The 13th Plenary of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea: Key Outcomes and Implications for the 9th Party Congress

In-tae Kim

Institute for National Security Strategy

Overview of the Plenary Meeting

North Korea convened an enlarged session of the 13th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) from December 9 to 11. The meeting addressed five agenda items: (1) a review of the implementation of Party and state policies over the past year; (2) an assessment of the work of the Central Inspection Commission; (3) major issues related to preparations for the 9th WPK Party Congress; (4) deliberation on the execution of the 2025 state budget and formulation of the 2026 state budget; and (5) organizational matters.

Since last year, North Korean media have departed from the previous practice of providing relatively detailed accounts of WPK plenary meetings, instead offering only high-level summaries. Coverage of this plenary followed the same pattern, largely limited to a listing of agenda items and General Secretary Kim Jong Un’s concluding remarks. This assessment therefore relies on the emphases evident in official reporting and recent propaganda trends to evaluate the year-end review and to anticipate the likely orientation of the forthcoming 9th WPK Congress.

Conclusion of the 8th Central Committee Leadership Body’s Official Term

The leadership body of the 8th Central Committee was formed at the 1st Plenary Meeting held immediately after the 8th Party Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in January 2021 and has carried out its official activities over the subsequent five-year term. Under the WPK Constitution, plenary meetings are to be convened “at least once a year” and function as the Party’s highest decision-making body between congresses, with responsibility for “organizing and guiding all Party work.”

Over the past five years, plenary meetings have been held approximately twice annually, addressing core issues of state governance, including periodic assessments of Party and state policy implementation. These meetings primarily focused on executing the decisions of the 8th Party Congress and advancing the five-year plan. In practice, they have functioned as the central executive mechanism overseeing policy implementation within a ruling system centered on Kim Jong Un and the WPK.

Quantitatively, the institutionalization of the plenary system has intensified. During the 8th Party Congress period, a total of 13 plenary meetings were held, compared to six during the 7th Party Congress term (2016), the first congress held under Kim Jong Un. This corresponds to an average interval of approximately 4.6 months. 

The number of formal agenda items also increased markedly—from 14 during the 7th term to 68 during the 8th—representing an almost fivefold rise. In terms of regularization and procedural density, the current system resembles the centralized Party leadership practices of the Kim Il Sung era (1960s–1980s), while also exhibiting an even stronger concentration of authority around a single leadership core.

Characteristics of the 13th Plenary Meeting

Despite traditionally serving as the annual review session and typically lasting five to six days, the 13th Plenary Meeting concluded in approximately three days. Held immediately ahead of the 9th Party Congress, the meeting focused primarily on summarizing key points related to “achievements and deviations,” while devoting greater attention to preparations for the upcoming congress and related political events, such as welcoming overseas-deployed troops and inaugurating major construction projects.

Notably, the meeting did not adopt a formal “Party Decision,” which normally outlines the principal policy tasks for the following year. Under Party regulations, next year’s policy priorities are to be determined by the 9th Central Committee to be elected at the 9th Party Congress. In lieu of a formal decision, Kim Jong Un repeatedly emphasized the need for a “successful conclusion of the work of the 8th Central Committee” and underscored the responsibilities and role of members of the Party’s leading organs through the end of the current term.

Overall Assessment for 2025: Completion of the Five-Year Plan

In his concluding remarks, Kim Jong Un characterized the year’s overall performance as marked by an “accelerated pace of advance” and “doubled self-reliance,” declaring that these achievements signified the “completion of the five-year plan.” This framing effectively preempted a formal evaluation by asserting the comprehensive fulfillment of the core objectives set forth at the 8th Party Congress. Kim further described the year as “a historic year of transition” that generated momentum for advancing to a new stage of development.

Although the plenary report did not specify concrete achievements or shortcomings, key assessments can be inferred. North Korea defined the year’s overarching objective as successfully concluding the five-year plan while substantively advancing preparations for the next development phase, with particular emphasis on commemorating the 80th anniversary of the WPK’s founding and preparing for the 9th Party Congress.

From the outset of the year, the regime prioritized visible economic and development initiatives, including the second-year groundbreaking ceremonies for the “20×10 Policy for Regional Development,” targeting 20 cities and counties. Kim Jong Un also expanded his pattern of on-site inspections at factories, hospitals, fisheries, and other civilian facilities, placing greater emphasis on direct field guidance rather than reliance on Party meetings alone. 

Unlike previous congress cycles, however, there was no formal “total mobilization” campaign, such as the “70-day” or “80-day” battles seen ahead of earlier congresses. Nevertheless, the sustained focus on economic tasks and propaganda campaigns from early in the year through the October anniversary period exceeded prior mobilization efforts in both scale and intensity.

Preparations for the 9th Party Congress

The plenary meeting formally addressed preparatory steps for the 9th Party Congress, including: (1) the establishment of a congress preparatory committee and the organization of subcommittees and sectoral working groups; (2) the drafting of revisions to Party regulations; (3) the compilation of comprehensive reviews of the activities of Party leadership bodies at all levels; and (4) the outlining of procedures for recommending delegates to higher-level Party conferences and the congress itself.

Compared with preparations for the 8th Party Congress initiated in August 2021, some elements appear delayed, and procedural variations are evident. Nonetheless, the ongoing trend under Kim Jong Un toward experimenting with new operational methods for Party leadership bodies, combined with detailed regulatory revisions, is expected to be further institutionalized through the 9th Party Congress.

Key Economic Policy Themes Expected at the 9th Party Congress

In addition to existing policy priorities, the plenary meeting highlighted new tasks aimed at addressing “urban–rural disparities.” In agriculture, “revolutionary measures” were emphasized for restructuring underperforming units, including West Coast tidal flat farms. In industry, the renovation of coal mining villages was singled out for particular attention. 

The meeting also reiterated long-standing rural development tasks, such as ensuring full preparation for the upcoming farming season, expanding wheat cultivation and processing capacity, and reforming the distribution system in line with socialist distribution principles. Emphasis was also placed on extending region-specific transformation achievements under the banner of “self-reliance and self-sufficiency.”

A notable continuity is the centrality of construction policy. Construction, a core pillar of the five-year economic plan, has mobilized national resources on a sustained basis, with both scope and targets steadily expanding. Since the 8th Party Congress, large-scale projects—including Pyongyang’s 50,000-unit housing initiative, rural modernization, local industrial factory construction, healthcare modernization and local hospitals, and greenhouse farms—have been added sequentially. 

The restructuring of tidal flat farms and coal mining villages highlighted at this plenary meeting also fundamentally constitutes construction-oriented tasks. The meeting further designated 20 cities and counties as targets for the third year of the regional development policy. As a result, construction-related tasks are likely to intensify further in next year’s economic agenda, accompanied by persistent challenges related to resource allocation and labor shortages.

Economic Policy Orientation: Emphasis on “People-First” and “Self-Reliance”

Finally, the meeting shed light on the anticipated direction of the next five-year plan in the Kim Jong Un era. It emphasized the need to “accurately set goals for the next five-year plan aimed at qualitative development across all sectors and to present scientific and realistic methods for their realization.” This language suggests a conceptual shift toward a “qualitative development stage” of comprehensive socialist development.

Whereas the 8th Five-Year Plan prioritized establishing an economic foundation—revitalizing the overall people’s economy and laying the groundwork for improved living standards—the forthcoming plan appears intended to build on that foundation by accelerating comprehensive socialist development through qualitative improvements across the entire economy.