An Analysis of North Korea’s Foreign Strategy and Policy Proposals for Improving Inter-Korean Relations                    Yong-hwan ChoiInstitute for National Security StrategyNorth Korea recently convened its Party Congress and the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA). The Ninth Party Congress—its first in five years—reviewed achievements since the Eighth Congress and set forth a national governance strategy for the next five years. Subsequently, the 15th SPA, North Korea’s highest legislative body and the functional equivalent of South Korea’s National Assembly, was constituted and convened.These domestic political developments unfolded amid a period of significant international turbulence, including the outbreak of conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran in the Middle East. Against this backdrop, this paper examines the foreign policy orientations articulated at North Korea’s most consequential political gatherings, assesses the implications of recent geopolitical developments, and identifies policy considerations for advancing peace on the Korean Peninsula and improving inter-Korean relations.Recent Trends and Changes in North Korea’s Foreign and Inter-Korean StrategiesSince the Eighth Party Congress in 2021, North Korea has pursued a foreign policy strategy that leverages what it characterizes as a “new Cold War structure.” At its core, this strategy seeks to deepen ties with China and Russia in order to offset pressure from the United States and its allies, capitalizing on the deterioration of U.S.-China and Russia-West relations amid intensifying strategic competition and the Russia-Ukraine war.In effect, Pyongyang assesses that shifts in the international system are creating expanded strategic space beyond the reach of the United States and the broader Western coalition, and it has actively sought to exploit these conditions.This assessment is reinforced by the erosion of great-power consensus within the United Nations Security Council, which has significantly constrained the body’s capacity to respond to international crises. Even in instances of clear violations of UN Security Council resolutions by North Korea, additional sanctions have not been adopted because of opposition from China and Russia.Moreover, the Russia-Ukraine war has provided a particularly favorable geopolitical environment for North Korea’s strategy. Notably, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in its 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment that North Korea currently occupies its most advantageous strategic position in decades.Several defining characteristics of North Korea’s evolving foreign strategy can be identified. First, the center of gravity in Pyongyang’s diplomacy has shifted from the United States toward China and Russia. Whereas North Korea previously operated under the assumption of a U.S.-led unipolar order, it now perceives the international system as transitioning toward a multipolar—or “new Cold War”—configuration.As a result, relations with Beijing and Moscow have assumed parity with, if not greater importance than, relations with Washington. This shift has also altered the traditional pattern of North Korean diplomacy, which typically oscillated between crisis escalation and negotiation with the United States. With alternative strategic partners available, Pyongyang faces reduced pressure to enter negotiations with Washington on an expedited timeline.Second, North Korea’s approach extends beyond passive alignment within a bloc structure; it reflects a willingness to actively shape and, if necessary, reinforce Cold War–style confrontation dynamics. Pyongyang appears to calculate that a polarized alignment—pitting the United States, South Korea, and Japan against North Korea, China, and Russia—does not disadvantage its strategic position.Indeed, it has signaled its readiness to help construct such a configuration. This orientation was reflected in statements by Kim Jong-un during the 11th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee in late 2024, where he emphasized the need to create a “favorable external environment through proactive and offensive foreign activities.”Third, North Korea’s growing confidence in its nuclear capabilities underpins its more assertive foreign policy posture. Nuclear weapons have become central to its national strategy, significantly diminishing the likelihood of denuclearization through negotiations. In a September 2025 address to the SPA, Kim Jong-un asserted that “the balance of power in the region is guaranteed by our physical deterrent,” signaling North Korea’s self-identification as a “strategic state” capable of shaping regional dynamics.Fourth, Pyongyang’s exploitation of the “new Cold War structure” is closely linked to its “two hostile states” framework for inter-Korean relations. If North Korea seeks to sustain and benefit from bloc-based confrontation, maintaining a state of hostility toward South Korea becomes strategically consistent with that objective.At the Ninth Party Congress, North Korea emphasized that the current international environment differs fundamentally from that of five years earlier, highlighting heightened instability and unpredictability. It attributed this turbulence to the actions of the United States and its allies, while asserting that national survival and development can be secured only through strength.Accordingly, Pyongyang reaffirmed that it will not relinquish its status as a nuclear-armed state, framing its nuclear forces as both a guarantor of security and a stabilizing mechanism for safeguarding national interests and development. At the same time, it articulated a more proactive foreign policy vision, asserting that a “fair and just multipolar world” should be constructed—with North Korea playing a central role. This formulation aligns closely with Russia’s vision of the international order, suggesting a convergence in strategic outlook between Pyongyang and Moscow and implying sustained bilateral alignment even beyond the Russia–Ukraine war.Two notable departures from past foreign policy frameworks were also evident. First, the Ninth Party Congress placed increased emphasis on the role of the Party Central Committee and on “national interests” in foreign policymaking. Given the traditionally dominant role of the supreme leader in North Korea’s political system, the explicit elevation of the Party Central Committee’s role in foreign affairs is particularly notable.While this may enhance policy agility, it could also constrain flexibility at the working level. Second, North Korea adopted a “conditional hardline” posture toward the United States—leaving open the possibility of dialogue—while simultaneously reaffirming its commitment to the “two hostile states” framework in inter-Korean relations.Pyongyang indicated that improved relations with Washington would be possible if the United States respects its status and abandons what it characterizes as a hostile policy. This formulation effectively places the onus for dialogue on the United States. In contrast, North Korea described the past eight decades of inter-Korean relations as “abnormal” and framed the hostile two-state paradigm as a long-term strategic choice rather than a temporary tactic.Prospects for the Middle East Conflict and Implications for North Korea’s StrategyIn response to the outbreak of hostilities involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, North Korea condemned U.S. and Israeli actions as illegal and as violations of sovereignty. At the same time, it engaged in limited military signaling, including a visit by Kim Jong-un to the destroyer Choe Hyon and a test launch of a strategic cruise missile. Notably, however, Pyongyang refrained from direct personal criticism of U.S. President Donald Trump and avoided high-level provocations such as intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests.Nevertheless, U.S. military actions targeting leadership structures in Iran are likely to heighten North Korea’s threat perceptions and reduce its willingness to engage in dialogue with Washington in the near term. At the same time, given the uncertain trajectory of the conflict, Pyongyang appears inclined to adopt a cautious, wait-and-see posture.Taken together, recent political developments and North Korea’s response to shifting international dynamics suggest a transition from a relatively passive strategy of exploiting great-power rivalry to a more active, multipolar foreign policy orientation. While continuity remains in its effort to leverage strategic space beyond U.S. influence, the Ninth Party Congress underscored a more assertive ambition to shape the emerging international order.Looking ahead, North Korea is likely to expand its diplomatic engagement not only with traditional partners such as China and Russia, but also with countries in the Global South. Early indications of this trend include high-level exchanges such as the March 25 visit by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.These developments may also be connected to broader initiatives associated with a “new Eurasian security architecture,” as articulated by Russian President Vladimir Putin, including efforts such as the proposed “Eurasian Charter” involving North Korea, Russia, Belarus, Iran, and Myanmar.By contrast, inter-Korean relations are expected to remain in a prolonged state of stalemate. North Korea’s current approach—characterized by strategic indifference rather than active escalation—suggests a continued freeze in bilateral engagement. While Pyongyang has left open the possibility of dialogue with the United States, the trajectory of U.S. policy—particularly in the context of ongoing Middle East tensions—will be a decisive factor. The key question remains whether Washington can present a proposal that North Korea deems sufficiently credible and advantageous to warrant engagement.Challenges for Promoting Peace on the Korean Peninsula and Improving Inter-Korean RelationsGiven that “hostility” and “two states” are not inherently synonymous, near- to medium-term policy toward North Korea should prioritize the mitigation of hostility. Effective crisis management between the two Koreas is essential, as even an inadvertent military clash would significantly impede any transition to dialogue.Once hostility is reduced, attention should shift to clarifying South Korea’s policy posture and normative rationale regarding a “two-state” framework, alongside building a durable domestic consensus. Under the current constitutional framework, which remains oriented toward unification, a central question is whether the concept of unification can be broadened beyond territorial and institutional integration to encompass economic and cultural convergence.Over the medium to long term, it will be critical to reassess approaches that place primary emphasis on resolving the “North Korean nuclear issue first” or on incremental nuclear reductions alone, both of which tend to reinforce the realist dynamics of inter-Korean relations.Given the prevailing skepticism—not only in North Korea but also among regional stakeholders—regarding the feasibility of resolving the nuclear issue, insisting on prior denuclearization is likely to constrain any transition to dialogue. In the absence of effective external mechanisms to compel denuclearization, it is necessary to develop a strategy for managing the nuclear issue through a framework of “strategic stability.”Leveraging a potential U.S.–China summit to catalyze the resumption of U.S.–North Korea dialogue—and subsequently extend that momentum to inter-Korean engagement—will be inherently challenging. Persuading third parties, particularly the United States and China, to bring North Korea to the negotiating table is difficult, and even if a U.S.–North Korea summit were convened, there remains a risk that it could prove largely symbolic or episodic.To facilitate a substantive shift on the Korean Peninsula, it is first necessary to establish stability, peace, and denuclearization as shared regional objectives across Northeast Asia, including among North Korea’s key partners, China and Russia.Accordingly, a central policy question is whether China and Russia—both of which play pivotal roles in North Korea’s external strategy—can be effectively engaged or, at a minimum, incentivized to maintain a neutral posture on Korean Peninsula issues. While South Korea’s capacity to directly influence Beijing and Moscow is inherently limited, it is nonetheless important to create conditions under which their positions do not actively constrain diplomatic progress.Historically, North Korea has entered negotiations when it has assessed such engagement to be in its own strategic interest, rather than as a result of external inducement alone. In this regard, the ability to alter the current strategic calculus on the Korean Peninsula will be a decisive factor in determining whether a meaningful transition to dialogue can be achieved.※ This article is a revised and reorganized version of the presentation “Analysis of North Korea’s Foreign Strategy and Measures for Improving Inter-Korean Relations,” delivered at the 77th Unification Strategy Forum hosted by the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University.

A Three-Step Framework for Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Issue and Promoting Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula under U.S.–North Korea Summit Diplomacy                    Kyung-joo JeonChief,Korean Peninsula Security Research Division,Center for Security and Strategy, Korea Institute for Defense AnalysesWill a U.S.–North Korea summit take place this year? Will such a summit serve as a meaningful opportunity to advance peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula? To date, the Government of the Republic of Korea has devoted considerable diplomatic capital to ensuring that both questions receive affirmative answers. However, recent developments have introduced new uncertainty.Reports indicate that U.S. President Donald Trump has postponed the U.S.–China summit until May, citing the U.S. airstrikes on Iran and the protracted nature of the Middle East conflict. This shift has weakened the momentum underpinning Seoul’s expectations and raised questions as to whether the previously observed willingness for dialogue between the United States and North Korea remains intact in the aftermath of the Iran strikes.Will U.S.-North Korea talks resume after the airstrikes on Iran?a. The U.S. government’s existing stance on North Korea’s nuclear programIn contrast to President Trump’s comparatively conciliatory rhetoric toward Kim Jong-un, the broader U.S. government has maintained—and in some respects strengthened—sanctions on North Korea’s nuclear program since the outset of the Trump administration.To constrain Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile development, Washington has employed a wide array of sanctions instruments through the Departments of the Treasury, State, and Commerce. While such measures are unlikely to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, they are intended to slow both the horizontal and vertical proliferation of its capabilities. These efforts encompass not only restrictions on the transfer of nuclear materials and technologies, but also the disruption of the financial networks and revenue streams that support its nuclear and missile programs.For example, in May 2025, the U.S. Department of State designated North Korea as a “Not Fully Cooperating Country” for the 29th consecutive year.1)In January 2026, the United States also imposed sanctions on six individuals and entities for their alleged involvement in the illicit transfer of WMD- and missile-related materials and technologies to North Korea, Iran, and Syria.2)On March 12, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) further expanded sanctions by designating six individuals and two entities accused of infiltrating U.S. companies through the deployment of IT specialists in order to exfiltrate sensitive information and channel funds to North Korea’s WMD programs.3)Taken together, these measures suggest that, notwithstanding President Trump’s occasional remarks that could be interpreted as tacit recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status and his repeated expressions of openness to dialogue, such rhetoric does not necessarily imply substantive policy concessions.In this regard, Kevin Kim, former Acting U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, noted on December 8, 2025, that President Trump seeks to negotiate with North Korea “from a position of overwhelming superiority,” emphasizing the continued importance of sanctions and human rights concerns as sources of leverage. In other words, even as he has pursued diplomatic engagement, President Trump has underscored the need to maintain pressure on Pyongyang.From Pyongyang’s perspective, however, this posture constitutes the essence of what it characterizes as the United States’ “hostile policy toward the DPRK,” as articulated at the Ninth Party Congress. North Korea has consistently maintained that peaceful coexistence is possible only if Washington abandons policies aimed at denying its status as a nuclear-armed state; conversely, it has warned that continued confrontation will be met with reciprocal measures.b. Following the Airstrikes on IranThe U.S. airstrikes on Iran, initiated in late February and continuing at present, underscore the firm stance of both the U.S. government and President Trump against the illicit acquisition of nuclear weapons. Washington has repeatedly framed the objective of the campaign as preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons capability. Should this hardline approach be applied directly to North Korea, it becomes increasingly difficult to assume that Pyongyang would be treated with the same degree of moderation observed previously.In such a scenario, the United States may apply similarly stringent standards to North Korea’s nuclear program, and the possibility of considering military options—should Pyongyang show no willingness to abandon its arsenal—cannot be entirely excluded. It is well documented that President Trump seriously contemplated military options against North Korea during his first term.4)Nevertheless, a firm stance on nuclear nonproliferation does not automatically translate into a preference for military action. It is equally plausible that President Trump could adopt a more proactive yet diplomatically oriented approach toward North Korea, distinct from his policy toward Iran. This distinction stems from the fact that North Korea already possesses operational nuclear weapons, which U.S. intelligence agencies assess to be deliverable to the U.S. mainland through intercontinental ballistic missiles.5)Moreover, North Korea’s strategic alignment with China and Russia—both nuclear-armed states and principal competitors of the United States—further complicates the strategic calculus. Given the risks of regional escalation already demonstrated in the Middle East, it is unlikely that Washington would readily accept the prospect of a similar or even greater escalation on the Korean Peninsula.Accordingly, once hostilities with Iran subside, the Trump administration is more likely to prioritize diplomatic engagement with North Korea over military options. Should the United States proceed with a rescheduled summit with China and secure Beijing’s cooperation, the likelihood of pursuing parallel or subsequent dialogue with Pyongyang would increase.Such an approach would also allow President Trump to reinforce his image as a leader committed to peace. Notably, there is broad consensus among policymakers, the media, and experts in the United States that the complete denuclearization of North Korea is not a realistic near-term objective. Under these conditions, it may be politically advantageous for President Trump to attribute past shortcomings to previous administrations while demonstrating a willingness to pursue pragmatic, incremental steps toward denuclearization.At the same time, North Korea’s receptivity to renewed dialogue may have shifted in the wake of the Iran airstrikes. Pyongyang, which previously declined U.S. overtures during the APEC summit in Gyeongju, has now observed Washington’s demonstrated willingness and capability to undertake high-risk military operations. From Kim Jong-un’s perspective, the perceived costs of misreading U.S. intentions may therefore have risen.At the same time, however, these developments may also deepen Pyongyang’s mistrust of U.S. diplomatic overtures and reinforce its commitment to retaining its nuclear deterrent. Consequently, if the United States were to pursue dialogue through formal diplomatic channels—beyond informal signaling via the media—it is less certain that North Korea would categorically reject engagement, even if denuclearization remains on the agenda. Even in the absence of an imminent military option, Pyongyang may remain concerned about the potential for additional forms of U.S. pressure or retaliation.In sum, the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue in the post-Iran strike environment will depend primarily on President Trump’s political will. While Kim Jong-un may exhibit greater caution toward engagement than at the time of the Ninth Party Congress, a credible and good-faith diplomatic initiative from Washington would be more difficult for Pyongyang to dismiss outright, even if discussions encompass denuclearization.Strategies for Pursuing Peace on the Korean Peninsula by Leveraging U.S.–North Korea Summit DiplomacyGiven that the prospects for U.S.–North Korea dialogue depend largely on the political will of President Trump and the support of his administration, the Republic of Korea’s policy orientation in this context should be directed primarily toward Washington rather than Pyongyang. Direct efforts by Seoul to initiate dialogue with North Korea or to independently improve inter-Korean relations are likely to prove counterproductive.This reflects not only North Korea’s long-articulated “two hostile states” framework, but also Kim Jong-un’s consistent preference for excluding South Korea from U.S.–North Korea negotiations.6) Indeed, the more actively South Korea seeks to position itself within, or derive gains from U.S.–North Korea dialogue, the greater the risk that Pyongyang will disengage from the process.Paradoxically, the most fundamental principle that Seoul must uphold while encouraging U.S.–North Korea dialogue is its unwavering commitment to denuclearization. Any perception that South Korea is prioritizing dialogue for its own sake risks generating suspicion in Washington that Seoul is retreating from the objective of denuclearization under the guise of reducing tensions or improving inter-Korean relations.Such perceptions would undermine policy credibility and weaken Seoul’s ability to influence U.S. decision-making. Accordingly, while supporting renewed dialogue, South Korea must consistently emphasize that such engagement should aim to meaningfully constrain North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and, over the longer term, advance denuclearization. This position must be articulated as the only viable pathway to durable peace on the Korean Peninsula.At the same time, the South Korean government should prioritize the institutionalization of robust prior consultation mechanisms with the United States to ensure that any bilateral U.S.–North Korea engagement does not diverge from South Korea’s core security interests. The experience of 2018 underscores the importance of maintaining strong working-level coordination, particularly in contexts where leader-level decision-making can exert disproportionate influence.The ultimate objective of dialogue is sustainable peace, and Seoul must therefore communicate clearly that the agenda, sequencing, incentive structures, and consultation principles governing U.S.–North Korea talks should be established in advance through close coordination. In essence, South Korea must ensure that its strategic interests are reflected not merely in whether dialogue occurs, but in shaping the substance and structure of that dialogue.To this end, three policy priorities merit particular emphasis.First, in making the case for U.S.–North Korea dialogue, South Korea should focus on the medium- to long-term strategic costs of allowing North Korea’s nuclear capabilities to advance unchecked, rather than relying on abstract notions such as “tension reduction” or “relationship improvement.” North Korea continues to make steady progress in nuclear warhead development, delivery systems, command and control, and survivability.In this context, the absence of dialogue does not preserve the status quo; rather, it enables a gradual shift in the strategic balance in Pyongyang’s favor. It is therefore important to underscore the limitations of past “strategic patience” approaches, as even President Trump has acknowledged, and to frame dialogue not as a concession, but as a risk-management instrument designed to prevent a more adverse security environment.Second, South Korea should play a constructive role in identifying realistic and actionable negotiation agendas that are politically and strategically acceptable to the United States. While the long-term objective of complete denuclearization must remain intact, it is impractical to expect a comprehensive agreement at the outset.Instead, an incremental approach should be pursued, including measures such as a moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests, a freeze on fissile material production, limited inspections of designated facilities, and confidence-building mechanisms to reduce the risk of inadvertent military escalation. These interim steps should be framed not as a departure from denuclearization, but as pragmatic and necessary stages toward achieving that objective.Third, while seeking to shape North Korea’s strategic intent through engagement, South Korea must simultaneously strengthen its deterrence posture in response to the continued advancement of North Korea’s capabilities. As Pyongyang modernizes both its nuclear and conventional forces, diplomatic outreach must not be interpreted as a relaxation of defense readiness.On the contrary, Seoul should make clear to Washington that efforts to facilitate dialogue must be accompanied by the sustained reinforcement of deterrence measures, including the enhancement of extended deterrence, the maintenance of the ROK–U.S. combined defense posture, the consistent enforcement of sanctions, and the deepening of trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan. Such a dual-track approach is essential to preventing North Korea from misinterpreting diplomatic engagement—particularly if it proves unsuccessful—as a strategic opportunity.Ultimately, establishing the necessary conditions—most notably, close and sustained coordination with the United States—to promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and facilitate a potential U.S.–North Korea summit will provide the foundation for implementing the Lee Jae-myung administration’s three-stage process of “freeze–reduction–denuclearization” with respect to nuclear weapons and delivery systems.※ This article is a revised and expanded version of a discussion paper presented at the 77th Unification Strategy Forum, titled “Seeking a New Paradigm for the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” (March 26, 2025), which was hosted by the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at the request of the SAND Institute.1) RFA Staff, “U.S. Designates North Korea and Five Other Countries as ‘Not Fully Cooperating Countries’ on Counterterrorism,” Radio Free Asia, May 13, 2025.2) Min-hee Park, “U.S. State Department Sanctions Six Entities for Violating Nonproliferation Laws… Including South Korean Firm ‘JS Research,’” Hankyoreh, January 28, 2026.3) Tae-hwa Kang, “Amid the Iran War… U.S. Imposes Additional Sanctions on North Korean IT Firm ‘Amnokgang’ and Others,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 13, 2026.4) Fred M. Kaplan, The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020).5) “U.S. Director of National Intelligence: ‘North Korean ICBMs Capable of Reaching U.S. Mainland… Source of Concern Both Within and Outside the Region,’” VOA, March 19, 2026.6) Jong-il Ra, Dong-soo Kim, and Young-jong Lee, The Road to Hanoi: The Divergent Choices of the ROK, North Korea, and the U.S. (Seoul: Param Books, 2022).

Restructuring Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation for a Transition to Peaceful Two-State Relations                    Eun-ju ChoiSejong InstituteInter-Korean relations have entered a qualitatively new phase that cannot be adequately explained by existing policy frameworks. North Korea is moving away from its longstanding conception of inter-Korean relations as a special relationship oriented toward unification and is instead redefining them as adversarial relations between two sovereign states.This shift was formalized at the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in December 2023, which explicitly characterized inter-Korean relations as hostile state-to-state relations. It was further reinforced in Kim Jong-un’s January 2024 speech before the Supreme People's Assembly, where a legislative initiative was introduced to codify the Republic of Korea as the primary hostile state in the constitution.Subsequent measures—including the reorganization of unification-related institutions and official narratives, the severing of inter-Korean transportation links, and the fortification of border security—indicate that this is not a tactical adjustment but a structural transformation. The Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in February 2026 reaffirmed this strategic trajectory.These developments necessitate a fundamental reassessment of South Korea’s policy toward North Korea, particularly in the domain of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. To date, such engagement has largely been predicated on a linear logic: expanded exchanges foster trust, which in turn contributes to peacebuilding and lays the groundwork for eventual unification.Within this framework, exchange and cooperation have been understood both as outcomes of improved relations and as instruments for shaping an environment conducive to unification. This premise, however, is now being fundamentally challenged. By redefining inter-Korean relations as hostile interactions between two sovereign states, North Korea has altered the underlying assumptions that have guided past policy.Under these conditions, the continuation of legacy approaches risks widening the gap between policy intent and strategic reality. Accordingly, exchange and cooperation should be reconceptualized—not as mechanisms for restoring prior patterns of engagement, but as instruments for managing adversarial relations in a stable manner and gradually creating the conditions for a long-term transition to peaceful coexistence.A more nuanced understanding of North Korea’s persistent reluctance toward inter-Korean cooperation is essential in this regard. Pyongyang’s resistance cannot be attributed solely to isolationism or ideological rigidity; rather, it is rooted in fundamental concerns about regime survival. North Korea has consistently perceived even South Korea’s proposals for reconciliation and cooperation as potentially leading, over time, to regime erosion and absorption-based unification.From this perspective, inter-Korean exchanges may be viewed as channels for political, social, and cultural penetration. These concerns are further compounded by anxieties over sovereignty and internal control. The inflow of external information, cultural influences, and interpersonal networks associated with inter-Korean engagement is regarded as potentially destabilizing.Moreover, North Korea does not approach economic cooperation solely in terms of material gain. It remains wary that increased external assistance and economic interdependence could weaken policy autonomy or create structural dependency. This helps explain its consistent resistance even to unilateral aid or to relationships perceived as hierarchical or patronizing.Recent developments in North Korea’s policy toward South Korea and its broader foreign policy orientation reflect these concerns with greater clarity. Pyongyang has deemphasized traditional themes of shared nationhood, reconciliation, and unification, and is instead recalibrating its approach around national security and state interests.Statements made at the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea—particularly the pledge to eliminate “outdated ideas and remnants of the past era” and to prevent any revival of previous frameworks—signal a deliberate departure from the legacy paradigm of inter-Korean relations grounded in unification discourse. The congress also emphasized a new five-year policy direction centered on state interests and self-reliance, reinforcing this broader strategic shift.Concurrently, North Korea has increasingly foregrounded the concept of “national interest” in its foreign policy. This shift suggests that future cooperation decisions will be guided less by symbolic or ideological considerations and more by calculations of security and practical utility. In effect, while North Korea appears to be closing the door to broad-based engagement, it is simultaneously clarifying the conditions under which limited, interest-based cooperation may remain feasible.Importantly, North Korea’s policy toward South Korea should not be analyzed solely within the confines of inter-Korean relations. Increasingly, Pyongyang appears to be integrating its South Korea policy into a broader strategic framework encompassing its approach to the United States, its relations with China and Russia, and its external economic strategy.Recent assessments of the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea likewise suggest that Pyongyang is embedding its South Korea policy within a wider geopolitical and security calculus. This suggests that if South Korea continues to treat inter-Korean relations primarily as a special intra-national issue, it risks misalignment with the evolving strategic context.From North Korea’s perspective, South Korea is no longer a partner for unification but rather an external actor to be managed within the broader calculus of regime security and diplomatic balance. Accordingly, South Korea must adopt a multidimensional analytical and policy approach that situates inter-Korean relations within the wider Northeast Asian security environment and North Korea’s overall foreign strategy.Within this altered landscape, the identification of viable areas of convergence becomes critical. The key lies in identifying domains in which North Korea can derive tangible benefits without triggering its core security concerns. Bilateral initiatives led exclusively by South Korea are likely to generate political sensitivities in Pyongyang.By contrast, multilateral frameworks mediated by international organizations or third parties may entail relatively lower political costs. Furthermore, while North Korea is likely to remain highly sensitive to exchanges involving significant symbolic or informational exposure, it may exhibit limited receptivity in functional areas where regime risks are low and practical benefits are evident—such as public health, disaster management, environmental protection, and technical standardization.From the standpoint of North Korea’s stated priorities—national interest, the maintenance of state functions, and societal stability—these sectors represent domains in which pragmatic considerations may outweigh ideological constraints. Consequently, the basis for inter-Korean cooperation should be sought not in symbolic or nationalistic narratives, but in functional forms of cooperation that mitigate North Korea’s concerns while delivering tangible benefits.In particular, cooperation in public health and disaster management represents the most viable point of entry. Transnational challenges such as infectious diseases, floods, droughts, wildfires, and typhoons cannot be effectively addressed by a single state acting alone. Because these issues are not directly tied to military or ideological competition and instead relate to basic state functions and public safety, they provide a more politically defensible basis for North Korea’s participation.A similar logic applies to environmental and climate cooperation. Issues such as yellow dust, fine particulate matter, deforestation, wildfires, and water quality are inherently transboundary and lend themselves to being framed as technical or functional cooperation rather than politically sensitive bilateral engagement.Technical cooperation also holds considerable potential, particularly in non-political domains such as disaster forecasting, meteorological and agricultural analysis, technical standards, and public health data systems. In addition, humanitarian and livelihood-oriented cooperation may reduce political sensitivities if structured as human security initiatives implemented through international organizations or third-party mechanisms rather than as direct inter-Korean assistance.It is important to underscore, however, that identifying such areas of convergence does not imply the immediate resumption of cooperation. Rather, these domains constitute a minimal policy space that preserves the possibility of future engagement under more favorable conditions.The significance of sectors such as public health, disaster management, environmental cooperation, and technical standardization lies less in their immediate outputs than in their function as buffers—preventing inter-Korean relations from becoming fully entrenched in military confrontation and mutual exclusion. In this sense, identifying common ground should be understood not as an expression of optimistic cooperation, but as a component of a long-term strategy for managing tensions and preserving pathways to peace.Against this backdrop, South Korea’s policy framework should be recalibrated along several dimensions. First, in the near term, policy emphasis should shift toward risk management and the establishment of conditions for a peaceful transition in relations, rather than toward the immediate resumption of exchanges. Without measures to reduce military tensions, prevent accidental escalation, and ensure a baseline level of predictability, any form of cooperation is unlikely to prove sustainable.Second, adjustments in policy discourse and signaling are required. Rather than relying on unification-centric narratives, greater emphasis should be placed on concepts such as peace, coexistence, stability, and risk management. At the same time, assurances regarding respect for North Korea’s system and the non-pursuit of absorption-based unification should be consistently reflected in official statements and policy documents.Third, South Korea should proactively establish multilateral cooperation frameworks that do not depend on North Korea’s immediate participation. Regardless of Pyongyang’s response, Seoul should work with international organizations and regional partners to build functional platforms that North Korea could join at a later stage.Fourth, it is necessary to develop a forward-looking diplomatic architecture that prevents South Korea from being marginalized amid the evolving dynamics among the United States, North Korea, China, and Russia. Given that North Korea’s policy toward South Korea is embedded within its broader foreign strategy, South Korea’s response must likewise extend beyond the confines of inter-Korean relations alone.Ultimately, the task at hand is not to restore past patterns of inter-Korean engagement, but to create new conditions that enable a stable and peaceful two-state relationship under changed strategic realities. Efforts that emphasize the abstract necessity of cooperation while neglecting North Korea’s underlying concerns are unlikely to yield meaningful results.Conversely, a strategy that accurately interprets those concerns and identifies pragmatic areas of convergence—offering tangible benefits while minimizing perceived risks—may open limited but meaningful avenues for engagement. Inter-Korean exchange and cooperation should no longer be treated merely as symbolic indicators of improved relations.Rather, they must be reconfigured as calibrated policy instruments for managing adversarial relations and laying the groundwork for a gradual transition to peaceful coexistence. Such a transition will not be achieved through declaratory policy alone, but through sustained analytical rigor, strategic patience, and persistent diplomatic efforts grounded in a realistic appraisal of the other side’s interests and constraints.

The Importance of Sustaining Peace on the Korean Peninsula and Strengthening the ROK–U.S. Alliance Amid Recent Developments in the Middle East                    Kim TaeJoonDirector, Institute for Korean Peninsula Security StudiesProfessor Emeritus, Korea National Defense UniversityPrologue: From the Strait of Hormuz to the Korean Peninsula—A Connected Front LineMarch 2026: The flames of conflict are intensifying in the Persian Gulf. Large-scale airstrikes conducted by the United States and Israel against Iran have inflicted significant damage on its nuclear facilities and military infrastructure. Nevertheless, the Iranian regime remains intact, and the conflict appears to be extending beyond initial expectations. Many in South Korea may perceive this as a regional conflict confined to the Middle East; however, this perception is misguided.What is unfolding in the Strait of Hormuz is directly linked to the security of the Korean Peninsula. More than 70% of South Korea’s energy imports transit this maritime chokepoint. The cautious posture adopted by major states—despite U.S. requests for allied contributions to maritime escort and mine-clearing operations—underscores that trust within alliances cannot be taken for granted. Such fissures in trust bear directly on the credibility of extended deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. The front lines are interconnected.Part 1. The Flames of the Middle East—The Current Phase of the Iran War and the Silence of AlliesThe U.S. military has conducted precision strikes against dozens of key targets, including military infrastructure such as the airport and runway on Kharg Island, integrated air defense systems, the Jassan naval base, and missile and mine storage facilities.The amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli (LHA-7), carrying approximately 2,500 Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, is also en route to the Middle East and is expected to be deployed to waters near the Strait of Hormuz in the near term. A classic strategy of “coercive diplomacy” is evident, leveraging Kharg Island—through which the majority of Iran’s oil exports pass—as a point of pressure to compel Iran to negotiate.However, despite this overwhelming military advantage, the United States appears to be experiencing a degree of political isolation. On March 17, 2026, President Trump publicly criticized the limited response from allies in statements issued by the White House and on his social media platforms, expressing dissatisfaction that even modest naval contributions for maritime escort and mine-clearing operations had not materialized. This should be understood not merely as rhetorical frustration, but as an indicator that the U.S.-led multinational maritime security framework is not functioning as intended.In practice, although the United States has explicitly called upon major powers—including South Korea, Japan, China, the United Kingdom, and France—to participate, each has maintained a cautious stance, citing its own strategic considerations. European actors, in particular, tend to frame the situation as a localized conflict, with some explicitly ruling out military involvement.As a result, participation has remained limited. That the world’s preeminent military power has been unable to secure even modest allied contributions—on the order of “a few minesweepers”—underscores emerging strains within the contemporary alliance system and highlights the evolving realities of burden-sharing.Part 2. A Shaky Alliance—Trump’s Credibility Crisis and the Dilemma of Extended DeterrenceAllies’ reluctance to become involved reflects more than simple risk aversion. A more fundamental factor is the erosion of confidence in President Trump’s statements and policy direction. He has conveyed inconsistent signals—at times suggesting an early termination of the conflict, while at others indicating preparations for a protracted engagement—and has alternated between raising the prospect of negotiations and rejecting them on the grounds that requisite conditions have not been met.As instances of post-agreement policy reversals have accumulated in prior diplomatic engagements, concerns regarding the predictability of U.S. policy have intensified among allied governments. His repeated sharp criticisms of NATO and other key allies have further reinforced these perceptions.Under such circumstances, if a country were to participate in deployments only to face a sudden U.S. declaration of mission termination and force withdrawal, it could be left to bear the operational and strategic burden vis-à-vis Iran on its own. This extends beyond conventional military risk; it suggests that participation in joint operations with a partner whose reliability is in question may itself constitute a strategic liability. This concern lies at the core of allied hesitation.South Korea is thus confronted with a more consequential question: if the Trump administration continues to signal diminished reliability to its allies, what are the implications for security on the Korean Peninsula? To what extent can extended deterrence—the commitment that the United States will respond alongside South Korea in the event of a North Korean nuclear or missile provocation—be regarded as credible? Alliance credibility is not established through declaratory policy alone, but through the consistent accumulation of actions. It is therefore difficult to dismiss the possibility that patterns of policy execution observed in the Strait of Hormuz could manifest in a similar manner in future contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.Part 3. North Korea’s Multifaceted Military Advancements and the Security Vacuum on the Korean Peninsula—Expanding Threats and Diminishing Deterrence3-1. The Advancement in North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile CapabilitiesOn March 18, 2026, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard issued a clear warning during testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee: “North Korea’s ICBMs can already reach the U.S. mainland, and it remains committed to expanding its nuclear arsenal.”In 2025 alone, North Korea reportedly generated approximately $2 billion (roughly 3 trillion won) through illicit cryptocurrency activities and redirected these resources into its strategic weapons programs. It is also pursuing the development of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), designed to penetrate U.S. and regional missile defense systems.3-2. Naval Power Enhancement—The Introduction of the Choe Hyun and Nuclear SubmarinesThe threat posed by North Korea is no longer confined to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. In 2025, Pyongyang undertook a broad military modernization effort, marked by a particularly notable qualitative shift in its naval capabilities.On April 25, 2025, North Korea launched the Choe Hyun, a new 5,000-ton-class destroyer. As the first platform in the Korean People’s Navy reportedly equipped with phased-array radar and vertical launch systems, the vessel demonstrated an unusually rapid operational tempo, conducting live-fire testing within five days of its launch.The Choe Hyun is assessed to be equipped with supersonic cruise missiles, an integrated ship-based air defense system, and a 127mm automatic deck gun. The configuration of its radar and air defense systems bears similarities to Russian naval platforms, raising the possibility of external technical assistance. Kim Jong-un personally observed the test and directed that efforts to “accelerate the nuclear armament of the Navy” be intensified.In March 2026, Kim Jong-un again observed a test launch of a strategic cruise missile from the Choe Hyun. The missile reportedly struck a target in the West Sea after a flight lasting approximately 2 hours and 48 minutes. Analysts assess the system to be the Hwasal-3, with an estimated range of 2,000–2,500 kilometers. This capability extends beyond the Korean Peninsula, conveying a broader strategic signal aimed at U.S. military installations in the region—including Guam—and potentially beyond.North Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine capabilities are also advancing rapidly. On December 25, 2025, Pyongyang unveiled, for the first time, the full hull of an 8,700-ton-class strategic nuclear submarine. The sail is assessed to accommodate up to ten submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) tubes.Once operational, such a platform would provide North Korea with a credible second-strike capability. Some analysts have suggested that the small modular reactor technology required for such systems may have been acquired with external assistance, potentially from Russia.3-3. Constitutionalizing Hostility—The “Two Hostile States” DoctrineNorth Korea’s military advancement is not the product of episodic or accidental provocation, but rather an expression of systemic intent. Through its 2023 constitutional amendment, North Korea formally codified its status as a nuclear-armed state and inserted a provision into Article 58 defining the Republic of Korea as a “hostile state.”In doing so, it has effectively foreclosed space for dialogue and negotiation, while institutionalizing the legitimacy of its military buildup. This constitutes not a tactical adjustment but a strategic declaration, and the underlying structure of the threat is unlikely to change in the near term.3-4. The Security Vacuum on the Korean Peninsula Created by the War in the Middle EastWhat warrants closer scrutiny is the evolving strategic environment. The United States is currently concentrating a significant portion of its strategic assets on the conflict in the Middle East. The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford has withdrawn from the operational theater due to a fire, while ammunition constraints and cumulative fatigue from sustained operations are becoming increasingly evident.Since the onset of the Iran conflict, the redeployment of U.S. Forces Korea air defense assets to the Middle East has begun, and reports indicate that, following Patriot systems, elements of the THAAD system have also been repositioned. The longer the conflict persists, the more U.S. strategic attention and resources are likely to remain committed to the Middle East.Director Gabbard assessed that “support from Russia, China, and North Korea during the Iran conflict has been far more limited than anticipated,” but this does not suggest any diminution in North Korea’s propensity for provocation. On the contrary, Pyongyang may interpret the current environment—characterized by a diversion of U.S. strategic focus—as an opportunity. Security on the Korean Peninsula does not exist in isolation. As the conflict in the Middle East endures, the relative level of deterrence applied to the Korean Peninsula is correspondingly reduced.3-5. South Korea’s Security at a Crossroads—Expanding Threats, Shrinking DefensesWhile North Korea is advancing its military capabilities across multiple domains, the internal realities of the South Korean military reveal a growing structural imbalance. The most fundamental issue is the sharp decline in personnel strength. According to data from the Ministry of National Defense, South Korea’s active-duty force has decreased by approximately 110,000 over a six-year period, from 560,000 in 2019 to 450,000 as of 2025.During this period, 17 division-level or higher units have been disbanded or consolidated, and the officer accession rate, which stood at approximately 90% in 2019, declined to around 50% by 2024. Demographic decline is thus directly eroding national defense capacity.This challenge is compounded by issues of morale within the force. Reports from the field increasingly indicate the emergence of a structural condition in which the sense of duty and pride in national defense is insufficient to offset perceived deprivation.At the same time, the U.S. 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) outlines a framework in which primary responsibility for deterring North Korea shifts increasingly to South Korea, with the expectation that South Korean forces will be capable of independently sustaining defense operations for at least 30 days prior to the arrival of U.S. reinforcements. However, given the concurrent realities of force reductions, difficulties in officer recruitment, and emerging gaps in air and missile defense, this expectation risks remaining aspirational rather than operationally feasible.Threats are expanding, while the forces tasked with deterrence are contracting, and the morale underpinning those forces is under strain. This is the reality of security on the Korean Peninsula in 2026. The unveiling of North Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine, the strategic cruise missile launches from the Choe Hyun, and the redeployment of U.S. Forces Korea air defense assets to the Middle East—taken together—render public concern in South Korea both understandable and grounded in reality.Part 4. The ROK-U.S. Alliance: What Must Be Done Now?4-1. The Dilemma of Troop Deployment and the Cost of InactionSouth Korea’s dilemma is both concrete and immediate. All 12 of its naval minesweepers are small vessels of 700 tons or less, limiting their capacity for sustained independent operations. Deploying a task group of at least three vessels, including an Aegis destroyer, would require approximately 600 to 900 personnel and would necessarily create a corresponding capability gap vis-à-vis North Korea. While the military costs of deployment are significant, the diplomatic costs associated with inaction may be even greater.It is accurate to note that President Trump’s actions have, at times, undermined perceptions of U.S. credibility. However, this does not provide a sufficient basis for South Korean inaction. Alliances are inherently reciprocal. Should South Korea respond to U.S. requests with sustained reluctance or passivity, its moral and diplomatic standing to invoke U.S. extended deterrence in the face of North Korea’s nuclear threat would be correspondingly weakened. Alliance credibility is tested—and ultimately demonstrated—during periods of crisis. The present moment is such a test.4-2. A Strategy of Conditional Participation—Designing LeverageThe appropriate course lies neither in unconditional participation nor in outright refusal. A prudent approach is to leverage the 17-year record of the Cheonghae Unit as a diplomatic asset, employing conditional participation in mine-clearing operations as a source of bargaining leverage. The critical issue is one of sequencing and form. Committing to participation in advance and seeking conditions thereafter effectively relinquishes leverage; it is therefore essential to secure clearly documented commitments ex ante.For example, conditions such as the institutionalization of the ROK-U.S. Extended Deterrence Strategy Consultative Group (EDSCG), an increased frequency of rotational deployments of strategic assets—including strategic bombers and SSBNs—to the Korean Peninsula, and the strengthening of the operational substance of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) should be explicitly codified. In addition, efforts to secure a more favorable position in defense cost-sharing negotiations should be integrated into this framework.4-3. Restoring Confidence in Extended Deterrence—Pathways to Alleviating Public AnxietyConfidence in extended deterrence rests on three pillars: capability, will, and communication. The United States’ nuclear capability remains overwhelming; the principal concerns lie with will and communication. President Trump’s unpredictable pattern of public statements has contributed to doubts regarding U.S. resolve, while the redeployment of air defense assets has created a perception of a communication gap. Restoring these two elements constitutes a central task for South Korea’s foreign and security policy.Through the regularized operation of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), a framework should be established that enables South Korea to participate more substantively in U.S. nuclear decision-making processes during crisis contingencies.4-4. Securing Strategic Autonomy Between the United States and ChinaSouth Korea must carefully secure strategic autonomy within the broader context of U.S.–China strategic competition. It is necessary to assess with precision the potential ramifications that participation in operations related to Iran may have for China.Beijing could interpret South Korea’s deployment to the Strait of Hormuz as a signal of full alignment with the United States, potentially generating diplomatic and economic frictions comparable to those experienced during the THAAD dispute. Accordingly, a calibrated approach is required—one that clearly defines the nature of such deployment as a “contribution to humanitarian maritime security” and communicates this position in advance through diplomatic channels to minimize misperceptions.4-5. Securing Domestic Political Consensus and the Role of the National AssemblyThe decision to deploy forces extends beyond an executive policy determination; it is a matter that requires national consensus. A deployment undertaken in the absence of domestic political support is unlikely to be sustainable. As demonstrated by the cases of the Iraq (2003) and the Afghanistan (2001) deployments, the diplomatic impact of alliance contributions is maximized when supported by public consensus and legislative approval.The government must therefore present, in a transparent manner, the basis for its strategic assessment through close consultation with the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Security Committee and the National Defense Committee, thereby ensuring the legitimacy and durability of the policy.This approach—simultaneously accounting for post-conflict relations with Iran, the potential security vacuum vis-à-vis North Korea, and the need to preserve strategic autonomy between the United States and China—represents the most realistic and balanced course of action available to South Korea. A crisis presents both risks and opportunities; if managed proactively, it can reinforce the ROK–U.S. alliance and substantively strengthen deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.Epilogue: Peace on the Korean Peninsula Cannot Be Maintained on Its Own“Advance without seeking glory; retreat without evading responsibility; protect the people and serve the interests of the state—this is the treasure of a nation.” — The Art of WarPeace on the Korean Peninsula has been sustained for more than seven decades on the foundation of the ROK-U.S. alliance; yet that foundation is not immutable. President Trump’s unpredictability, the protracted conflict in the Middle East, North Korea’s advancing nuclear and naval capabilities and the constitutional codification of hostility, and the intensifying dynamics of U.S.-China strategic competition are all unfolding simultaneously. Under these conditions, the need for proactive alliance management has become more acute than at any point in recent memory.As North Korean nuclear-powered submarines operate below the surface, as its 5,000-ton-class destroyer, the Choe Hyun, conducts strategic missile launches in the Yellow Sea, and as U.S. air defense assets stationed in South Korea are redeployed to the Middle East, both the morale and operational capacity of the South Korean military are coming under mounting pressure. Public concern is therefore well-founded. Addressing this concern requires more than rhetorical reassurance; it demands the restoration of credible, tangible deterrence—and the starting point for such restoration lies in strengthening and actively managing the ROK–U.S. alliance.Passivity is not a viable option. Alliances that are not actively managed risk gradual erosion. Before the reverberations from the Strait of Hormuz reach the Korean Peninsula, South Korea must undertake a clear-eyed assessment of its strategic choices and act decisively. History records those nations that act with resolve—and imposes costs on those that fail.

The Strength of K-Defense as Reflected in the Middle East Situation                    Chi-beom ShinProfessor of Military ScienceKonyang UniversityDirector of External AffairsFuture SocietyThe recent escalation of military tensions in the Middle East, centered on Iran and Israel, underscores that the character of modern warfare has evolved beyond simple contests of firepower into an integrated construct combining precision-strike capabilities with multi-layered defense systems.In particular, the current conflict—having moved beyond the confines of a “shadow war” into overt confrontation—conveys a clear signal to the global defense market: operational reliability validated in combat and system-level integrity constitute the core foundations of national security. In this context, the recent rise of “K-defense,” which has gained substantial traction in the Middle Eastern market, carries strategic significance that extends well beyond export metrics.The Paradigm Shift in Modern Warfare and the Middle East’s Strategic ChoiceWhereas earlier Middle Eastern conflicts were characterized by conventional force-on-force engagements centered on tanks and fighter aircraft, the current environment reflects a decisive contest involving unmanned aerial systems (UAS), hypersonic weapons, and integrated air and missile defense architectures designed to counter them. As illustrated by Iran’s large-scale airstrike attempt, the ability to counter low-cost, high-effect asymmetric threats requires a seamless, multi-layered defensive framework.Against this backdrop, a central question arises: why are Middle Eastern states, including the United Arab Emirates, demonstrating a marked preference for South Korean systems such as the Cheongung-II (M-SAM), the Hyunmoo series, and the K9 self-propelled howitzer, despite the availability of numerous Western alternatives? The answer lies in three defining attributes of Korean defense systems: readiness, reliability, and tailored strategic alignment.The Decisive Advantages of K-DefenseFirst, these systems have been refined under sustained, real-world operational pressures. The Korean Peninsula represents a uniquely dense operational environment, where some of the world’s highest concentrations of military capabilities remain in persistent confrontation. K-defense platforms have undergone decades of iterative development to address North Korea’s asymmetric threat profile. The missile and unmanned systems challenges faced by Middle Eastern states closely parallel those for which South Korea has long prepared. It is therefore not coincidental that the Korean-developed medium-range surface-to-air missile system Cheongung-II, currently deployed in the United Arab Emirates, has been selected to provide air defense coverage in the region, demonstrating a notably high interception rate even under harsh desert conditions. Reports indicate that Cheongung-II recently achieved an interception rate of approximate 96 percent in countering a large-scale aerial attack attributed to Iran.Second, South Korea’s comparative advantage lies in system integration and lifecycle sustainment. In contemporary warfare, the effectiveness of software integration and maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) functions often outweighs the performance of individual platforms considered in isolation. Leveraging its strengths as an advanced information technology economy, South Korea has prioritized interoperability across its defense systems. Moreover, in contrast to the extended delivery timelines and restrictive conditions often associated with U.S. and European systems, South Korea offers expedited delivery schedules and a more flexible approach to technology transfer, thereby directly addressing the urgent operational requirements of partner nations seeking to minimize capability gaps.Third, K-defense offers a compelling value proposition. By maintaining cost competitiveness relative to U.S. and European systems while delivering comparable operational performance, South Korean platforms present an attractive option for countries facing fiscal constraints. This advantage is particularly salient for states pursuing large-scale procurement programs.Fourth, rapid delivery and scalable production capacity constitute critical strengths. Drawing on industrial capabilities developed across the shipbuilding, automotive, and electronics sectors, South Korea is able to support high-volume production within compressed timelines. This capability has proven decisive for countries confronting acute security challenges and has played a key role in securing major contracts in both Europe and the Middle East.Taken together, K-defense is expanding its global footprint on the basis of four pillars: technological capability, cost competitiveness, delivery speed, and strategic partnership. As it evolves beyond a narrow export industry into a broader instrument of national competitiveness and diplomatic leverage, there is growing recognition of its substantial long-term growth potential.K-Defense as a Diplomatic Asset for K-SecurityThe value of K-defense should now be elevated beyond its economic dimension to serve as a strategic instrument of “defense diplomacy.” As its presence in the Middle East becomes more firmly established, South Korea is well positioned to consolidate its role as a “security solutions provider” within the international community. This, in turn, presents an opportunity to deepen relations with Middle Eastern partners—whose importance is closely tied to energy security—transforming these ties from resource-based ties into comprehensive security partnerships.At the same time, complacency must be avoided. As demonstrated in the Iran-Israel conflict, the emergence of artificial intelligence-enabled targeting and autonomous weapons systems is redefining the technological frontier of defense. For K-defense to sustain its momentum following its expansion in the Middle East, a forward-looking transition toward manned–unmanned teaming (MUM-T) and the development of space-based defense capabilities will be essential.Conclusion: Strategic Pathways Toward the FutureAmid ongoing instability in the Middle East, K-defense has demonstrated its capabilities. As global attention increasingly turns to South Korea’s defense industry, the country must move beyond the role of a conventional arms exporter and contribute to the establishment of both technical and normative standards that promote international peace and stability.The enduring principle that credible deterrence is the most effective means of preventing conflict remains as relevant as ever. The precision defensive systems and advanced strike capabilities embodied in K-defense have the potential to serve as stabilizing factors in an increasingly volatile regional environment.In this regard, South Korea’s defense industry is evolving into a critical pillar supporting not only national security but also the broader objective of sustainable global peace. The emergence of K-defense as a source of national pride reflects its growing role at the center of this strategic trajectory.

Enhancing Korea–ASEAN Cooperation Amid Growing Anti-Korean Sentiment                    Nam-eun KimChungnam National UniversityEarlier this year, an unusually large wave of hateful and derogatory exchanges unfolded across South Korean and Southeast Asian online platforms. The incident began when a Korean fan attempted to film with a so-called “heavy-duty camera”—a type restricted at the venue—during a DAY6 concert in Malaysia and was stopped.The problem escalated when this incident spread on social media, with the debate quickly moving beyond internal fandom disputes over concert etiquette to include mockery and racially discriminatory comments targeting appearance, food culture, and economic status.The manner in which some Korean users tracked and disseminated the personal information of Southeast Asian fans—escalating even to expressions of “migrant worker hatred”—reveals a common mechanism through which online conflicts intersect with domestic discourses of migrant exclusion and racist rhetoric.Particularly noteworthy in this situation is how Southeast Asian netizens expressed solidarity by using the hashtag “SEAblings.” A portmanteau of Southeast Asia and “siblings,” SEAblings functioned as a signifier framing Southeast Asia as a “sibling community.” This symbol served as a linguistic device through which Southeast Asian youth positioned themselves not merely as a “K-pop consumer market,” but as actors responding to discrimination and asserting relational norms.What is particularly noteworthy is that this form of grassroots regionalism emerged at the very moment President Lee Jae-myung conducted top-down summit diplomacy during state visits to Singapore and the Philippines (March 1–4, 2026), presenting core agendas such as AI transformation, supply chain management, energy and food security, advanced technology cooperation, and economic solidarity. The government framed these visits as efforts to strengthen strategic partnerships and deepen cooperation in living standards and industrial development.Korea–ASEAN relations are currently being reconfigured simultaneously at two distinct levels. At the top level, summit diplomacy institutionalizes cooperation in security, economic resilience, and advanced technology under the framework of a “strategic partnership.” At the societal level, however, the SEAblings phenomenon—mediated through fandom networks and digital platforms—frames “respect and non-discrimination” as essential conditions for sustaining the relationship.If these two layers diverge, the achievements secured through summit diplomacy become vulnerable in terms of social acceptance and public trust. This dissonance cannot be addressed through the optimistic assumption that “increasing cultural exchange will mitigate the problem.”Instead, what is required is a restructuring that institutionally incorporates the “lower-level conditions” shaping the success or failure of cooperation—such as everyday experiences of discrimination, the amplifying effects of platform-based conflicts, and the interdependence between migrant labor and the cultural industry—into the cooperation agenda.1. The ‘SEAblings Incident’: How Fandom Conflict Became Racialized and Fostered Regional SolidarityThis incident illustrates how conflicts within global fandom communities can become racialized as they spread online. In the initial phase, Malaysian fans raised concerns regarding violations of venue rules and disruptive behavior.However, as photos and videos circulated and mutual mockery intensified, the debate quickly escalated into a collective confrontation framed as “Korea versus Southeast Asia.” Korean media specifically reported cases in which some Korean users tracked down the personal details of Southeast Asian fans and exposed their status as “migrant workers,” subjecting them to ridicule. This suggests that when certain users draw upon domestic anti-migrant rhetoric to escalate a dispute, the conflict can move beyond the realm of fandom norms to encompass issues of racial hierarchy and social exclusion.The #SEAblings hashtag functioned as a symbol of solidarity at a moment when internal fandom disputes escalated into collective confrontation and racialized hierarchical language was mobilized. Importantly, the hashtag served not merely as an emotional expression, but as a signifier that collectively organized Southeast Asian youth across national boundaries, visualizing regional solidarity while articulating a clear normative demand: “We can love K-pop, but we reject racism.”In short, the SEAblings incident demonstrates that Southeast Asian youth are emerging not as passive consumers of Korean content, but as politicized fandom actors capable of recognizing discrimination and mobilizing collective responses. This shift should not be viewed solely as a market risk; rather, it reflects the rise of new negotiating actors demanding the establishment and enforcement of norms within Korea–ASEAN relations.2. The ‘Growth and Stability’ Framework in Summit Diplomacy and the Cultural Cooperation GapPresident Lee’s visits to Singapore and the Philippines have been framed around the themes of “growth” and “stability” in presenting diplomatic achievements. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, characterizes the Korea–Singapore relationship through three pillars of strategic partnership—security cooperation, economic solidarity, and advanced technology collaboration—while emphasizing strengthened communication and cooperation in supply chains, energy, and food security.KTV’s special coverage similarly frames the visits as efforts to link external cooperation with “economic and livelihood achievements,” interpreting their outcomes within a framework of stability and growth rooted in everyday life and industrial development.As summit diplomacy increasingly emphasizes the “growth and stability” framework, the cultural sphere is often reduced to a symbolic repertoire. Culture is invoked to express friendship and create a diplomatic atmosphere, yet issues arising from cultural consumption—such as discrimination, hate speech, platform-driven conflict, and migrant rights—are frequently marginalized within the cooperation agenda.The SEAblings incident illustrates how these spaces of cultural consumption can become vulnerable arenas that undermine trust in bilateral and regional relations. The spread of the Korean Wave represents not only the diffusion of cultural goodwill but also the expansion of interaction points, including digital platforms and performance venues. As these points of contact broaden, experiences of discrimination are shared more rapidly, and conflicts are more easily politicized as normative issues.Accordingly, Korea–ASEAN cooperation must move beyond simply expanding cultural events. It should institutionally embed norms and procedures designed to prevent, mitigate, and mediate conflicts arising within cultural and social domains. Inclusive cultural cooperation should thus function not as promotional content, but as an operational framework incorporating clear rules and dispute-resolution mechanisms.3. Inclusive Cultural Cooperation: Framing the Issue as ‘Cultural and Social Risk Governance’Viewing SEAblings solely through the lens of “anti-Korean sentiment” or “boycott risk” may be useful for short-term responses, but it risks undermining social acceptance and trust in the medium- to long-term. The core message embedded in SEAblings is conditional support: consumption may continue, but discrimination will not be tolerated. In this sense, the phenomenon should be understood less as an obstacle to cooperation and more as a litmus test for whether Korea–ASEAN relations can endure not only as a strategic framework, but also as a normative relationship.To translate this recognition into policy, the governance of cultural and social risks must be prioritized within the South Korea–ASEAN cooperation agenda. Specifically, the following policy package should be considered.Incorporating a “Digital Public Sphere” Agenda into the Official Cooperation Framework Summit meetings, joint statements, and cooperation visions should explicitly address responses to online hate speech and racism, multilingual fact-checking and mediation protocols, and youth exchange platforms. This approach would shift conflict management from a reactive, post-incident model to continuous oversight.The objective is not to restrict freedom of expression, but to establish transparent operational procedures—detection, verification, explanation, and recurrence prevention—supported by multilingual correction and mediation systems as shared standards.Joint Design of Operational Standards for Overseas Performances and Cultural EventsThe SEAblings incident demonstrates how conflicts can escalate rapidly when venue regulations, on-site management, and platform-driven amplification intersect. Accordingly, operational standards for concerts and cultural events should be jointly designed at the Korea–ASEAN level. These standards should include multilingual announcements of venue rules, accessible complaint-handling channels, designated on-site mediation personnel, and clear procedures with defined timelines for official explanations in the event of disputes.Institutionalizing Youth and Fandom Communities as Collaborative Partners, Not MarketsThrough permanent consultative mechanisms, such as a “Korea–ASEAN Youth and Fandom Forum,” the current reactive model of post-incident damage control should be transformed into a framework focused on prevention and coordination. Fandom communities should be recognized not merely as consumers, but as co-designers of platform governance and cultural norms. When institutionalized, grassroots regional dynamics such as SEAblings can evolve from potential sources of conflict into instruments of cooperative engagement.Co-producing Educational and Cultural Literacy ProgramsHate and discrimination cannot be explained solely by gaps in information. Nevertheless, educational mechanisms are necessary to examine how the language of hatred produces social harm and how the production and consumption structures of K-culture can reinforce hierarchy and conflict.A practical approach would be to jointly develop and distribute shared educational content—covering anti-hate awareness, multicultural understanding, and platform literacy—for use in schools, universities, and youth programs as part of Korea–ASEAN cooperative initiatives.4. Conclusion: Integrating ‘Signals from Below’ into Institutions for Sustainable CooperationSouth Korean media interpreted this incident as revealing elements of “Southeast Asian contempt” and racism within Korean society, warning that although the Korean Wave draws strength from diversity, exclusivity could pose a long-term risk. This assessment is valid.However, from the perspective of Korea–ASEAN relations, it is even more important to recognize that SEAblings is not merely a sign of rejection toward Korea. Rather, it constitutes a normative demand that respect and non-discrimination be recognized as prerequisites for sustainable cooperation.The Lee Jae-myung administration’s efforts to strengthen strategic partnerships through visits to Singapore and the Philippines represent a necessary response to contemporary geopolitical and geo-economic challenges. Yet such strategic cooperation can endure only when underpinned by social trust—a trust that is most vulnerable within the sphere of cultural consumption.Inclusive cultural cooperation, therefore, entails institutionalizing this vulnerable sphere within the broader cooperative framework through shared norms and operational procedures.While summit diplomacy emphasizes the language of “growth and stability,” the SEAblings movement articulates the language of “respect and non-discrimination.” When these two discourses remain disconnected, cooperation becomes fragile. Conversely, when they are integrated and institutionalized through standards, coordination procedures, and mediation mechanisms, Korea–ASEAN cooperation can evolve beyond mere market expansion into a sustainable partnership connecting East and Southeast Asia.The SEAblings phenomenon provides a clear example illustrating this direction.

The Importance of Maintaining Peace on the Korean Peninsula and the ROK–U.S. Alliance in Light of the Middle East Situation                    Sang-hyun LeeHonorary Research FellowSejong InstituteWhy Are the U.S. and Israel Attacking Iran?Even before the ink had dried on the Gaza Peace Committee agreement initiated by President Trump, the Middle East was once again engulfed in conflict. On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a military operation that included preemptive strikes against Iran, citing the need to support anti-government protest movements and to disrupt Tehran’s nuclear weapons development program.In response, Iran launched an unprecedented retaliatory ballistic missile attack targeting U.S. military bases in Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, as well as Israeli territory. This escalation transformed the Iranian crisis from a bilateral confrontation into a regional conflict affecting much of the Middle East, with the exception of Egypt. Iran’s threat to block the Strait of Hormuz further sent shockwaves through the global oil market.The primary motivation behind U.S. and Israeli military actions has been to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Following the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Tehran has steadily expanded its uranium enrichment capabilities. Both Israel and the United States assess that these programs are unlikely to remain purely civilian and pose a significant risk of evolving into a nuclear weapons program. Israel, in particular, views a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat.If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, it could establish a credible deterrent against Israel and potentially undermine Israel’s long-standing military superiority in the region. Another major concern is Iran’s expanding regional influence. Tehran has supported Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, the Houthi movement in Yemen, and allied forces in Syria.Israel and the United States interpret these networks as part of Iran’s effort to construct a de facto anti-American and anti-Israeli military apparatus across the region. Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. and Israeli military action include degrading Iran’s military infrastructure and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, disrupting regional weapons supply chains, and suppressing proxy forces operating throughout the Middle East.From Washington’s perspective, demonstrating credible military deterrence is essential. Failure to prevent Iranian provocations could undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments, leading regional partners—particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel—to question the reliability of American security guarantees.The United States and Israel describe the operation as a preemptive strike aimed at eliminating Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities. However, many countries and legal scholars argue that preemptive attacks conducted without an imminent threat of armed aggression raise serious concerns regarding sovereignty and international law. From an international relations perspective, Israel and the U.S. emphasize the necessity of preventive action to restore deterrence, whereas critics contend that the operation violates Iran’s right to self-defense and undermines the global order.At the same time, U.S. and Israeli actions appear intended to encourage regime change by supporting anti-regime movements within Iran. These efforts aim to weaken the theocratic system and signal opposition to the potential succession of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei by his second son, Mojtaba Khamenei.The Link Between Geopolitical Risk and Geoeconomic ShockThe recent U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran represent the latest episode in a series of global geopolitical upheavals that have unfolded since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. On June 22, 2025, the United States launched Operation Midnight Hammer, striking multiple Iranian nuclear facilities, including the Fordow uranium enrichment plant, the Natanz complex, and a suspected nuclear site in Isfahan.On January 3, 2026, a U.S.-led special operation in Venezuela resulted in the seizure of the capital and the arrest of President Nicolás Maduro and his spouse. These developments, culminating in the ongoing military operation against Iran, signal the gradual erosion of international norms and the emergence of a period increasingly defined by the diplomacy of force.In today’s globalized economy, geopolitical risks quickly generate geoeconomic repercussions, transmitting shocks to financial markets and spilling over into the real economy. Under these conditions, the distinction between geopolitical risk and geoeconomic impact becomes increasingly blurred. Actions such as Russia’s disregard for territorial sovereignty or the U.S.’s arrest of a foreign head of state intensify debates over legal uncertainty while signaling to markets that major powers remain willing to use force to achieve their strategic objectives.Financial markets typically interpret such developments as global risk events. Heightened geopolitical uncertainty drives risk-off behavior, shifting investment away from equities and high-yield bonds toward safe-haven assets such as government bonds, gold, and cash. This dynamic often results in appreciation of the U.S. dollar, reflecting increased global demand for safe assets.Iran’s response—including threats to neighboring states and the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz—illustrates the close link between geopolitical tensions, supply chain disruptions, and oil price volatility. The Strait of Hormuz is a critical chokepoint, transporting over 20 million barrels of oil per day, which accounts for more than 20 percent of global crude oil trade. Analysts warn that a prolonged closure could push prices above $150 per barrel, delivering a direct shock to economies such as South Korea’s by affecting interest rates, exchange rates, and consumer sentiment.As the Iran conflict risks becoming protracted, global oil prices have already begun to fluctuate sharply. In early March 2026, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude surpassed $80 per barrel, reaching its highest level since the start of the second Trump administration. Rising energy costs contribute to higher consumer prices, reducing real purchasing power—particularly for low-income households—and exacerbating existing affordability concerns. Ongoing uncertainty regarding the conflict’s resolution has further intensified price volatility.These developments compound existing shocks from earlier trade disputes and supply chain disruptions, generating long-term negative effects on the global economy. Geopolitical crises are not isolated events; they accelerate structural transformations in the international economic system, particularly the convergence of security, finance, and commodities. Rising geopolitical risk contributes to the securityization of energy transactions, reinforces the strength of the U.S. dollar, tightens financial conditions in emerging markets, and intensifies capital outflow pressures.Emerging markets face heightened vulnerabilities due to sanctions exposure and alignment risks, which may reinforce bloc formation in global energy and financial systems. Countries such as South Korea, with high external economic dependence and limited domestic energy resources, must prepare for multiple risks, including stronger linkages between energy prices and exchange rates, fragmentation of export markets, and structurally elevated demand for foreign currency liquidity and financial hedging mechanisms.The Importance of Peace on the Korean Peninsula and the ROK–U.S. AllianceThe situation in the Middle East also carries important implications for peace on the Korean Peninsula. The recently convened Ninth KWP Congress reaffirmed the consolidation of Kim Jong-un’s rule across both the power structure and the regime’s policy orientation, while once again confirming his firm control over the Party, the military, and the cabinet.The congress further reiterated the regime’s commitment to a nuclear and military path as the “core of the national strategy,” while emphasizing the continued “institutionalization of nuclear weapons possession.” This reflects Pyongyang’s perception that nuclear weapons are no longer merely a bargaining chip but rather a permanent guarantee of regime security.North Korea’s external posture has correspondingly hardened, framing South Korea and the United States as “hostile forces” while adhering to a strategy centered on self-reliance and prolonged confrontation. In the military and nuclear domains, the regime reaffirmed its trajectory toward the development, diversification, and qualitative advancement of tactical nuclear weapons, emphasizing expanded nuclear and missile capabilities, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), solid-fuel propulsion, hypersonic technologies, and submarine-launched systems.By emphasizing swift and severe retaliation in times of crisis and employing rhetoric that lowers the threshold for deterrent use, the regime appears to signal a doctrine incorporating elements of preemptive and automated response. Moreover, by prioritizing the allocation of national resources to military and scientific–technological sectors, Pyongyang continues to place the development of strategic weapons at the top of its national agenda, even under sustained international sanctions.Regarding its message to the United States, North Korea signaled the possibility of resuming dialogue, stating that if Washington were to recognize North Korea’s status as a nuclear power and abandon its hostile policy, there would be no reason to refrain from talks.This approach reflects a strategy of engaging the United States while sidelining South Korea, effectively signaling that Pyongyang is willing to negotiate with Washington only on the condition that its nuclear status is acknowledged. At the same time, former President Donald Trump has repeatedly suggested that maintaining a constructive relationship with Kim Jong-un, despite North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, could be advantageous.He has on several occasions referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power,” fueling speculation about the possibility of a surprise summit between Kim Jong-un and Trump during the latter’s anticipated visit to Beijing in April. Under these circumstances, the possibility cannot be ruled out that Trump might pursue a partial sanctions-relief arrangement in exchange for a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear program, presenting it as a diplomatic achievement.Particularly troubling for South Korea is the message directed at Seoul. North Korea has characterized South Korea as its “eternal principal enemy,” explicitly excluding it from the category of “compatriots” and further institutionalizing the doctrine of “two hostile states.”As a result, prospects for the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue remain bleak for the foreseeable future. Pyongyang criticized the current South Korean government’s conciliatory posture as deceptive and insincere, asserting that there is nothing to discuss with the Republic of Korea and declaring its intention to permanently remove South Korea from the category of fellow countrymen.It further stated that it would neither pursue dialogue nor cooperation with South Korea under any pretext, effectively signaling that a form of “cold peace”—in which neither dialogue nor open conflict occurs—is the model of inter-Korean relations North Korea now seeks. This posture poses a significant challenge for the Lee Jae-myung administration, which has pursued a policy of proactive engagement toward the North.The evolving geopolitical turbulence—from the war in Ukraine to the recent escalation in the Middle East—offers several important lessons for the Korean Peninsula. First, these developments send a clear message to North Korean leader Kim Jong‑un.Observing that regimes such as those in Venezuela and Iran could become targets of decisive U.S. military operations—operations that have included precision strikes on leadership and nuclear infrastructure—North Korea may become even more inward‑looking and further intensify its reliance on nuclear deterrence. Analysts note that Pyongyang is likely observing these developments with heightened anxiety and a strengthened determination to retain its nuclear arsenal, perceiving that the United States’ capability and willingness to remove hostile leaders has shifted from theory to practice.The U.S. capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and the unprecedented military operations targeting Iranian leadership and nuclear infrastructure send a powerful signal about the potential consequences of strategic miscalculation.For North Korea—often viewed as a parallel case in the development of weapons of mass destruction—such developments reinforce the perception that nuclear weapons constitute the ultimate guarantee of regime survival. If Pyongyang internalizes this lesson, its willingness to engage in denuclearization or arms‑reduction negotiations could diminish significantly, leaving the Korean Peninsula in a persistently fragile and tense security environment.Second, if U.S. military operations in Iran become protracted, South Korea faces the serious concern that certain assets of United States Forces Korea (USFK) could be redeployed to the Middle East. Reports indicate that air defense systems, including Patriot (PAC‑3) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) units previously stationed under the USFK framework, have already been transferred to the region.A substantial redeployment of these air defense capabilities—key components of deterrence against North Korea—could undermine South Korea’s defensive posture and create opportunities for miscalculation by Pyongyang. Accordingly, Seoul and Washington must ensure that complementary measures are in place to prevent gaps in their joint deterrence capabilities.The challenge is further compounded by indications that the Iran conflict may become protracted. Despite heavy U.S. strikes, Iran has reportedly designated Mojtaba Khamenei, the strongly anti-American second son of the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as successor, signaling Tehran’s readiness for a sustained confrontation.Third, South Korea must prepare for the broader geopolitical repercussions of the Iran crisis. A potential blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would sharply increase global logistics costs. Given its heavy reliance on the Middle East for crude oil imports and its near-total dependence on maritime transportation for an export-driven manufacturing sector, South Korea would be particularly vulnerable to such disruptions.With approximately 68.8 percent of its crude oil imports coming from the Middle East, responding to a potential Strait of Hormuz blockade and surging energy prices presents a critical policy challenge for South Korea. The most urgent priority is to diversify energy supply chains to reduce risk exposure.The experience of European countries— which quickly reduced dependence on Russian natural gas and diversified supply routes following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022—offers a useful precedent. Over the longer term, increasing the share of renewable energy sources, including solar, wind, and hydrogen, will be essential for reducing reliance on fossil fuels.In conclusion, maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula is increasingly critical amid growing instability in the Middle East and the broader international environment. As the risk of international conflict spreads, ensuring stability and a managed peace on the peninsula is essential not only for regional security but also for the broader international order.The most realistic foundation for sustaining peace on the Korean Peninsula remains the ROK–U.S. alliance. Strengthening this alliance through credible deterrence and close strategic coordination is essential for preventing provocations and maintaining a stable framework of peace.Ultimately, peace on the peninsula must not be allowed to fluctuate in response to external crises. Even amid an increasingly unstable international environment, sustaining firm security cooperation anchored in the ROK–U.S. alliance—and leveraging this partnership to reinforce a durable peace structure—remains indispensable.

An Analysis of North Korea’s Ninth Party Congress and the Tasks for Peace on the Korean Peninsula                    Hyung-joong ParkFormer Senior Research FellowKorea Institute for National UnificationNorth Korea's 2017 declaration that it had completed its national nuclear force signaled that it had acquired the capacity to independently guarantee its military security. From that juncture, Pyongyang recalibrated its external security policy during the period of Eighth Korea Workers’ Party (KWP) Congress (2021–2025).In particular, it institutionalized the permanent retention of its nuclear arsenal and fundamentally altered the trajectory of its policies toward the United States and South Korea. The Ninth Party Congress systematically consolidated and reaffirmed these policy adjustments.Following North Korea's reaffirmation of its “hostile two states” policy at the Ninth Party Congress in mid-to-late February, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung reiterated his North Korea policy in his March 1 commemorative address.He called upon the two Koreas to “end the era of conflict and confrontation and move resolutely toward a peaceful and coexisting Korean Peninsula,” pledging to “consistently and persistently pursue the necessary steps” to that end. A comparative reading of North Korea's Ninth Party Congress and South Korea's March 1 address confirms that the two sides’ respective positions remain fundamentally irreconcilable. South Korea appeals to North Korea in terms of peace, trust, mutual restraint, a shared future, and peaceful coexistence. By contrast, North Korea’s discourse toward South Korea is grounded in the institutionalization of hostility, the permanence of nuclear deterrence, a strength-based military balance, the asserted will and readiness to conduct preemptive strikes, and the doctrinalization of a hostile-state framework.This article advances three principal themes. First, it analyzes the foundational direction of North Korea's external security strategy that forms the backdrop to the Ninth Party Congress. Second, it examines the security and diplomatic assessments and policy lines articulated in the Ninth Party Congress report. Third, it assesses prospective developments.1. The Security Landscape on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea's Strategic Direction Since 2017North Korea's 2017 declaration of “completing its national nuclear force” indicated that it had attained a basic capability to independently secure its survival through nuclear weapons. While seeking to leverage the diplomatic capital generated by this capability, North Korea undertook a structural transformation of its external security strategy.Through iterative engagement and recalibration between 2018 and 2019, it consolidated an external and inter-Korean security strategy predicated on the permanence of nuclear deterrence and the policy of two hostile states, particularly during the period of the Eighth Party Congress. The Ninth Party Congress reaffirmed this strategic orientation.Permanence of Nuclear DeterrenceThrough the enactment of the Nuclear Forces Law in 2022 and the constitutional codification in 2023 of the continued advancement of nuclear capabilities, North Korea formally established that nuclear weapons are not a provisional bargaining instrument but a permanent strategic asset. This development carries three principal implications:First, North Korea will not relinquish its nuclear arsenal, and it expects the United States to acknowledge its nuclear status.Second, nuclear deterrence constitutes the central mechanism of war prevention, thereby alleviating the regime’s perceived vulnerability to external military intervention.Third, all future policy formulation proceeds from the premise of sustained nuclear possession. Put differently, North Korea’s central strategic question has shifted to the following: given the secured status of its nuclear capability, how can the state be managed in a safe and durable manner?Hostile Two-State PolicySince the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth KWP Central Committee in December 2023, North Korea has formally designated South Korea as its most hostile external enemy. While nuclear deterrence has foreclosed the possibility of absorption by the South, North Korea remains structurally inferior in most non-military domains. It perceives no viable means of neutralizing the internal security risks associated with this asymmetry. The hostile two-state policy thus functions as a strategic mechanism—underwritten by nuclear-backed military security—to preemptively eliminate internal political vulnerabilities arising rom South Korea’s comparative superiority through institutionalized hostility and comprehensive severance.Abandoning the long-standing objective of unification, which it now regards as unattainable, North Korea instead seeks protracted coexistence premised on adversarial separation. This strategic recalibration, which treats South Korea as a hostile foreign state, has redefined North Korea’s conception of security and diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula and has implicitly expanded the doctrinal scope for potential nuclear employment against the South.Institutionalized ConflictThe 2019 declaration of a “long-term confrontation” with the United States and the December 2023 articulation of the hostile two-state policy indicate that North Korea conceptualizes its antagonism with both the United States and South Korea not as episodic, but as structurally enduring. This orientation entails the three implications:First, nuclear deterrence must be sustained indefinitely, with the military apparatus maintained in a state of continuous readiness.Second, legal and policy frameworks are constructed on the presumption of protracted conflict.Third, North Korea does not anticipate the near-term normalization of inter-Korean relations.Pursuing Stabilization Over ExpansionAt present, North Korea does not appear to be pursuing territorial expansion or a fundamental reordering of the peninsula’s structure. With regime security underwritten by nuclear deterrence, its policy orientation is twofold. First, it seeks to tighten internal governance, achieve incremental economic improvement, and consolidate systemic stability. Second, it continues military modernization and calibrated provocations toward the South to preserve deterrence credibility and sustain hostility. This approach is oriented toward maintaining the status quo while avoiding escalatory thresholds that could jeopardize regime survival.Whereas the pre-2017 period emphasized regime survival, deterrence construction, and systemic revision, the current phase prioritizes the consolidation of established deterrent capabilities and assurance of their continuous operational viability. North Korea seeks to avoid acute instability or large-scale war that could threaten regime continuity.Long-Term Equilibrium in Inter-Korean and U.S.–North Korea RivalryNorth Korea appears to assess that its strategic competition with both the United States and South Korea has entered a stable equilibrium. Although hostility persists, mutual nuclear deterrence constrains unilateral attempts to revise the status quo.None of the principal actors—North Korea, South Korea, or the United States—can pursue transformative change without incurring unacceptable nuclear risk. Accordingly, while large-scale war is deemed unlikely, genuine peace remains absent. Instead, a durable yet frozen adversarial standoff prevails. This condition is likely to persist as long as the mutual nuclear deterrence configuration between the South Korea–U.S. alliance and North Korea remains intact.2. Security and Foreign Policy Assessments and Policy Directives from the Ninth Party CongressThe assessments of the international environment, the United States, and South Korea, as articulated in the Ninth Party Congress report, largely reaffirm positions consolidated during the period of the Eighth Party Congress. Compared with that earlier period, however, the Ninth Party Congress reflects a somewhat more confident and proactive posture.International Environment and Perception of the United StatesFirst, the report asserts that “the current international order, dominated by the predatory logic of the strong devouring the weak, has entered a vortex of turmoil and upheaval.” Within this framing, emerging multipolarity offers North Korea opportunities to leverage other major powers to counterbalance the United States.Second, it contends that international law is effective in the absent of material power, asserting that “the United States’ inherent hostility and coercive disposition, institutionalized through force, remain unchanged.”Third, it reiterates that only power guarantees survival, maintaining that “so long as the global order remains unaltered, our abandonment of nuclear weapons is categorically impossible.”Fourth, it characterizes hostility with the United States as enduring and declares that North Korea will “continue thorough preparations for confrontation and firmly uphold the strongest posture as the immutable foundation of its U.S. policy.”Fifth, it states that “if the United States recognizes North Korea’s status as a nuclear state, peaceful coexistence may be feasible; otherwise, confrontation will persist.” This appears less an overture for dialogue than the articulation of preconditions that are structurally difficult for Washington to accept.Sixth, it emphasizes that “adversaries must not discern North Korea’s intentions,” viewing strategic ambiguity as a means of reinforcing deterrence credibility.Perception of South KoreaFirst, the report contends that “South Korea’s ruling forces have consistently sought to erode our system under the guise of reconciliation and cooperation,” asserting that South Korea’s designation as the “primary adversary and immutable main enemy” constitutes a historical determination.Second, it declares that “regardless of South Korea’s alliances or military expenditures, the dynamics established by nuclear-armed states on the Korean Peninsula will remain unchanged. The only path to safety for South Korea is to sever all entanglements with North Korea and refrain from interference.”Third, it warns that “should South Korea undertake actions that disrupt the prevailing stability, North Korea will employ all physical means appropriate to an enemy state, and within that continuum the possibility of South Korea’s complete collapse cannot be excluded.”Collectively, these positions entrench the permanence of the hostile two-state framework and reflect North Korea’s assessment that the peninsula’s military balance is structurally fixed by its nuclear deterrent. Any South Korean effort to enhance pressure or pursue military superiority is construed as destabilizing, warranting a recalibration of operational criteria to those applicable to hostile foreign states.National Defense Capability DevelopmentThe defense capability agenda articulated at the Ninth Party Congress provides the military foundation for the hostile two-state doctrine. Systems identified for development include ground- and submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered naval platforms, AI-enabled unmanned strike swarms, anti-satellite assets, electronic warfare capabilities designed to incapacitate adversary command-and-control networks, and enhanced reconnaissance satellites. Additionally, North Korea seeks to secure tactical escalation dominance vis-à-vis South Korea through the deployment of 600-millimeter multiple rocket launchers, 240-millimeter systems, and integrated tactical missile complexes. This trajectory indicates a concerted effort to institutionalize credible nuclear warfighting capabilities, particularly at the tactical level.3. ConclusionIn light of the prevailing security architecture on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea’s military modernization trajectory, and the entrenched policy positions of both Koreas, several conclusions can be drawn.First, within the structured framework of mutual nuclear deterrence between the South Korea–U.S. alliance and North Korea, the likelihood of full-scale war appears constrained. However, deterrence equilibrium does not necessarily equate to durable stability.Second, while deterrence functions, crisis stability remains fragile. North Korea’s entrenched hostility, the prolonged suspension of inter-Korean dialogue, sustained high-readiness postures on both sides, North Korea’s preemptive tactical nuclear doctrine, and reciprocal preemptive strike and rapid-retaliation capabilities collectively heighten the risk of miscalculation. Given the persistent potential for escalation once tensions materialize, the refinement of crisis management mechanisms is imperative.Third, North Korea is likely to persist in military modernization and limited provocations to offset any relative erosion of deterrence resulting from South Korea–U.S. advancements, while reinforcing domestic cohesion through sustained hostility toward the South. A dual-track strategy—reinforces credible deterrence while establishing robust management mechanisms to prevent inadvertent clashes—is therefore required.Fourth, North Korea’s pursuit of permanently entrenched nuclear deterrence is unlikely to change in the near term, and the hostile two-state framework is likely to endure. Policy approaches must therefore be realistic, phased, and carefully calibrated to these structural constraints.Fifth, inter-Korean relations are likely to remain characterized by adversarial coexistence under a heavily militarized deterrence balance. While overt conflict may be averted, such peace would constitute an inherently unstable equilibrium, grounded in mutual armament, fragile crisis stability, and sustained hostility. Accordingly, efforts to maintain deterrence credibility must proceed in parallel with the gradual restoration of institutional and diplomatic mechanisms aimed at reducing tensions.As actors fundamentally obligated to pursue peaceful coexistence, the restoration of inter-Korean dialogue constitutes a public good with implications that extend beyond the peninsula, directly affecting peace in Northeast Asia and the broader international community. Sustained international engagement and support are therefore indispensable.The Government of the Republic of Korea has consistently affirmed its determination to eliminate the risk of war and nuclear threats on the Korean Peninsula and to establish a durable framework for peaceful coexistence. As a responsible middle power with growing global responsibilities, the Republic of Korea recognizes that peace on the peninsula is intrinsically linked to regional stability in Northeast Asia and to global security. It will therefore continue to work in concert with the international community to translate this vision into concrete and sustainable outcomes.

Why K-Defense Is Recognized for Its Excellence and Competitiveness in the International Community                    Chi-beom ShinProfessor, Department of Military ScienceKonyang UniversityPlanning Director, Future Society AssociationThe international security order is undergoing a profound structural realignment. Protracted conflicts, the reconfiguration of alliance networks, and the strategic weaponization of supply chains are reshaping not only the geopolitical landscape but also the underlying logic of the defense industry. Defense can no longer be understood as a transactional marketplace for discrete weapons platforms; It has become an extension of national strategic capacity, institutional credibility, and long-term reliability.Over the past decade, South Korea has markedly expanded its defense exports and consolidated its position in the global market. In 2022, it recorded approximately $17 billion in defense exports—a historic high—and in 2023 diversified its export portfolio through major contracts in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Asia.Performance across core platforms—including self-propelled artillery, main battle tanks, multiple launch rocket systems, aircraft, and submarines—demonstrates not only technological maturity but also a balanced industrial ecosystem that is not dependent on a single flagship system.Importantly, international recognition of South Korean defense capabilities has not been driven solely by export volume. Rather, it reflects demonstrated performance in schedule adherence, large-scale contract execution, and comprehensive life-cycle management, including follow-on logistics and sustainment.In an era defined by supply-chain disruption and strategic uncertainty, the ability to ensure delivery continuity under crisis conditions has become a central criterion in defense partnerships. South Korea’s track record suggests that, beyond production capacity, it has accumulated policy consistency, contractual reliability, and institutional coherence.National Strategy and the Top Four ObjectiveThe South Korean government has articulated the advancement of “K-defense” as a core national policy agenda, setting forth the strategic objective of becoming a “top four global defense powerhouse.” This formulation should not be misconstrued as a narrow pursuit of numerical ranking; rather, it signals an intent to position South Korea as a responsible defense partner—one capable of contributing to supply-chain resilience, strengthening technological self-reliance, and fostering long-term, trust-based security cooperation.Defense policy is increasingly integrated with diplomatic strategy and national security planning. In this context, K-defense represents not merely an industrial export sector, but a component of comprehensive national power.South Korea’s competitive advantages are structural rather than episodic. They include comparatively rapid delivery timelines, flexible production systems, cost-effectiveness, and political reliability. These attributes are rooted in decades of accumulated industrial capacity, operational military experience, and institutional support mechanisms that align government policy with industry performance.Canada’s Submarine Program: A Structural Partnership QuestionWithin this strategic environment, Canada’s Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) should be understood as more than a procurement competition. Submarines are inherently long-duration strategic assets, requiring integrated solutions encompassing design, construction, maintenance, modernization, and interoperability over several decades. As such, decisions on submarine acquisition shape enduring security partnerships.South Korea’s KSS-III program demonstrates advanced capabilities, including indigenous design competence, air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems, long-range strike capacity, and high levels of automation. South Korea’s experience in large-scale shipbuilding and complex systems integration further supports disciplined schedule management and cost control—factors particularly salient in submarine acquisition programs, which are historically prone to delays and cost overruns.With respect to Canada’s operational requirements—Arctic-capable performance, long-term sustainability, and interoperability with allied forces—South Korea is positioned to propose a cooperative framework that extends beyond a platform sale. A joint development or co-production model, incorporating technology collaboration and industrial participation, could evolve into a durable strategic partnership rather than a transactional export arrangement.The Strategic Implications of Overseas Defense OrdersDefense cooperation today carries systemic implications that transcend bilateral commercial interests. As supply chains in critical sectors become overly concentrated geographically, global security becomes correspondingly vulnerable. Consequently, many states are actively seeking to diversify their defense suppliers in order to mitigate strategic risk.In this context, South Korea has emerged as a credible alternative supplier—one capable of combining production stability with timely delivery. Its flexible approaches, including technology transfer, local production arrangements, and joint research and development initiatives, further enhance its attractiveness as a partner.Securing overseas contracts, therefore, is not solely a matter of expanding export revenues; it carries strategic significance insofar as it contributes to strengthening partner nations’ defense capacities while reinforcing broader supply-chain resilience. In this sense, defense exports function as instruments of cooperative security architecture.From Industrial Brand to Strategic TrustK-defense has evolved beyond a commercial label. It increasingly represents a policy choice for countries seeking stable, predictable, and institutionally reliable partners within a fluid international security environment.The aspiration to rank among the world’s top four defense powers should thus be interpreted as a strategic vision rather than a symbolic benchmark. It reflects an intention to act as a globally responsible stakeholder—one that contributes to supply-chain stability, cultivates enduring partnerships, and shares advanced technological capabilities within a framework of mutual trust.In contemporary defense markets, trust has become as consequential as technological sophistication. Nations do not merely purchase platforms; they invest in long-term relationships. By demonstrating performance reliability, policy coherence, and strategic alignment, South Korea has positioned itself as a credible and realistic option for states seeking such partnerships.South Korea has accumulated trust through consistent execution.The next phase lies in institutionalizing that trust within a durable strategic architecture.

Challenges in Advancing the Korean Peninsula Peace Initiative Amid Global Turbulence                 Jae-hung ChungSenior FellowSejong InstituteI. The Evolving Strategic Environment: Multipolarity and Sino-Russian AlignmentAmid the protracted Russia–Ukraine war, intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition, and escalating instability in the Middle East, the China–Russia joint statement issued in Moscow on May 8, 2025, has been widely interpreted as a declaratory commitment to accelerating the transition toward a multipolar international order. In the view of both Beijing and Moscow, this transition represents not a contingent development but an irreversible structural and historical trend.Against the backdrop of growing Global South activism and the institutional expansion of BRICS and Eurasian frameworks, China and Russia are positioning themselves as principal architects of an alternative order distinct from the U.S.- and Western-led rules-based system.Through enhanced coordination within BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and other multilateral platforms, the two countries are actively cultivating political and economic alignment with emerging powers. For South Korea, this deepening Sino-Russian strategic convergence presents a complex and enduring diplomatic challenge.China and Russia increasingly frame their cooperation as a response to what they characterize as U.S.-led unilateralism and the persistence of a residual unipolar order. Escalating U.S.–China rivalry, growing tensions between China and Japan, and cross-Strait instability have further reinforced the logic of strategic alignment between Beijing and Moscow. The two governments have articulated common positions on the Russia–Ukraine war, conflicts in the Middle East, and security developments on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait.This trajectory was reaffirmed on February 1, 2026, in Beijing, when Wang Yi, Director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Chinese Communist Party, met with Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of the Russian Security Council. Both sides emphasized the importance of safeguarding what they describe as a UN-centered international order while advancing multipolarity. They also underscored mutual support for each other’s “core interests” and pledged enhanced strategic coordination in addressing complex global challenges.Russia reiterated its support for the One-China principle and expressed opposition to Japan’s military normalization efforts. Notably, Moscow has increasingly framed the Russia–Ukraine war, conflicts in the Middle East, and developments on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait as interconnected geopolitical issues tied to the principle of “indivisible security” in Eurasia. This conceptual framework reinforces joint efforts to coordinate policy responses within the UN, the SCO, and BRICS.On February 4, 2026, Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin held a virtual summit and agreed to further strengthen their “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.” Both leaders criticized U.S. “America First” policies, including tariff measures and regional interventions, and pledged closer coordination.President Putin designated 2026 as the 25th anniversary of the China–Russia Treaty of Friendship and proposed a medium- to long-term “Grand Plan” encompassing political, economic, military-security, energy, scientific, and people-to-people cooperation. President Xi emphasized safeguarding a UN-centered international system and preserving global strategic stability as core responsibilities of bilateral relationship.These developments indicate not merely tactical alignment but a sustained effort to institutionalize strategic coordination across diplomatic, economic, and military domains.II. Expanding Military and Strategic CoordinationSino-Russian coordination has increasingly extended into the military sphere. While not constituting a formal alliance, their operational cooperation has expanded in both scale and geographic scope since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war. Joint exercises have moved beyond Northeast Asia to include the Arctic, the Western Pacific, and Central Asia. Activities such as joint air patrols, missile early-warning drills, naval exercises, and reconnaissance operations have become more increasingly regularized.China and Russia have expressed particular concern over strengthened trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan, as well as Japan’s evolving defense posture. In response, Beijing and Moscow are likely to expand diplomatic and informational coordination through multilateral platforms, while also signaling deterrent resolve through continued joint military activities in sensitive maritime zones, including the East Sea (Sea of Japan), the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea.This evolving pattern of cooperation functions as a strategic counterweight to the U.S.- and Western-led security architecture. As both governments describe the current period as one of “great changes unseen in a century,” they are accelerating efforts to reshape institutional norms and power alignments through BRICS, the SCO, and related initiatives.China’s promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and related frameworks reflects a comprehensive vision for reforming global governance.The result is an increasingly structured strategic rivalry between two competing blocs: on one side, U.S.–ROK–Japan security cooperation anchored in the ROK–U.S. alliance; on the other, deepening a North Korea–China–Russia alignment. This dynamic is contributing to the consolidation of a quasi–new Cold War structure in Northeast Asia and elevating the Korean Peninsula as a focal point of major-power competition.III. Reframing the Korean Peninsula in a Systemic ContextUnder these conditions, the Korean Peninsula can no longer be viewed solely through the lens of inter-Korean relations or U.S.–North Korea diplomacy. Instead, it must be understood as embedded within a multilayered geopolitical structure involving the United States, China, and Russia. Without careful management, the Peninsula risks becoming a structural flashpoint within a broader system of great-power rivalry, thereby increasing the probability of unintended escalation.Accordingly, peace on the Korean Peninsula must be reconceptualized not as a discrete diplomatic event or declaratory milestone, but as a medium- to long-term strategic objective aligned with systemic shifts in the international order. Stability, in turn, must be institutionalized rather than episodically negotiated.IV. Reconceptualizing the Korean Peninsula Peace Initiative as a Strategic BufferIn this context, the Korean Peninsula Peace Initiative advanced by the Lee Jae-myung administration warrants analysis beyond its immediate inter-Korean dimension. It can be interpreted as both a strategic survival mechanism and an effort to create diplomatic maneuvering space within an emerging bipolar—or multipolar—competitive order.Central to the initiative is the concept of “institutionalized peaceful coexistence.” This approach seeks to transform the Peninsula from a forward operating arena of bloc confrontation into a managed zone of stability. By developing legal and institutional mechanisms to mitigate the fragility of the armistice regime and reduce the risk of accidental or unintended conflict, Seoul aims to create a stabilizing buffer amid intensifying U.S.–China–Russia strategic competition.Such institutionalization does not imply neutrality or alliance dilution. Rather, it reflects a pragmatic effort to secure greater strategic autonomy within existing alliance commitments while preventing the Peninsula from becoming a proxy theater for systemic confrontation.ConclusionThe convergence of Sino-Russian strategic alignment and intensified U.S.–Western counterbalancing has ushered in a transitional period in the global order. For South Korea, the challenge lies in navigating this structural transformation without allowing the Korean Peninsula to become a destabilizing variable in great-power competition.The Korean Peninsula Peace Initiative should therefore be understood as a forward-looking strategic framework designed to expand South Korea’s diplomatic space amid what Beijing and Moscow characterize as a “great transformation unseen in a century.” Its ultimate success will depend not only on inter-Korean engagement but also on Seoul’s ability to manage alliance dynamics, engage regional stakeholders, and embed Peninsula stability within the broader architecture of an evolving international order.

The Strategic Advancement of K-Defense: A Pillar of Global Security and an Engine of Future Growth                    Dong-soon ParkProfessor Graduate School of Defense ScienceHansung University2026: A Strategic Turning Point for South Korea’s Defense IndustrySouth Korea’s defense industry stands at a critical juncture. Once viewed primarily as a sector focused on the production and export of military equipment has evolved into a central pillar of national economic strategy and a key contributor to the security architecture of like-minded democracies. “K-Defense” has emerged not only as a high-growth industrial sector attracting sustained global attention, but also as an increasingly influential player in the evolving global defense market.In recognition of this shift, the South Korean government has set an ambitious objective: to position the country among the world’s top four defense exporters. This goal is backed by a whole-of-government export promotion framework that combines industrial policy, financial instruments, and high-level diplomatic engagement.According to data released in January 2026 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) covering the 2020–2024 period, global arms transfers have been strongly influenced by the ongoing war in Ukraine, which has driven significant increases in European procurement.The United States remains the dominant global defense exporter, accounting for approximately 43 percent of the market. France, Russia, China, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom follow. South Korea has steadily advanced into the top tier of exporters, with market share approaching the global top ten.In 2025, South Korea’s defense exports reached approximately $15.2 billion, while its order backlog approached KRW 130 trillion—figures that underscore record-setting performance. Over the past decade, the industry’s expansion into overseas markets has been driven by sustained investments in technological sophistication, scalable production, and rigorous quality assurance.Flagship systems—including the K9 self-propelled howitzer, the FA-50 light combat aircraft, and the Cheonmu multiple launch rocket system—illustrate this trajectory. The K9 has secured contracts across Europe, notably in Türkiye and Poland, and is widely recognized for its competitive performance.The FA-50 has maintained steady demand in Southeast Asia and beyond, while the Cheonmu system has gained upward traction in both European and Middle Eastern markets. Collectively, these platforms have strengthened not only the commercial profile of K-Defense but also South Korea’s broader strategic and diplomatic influence.In 2026, the government formally designated the defense industry as a “national strategic industry,” linking national security imperatives with long-term economic growth. Under the banner of a “major transformation toward global top-tier status,” the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) outlined a policy framework built on three pillars: technological advancement, shared growth across the industrial ecosystem, and globalization. This framework goes beyond rhetoric, encompassing, financial mechanisms such as the K-Defense Export Fund, enhanced export financing tools, and coordinated diplomatic support for major overseas contracts.Within this context, large-scale international programs—such as Canada’s submarine procurement initiative—are seen not merely as commercial opportunities but as strategically significant projects with the potential to shape the long-term trajectory of Korea’s defense industrial base.Sources of Global Demand for K-DefenseK-Defense is often “described in shorthand as “cost-effective.” While competitive pricing is certainly an important factor, the underlying drivers of global demand are more complex, reflecting structural advantages in production, performance, and partnership strategy.1. Supply Chain Resilience and Timely DeliveryIn an era marked by geopolitical volatility and supply chain disruptions, the timely delivery of defense systems has become a key concern for procurement authorities worldwide. South Korea’s defense industry benefits from a robust domestic manufacturing base, vertically integrated production capacity, and the capability to surge output when needed.A notable example is Hanwha Aerospace’s January 30 contract with Norway’s Defence Materiel Agency (NDMA), valued at approximately $922 million, for a comprehensive Cheonmu package—including launch systems, precision-guided munitions, and integrated logistics support. The agreement highlights Korea’s ability to meet stringent NATO interoperability standards while delivering within compressed timelines. In today’s constrained global market, supply reliability has emerged as a strategic differentiator.2. Operational Credibility and Combat-Proven PerformanceLeading K-Defense platforms—including the K9 howitzer, K2 main battle tank, and FA-50 aircraft—have been developed and refined through decades of operational deployment by the Republic of Korea Armed Forces. These systems have been tested under demanding terrain and climate conditions and are optimized for integration into advanced, network-centric warfare architectures.Their export appeal is therefore grounded not only in technical specifications but also in demonstrated reliability, life-cycle performance, and interoperability within modern command-and-control environments. For purchasing states, such operational validation mitigates risk and strengthens confidence in long-term force planning3. Strategic Partnership Through Technology Transfer and LocalizationPerhaps most distinctively, South Korea has positioned itself not merely as a supplier but as a long-term strategic partner. Its export model frequently incorporates technology transfer, licensed production, and localized industrial participation. This approach strengthens the defense self-reliance of partner nations while embedding Korean firms within local industrial ecosystems.By addressing concerns over excessive technological dependence and fostering indigenous maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) capabilities, this model has generated durable political and industrial goodwill. It represents a mutually reinforcing framework in which defense exports contribute simultaneously to alliance-building, industrial cooperation, and strategic alignment.Securing the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project: A Strategic Imperative for 2026The foremost priority for South Korea’s defense industry in 2026 is securing the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), a program valued at approximately KRW 60 trillion (roughly the USD equivalent, depending on exchange rates). The CPSP represents one of the most consequential overseas defense procurements currently underway and a potential inflection point for K-Defense.Launched in 2021, the CPSP is intended to replace Canada’s four aging Victoria-class submarines with a fleet of eight to twelve 3,000-ton diesel-electric submarines. Ottawa has targeted delivery of lead vessel around 2035. Of the total estimated program value, approximately KRW 20 trillion is allocated to construction, with the remaining KRW 40 trillion projected for lifecycle sustainment, including maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO).Strategic Context of Canada’s Submarine ModernizationCanada’s requirement reflects its unique geostrategic circumstances. As the country with the world’s longest coastline, Canada must maintain persistent maritime surveillance and deterrence capabilities across three primary theaters: the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the increasingly contested Arctic.The existing Victoria-class submarines—2,400-ton platforms acquired secondhand from the United Kingdom in 1998—have reached the limits of operational sustainability, with reports indicating that only one vessel remains fully operational.At the same time, heightened submarine activity by Russia and China, particularly in the Arctic, has increased the urgency of deploying modern, stealth-capable platforms optimized for under-ice and long-duration patrol operations. The CPSP is therefore central not only to naval modernization but also to safeguarding Arctic sovereignty, maritime trade routes, and broader national security interests.Recent remarks by Presidential Chief of Staff Hoon-sik Kang following his January 31 visit to Canada have intensified domestic attention on the project. South Korean firms Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries have formed a unified bidding team and are competing with Germany’s Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems (TKMS), with a preferred bidder expected to be selected in the first half of the year.Beyond its monetary scale, the CPSP is widely viewed as a qualitative watershed for South Korea’s defense industrial base.Strategic Rationale for Securing the CPSP ContractA careful assessment of the CPSP highlights several strategic considerations.1. Establishing a Security Partnership with a North American AllyCanada is a core NATO member and one of the United States’ closest allies. Successfully exporting submarines to Canada would demonstrate that South Korean naval platforms meet the stringent operational, technical, and interoperability standards required in North American and NATO markets.Such validation would enhance South Korea’s credibility as a high-end defense supplier and could open pathways for expanded cooperation with other NATO states, including future collaboration opportunities with the United States.2. Demonstrated Industrial Capacity and Advanced TechnologySouth Korea possesses robust submarine design, construction, and delivery capabilities. The 3,000-ton Dosan Ahn Chang-ho–class submarines incorporate advanced features, including air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems and next-generation lithium-ion batteries, providing enhanced endurance and operational flexibility.Equally important is South Korea’s global leadership in commercial shipbuilding, which translates into production scalability, schedule discipline, and cost control—factors that are increasingly decisive in large-scale naval procurement. In an environment where timely delivery is a strategic priority, South Korea’s ability to mobilize industrial capacity at scale represents a significant competitive advantage.3. A Whole-of-Government, Whole-of-Industry Partnership ModelThe CPSP competition extends beyond platform performance. As confirmed during the February 2 visit of Canada’s Special Envoy for Defense Procurement, Stephen Fuhr, the evaluation encompasses broader industrial cooperation and long-term ecosystem development.South Korea has advanced a “One Team” model integrating government, industry, and military stakeholders. The proposed approach includes not only submarine construction but also industrial collaboration across sectors where South Korea maintains global competitiveness—automotive manufacturing, advanced steel production, shipbuilding, defense systems integration, artificial intelligence, aerospace, and energy infrastructure. This “defense-plus-industrial partnership” framework is designed to provide Canada with long-term economic and technological value rather than a narrow procurement transaction.Managing Competitive RealitiesWhile South Korean submarine technology is widely regarded as highly competitive, Germany’s longstanding security relationship with Canada within the NATO framework provides a structural advantage for its bid. Accordingly, South Korea’s approach has involved sustained, high-level diplomatic engagement.President Lee Jae-myung met with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in Gyeongju on October 30, 2025, reinforcing bilateral strategic ties. During that visit, the Canadian Prime Minister toured Hanwha Ocean’s Geoje shipyard to review CPSP-related production facilities. Additional high-level exchanges—including Chief of Staff Kang’s visit to Canada as Special Envoy for Strategic Economic Cooperation and the recent visit of Canada’s Minister of Defence Procurement to South Korea—reflect a coordinated, government-wide effort.Director Kang has publicly acknowledged that the competition will be challenging while expressing confidence in Korea’s proposal. This balanced perspective underscores the high stakes involved.Strategic and Economic ImplicationsSecuring the CPSP contract would generate substantial domestic economic impact. Estimates suggest production-related effects exceeding KRW 40 trillion, the engagement of more than 300 supplier firms, and the creation of over 20,000 jobs. Beyond immediate economic returns, the project would reinforce the global standing of South Korea’s shipbuilding and defense industries and provide a platform for expanded exports to NATO member states.Successfully executing a project of this scale would demonstrate South Korea’s capacity to deliver advanced, large-displacement submarines in accordance with the highest international standards. It would further solidify K-Defense as a reliable partner within allied security architectures.Conclusion: K-Defense as a Strategic NecessityK-Defense has moved beyond the realm of optional industrial diversification; it now constitutes a strategic necessity. The national objective of becoming a leading global defense exporter aligns economic growth with diplomatic leverage and security cooperation.Success in major overseas procurements—particularly the Canadian submarine program—will depend on the convergence of industrial innovation and sustained government support. If achieved, these outcomes will not only strengthen South Korea’s economic base but also enhance its role as a contributor to global stability.The advancement of K-Defense is therefore not solely a matter of commercial gain. It represents an opportunity for South Korea to demonstrate that it is a dependable partner—prepared to share technology, strengthen collective security, and contribute meaningfully to peace and stability in an increasingly uncertain international environment.

Realizing the Three Major Goals of the Korean Peninsula Peace Initiative: Addressing North Korea’s Denuclearization Evasion and U.S. Strategic Indifference                    Jin-Ha KimResearch Fellow, K-Policy PlatformAdjunct Professor, Hallym University of Graduate StudiesIn September 2025, President Lee Jae-myung articulated a vision for peace on the Korean Peninsula in his keynote address to the 80th United Nations General Assembly. His vision aimed to move beyond decades of hostility and confrontation toward peaceful coexistence and shared prosperity. To this end, he outlined three core goals and pathways—exchange, normalization, and denuclearization—as the foundation of the Korean Peninsula peace initiative.Advancing these objectives in engagement with North Korea, which has embraced a “hostile two-state theory” and categorically rejected inter-Korean cooperation, presents a formidable challenge. Since the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994, Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weapons has served as a structural impediment to peace, undermining stability on the peninsula for more than three decades.Given that denuclearization will decisively shape the feasibility of the peace initiative, this paper examines North Korea’s strategy of entrenching its nuclear status while evading denuclearization pressures and explores potential countermeasures.North Korea regards nuclear weapons as an indispensable and absolute instrument for altering the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly, it has consistently expanded and institutionalized its nuclear forces. In future negotiations with the United States, the international community, and South Korea, Pyongyang is likely to seek the irreversible consolidation of its nuclear status as an established fact, thereby neutralizing denuclearization demands.Currently, North Korea portrays the United States and South Korea as actors trapped in a “delusion of denuclearization,” while focusing on cementing nuclear possession as an immutable reality. This stance was reaffirmed by Kim Jong Un in his policy address at the 13th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly in September 2025, where he asserted that “the concept of denuclearization has already lost its meaning.”To provide an institutional and material foundation for this strategy, North Korea has pursued its second nuclear force enhancement plan since the Eighth Party Congress. This initiative has involved the accelerated expansion, diversification, and operationalization of its nuclear forces, accompanied by a rapid increase in the number of warheads.An emboldened North Korea is therefore likely to adopt a more assertive external posture and a hardened negotiating stance aimed at reshaping the strategic environment of the Korean Peninsula. Leveraging its expanded nuclear capabilities, Pyongyang is expected to prioritize objectives such as ending what it perceives as U.S. hostile policies and halting pressures related to human rights issues.Ultimately, it will seek to undermine the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments to South Korea by pressing for reductions or withdrawal of U.S. forces, curtailment of strategic asset deployments, downsizing of ROK-U.S. combined exercises, neutralization of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), and removal of the THAAD missile defense system.At the same time, North Korea is likely to pursue greater strategic autonomy by expanding its nuclear arsenal, to emphasize its geopolitical relevance while maintaining equidistance among major powers, including the United States, China, and Russia. Pyongyang is expected to leverage this positioning to generate momentum for altering the status quo on the Korean Peninsula.Domestically, nuclear force enhancement and the coercive diplomacy it enables are likely to be instrumentalized to reinforce regime stability and bolster Kim Jong Un’s leadership legitimacy. The normalization and expansion of nuclear forces will be presented as a milestone in North Korea’s transformation into a “strong and prosperous nation” and, ultimately, a “strategic nuclear power,” reinforcing the leader’s image as a figure of military and diplomatic authority.North Korea is also likely to intensify efforts to marginalize South Korea by maintaining its nuclear posture. In its dealings with the United States, Pyongyang is expected to insist on direct negotiations and, if dialogue resumes—particularly under an arms-management framework that diverges from denuclearization—it will demand the exclusion of South Korea as a non-nuclear participant.This intent was explicitly articulated by Kim Yo-jong at an August 20 meeting of senior foreign ministry officials, where she emphasized a “regional diplomatic arena centered on our state.” Kim Jong Un reaffirmed this position in September 2025, stating unequivocally that North Korea has “no reason” to engage with South Korea.Over time, this exclusionary approach could develop into a broader marginalization strategy aimed at undermining South Korea’s position in East Asian regional politics. If reinforced by pressure from China and Russia and accompanied by reduced U.S. engagement, such dynamics could push South Korea toward strategic isolation and de facto Finlandization, potentially challenging the foundations of its sovereign autonomy.To advance these objectives while evading U.S. denuclearization pressure and extracting maximum concessions, North Korea is likely to employ a multifaceted tactical approach. Central to this strategy is a “pressure first, negotiations later” approach, whereby Pyongyang delays engagement in order to shape negotiations from a position of accumulated strength. During this period, North Korea will continue expanding its nuclear capabilities while Washington remains focused on maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and prioritizing its strategic attention on China.The deepening Russia–North Korea partnership further complicates this landscape. Enhanced military cooperation partially mitigates the effects of sanctions, provides North Korea with resources for regime maintenance, and raises the prospect of advanced technology transfers.Against the backdrop of intensifying bloc dynamics and alignment with revisionist powers, Pyongyang has little incentive to accelerate negotiations with a U.S. administration preoccupied with crises in Ukraine and the Middle East. Instead, North Korea is likely to strengthen coordination with China and Russia, gradually increasing strategic pressure on Washington.Nuclear advancement and heightened provocations will also function as instruments of coercion. By significantly expanding its arsenal and sustaining provocations, North Korea seeks to normalize international acceptance of the “failure of denuclearization” and influence U.S. domestic discourse toward de facto recognition or acceptance of a nuclear freeze.Concurrently, Pyongyang may aim to stimulate debate within the United States over weakening extended deterrence commitments to South Korea or reducing the U.S. military presence there. Ultimately, North Korea seeks to position itself to propose a coercive bargain: stability on the Korean Peninsula in exchange for a reduction in U.S. “hostile policies.”On the U.S. side, denuclearization and renewed dialogue with North Korea do not currently appear to be among the highest strategic priorities. U.S.–North Korea relations are characterized by prolonged stagnation, accompanied by exploratory efforts to preserve the possibility of engagement. The U.S. administration remains primarily focused on higher-priority challenges, including managing the war in Ukraine and shaping long-term strategic competition with China.Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that informal confidence-building measures—such as a temporary suspension of ROK-U.S. joint exercises or strategic asset deployments in exchange for a moratorium on North Korean nuclear and missile tests—might be considered preparatory steps toward reopening a dialogue channel.North Korea, meanwhile, is likely to prioritize completing its second five-year plan for nuclear force advancement, which is approaching its final phase, rather than entering premature negotiations with the United States. Pyongyang is expected to leverage the Ninth Party Congress, scheduled for 2026, as a platform to showcase these achievements both domestically and on the international stage.Despite initiating preparatory steps—such as the December plenary meeting—North Korea does not appear to be accelerating the timing of the party congress, contrary to earlier expectations. This suggests that Pyongyang is closely monitoring potential shifts in U.S. policy and rapid changes in the international environment, waiting for a strategic window more favorable to its interests.From North Korea’s perspective, aligning with revisionist powers and advancing its objective of altering the status quo on the Korean Peninsula may be considered a more reliable path to regime survival than engaging in uncertain negotiations with Washington.The U.S. midterm elections scheduled for November 2026 could serve as an inflection point for both U.S.–North Korea dialogue and inter-Korean relations. Mounting domestic and international pressures on the United States—including challenges in managing the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, frictions with traditional allies over currency and trade disputes, and deepening domestic political polarization amid economic stagnation—are likely to intensify demands on the Trump administration to deliver tangible diplomatic outcomes.This environment could incentivize Washington to pursue expedited negotiations with North Korea. Pyongyang, in turn, is highly likely to calculate that such conditions would enable it to extract greater concessions.Kim Jong Un’s September 2025 address to the Supreme People’s Assembly illustrates this strategic calculus. While strongly condemning ROK–U.S. joint military exercises and reiterating the impossibility of denuclearization, he simultaneously signaled conditional openness to dialogue, stating that “if we desire peaceful coexistence, there is no reason we cannot sit down with the United States.” Under such circumstances, if negotiations were to resume, denuclearization would likely no longer be the central agenda item.Given Washington’s heightened sense of urgency to reinitiate dialogue and demonstrate diplomatic progress, there is an increasing risk that the existing denuclearization framework could be supplanted by a politically driven negotiation centered on “peaceful coexistence.”Such an approach might involve accepting elements of North Korea’s demands—such as the rollback of so-called hostile policies or reductions in U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula—in exchange for limits on Pyongyang’s ability to strike the U.S. homeland or caps on its nuclear warhead inventory. This outcome would carry significantly adverse implications for South Korea’s security and long-term viability.In response, several policy measures should be considered. First, the ROK–U.S.–Japan trilateral cooperation framework must be revitalized and strengthened to reaffirm allied and international consensus around the principle of North Korean denuclearization.At the bilateral level, Seoul and Washington should work to institutionalize and codify the denuclearization principle in a manner that is politically and strategically irreversible. Reasserting denuclearization as a core international norm would increase pressure on North Korea to respond strategically to South Korea’s peace initiatives, rather than pursue unilateral alternatives.U.S.–North Korea negotiations must avoid resulting in the normalization of North Korea’s nuclear status or the erosion of U.S. extended deterrence commitments. Achieving this requires simultaneously enhancing the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence and strengthening South Korea’s indigenous deterrence capabilities.Seoul should continue to press Washington to regularize the deployment of U.S. strategic assets, reinforce institutional linkages between the ROK–U.S. Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) and the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), and fully operationalize the Conventional Nuclear Integration (CNI) framework. In parallel, South Korea should expand its independent deterrence and retaliatory capabilities through further development of the Korean-style three-axis system, which would also serve as a minimum hedge against the risk of unilateral U.S. retrenchment.Third, diplomatic efforts must be intensified to preempt North Korea’s strategy of excluding and marginalizing South Korea from negotiations, as well as the potential for U.S. acquiescence to such exclusion. While continuing to reestablish denuclearization as an irreversible international principle, Seoul should apply early and sustained pressure to secure firm U.S. commitments—either to reinforce extended deterrence or, if denuclearization is effectively abandoned, to support South Korea’s pursuit of an independent nuclear deterrent.Finally, by strengthening its own defense capabilities and deepening ROK–U.S. defense-industrial cooperation, South Korea must reinforce the perception within U.S. policy circles that it is an indispensable geopolitical asset in the broader strategy of balancing China. In practical terms, this requires firmly embedding the principle that maintaining the alliance with South Korea takes strategic precedence over transactional compromises with North Korea. Concurrently, both governments should work to heighten awareness of the strategic costs associated with alliance weakening, including the risk of a nuclear domino effect in East Asia. Paradoxically, a steadfast commitment to denuclearization, coupled with a credible deterrence posture, may serve as a catalyst that ultimately compels North Korea to engage more constructively with South Korea’s peace initiatives.

Prospects for a U.S.–North Korea Summit and the Strategic Environment on the Korean Peninsula                    Jung KimGraduate School of North Korean StudiesIn a January 18, 2026 editorial, The Washington Post argued that U.S. policy toward North Korea should move beyond the exclusive pursuit of the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” and instead acknowledge North Korea as a de facto nuclear power for the purposes of negotiation.The editorial recommended a shift toward an arms management framework—focused on freezing, capping, and ultimately reducing North Korea’s nuclear arsenal—rather than continuing to insist on denuclearization as the sole objective. Its central argument was not the abandonment of long-standing principles, but the recognition that an ideals-only approach, detached from prevailing realities, risks exacerbating instability. The editorial cautioned that, absent near-term and practical measures to limit the scale and operational risks of North Korea’s nuclear forces, Pyongyang’s capabilities would continue to expand, thereby increasing the likelihood of miscalculation or accidental conflict.The editorial attracted attention not only for its substantive argument but also for the way it illuminated an emerging current within Washington policy circles. The Washington Post interpreted the Trump administration’s complete omission of North Korea from the December 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) as a deliberate choice, suggesting that the explicit emphasis on denuclearization in the 2017 strategy has become increasingly detached from prevailing strategic realities.Against the backdrop of intelligence assessments showing North Korea’s continued buildup of nuclear capabilities and preparations for a possible resumption of nuclear testing, negotiations premised on prior denuclearization commitments face prohibitive entry conditions.The editorial cited estimates suggesting that North Korea may possess as many as 50 nuclear warheads and assessed that its nuclear test sites could be reactivated on short notice. It characterized the current situation as one of nuclear “entrenchment,” rather than a reversible deviation from past commitments.Importantly, the editorial did not advocate unconditional or formal recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. It explicitly acknowledged the risk that accepting the nuclear reality could intensify domestic debates over nuclear armament in South Korea and Japan.Accordingly, it argued that any shift in focus—from denuclearization to freeze-and-cap measures—would need to be accompanied by transparency, close alliance coordination, and clearly defined costs imposed on Pyongyang. The substance of the proposed shift therefore lies not merely in redefining objectives, but in constructing crisis management mechanisms that integrate alliance cohesion, verification, and enforceability.Assessing broader trends within the U.S. policy community requires looking beyond the omission in the NSS itself. Recent defense planning documents point to a relative recalibration of U.S. roles on the Korean Peninsula, with South Korea expected to assume greater primary responsibility for deterrence. This adjustment reflects both the prioritization of strategic competition with China and a broader effort to reinforce allied self-reliance.The absence of explicit references to denuclearization in these documents further supports the interpretation that U.S. policy is shifting from a strategy centered on resolution toward one focused on long-term management. Within this framework, North Korea is treated less as a problem to be decisively resolved and more as a persistent risk to be contained.This evolution, however, is neither uncontested nor uniform. Arms management approaches resonate with realist deterrence theorists, yet they remain deeply controversial among policymakers who prioritize non-proliferation or view any concessions as legitimizing a nuclear fait accompli.Domestic political constraints in the United States further circumscribe policy maneuverability. Sanctions relief cannot be delivered through presidential discretion alone; congressional oversight, statutory requirements, judicial considerations, and allied concerns collectively narrow the available negotiating space. Consequently, even if a summit were convened, it could risk devolving into largely symbolic diplomacy, yielding limited working-level outcomes without durable constraints. Importantly, a shift toward arms control does not inherently simplify negotiations; rather, it raises the political burden of specifying—and defending—the concrete concessions the United States would be prepared to offer.Against this backdrop, the prospect of a U.S.–North Korea summit within the year remains plausible but uncertain. If President Trump favors top-down diplomacy, a summit could be staged as a political breakthrough for both domestic and international audiences. North Korea, however, is likely to approach such talks with elevated expectations. Pyongyang has long sought negotiations premised on its status as a nuclear power, framed in terms of arms management rather than disarmament.Should the United States adopt a freeze-and-cap approach, North Korea would almost certainly attempt to link such a shift to some form of implicit recognition. The success or failure of a summit would therefore hinge on how far Washington is prepared to offer concessions with recognition-adjacent effects, and on whether U.S. allies—particularly South Korea and Japan—are willing to accept the strategic and political implications that would follow.Possible negotiation outcomes within the year appear to converge around two scenarios. The first is symbolic diplomacy, which may ease tensions atmospherically but fails to impose meaningful constraints on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. The second is a limited, or “mini-agreement,” centered on an observable freeze—such as halting fissile material production or suspending specific missile tests—paired with narrow, reversible concessions and limited verification.For such an agreement to be strategically meaningful, several conditions are essential. Weak verification would render any freeze indistinguishable from a tactical delay. Concessions that undermine alliance deterrence could amplify regional instability even if a freeze were nominally achieved. Accordingly, minimum verification standards—specifying what is verified, where, and by what means—as well as the scope and sequencing of concessions must be clearly defined and agreed upon within the alliance in advance.For South Korea, the policy challenge is inherently dual-layered. First, as U.S. engagement with North Korea shifts toward a management-oriented approach, Seoul must reinforce the credibility of extended deterrence while containing domestic anxiety and debates over nuclear armament. Second, South Korea cannot passively accept a management paradigm; it must articulate a strategic pathway that links short-term risk management to a longer-term environment conducive to disarmament and denuclearization.This requires avoiding a false trade-off between crisis management and deterrence. Crisis management does not substitute for deterrence: deterrence suppresses crises, while diplomacy manages and ultimately resolves them. Only their parallel operation provides the foundation for a sustainable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.Within this context, the “Three Major Goals of the Korean Peninsula Peace Initiative” require recalibration to reflect present realities. The first goal—a Korean Peninsula free of war and nuclear weapons—should be retained as a guiding ideal while pursued pragmatically through a phased approach. If immediate nuclear elimination is unattainable, preventing war and mitigating nuclear risks must take precedence.Establishing and verifying ceilings on North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities can help prevent further expansion, thereby creating conditions for eventual reduction or abandonment as the regional environment evolves. This approach does not lower long-term ambitions; rather, it reflects strategic realism aimed at preserving the prerequisites for achieving enduring objectives. In this light, The Washington Post’s freeze-and-cap proposal can be understood as an effort to institutionalize this intermediate phase of risk management.The second goal—establishing a peace regime without war—should be understood as an institutional framework rather than a purely political declaration. Its core elements include preventing accidental conflict, maintaining communication during crises, and ensuring transparency, all of which are inseparable from verification mechanisms. Practical measures such as permanent military hotlines, rules of engagement for encounters at sea and in the air, advance notification of exercises, and structured military-to-military contacts could be implemented in the near term.These initiatives must be accompanied by sustained reinforcement of alliance deterrence. In a context where U.S. deterrence roles may be relatively recalibrated, South Korea must simultaneously enhance self-reliance and redesign operational concepts within the alliance framework to ensure credible crisis management and regional stability.The third goal—contributing to global peace—is closely linked to preventing the normalization of nuclear proliferation. If North Korea’s nuclear status becomes entrenched and allied anxieties intensify, pressures for regional nuclear armament are likely to influence policy debates. Mitigating these risks requires maintaining a credible linkage between crisis management, alliance deterrence, and the long-term objective of non-proliferation, ensuring that short-term stability measures do not inadvertently undermine broader global security norms.In sum, the strategic environment surrounding a potential U.S.–North Korea summit is defined less by diplomatic opportunity than by the challenge of managing risk without legitimizing proliferation. Whether engagement produces stability or accelerates fragmentation will hinge on the clarity of objectives, the discipline of alliance coordination, and the credibility of verification and deterrence mechanisms that underpin any negotiated outcome.

MASGA and Nuclear-Powered Submarines: A New Phase in the Evolution of the ROK–U.S. Alliance                    Tae-jun KimDirector, Institute for Korean Peninsula Security StudiesHonorary Professor, Korea National Defense UniversityI. Maritime Hegemony and the Strategic Logic of MASGA1. Strategic Competition Moves SeawardThe principal arena of contemporary international politics has shifted decisively toward the maritime domain. Under President Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine, U.S.–China strategic competition expanded beyond trade and technology into a contest over maritime access and sea control.The world’s oceans function as critical arteries of the global economy, carrying energy resources, food supplies, and key industrial inputs such as semiconductors. Control over these sea lines of communication increasingly determines which states possess the capacity to shape international norms and rules.Recent U.S. actions—such as operations aimed at exerting pressure on Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro—underscore this strategic reality. States with blue-water naval capabilities retain the option to intervene selectively and decisively, while those lacking such capabilities are relegated to more passive roles in international affairs.Nowhere is this dynamic more pronounced than in the Indo-Pacific. The potential for a Chinese attempt to coerce or invade Taiwan has accelerated competition for maritime dominance across the broader region, including the South China Sea. As a result, both Washington and Beijing are concentrating national resources on naval expansion, making maritime power a central variable in the emerging international order.2. China’s Quantitative Expansion and the Erosion of America’s Industrial BaseAccording to The Military Balance 2025 published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), China has already surpassed the United States in the number of surface combatants, fielding approximately 435 vessels compared to the U.S. Navy’s 294. China now operates three aircraft carrier strike groups, significantly enhancing its capacity for regional sea denial and blockade operations.The United States retains clear qualitative advantages in nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, attack submarines (SSNs), ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and AEGIS combat systems. However, its ability to translate qualitative superiority into sustained force expansion has been constrained by the weakening of its shipbuilding industrial base. Following the Cold War, the bifurcation of civilian merchant shipbuilding and military production exposed structural inefficiencies, leading to cost overruns, production delays, and reduced output.By contrast, South Korea and China have leveraged their robust commercial shipbuilding sectors, including experience in large-scale merchant and specialized vessels, to enhance productivity and maintain industrial competitiveness. This divergence has become a critical factor shaping the balance of maritime power.II. Nuclear-Powered Submarines and Stability on the Korean Peninsula1. The Strategic Role of SSNs in a Maritime Competition EraThe evolving maritime security environment in Northeast Asia represents not merely a change in operational conditions but a fundamental shift in strategic orientation. North Korea’s pursuit of enhanced submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capabilities, combined with China’s expanding SSN and SSBN fleets, has shifted the center of gravity of South Korea’s security concerns from land-based threats to the maritime domain.In this context, nuclear-powered attack submarines are emerging as a critical strategic capability. An SSN is not simply an advanced weapons platform: it represents a qualitative transformation in deterrence posture. With extended submerged endurance, high survivability, and true blue-water operational reach, SSNs provide South Korea with the ability to deter North Korean nuclear and missile threats while countering potential Chinese maritime coercion or blockade strategies.This capability goes beyond incremental force enhancement. It lays the foundation for more credible and independent deterrence and enables Seoul to pursue a more autonomous and flexible security policy within the alliance framework.2. The Imperative of Compliance with International NormsAny South Korean pursuit of SSNs must be accompanied by robust institutional safeguards aligned with international nonproliferation norms. Ensuring that nuclear technology is not diverted for weapons purposes is essential for maintaining international confidence and legitimacy.Failure to adhere to these norms would carry significant costs:  ● Diplomatic Isolation: Noncompliance could place South Korea under suspicion as a proliferation risk, undermining trust with key partners such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan.  ● Economic Consequences: Potential sanctions by the IAEA or UN Security Council would adversely affect not only the nuclear and defense sectors but also broader trade and financial relations.  ● Alliance Strain: The ROK–U.S. alliance rests on mutual trust. Violations of international norms could generate political backlash in Washington, jeopardizing cooperation initiatives such as MASGA.  ● Domestic Costs: Diplomatic and economic penalties would ultimately impose tangible burdens on South Korea’s economy and security, potentially negating the benefits of SSN acquisition.Accordingly, SSN development must be framed not as unchecked military expansion but as a carefully governed security initiative consistent with global norms. Only under such conditions can South Korea maintain its standing as a responsible advanced state.Ultimately, SSNs are not merely instruments of power but stabilizing assets essential to maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula and strategic balance in Northeast Asia. In an era of intensifying maritime competition, proactive maritime capability development is increasingly synonymous with deterrence and stability.III. MASGA and the Transformation of the Alliance1. Structural Weaknesses in U.S. Shipbuilding and the Origins of MASGAThe decline of the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base after the Cold War produced systemic inefficiencies that now constrain naval expansion. Prolonged construction timelines and chronic cost overruns have become endemic. MASGA—Make American Shipbuilding Great Again—emerged as a response to these vulnerabilities.Initially proposed by South Korea as a means to mitigating protectionist pressure from the Trump administration, MASGA evolved into a mutually beneficial industrial cooperation framework. By integrating South Korean capital, technology, and production expertise, the initiative offered a pathway to revitalizing U.S. shipbuilding capacity while creating domestic employment. President Trump embraced MASGA not merely as a slogan but as a national-level industrial strategy.2. Hanwha’s Role and the Expansion of MASGAIn 2024, Hanwha’s acquisition of the Philadelphia Shipyard marked a tangible expansion of MASGA from concept to implementation. The shipyard’s capabilities are being extended beyond merchant vessels construction to include warship production as well as maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) services.The Trump administration’s plan to expand the U.S. Navy to 381 ships further underscored the security implications of this cooperation. Hanwha’s ongoing expansion of the Philadelphia facility, together with its partnership with U.S. firm HavokAI on a 60-meter-class unmanned surface vessel, illustrates MASGA’s extension into advanced defense technologies. With $3 billion allocated for unmanned systems, MASGA is increasingly embedded in the future architecture of U.S. naval power.3. South Korea’s Industrial Power as a Strategic AssetSouth Korea is the world’s second-largest shipbuilding nation, accounting for more than 25 percent of global market share. Firms such as Hyundai Heavy Industries, Samsung Heavy Industries, and Hanwha Ocean possess globally competitive capabilities in LNG carriers, ultra-large container ships, and specialized vessels, alongside extensive experience in constructing AEGIS destroyers and submarines.This industrial base constitutes a strategic national asset rather than merely a commercial advantage. It has reached a level of sophistication at which discussions of SSN construction are no longer theoretical. MASGA has thus accelerated the evolution of the ROK–U.S. alliance from a traditional security partnership into an integrated industrial, technological, and strategic alliance.4. South Korea’s Strategic ChoiceMASGA has reshaped U.S. perceptions of South Korea—from a recipient of security guarantees to a strategic provider of tangible industrial and technological value. At the same time, U.S. support for South Korea’s pursuit of SSNs offers Seoul a credible deterrent against North Korea’s SLBM threat and China’s maritime coercion strategies.This convergence represents more than military enhancement. It constitutes a strategic choice essential to sustaining peace on the Korean Peninsula and preserving balance in Northeast Asia. SSNs and MASGA together mark a historic step in redefining the ROK–U.S. alliance as a comprehensive partnership integrating security, industry, and technology.In an era defined by competition for maritime hegemony, South Korea’s turn toward the sea reflects a decision about its future role as a power. It answers a fundamental question—what kind of state will South Korea become?—and signals a decisive moment in the transformation of the alliance.

Managing Bilateral Friction Through Practical Diplomacy: Korea–Japan Shuttle Diplomacy and the Containment of Negative Variables                    Min-young YooResearch Fellow, Institute for Asian Studies, Korea UniversityFor many Koreans, Horyuji Temple in Nara Prefecture, Japan is associated with the Golden Hall murals traditionally attributed to the Goguryeo monk Damjing. Older generations recall learning about Damjing’s alleged role from school history textbooks. Although subsequent scholarship has questioned whether Damjing personally painted the murals, there is broad academic consensus that artisans and monks from the Korean Peninsula, particularly from Goguryeo and Baekje, played a significant role in the construction of Horyuji and in the formation of Japan’s early Nara-period culture more than 1,300 years ago.In Japan, Horyuji is widely regarded as a national cultural symbol and is celebrated as the world’s oldest surviving wooden structure. Its architectural form has been carefully preserved for over a millennium, and in 1993 it was designated Japan’s first UNESCO World Cultural Heritage site.Against this backdrop, the decision by the leaders of South Korea and Japan to visit Horyuji following their summit carries layered diplomatic meaning. For the Korean public, the visit evokes the long history of premodern exchange between the two countries and implicitly encourages a broader historical lens— one that acknowledges cooperation and cultural transmission alongside the painful legacy of modern history. It also resonates with a sense of national pride rooted in the recognition that the Korean Peninsula contributed meaningfully to the foundations of Japanese civilization.For the Japanese public, the visit similarly recalls early bilateral exchanges, but more importantly, the presence of a South Korean president at one of Japan’s most revered historical sites conveys respect for Japanese cultural heritage. In this sense, the symbolism is comparable to the impression that might be created if a foreign leader were to visit Korea’s Bulguksa Temple and Seokguram Grotto—sites deeply embedded in Korean historical identity.Beyond symbolism, both leaders sought to shape positive public perceptions at home. Their joint cultural performance, including playing drums together—an activity associated with Prime Minister Takaichi’s student years—projected personal a sense of rapport. The choice of music, including “Golden” from K-Pop Demon Hunters and BTS’s “Dynamite,” further underscored cultural familiarity and mutual openness.Substantively, Japan’s decision to raise the excavation of remains and DNA identification related to the 1942 Chosei Coal Mine flooding accident as the first agenda item of the summit was particularly notable. The South Korean side responded positively, interpreting the initiative as an effort to address unresolved issues stemming from the colonial period and forced mobilization—topics that remain politically sensitive within Japan.The leaders also discussed practical cooperation across a range of functional areas, including economic security, coordination within global supply chains, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and joint law enforcement responses to transnational organized crime. While progress varied across issues, concrete implementation plans are reportedly advancing in certain areas.On more contentious topics—such as South Korea’s accession to the CPTPP, Japanese seafood imports, and the abductees issue—no agreements were reached. Nevertheless, both sides emphasized that their respective positions were fully conveyed and understood. This approach reflects an effort to expand cooperation where feasible while managing, rather than escalating, points of disagreement.At the same time, limitations remain evident. Although progress on the Chosei Mine project is meaningful, Japanese media outlets such as Sankei Shimbun have noted that this issue is one of the few historical cases where confrontation is relatively muted. It differs fundamentally from issues involving legal responsibility and compensation—such as forced labor or the comfort women issue—where positions remain sharply opposed.From Tokyo’s perspective, cooperation on the Chosei Mine represents a relatively low-risk historical issue, unlikely to provoke backlash from domestic conservative constituencies. While this may reflect pragmatic issue selection, it would be premature to interpret it as evidence of a broader political willingness to confront more contentious historical questions.The durability of shuttle diplomacy also warrants careful scrutiny. President Lee Jae-myung’s reference to a future visit “next time in Andong” signals an intention to institutionalize reciprocal leader-level visits. However, historical precedent counsels caution. Shuttle diplomacy, first articulated in the 1998 Kim Dae-jung–Obuchi Declaration, has repeatedly proven vulnerable to disruption.Initiated in 2004 between President Roh Moo-hyun and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, it was suspended within a year following Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine. It resumed in 2008 under President Lee Myung-bak and Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, only to stall again in 2011 amid renewed historical disputes. Japanese media continue to view the current phase through this historical lens, offering restrained and cautious assessments.After a 12-year hiatus, shuttle diplomacy was revived in 2023 under President Yoon Suk-yeol and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. Despite subsequent leadership changes in both countries, the framework has thus far remained intact. Both President Lee Jae-myung and Prime Minister Takaichi have publicly affirmed their commitment to its continuation. Nonetheless, unresolved historical and territorial issues remain latent disruptors. Moreover, domestic political uncertainty in Japan—including the contrast between Prime Minister Takaichi’s personal popularity and the Liberal Democratic Party’s comparatively weaker standing—introduces additional variables. Scenarios ranging from cabinet reshuffles to coalition realignments or even a change in government could all affect the trajectory of bilateral engagement.Despite these risks, one encouraging development is President Lee Jae-myung’s articulated approach to South Korea–Japan relations. During the summit, he emphasized that “uncomfortable or negative issues must be managed carefully and minimized.” Following the impeachment and removal of former President Yoon Suk-yeol—who had actively pursued rapprochement with Japan—there was considerable concern within Japanese diplomatic circles that a Democratic Party administration might reverse prior progress.Contrary to those expectations, President Lee has adopted a pragmatic stance. While acknowledging the persistence of historical and territorial disputes, he has argued against either neglecting them or allowing them to dominate the bilateral agenda. Instead, he has framed them as issues to be managed in parallel with expanded cooperation.If sustained, this approach could enable tangible policy outcomes for South Korea by broadening functional cooperation with Japan while containing domestic political backlash from hardline critics. In this sense, the current phase of shuttle diplomacy reflects not an absence of friction, but a shared recognition that managing disagreement—rather than resolving it outright—may be the most realistic foundation for stable Korea–Japan relations.