military balances, cyberspace, outer space, intelligence, economic security, and supply chains. Equally important, South Korea should articulate a broader strategic vision that defines the regional order it seeks to promote and sustain.In today's increasingly complex security environment, no single actor possesses either complete situational awareness or the capacity to shape the strategic environment unilaterally. Accordingly, the appropriate strategic paradigm is no longer one of dominance and control but rather one of coexistence, risk management, and strategic stability. Within such a framework, initiatives such as prioritizing a freeze on North Korea's nuclear program acquire lasting strategic value only when they are integrated into a broader architecture for regional security management.South Korea's Leadership: Advancing Multilayered Threat Reduction and Arms ControlA central requirement is a renewed understanding of trust. Trust cannot be built through rhetorical commitments to peace alone; it must be grounded in tangible measures that reduce security risks. Calls for trust unaccompanied by concrete threat-reduction measures fail to address the underlying sources of instability.Three practical approaches merit particular consideration.First, South Korea should pursue incremental and reciprocal threat-reduction measures. Rather than waiting for a comprehensive agreement, Seoul could initiate limited but meaningful confidence-building measures that gradually create the conditions for broader negotiations. Such calibrated reciprocity can provide a practical foundation for sustained leader-level dialogue.Second, policymakers should encourage behavioral and tacit forms of arms control. Even in the absence of formal agreements, predictable military behavior, operational restraint, and the avoidance of provocative actions can significantly reduce the risks of miscalculation and unintended escalation.Third, South Korea should assume a leading role in promoting regional cooperative security and arms control in Northeast Asia. Seoul could propose a multilateral framework for consultations on threat reduction aimed at minimizing strategic misperceptions arising from competition over nuclear weapons and advanced conventional strike capabilities. If broader strategic arms control discussions among the United States, China, and Russia were eventually incorporated into such a framework, the North Korean nuclear issue could also be addressed within a more comprehensive and sustainable regional security architecture.As demonstrated during President Lee's recent diplomatic engagements, South Korea's growing national capabilities and international standing provide an opportunity to move beyond the role of a facilitator between Washington and Pyongyang. Instead, Seoul should seek to establish itself as a strategic architect capable of shaping a durable framework for peaceful coexistence and long-term stability in Northeast Asia. Achieving this objective will require a comprehensive strategy centered on sustained threat reduction, cooperative security, and regional stability.From Managing the Status Quo to Shaping the Strategic EnvironmentThe renewed momentum toward U.S.–North Korea dialogue and the proposal to prioritize a freeze on North Korea's nuclear program represent meaningful efforts to adapt policy to a changing strategic environment. As an initial step, such measures can contribute to reducing tensions and strengthening crisis management on the Korean Peninsula.Their true significance, however, lies not in their immediate policy outcomes but in their potential to serve as the foundation for a broader strategic framework. Individual initiatives should therefore be embedded within a three-tiered strategy: short-term measures focused on reducing tensions and restoring crisis-management mechanisms; medium-term efforts emphasizing threat reduction and arms control; and long-term objectives aimed at establishing a stable regional security order in Northeast Asia.Such an approach would provide the foundation for a distinctly Korean model of strategic stability centered on mutual threat reduction and cooperative security. Ultimately, sustainable progress will require a broader transformation in strategic thinking—one that moves beyond outdated policy paradigms grounded primarily in normative aspirations or historical assumptions and instead embraces a forward-looking strategy capable of managing coexistence in an increasingly complex security environment. Only through such a strategic shift can the current opening for renewed dialogue be translated into durable strategic gains.

The Strategic Imperative for South Korea–NATO Defense Industrial Cooperation               Chan YangSenior Research FellowKorea Defense Industry Promotion AssociationThe war in Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped the international security environment. Russia's growing military cooperation with North Korea, the rise of gray-zone threats targeting cyber networks, space assets, and critical undersea infrastructure, and the intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China have increasingly linked security in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. North Korean artillery ammunition and troop deployments directly affect the sustainability of the war in Europe, while the military technologies Pyongyang may receive in return could significantly enhance its military capabilities on the Korean Peninsula. Europe is therefore no longer a distant theater of conflict for South Korea, just as the Korean Peninsula can no longer be regarded as a peripheral security concern for NATO.The most consequential question arising from this changing strategic environment is not which country possesses more advanced weapons, but which defense industrial base can sustain military operations over time. The credibility of deterrence increasingly depends on how rapidly combat losses can be replenished, how quickly damaged systems can be repaired, and how effectively operational lessons can be incorporated into weapons development and production. Simply increasing defense budgets is insufficient. Financial resources translate into military capability only when supported by an integrated industrial base encompassing production facilities, skilled labor, critical raw materials, testing and certification infrastructure, component inventories, and maintenance networks.1. A Changing Security Environment Exposes Structural Constraints on Both SidesAt the 2025 Hague Summit, NATO committed to investing 5 percent of GDP in defense and security-related expenditures by 2035. Building on its revised Defense Production Action Plan (DPAP), the Alliance is pursuing demand aggregation, multinational procurement, expanded production capacity, and greater standardization across member states.This initiative reflects not a lack of awareness of evolving security threats, but rather a recognition of the persistent lag between increased defense spending and the generation of actual military capability. Europe continues to possess globally competitive industries in aerospace, missile systems, sensors, and electronic warfare. However, decades of post-Cold War optimization around just-in-time production and limited-volume procurement have reduced surge production capacity, particularly for ammunition, ground systems, critical components, and maintenance support.Fragmentation presents an even greater structural challenge. Differences in operational requirements, certification procedures, procurement schedules, and export regulations across NATO member states have resulted in multiple variants of similar weapons systems, each requiring unique components and logistics support. Consequently, increased defense spending often generates competition for limited industrial capacity rather than proportionate increases in production. This dynamic contributes to rising procurement costs and longer delivery schedules.Between 2020 and 2024, European arms imports increased by 155 percent compared with the previous five-year period, while 64 percent of NATO Europe's imported defense equipment originated from the United States. Although U.S. suppliers have successfully met urgent operational requirements, this pattern has also highlighted the risks associated with dependence on a single supplier and export-control processes beyond Europe's direct control.Accordingly, NATO's strategic objective should not be framed as a choice between European and non-European suppliers. Rather, the priority is to establish diversified, resilient supply chains capable of expanding production, substituting suppliers, and sustaining maintenance during prolonged crises.South Korea confronts a different, yet equally important, set of structural constraints. Over several decades, South Korea has developed exceptional capabilities in rapid mass production, timely delivery, and integrated manufacturing through sustained government investment, stable domestic procurement, and highly coordinated industrial supply chains. Nevertheless, the domestic market alone cannot sustain this industrial base. Once major acquisition programs conclude without follow-on orders, production lines become dormant, highly skilled engineers disperse, suppliers exit the market, and testing infrastructure deteriorates. Reconstituting this industrial ecosystem requires significant time and financial investment.Furthermore, the historical reliance on government-directed research and development has limited incentives for private firms to undertake high-risk investments in next-generation defense technologies.Expanding exports alone cannot fully resolve these structural challenges. European governments increasingly require local production, technology transfer, and regional sourcing of components. Initiatives such as the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (SAFE) and the European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP) are specifically designed to strengthen Europe's defense technological and industrial base. In addition, systems incorporating U.S.-origin components remain subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), including re-export approval requirements and restrictions on the transfer of technical data. Financing requirements, localization costs, concerns about creating future competitors, and differing national export-control policies further complicate market access.Consequently, if South Korea limits its engagement to exporting finished systems, it risks being viewed merely as a temporary supplier addressing Europe's current production shortfall rather than as a long-term strategic industrial partner.2. Why South Korea–NATO Defense Industrial Cooperation Is a Strategic NecessityFirst, South Korea and NATO possess complementary comparative advantages across different time horizons.South Korea offers rapid production capacity through existing manufacturing lines, agile industrial decision-making, and integrated supplier networks. NATO, by contrast, provides long-term demand visibility through capability planning, common standards, and multi-year multinational procurement.Combining South Korea's manufacturing speed with NATO's predictable procurement framework would enable the Alliance to address immediate capability gaps while providing South Korean industry with the production stability needed to sustain investment in research and development, workforce development, and industrial expansion.This relationship should therefore evolve beyond one in which South Korea merely fills temporary production shortfalls. Instead, it should follow a phased approach in which Korean manufacturers address immediate production requirements while joint production capacity and localized manufacturing are progressively expanded across Europe over the longer term.Second, cooperation should focus on establishing a distributed defense industrial base rather than maximizing individual weapons sales.Modern warfare increasingly rewards resilience over efficiency. Supply chains concentrated in a single factory or country may minimize costs during peacetime but become highly vulnerable to wartime disruption.Integrating South Korean manufacturing with European assembly, component production, ammunition manufacturing, and maintenance hubs would enable production to continue even if individual facilities were disrupted by military attack or supply-chain interruptions.Localization should therefore be understood not simply as increasing domestic content but as strengthening industrial resilience through redundant production capacity, interchangeable manufacturing processes, strategic stockpiles, rapid production conversion, and the mutual recognition of industrial certifications.Third, the principal objective of cooperation should be operational readiness rather than export volume.During prolonged conflicts, sustaining deployed systems becomes more important than delivering new equipment. Europe would benefit from multinational maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) hubs, shared spare-parts inventories, standardized maintenance certification, and integrated configuration management.The adoption of predictive and condition-based maintenance would enhance operational readiness while reducing lifecycle costs. At the same time, South Korean manufacturers would gain access to operational data collected across diverse training and combat environments, enabling continuous improvements in system design, software performance, and future product development.Fourth, defense industrial cooperation serves as strategic insurance that strengthens deterrence across both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters.Given the growing military relationship between Russia and North Korea, security challenges in Europe and Northeast Asia have become increasingly interconnected. Expanded South Korean production capacity can strengthen Europe's wartime resilience, thereby reducing Russia's ability to achieve its objectives through a prolonged war of attrition. Conversely, deeper cooperation with NATO in areas such as advanced technologies, intelligence, cyber defense, and space security would enhance South Korea's ability to monitor and respond to North Korea's evolving military capabilities.Finally, industrial capacity itself contributes directly to deterrence.Potential adversaries are more likely to initiate conflict when they believe they can exhaust an opponent's stockpiles or disable its industrial base through an initial offensive. Conversely, an alliance capable of rapidly replacing combat losses, restoring damaged systems, sustaining maintenance networks, and continuously adapting weapons designs significantly reduces the likelihood that an initial offensive can achieve decisive strategic gains.Defense industrial cooperation should therefore be understood not primarily as an arms export policy, but as a long-term strategy for strengthening deterrence by demonstrating the collective capacity to sustain prolonged military operations.3. The Strategic Significance and Future Prospects of the “Korea–NATO Defense Industry Partnership 2.0”At the 2026 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit, President Lee Jae-myung unveiled the "Korea–NATO Defense Industry Partnership 2.0," a strategic initiative designed to transform existing defense cooperation from a relationship centered primarily on arms exports into one based on joint research and development (R&D), co-production, and operational collaboration. The proposal reflects Seoul's broader objective of positioning South Korea not simply as a supplier of military equipment, but as an integrated partner within NATO's evolving defense industrial ecosystem.The initiative is particularly notable because it closely aligns with NATO's recent emphasis on strengthening defense industrial resilience, expanding multinational defense production, and accelerating innovation in emerging technologies. President Lee highlighted cooperation in artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, drones, robotics, space capabilities, ammunition production, and defense supply chains—areas that have become central priorities for NATO in response to the changing security environment.Speaking at the NATO Defense Industry Forum in Ankara, Türkiye, President Lee argued that defense industrial cooperation should evolve beyond the traditional export-oriented model toward one based on jointly developing, producing, and operating advanced weapons systems. He emphasized that the increasingly volatile international security environment requires deeper industrial integration among like-minded partners and faster mechanisms for technological cooperation.The proposal represents more than an expansion of existing defense cooperation. It reflects a broader strategic vision that treats the defense industry as a pillar of national security, economic security, technological competitiveness, and supply chain resilience. In this framework, defense cooperation is no longer viewed solely through the lens of commercial arms sales but as a long-term strategic partnership encompassing innovation, industrial capacity, and technological leadership.A central component of President Lee's proposal is expanded joint R&D in next-generation defense technologies. Citing South Korea's participation in NATO's ammunition and space-related cooperation initiatives, he called for broader collaboration in AI, autonomous systems, drones, robotics, and space technologies. These priorities closely complement NATO's own innovation agenda, including the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), the NATO Innovation Fund, and expanding cooperation in space security. As technological superiority increasingly determines military effectiveness, advanced defense innovation has become a defining element of strategic competition.Supply chain resilience constitutes another major pillar of the initiative. President Lee proposed establishing a multinational defense supply chain management mechanism modeled on the International Energy Agency's (IEA) strategic petroleum reserve system. The proposal mirrors NATO's post-Ukraine efforts to strengthen joint ammunition procurement, diversify defense production, and expand co-production among allies. The prolonged Russia-Ukraine war has demonstrated that sustained deterrence depends not only on advanced weapons systems but also on the industrial capacity to manufacture, replenish, and sustain military capabilities over time. In this context, President Lee's observation that "the supply chain itself has become an essential element of deterrence" reflects an increasingly accepted assessment within contemporary defense planning.South Korea has already expanded defense cooperation with NATO member states—including Poland, Germany, Romania, and Norway—through exports of major defense platforms such as the K2 main battle tank, K9 self-propelled howitzer, FA-50 light combat aircraft, and Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher system. However, previous cooperation has largely been transactional, centered on arms sales and follow-on logistical support. Partnership 2.0 seeks to establish a more comprehensive model incorporating joint R&D, local manufacturing, maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO), lifecycle sustainment, and operational interoperability. If successfully implemented, the initiative could facilitate the deeper integration of South Korean defense firms into European defense supply chains while enhancing interoperability under NATO standards.President Lee also underscored that strategic trust is the foundation of successful defense industrial cooperation. He argued that meaningful collaboration requires confidence that critical supplies will remain available during crises and that sensitive technologies will be adequately protected. Emphasizing the shared democratic values of South Korea and NATO, he presented Seoul as a reliable long-term defense partner capable of contributing to the Alliance's collective security objectives.The proposal reflects broader structural changes in the international security environment. The prolonged Russia-Ukraine war and intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition have elevated defense industrial capacity from a supporting function to a central component of national power. Modern conflicts increasingly depend on technological innovation, industrial production capacity, resilient supply chains, and sustained logistical support rather than battlefield performance alone. President Lee's characterization of research institutions and production facilities as the "front lines of national security" captures this evolving understanding of strategic competition.Nevertheless, significant challenges remain before the initiative can be translated into concrete policy. Joint R&D will require careful management of technology transfer, intellectual property protection, and security standards. Differences in defense procurement policies among NATO members, coordination with U.S. and European defense industries, export control regulations, and varying national industrial interests could all complicate implementation. Moreover, the extent to which NATO members are prepared to integrate South Korea into critical defense supply chains remains an open question. The long-term success of the Korea–NATO Defense Industry Partnership 2.0 will ultimately depend on whether both sides can institutionalize cooperation beyond arms procurement and establish durable mechanisms for industrial integration, technological collaboration, and shared defense production.4. From Strategic Necessity to Institutionalized CooperationThe first priority should be to institutionalize a Korea–NATO–EU Defense Technology and Supply Chain Dialogue, integrating the Korea–NATO Individual Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP), NATO science and technology cooperation, and the EU–Republic of Korea Security and Defence Partnership.Rather than serving as a purely declaratory forum, this mechanism should establish permanent working groups focused on:   . Long-term capability planning and multi-year procurement;   . Standards, testing, certification, and interoperability;   . Joint research, production, and maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO); and   . Export controls, technology security, and supply-chain resilience.NATO should provide greater transparency regarding future capability requirements and procurement timelines, while South Korea should provide realistic assessments of its industrial capacity, production schedules, and supply-chain constraints.Institutionally, this foundation already exists. South Korea and NATO concluded the Individual Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP) in 2023, while South Korea and the European Union signed a Security and Defence Partnership in 2024. At the 2026 Summit, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to expanding cooperation, including in defense industrial collaboration.ConclusionDefense industrial cooperation between South Korea and NATO should not be viewed as a relationship in which one side compensates for the other's deficiencies. Rather, it represents a partnership between two highly complementary industrial ecosystems.NATO and Europe possess advanced research capabilities, mature defense standards, operational expertise, and predictable long-term demand. South Korea contributes rapid manufacturing capacity, integrated production systems, and highly efficient supply-chain management. Together, these complementary strengths create a strong foundation for a mutually beneficial and enduring strategic partnership.However, this opportunity will remain temporary if cooperation is confined to exports of finished platforms and limited localization initiatives.Instead, both sides should move beyond viewing South Korea merely as a temporary supplier until European production recovers—or Europe merely as a large export market for Korean firms. Future cooperation should integrate common capability requirements, collaborative system design, distributed manufacturing, multinational maintenance networks, long-term procurement arrangements, and robust export-control frameworks into a single strategic ecosystem.In an era in which security challenges increasingly span multiple regions, defense industrial capacity must become equally interconnected. The ultimate objective of South Korea–NATO defense industrial cooperation should not simply be to sell more weapons, but to establish a distributed technology and industrial alliance capable of collectively designing, producing, sustaining, and continuously improving military capabilities over the long term.

Restraint by Design:Korea’s Nuclear-Powered Submarine and the Low-Enriched Case for Allied Confidence               Peter Jaegeul SongResearch Fellow, Korea Nuclear Security Strategy ForumExternal Researcher, Korea Environment Institute1. From "Whether" to "How"In Gyeongju on October 29, 2025, a question that had shaped South Korea’s defense planning for more than three decades quietly changed form. For years, the debate over a nuclear-powered submarine had revolved around a single question: whether Seoul would ever receive U.S. approval to pursue such a capability. On the margins of the APEC summit, President Lee Jae-myung publicly asked President Trump for access to reactor fuel.Within a day, the U.S. president signaled his support, and on November 13 the two governments formalized that understanding in a joint fact sheet. The document stated that the United States would support South Korea's development of conventionally armed nuclear-powered attack submarines and cooperate with Seoul on the project‘s key requirements, including arrangements for nuclear fuel.¹The debate had fundamentally shifted. What had once been a question of permission became a question of implementation. The central issues were no longer political approval but engineering, governance, and alliance management: what type of fuel should be used, how it should be safeguarded, who should oversee compliance, where the submarines should be built, and what industrial base would sustain the program.This essay examines the programme through that shift. It argues that the case for a South Korean nuclear-powered submarine rests on three propositions that must stand together: first, that the capability is strategically necessary; second, that it is compatible with the global nonproliferation regime rather than an exception carved out from it; and third, that it can be governed with sufficient transparency that South Korea's allies need never rely on trust alone. The thread connecting these three propositions is neither the submarine nor its weapons, but the fuel that powers its reactor.2. The Case from Beneath the WaterlineThe argument for necessity begins with an uncomfortable reality: the threat South Korea must confront is itself going nuclear at sea. North Korea declared its intention to develop a nuclear-powered submarine at the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021, and it has since moved from aspiration to construction. In March 2025, Kim Jong-un inspected what North Korean state media described as a “nuclear-powered strategic guided-missile submarine” under construction. Later that year, he returned to unveil a completed hull reported to displace approximately 8,700 tonnes.²South Korean defense analysts assess that such a platform, if completed and successfully commissioned, could carry both submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Its capacity for prolonged submerged operations would significantly complicate the preemptive operational concepts on which the U.S.–ROK alliance has long relied.³ Whether Pyongyang can master naval nuclear propulsion on its own remains uncertain; whether external assistance could substantially accelerate that effort is the more consequential—and unsettling—question.⁴Against a submerged, mobile, missile-armed adversary, the limits of conventional propulsion are a matter not of prestige but of physics. A diesel-electric submarine must periodically surface or snorkel to recharge its batteries, and its submerged endurance is measured in days rather than months. By contrast, a nuclear-powered submarine can remain submerged for extended periods, transit across the theater at sustained speed, and maintain a persistent presence near an adversary's coast without surfacing. That endurance is precisely what is required to detect, track, and, if necessary, deter a strategic submarine before it can launch its missiles.South Korea's own development plans reflect this operational logic. They identify the substantially greater endurance, sustained submerged operations, and mobility provided by nuclear propulsion as essential to countering North Korea's submarine-based nuclear and missile threat.⁵There is also a broader alliance dividend. A South Korean submarine capable of conducting long-endurance anti-submarine warfare and sea-denial missions in its surrounding waters would allow U.S. submarines to concentrate on higher-priority requirements elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific. Properly understood, this is a contribution to alliance burden-sharing rather than a substitute for it.⁶3. The Fuel is the PolicyThe analysis now turns to the reactor—and to the single decision that does more than any other to make the programme strategically and politically defensible. South Korea has chosen to fuel its submarines with low-enriched uranium (LEU). The Ministry of National Defense's development plan, published on May 26, 2026, designates the programme as Jangbogo-N and specifies the use of LEU enriched to below 20 percent, paired with a long-life reactor core designed to minimize refueling over the submarine's operational life. The plan envisages launching the first boat in the mid-2030s following approximately a decade of development and construction.⁷The significance of that choice is best understood by comparison. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia fuel their naval reactors with highly enriched uranium (HEU)—weapons-grade material enriched to more than 90 percent—which allows for compact reactor cores capable of operating throughout a submarine's service life without refueling. Australia, under AUKUS, will receive submarines using the same HEU-based approach.⁸South Korea has deliberately chosen a different path. France, by contrast, has operated both its Rubis- and Barracuda-class submarines using low-enriched uranium (LEU) for decades, and Seoul's approach most closely resembles the French model rather than the Anglo-American one.⁹The trade-off is genuine and should be stated plainly. An LEU-fueled reactor stores less fissile material per unit volume than an HEU design, requiring a larger reactor core and periodic refueling over the submarine's service life. That, in turn, places greater demands on refueling infrastructure, maintenance planning, and fleet-availability management.10 South Korea is accepting these industrial and operational costs in exchange for a significant political and legal advantage: fuel that is not directly usable in nuclear weapons and is therefore far less likely to generate proliferation concerns.The reasoning is familiar in the energy sector. The true cost of a fuel is never measured solely by its energy density or price, but also by the system of dependence, oversight, and trust that accompanies it. Of all the fuels available for naval propulsion, low-enriched uranium carries the lightest burden in that regard.4. A Seat Inside the Regime, Not Outside ItFuel choice addresses the proliferation question at the level of physics; law and institutions must resolve it at the level of governance. South Korea proposes to remain exactly what it is: a non-nuclear-weapon state in full compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), while operating a class of vessel that, until AUKUS, had been fielded only by nuclear-weapon states.The programme's first commitment is unequivocal: the Republic of Korea will neither possess nor develop nuclear weapons of any kind.⁵ The capability it seeks is a conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarine—a platform designed for undersea surveillance, deterrence, and anti-submarine warfare, not the delivery of nuclear weapons. That distinction has also been reflected in the way the United States has described the programme.¹¹The legal pathway runs through a provision that lay largely dormant for more than half a century. The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement that every non-nuclear-weapon state concludes with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) contains, in Paragraph 14, a mechanism under which nuclear material may be used for a non-proscribed military purpose, such as naval propulsion, pursuant to a special arrangement with the Agency rather than being removed entirely from safeguards accountability. It is this provision that AUKUS brought back to the forefront, and it is through a comparable arrangement that South Korea's programme must proceed.10Two additional legal considerations shape that pathway. First, the bilateral agreement governing U.S.–ROK civil nuclear cooperation—the so-called "123 Agreement"—defines the legal framework for the transfer of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment. The November joint fact sheet makes clear that U.S. support for South Korea's eventual civil enrichment and reprocessing for peaceful purposes would remain consistent with both the 123 Agreement and U.S. law.Second, because naval nuclear propulsion falls outside the scope of ordinary civil nuclear cooperation, many analysts expect a dedicated bilateral arrangement for naval propulsion—analogous in principle, though not necessarily identical, to the separate legal framework established under AUKUS—rather than a simple amendment to the existing agreement.¹²None of this will happen automatically. It will require sustained engagement with the U.S. Congress, close coordination with the IAEA, and careful consultation with the broader nonproliferation community. The critical point, however, is the direction of travel: South Korea is seeking to work through the institutions of the nonproliferation regime, not around them.5. The Industrial SpineA nuclear-powered submarine programme is, before anything else, an industrial enterprise. It is in this respect that South Korea's case is especially compelling. The Ministry of National Defense's development plan describes the programme as a national industrial undertaking extending over approximately four decades—roughly a decade for development and construction, followed by three or more decades of operation.It brings together three sectors in which South Korea already possesses world-class capabilities: shipbuilding, civilian nuclear engineering, and defense manufacturing. The stated objective is to design, build, operate, maintain, fuel, and ultimately decommission these submarines domestically, drawing on an industrial base that has been developed over decades in both the nuclear and shipbuilding sectors.⁵Anyone who has walked the quaysides and fabrication halls where South Korea builds large commercial vessels and nuclear-energy infrastructure will recognize what that industrial base actually comprises: heavy-plate fabrication held to exacting tolerances; pressure-boundary welding certified to uncompromising standards; the complex logistics of modular assembly; and a domestic supplier network capable of producing primary nuclear components.The same heavy-engineering expertise that has made South Korean shipyards and their suppliers indispensable to the global maritime and nuclear-energy industries is precisely the expertise that a naval nuclear-propulsion programme demands.The decision to use low-enriched uranium, though less efficient from an engineering standpoint, carries a quiet industrial advantage. A reactor core requiring periodic refueling transforms what might otherwise be a one-time construction programme into a decades-long cycle of maintenance, refueling, overhaul, and life-cycle support—sovereign, sustained, and highly skilled work undertaken domestically rather than exported abroad.10This is precisely the logic reflected in the alliance's evolving maritime cooperation. The November joint fact sheet pairs support for South Korea's submarine programme with a bilateral shipbuilding initiative focused on maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO), workforce development, supply-chain resilience, and significant South Korean investment in U.S. shipbuilding infrastructure.¹ A country capable of sustaining its own naval reactors while also strengthening its ally's maritime industrial base is making an enduring contribution to alliance capability, not merely requesting a strategic concession.6. What Transparency BuysIt is tempting to view transparency as merely the price of admission—the inspections and safeguards accepted in exchange for the capability a state seeks to acquire. That framing, however, understates its strategic value. For a country in South Korea's position, verifiable transparency is not a concession extracted by skeptical partners; it is the strategic asset that makes the entire enterprise credible, sustainable, and politically durable.South Korea has, unusually, chosen to state its constraints in advance. Alongside its decisions on reactor fuel and domestic industrial development, the government's plan publicly commits the programme to fulfilling its nonproliferation obligations with full transparency, acquiring and managing low-enriched uranium in close consultation with the United States, and developing, together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a safeguards arrangement specifically tailored to naval nuclear propulsion.⁵When the Agency's Director General, Rafael Grossi, visited Seoul in the spring of 2026, his message mirrored that commitment: if South Korea builds these submarines, it must be able to demonstrate—openly, continuously, and verifiably—that their nuclear fuel has not been diverted.⁸ The United States, for its part, has consistently framed its cooperation as fully consistent with the highest nonproliferation standards.¹¹ These are not competing demands but complementary elements of the same governance architecture, viewed from three different institutional perspectives.The strategic value of that architecture is its durability. A capability granted as a bespoke exception is inherently fragile—vulnerable to the next administration, the next skeptical congressional committee, or the next state asking why it was denied the same opportunity. By contrast, a capability built on the least proliferation-sensitive fuel consistent with operational requirements, governed through an agreed safeguards arrangement, and publicly committed to before anyone demanded it is one that South Korea can defend in any forum where its legitimacy is questioned.That is the deeper logic of designing restraint into the programme from first principles rather than bolting it on afterward. Strategic necessity gives South Korea reason to ask. Permissibility and transparency are what allow it to keep the answer.The submarine itself will be silent beneath the surface because of its reactor. The programme that sustains it should aspire to the opposite: to be legible, accountable, and—for precisely that reason—enduring.References1. The White House, “Joint Fact Sheet on President Donald J. Trump’s Meeting with President Lee Jae Myung,” 13 November 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/11/joint-fact-sheet-on-president-donald-j-trumps-meeting-with-president-lee-jae-myung/2. Bizhankook, analysis of North Korea’s disclosed 8,700-tonne strategic nuclear-powered submarine, 29 December 2025. https://www.bizhankook.com/bk/article/310283. Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) assessment, reported in The Korea Economic Daily (Hankyung), 25 March 2025. https://www.hankyung.com/article/202503257196i4. Financial News (FN News), on North Korea’s naval nuclear build-up and external-assistance variable, 24 June 2026. https://www.fnnews.com/news/2026062408093156985. Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, “Basic Plan for the Development of the Republic of Korea’s Nuclear-Powered Submarine,” 26 May 2026 (National Strategy Portal). https://nsp.nanet.go.kr/plan/subject/detail.do?nationalPlanControlNo=PLAN00000634046. MBC News, on the Gyeongju summit, alliance burden-sharing and the domestic-build / low-enriched-fuel approach, 5 November 2025. https://imnews.imbc.com/replay/2025/nw1400/article/6772547_36776.html7. The Kyunghyang Shinmun, on the basic plan’s five principles, low-enriched-uranium fuel and launch timeline, 26 May 2026. https://www.khan.co.kr/article/202605261829001/8. Kookmin Ilbo, on the low-enriched-uranium and IAEA-cooperation approach, the highly-enriched fuel used by other operators, and IAEA Director General Grossi’s Seoul visit, 26 May 2026. https://www.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=17797868409. E-News Today, citing the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy on France’s low-enriched Rubis and Barracuda reactors, May 2026. https://www.enewstoday.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=243592210. Newspim, contributed analysis on low-enriched versus highly enriched naval fuel and the IAEA comprehensive-safeguards paragraph 14, 18 June 2026. https://www.newspim.com/news/view/2026061800114811. VOA Korean, U.S. Department of State statement supporting the ROK’s conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarine programme under the strongest non-proliferation standards, 28 May 2026. https://www.voakorea.com/a/state-department-u-s-supports-south-korea-s-nuclear-powered-submarine-program-052826/8154841.html12. The Sejong Institute, Sejong Focus, on the two routes for U.S.–ROK naval-fuel cooperation and the AUKUS naval nuclear-propulsion precedent, 2026. https://www.sejong.org/web/boad/1/egoread.php?bd=1&itm=&txt=&pg=2&seq=12917

The First Year of the Lee Jae-myung Administration: Achievements and Challenges in Foreign Policy and Economic Policy                    Son-taek WangVisiting ProfessorSogang UniversityAs the Lee Jae-myung administration marks its first anniversary, assessing its achievements and challenges in foreign policy and the economy is particularly instructive. Unlike most previous administrations, it assumed office amid simultaneous domestic and international crises.Within a year, however, the administration has moved beyond restoring political stability and has begun laying the foundations for a new phase of national development. Its performance in both foreign policy and economic management has exceeded many observers' expectations, owing largely to strategic policy choices and their consistent implementation.The administration's most significant foreign policy achievement during its first year has been the steady management of the ROK–U.S. alliance. The ROK–U.S. summit held in Washington, D.C., in July marked a decisive turning point in defining the direction of South Korea's foreign policy under the Lee administration. Despite these circumstances, the government, through careful preparation and agile diplomacy, successfully concluded the meeting, reaffirming the continuity and resilience of the alliance to both domestic and international audiences. Equally significant was the ROK–Japan summit that preceded the Washington meeting.By reaffirming his commitment to sustained trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and the ROK, President Lee Jae-myung demonstrated that South Korea's foreign policy would remain predictable, consistent, and firmly anchored in cooperation with its key democratic partners.The successful hosting of the APEC Summit in Gyeongju was another major diplomatic achievement. During the preparatory phase, concerns were raised about the adequacy of infrastructure and the government's readiness to manage an event of such scale.In the end, however, South Korea demonstrated its diplomatic competence by organizing the summit efficiently and effectively. Particularly noteworthy was its facilitation of a U.S.–China summit on the margins of the meeting, which underscored Seoul's growing role as a capable middle power and a trusted diplomatic convenor.The management of South Korea–China relations also deserves recognition. A bilateral summit between the two countries was held on the sidelines of the Gyeongju APEC meeting, followed by another summit in Beijing earlier this year, helping to place bilateral relations on a more stable and predictable footing.At a time of intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition, the Lee administration succeeded in reinforcing the ROK–U.S. alliance while preserving opportunities for constructive engagement with China. By maintaining this balance, Seoul reduced strategic uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula and expanded its diplomatic flexibility in an increasingly competitive regional environment.These diplomatic achievements also produced tangible economic benefits. Following President Trump's return to office, the United States' renewed tariff policies significantly disrupted the global trading system and heightened uncertainty in international markets.Given South Korea's heavy dependence on international trade, many observers anticipated that the country would face a substantial economic shock. The Lee administration, however, moved quickly to engage Washington through active negotiations, ultimately securing trade terms broadly comparable to those obtained by South Korea's major competitors.Moreover, the administration did not view U.S. requests for expanded Korean investment in the United States simply as a burden arising from tariff negotiations. Instead, it treated them as an opportunity to broaden South Korea's access to the U.S. market and deepen bilateral industrial and technological cooperation. This approach reflected a broader strategy of transforming short-term trade frictions into longer-term economic and strategic partnerships.Equally significant was the progress made on long-standing issues in bilateral strategic cooperation. U.S. support for South Korea's development of conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines, together with progress toward expanding South Korea's domestic uranium enrichment capabilities for peaceful purposes, represented important steps toward resolving policy issues that had remained under discussion for decades.The improved relationship between the South Korean and U.S. governments also facilitated expanded cooperation between firms in both countries in the field of artificial intelligence, contributing to increased investment, exports, and corporate revenues. These developments strengthened South Korea's position in one of the world's fastest-growing strategic industries while reinforcing the broader economic partnership between the two allies.Financial markets also responded positively to the administration's economic agenda. The KOSPI index, which stood at approximately 2,700 when the administration took office, surpassed the 8,000-point mark within less than a year.Although this remarkable performance reflected multiple factors—including the global boom in artificial intelligence and favorable international market conditions—the administration's efforts to improve corporate governance, enhance market transparency, and pursue its long-term objective of raising the KOSPI above 5,000 also helped strengthen investor confidence.Taken together, these achievements were not the product of chance but of deliberate policy choices and consistent implementation. Among the factors underlying these stronger-than-expected outcomes, the most significant was the administration's unwavering commitment to maintaining and strengthening the ROK–U.S. alliance while preserving trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and the ROK.then–Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung repeatedly reaffirmed both his commitment to, and vision for, a strong ROK–U.S. alliance. After assuming office, he continued to emphasize alliance-centered diplomacy, helping restore international confidence in South Korea's strategic direction.Had uncertainty surrounding the alliance persisted, coordination with the United States on security, tariff negotiations, investment, and other bilateral initiatives would almost certainly have become more difficult. By reaffirming policy continuity at an early stage, the administration reduced strategic uncertainty and created a more favorable environment for diplomatic and economic cooperation.A second factor behind the administration's performance was its steady management of relations with neighboring countries. While reaffirming that the ROK–U.S. alliance remains the cornerstone of South Korea's foreign policy, the administration also made clear that it did not seek confrontation with China, thereby preserving opportunities for constructive and mutually beneficial cooperation. In its relations with Russia, it adopted a pragmatic approach that upheld fundamental principles while avoiding unnecessary escalation. Although no major breakthrough was achieved in relations with North Korea, the administration pursued policies aimed at reducing military tensions while keeping the door open to dialogue. Taken together, these policies helped maintain regional stability and reduced strategic uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula.A third factor was the administration's strategy of balancing greater strategic self-reliance with strong alliances and broader international cooperation. While reaffirming the ROK–U.S. alliance as the cornerstone of South Korea's foreign and security policy, the administration also articulated a clear commitment to the eventual transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) and to strengthening the country's independent defense capabilities. Alliance and strategic self-reliance should not be viewed as competing concepts but as mutually reinforcing pillars of national security. Strengthening deterrence through the alliance while enhancing South Korea's strategic autonomy and bargaining power through greater self-reliance is well suited to the country's geopolitical circumstances.Rather than emphasizing either alliance dependence or inter-Korean engagement as the primary organizing principle of foreign policy, the Lee administration has sought to integrate alliance cooperation, strategic autonomy, and regional diplomacy into a more balanced national security strategy.Despite these accomplishments, significant challenges remain. First, South Korea should gradually restore a more institutionalized framework for conducting foreign and trade policy. Over the past year, President Trump's unconventional negotiating style made it largely unavoidable for policy coordination to be concentrated in the Office of the President.In the medium to long term, however, greater responsibility should be delegated back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, and other relevant ministries. Strengthening the role of these institutions would promote greater policy continuity, improve administrative capacity, and ensure a more sustainable and resilient decision-making process.Another important priority is the effective implementation of the K-Initiative through an integrated, whole-of-government approach. Proposed by President Lee Jae-myung, the K-Initiative seeks to elevate South Korea's policy capabilities to world-leading standards across a broad range of sectors while enabling the country to assume a more proactive leadership role in addressing regional and global challenges.South Korea already enjoys significant international recognition for its economic competitiveness, democratic resilience, cultural influence, and leadership in advanced technologies. The next challenge is to convert these strengths into greater strategic influence by integrating them into a coherent national strategy that enhances both hard and soft power.To achieve this objective, the government should establish a high-level cross-ministerial task force with the authority to coordinate policy across relevant ministries and agencies, ensure strategic coherence, and oversee implementation. Building such an institutional mechanism should be one of the administration's highest priorities during its second year in office.Finally, improving inter-Korean relations will require patience, strategic consistency, and careful preparation. North Korea's continued adherence to its hostile "two-state" policy has made meaningful progress difficult. Even so, the administration's realistic objective of reducing military tensions while preserving the possibility of dialogue represents a constructive and pragmatic approach.Going forward, the South Korean government should continue to demonstrate its readiness for engagement while preparing practical measures that can be implemented when opportunities for cooperation reemerge. Lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula will not be achieved through short-term political developments, but through sustained strategic commitment, consistent diplomacy, and long-term patience.The administration's first year was defined by efforts to overcome serious domestic and international crises while restoring national stability. At the same time, it laid the groundwork for South Korea's next stage of development. Its achievements in diplomacy and the economy were not inevitable but reflected deliberate strategic choices made under exceptionally difficult circumstances.Looking ahead, if the Lee Jae-myung administration continues to strengthen the ROK–U.S. alliance, maintain balanced relations with neighboring countries, and pursue a foreign policy that integrates strategic self-reliance with international cooperation, it will be well positioned to open a new chapter of sustainable growth and national development over the remainder of its term.

Strengthening South Korea’s Role as a Globally Responsible Power Through the President’s Participation in the G7 Summit and European Tour                    Soo-hyoung LeeSenior Advisor Institute for National Security StrategyThe Lee Jae-myung administration came to office at a time of growing geopolitical uncertainty and intensifying strategic competition. In response to these challenges, it has pursued a foreign policy centered on pragmatic diplomacy and the advancement of South Korea's national interests. Within this framework, the administration has developed a diplomatic strategy designed to enhance South Korea's role as a responsible global power through practical, interest-based engagement across three interconnected but distinct dimensions.The first track emphasizes the pursuit of peaceful coexistence between North and South Korea, which the administration regards as the essential foundation for South Korea's development as a responsible global power. The second track involves strengthening and managing relations with major regional stakeholders, including the United States, China, Japan, and Russia. Given their direct influence on the security environment of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, these relationships play a critical role in shaping the prospects for inter-Korean stability, regional peace, and strategic cooperation.The third track, which most directly embodies the Lee Jae-myung administration's vision of South Korea as a "responsible global power," focuses on global multilateral diplomacy aimed at strengthening solidarity and cooperation with major middle powers and contributing to a stable, predictable, and rules-based international order.Rather than functioning independently, these three tracks form mutually reinforcing layers of a comprehensive diplomatic strategy. Progress in one area can generate positive effects in the others, creating synergies that enhance South Korea's overall diplomatic influence and strategic flexibility.Since assuming office in June 2025, the Lee Jae-myung administration has taken initial steps toward advancing South Korea's role as a "responsible global power" through active participation in major international forums, including the G7 Summit and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit scheduled to be held in Gyeongju in October 2026.The President's recent European tour from June 9 to 18, including his participation in the G7 Summit, constituted a significant diplomatic effort to strengthen South Korea's international standing and reinforce its image as a responsible and constructive contributor to global affairs.The principal achievements of this diplomatic initiative can be summarized as follows:Strengthening Strategic Cooperation with EuropeFirst, the Korea–EU Summit held on June 10 built upon a series of high-level engagements with key European partners, including France, Italy, Germany, and Poland. The summit marked an important milestone in the Lee Jae-myung administration's efforts to deepen engagement with Europe and underscored South Korea's commitment to strengthening international cooperation and supporting a more resilient multilateral order.At the summit, South Korea and the European Union adopted a joint statement reaffirming their shared commitment to expanding cooperation across a broad range of areas, including security, defense, trade, investment, science and technology, and people-to-people exchanges. Both sides also pledged to work closely together in addressing challenges to multilateralism and responding to structural changes in the global economy and international trading system.In particular, the conclusion of the Digital Trade Agreement between South Korea and the European Union—the world's largest single market and South Korea's third-largest trading partner—will help establish a more stable, transparent, and predictable framework for digital trade. The agreement is intended to facilitate cross-border digital commerce, strengthen consumer protection, and promote cooperation in emerging sectors of the global economy, where digital connectivity is playing an increasingly important role.South Korea and the EU also agreed to deepen security cooperation by launching negotiations on a Security of Information Agreement and concluding an agreement on the transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data. These measures are expected to enhance information-sharing, strengthen institutional cooperation, and improve coordination in addressing transnational security challenges.Regarding the outcomes of the EU Summit, National Security Advisor Wi Seong-rak noted that both sides shared a common understanding of the need to explore ways to address the erosion of multilateralism and emerging shifts in the global economic and trade environment. He further emphasized that the two sides engaged in constructive cooperation to ensure that the EU’s ongoing regulatory initiatives do not inadvertently create new barriers to trade.During the Korea–Italy Summit on June 11, the two countries agreed to elevate their bilateral relationship to a "Special Strategic Partnership," marking a new stage in the development of their ties. As a key member of both the G7 and the European Union, Italy is an important partner for South Korea in addressing shared global challenges amid an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment.The two sides also adopted the 2026–2030 Korea–Italy Strategic Action Plan, which was originally proposed by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni during her visit to South Korea in January. The plan provides a framework for expanding cooperation across a wide range of areas, including the economy, science and technology, culture, education, people-to-people exchanges, defense, and public safety.Reaffirming the Vision of Peace on the Korean PeninsulaMeanwhile, in a commemorative address delivered on June 14 at the “Special Mass for Peace and Solidarity” held at the Basilica of St. Paul Outside the Walls in Rome, President Lee Jae-myung once again underscored the importance of peaceful coexistence between North and South Korea.President Lee made clear that his administration does not seek absorption-based unification or engage in a zero-sum competition between the two political systems. Instead, he reaffirmed his commitment to moving beyond the current armistice framework and working toward the establishment of a durable and sustainable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.He also highlighted the importance of establishing a virtuous cycle in which progress toward peace on the Korean Peninsula contributes to broader international peace and stability, while global cooperation and solidarity help create conditions conducive to peace on the peninsula.South Korea’s Role at the G7 SummitAt the G7 Summit held in Évian, France, on June 16–17, President Lee Jae-myung engaged in extensive discussions with fellow leaders on a range of pressing international issues, including development cooperation, global economic imbalances, artificial intelligence, and digital transformation.The summit underscored the growing importance of international cooperation in responding to increasingly complex transnational challenges. In each session, President Lee shared South Korea's policy experiences and perspectives, highlighting the country's capacity to contribute to global governance, technological innovation, and sustainable development. In particular, President Lee highlighted South Korea’s role as a responsible global power capable of serving as a bridge between developed and developing countries. He emphasized that the G7’s efforts to promote global development should be based on mutually beneficial cooperation and inclusive partnerships.President Lee also presented South Korea's vision of a "Global AI Society," in which the benefits of advances in artificial intelligence are shared broadly across humanity. During a session on forging new partnerships through development cooperation, President Lee observed:“As public resources alone are insufficient to meet growing development needs, we need partnerships in which development assistance, investment, technology, and institutional capacity work together.”He further highlighted the importance of mobilizing private-sector investment to address the growing gap in development financing caused by declining aid resources. As an example, he cited a project implemented by the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), which supported local startups in Indonesia and helped leverage approximately $50 million in private investment through an initial grant contribution of just $1 million.These initiatives reflect South Korea's evolving role in the international community—not merely as a beneficiary of the international system, but as a responsible contributor committed to advancing global cooperation, stability, and sustainable development.President Lee Jae-myung's participation in the G7 Summit is expected to yield several important outcomes. First, it will help lay the groundwork for consolidating South Korea's position as a "G7 Plus" country with growing global responsibilities, following its participation in the summit for a second consecutive year since June 2025.Second, South Korea seeks to make a more active contribution to international efforts aimed at addressing shared global challenges and supporting G7 initiatives in areas such as global economic imbalances, critical minerals, digital transformation, and transnational threats, including illicit drug trafficking. At the same time, the South Korean government aims to build on these efforts and strengthen the country's leadership role in global governance in preparation for its chairmanship of the G20 in 2028.If the APEC Summit held in Gyeongju last October marked South Korea's initial step toward becoming a responsible global power and provided an opportunity to redefine a national identity commensurate with that role, then President Lee Jae-myung's participation in the G7 Summit and his European tour are significant in that they have helped lay the foundation for enhancing South Korea's strategic autonomy as a responsible global actor.At the G7 Summit, President Lee Jae-myung held a direct meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump and urged him to play a leading role in pursuing a peaceful resolution to the North Korean issue, thereby advancing diplomatic efforts to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table.President Lee also engaged in close consultations with President Trump on a range of global and regional issues, including the ROK-U.S. alliance, developments in the Middle East, and challenges on the Korean Peninsula. President Trump responded positively, pledging to “play the necessary role for peace on the Korean Peninsula.” This underscores the South Korean government’s continued commitment to advancing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.This approach seeks to promote universal values and openness within the international system at a time of intensifying great-power competition, growing economic and security fragmentation, and the persistence of hierarchical power structures. At the same time, it emphasizes cooperation and solidarity with major middle powers that share a common interest in preserving a stable, inclusive, and rules-based international order.As South Korea aspires to become a responsible global power, it must further consolidate the international identity and standing that such a role requires. Historically, the Korean Peninsula's location at the crossroads of major civilizations and competing great-power interests exposed it to prolonged periods of external intervention, colonial rule, national division, and hardship.Today, however, South Korea is fundamentally different from the country it once was. It has emerged as a nation that commands international attention and contributes meaningfully to addressing major global challenges.Despite its relatively limited territorial size and the unique geopolitical reality of remaining the world's only divided nation, South Korea has emerged as a capable and responsible actor on a wide range of international issues. According to assessments by leading international media outlets and research institutions, South Korea is now widely regarded as one of the world's most influential middle powers.Beyond the traditional major powers such as the United States, China, and Russia, South Korea increasingly occupies a position comparable to that of leading European countries—including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—in terms of its economic strength, technological capabilities, diplomatic influence, and contributions to global governance.In this sense, South Korea has overcome the historical legacy of peripheralization and colonial rule, transforming experiences of hardship and adversity into a foundation for constructive and responsible engagement with the international community.The next challenge is to build a broader domestic and international consensus—across intellectual, institutional, and societal spheres—regarding South Korea's identity, responsibilities, and role in global affairs. On the basis of this shared understanding, South Korea can further institutionalize and consolidate its position as a responsible global power.To effectively project the Republic of Korea's identity as a responsible global power and communicate its role to the international community, South Korea must first articulate the core principles that define such a role.A South Korea that has emerged as a responsible global power should embody a spirit of confidence, openness, and responsibility grounded in both contemporary global realities and the country's unique historical experience.This identity should not merely replicate conventional interpretations of liberal democratic values. Rather, it should reflect South Korea's own historical trajectory, developmental experience, and strategic circumstances, while remaining consistent with universal principles of democracy, human rights, peace, and international cooperation.As a responsible global power, the Republic of Korea bears both historical and contemporary responsibility to transform the constraints that once produced national suffering into sources of opportunity and constructive engagement. Through this transformation, South Korea can contribute to preventing the recurrence of historical tragedies that brought hardship not only to the Korean Peninsula but also to the broader Northeast Asian region.To fulfill this responsibility effectively, the Lee Jae-myung administration must advance a vision of South Korea grounded in national confidence, openness, and inclusive international cooperation as it seeks to consolidate its role as a responsible global power.South Korea must maintain a sense of national confidence that resists excessive dependence or undue deference in the face of pressure from major powers that continue to exercise significant military and economic influence. At the same time, in strengthening cooperation with smaller and middle-sized countries, it should avoid any perception of superiority or exclusivity.Instead, South Korea should embrace a spirit of openness and inclusiveness, actively pursuing cooperation—and, where necessary, solidarity—with countries across the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia, and the countries across the globeWithout a firm commitment to national confidence and inclusive engagement, it will be difficult to establish and sustain South Korea's role as a responsible global power.The Republic of Korea's emergence as a responsible global power grounded in confidence and inclusiveness is not merely an aspirational slogan. Rather, it reflects the country's current international position and the outcome of a careful assessment of its objective capabilities, strategic environment, and leadership potential.In an international system still shaped by major powers—where strategic competition among great powers persists despite trends toward multipolarity, and where hierarchical structures remain embedded in global supply chains and security architectures—the need for national agency is closely linked to South Korea's geopolitical reality. The Korean Peninsula continues to occupy a strategically significant position at the intersection of major power interests, particularly those of the United States and China.At the same time, South Korea's commitment to inclusiveness is rooted in its own historical experience: its transformation from a recipient of international assistance into a contributor to global cooperation; its earlier marginalization within the international system; its colonial past; and the enduring tragedy of national division. These experiences have collectively shaped South Korea's commitment to peaceful coexistence, shared prosperity, and international cooperation.This approach is also consistent with the Lee Jae-myung administration's foreign policy orientation, which seeks to strengthen multilateralism and promote open and inclusive regional and global institutions amid an increasingly fragmented and unstable international environment.South Korea's international position, together with the historical responsibilities facing the Lee Jae-myung administration and the demands of the current international environment, is reflected in the concept of a responsible global power grounded in confidence and inclusiveness.For the Republic of Korea as a divided nation, the pursuit of an inclusive and peace-oriented state is not merely a policy objective of a particular administration. Rather, it represents a long-term national mission that transcends changes in government.As President Lee Jae-myung stated in his commemorative address at the “Special Mass for Peace and Solidarity,” the establishment of a foundation for peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula represents the first step toward becoming an inclusive, peace-oriented nation and a critical pillar in the construction of a responsible global power.President Lee's attendance at the G7 Summit and his European tour should be understood as an opportunity to plant new seeds for peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula and to lay a durable foundation for South Korea's role as a responsible global power in the international community.