Xi Jinping’s Visit to the United States Should Put “Halting North Korea’s Nuclear Program” on the AgendaJae-deok ChoiProfessor Seoul Graduate School of ScienceChinese President Xi Jinping is scheduled to visit the United States on September 24 for a summit with President Donald Trump. This will be their first meeting in four months, following their summit in Beijing in May. Issues expected to be on the negotiating table include Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural products and aircraft, tariffs, artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductors, rare earth elements, and Taiwan. Given President Trump’s stated intention to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un before the end of the year, the North Korean nuclear issue could also feature in their discussions.However, the number of issues on the agenda does not necessarily mean that the summit will produce a major agreement. U.S.-China competition has evolved into a long-term strategic rivalry that extends beyond trade and advanced technology to encompass supply chains, military and security affairs, and global influence. The summit is therefore more likely to focus on reviewing existing agreements and managing outstanding issues that require adjustment than on reaching a grand compromise that would fundamentally alter the course of bilateral relations.Ahead of the November midterm elections, the Trump administration needs short-term achievements it can present to voters, including increased Chinese purchases of U.S. products, the creation of manufacturing jobs, and an improvement in the trade balance. China, meanwhile, is likely to use purchases of U.S. products and the supply of rare earth elements as bargaining chips in seeking tariff reductions and an easing of technology restrictions. While Washington is seeking tangible results in the near term, Beijing is placing relatively greater emphasis on limiting additional pressure and buying time to respond.The United States is likely to demand additional Chinese purchases of agricultural and livestock products, including soybeans, corn, and beef, as well as Boeing aircraft. In May, China agreed to purchase 200 Boeing aircraft and at least $17 billion worth of U.S. agricultural products annually. At the upcoming summit, implementation of these existing commitments and improved access to the Chinese market are likely to be key issues. Although there may be limited room for negotiation on AI, semiconductors, and rare earth elements, the two countries’ fundamental strategic objectives—maintaining U.S. technological leadership and advancing China’s technological self-reliance—are unlikely to change.The Taiwan issue offers less room for negotiation than economic and technological matters. China may seek to persuade the United States to scale back arms sales to Taiwan and limit high-level exchanges, but Washington would find it difficult to alter its existing policy, which is closely linked to Indo-Pacific security and advanced semiconductor supply chains. Ultimately, the outcome of the summit will depend more on the substance of any agreements than on the number of issues discussed. Even if the two countries reach economic agreements, it would be difficult to interpret them as evidence of an overall improvement in U.S.-China relations if their fundamental positions on advanced technology and Taiwan remain unchanged.The same applies to the North Korean nuclear issue. Reaffirming the principle of denuclearization at a summit is fundamentally different from establishing substantive U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea. Washington may seek Beijing’s cooperation in deterring further North Korean provocations and facilitating the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue. Beijing, for its part, is likely to emphasize the need for a political resolution to the Korean Peninsula issue and the importance of dialogue. This reflects China’s strategic dilemma: while concerned about the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, Beijing remains wary of instability within the North Korean regime and of an expansion of U.S. military influence on the Korean Peninsula.Furthermore, North Korea has expanded its diplomatic options and sources of external support through growing military and economic cooperation with Russia. As China’s influence over North Korea has become more limited than in the past, even a reaffirmation of the principle of denuclearization by the U.S. and Chinese leaders would not necessarily lead to agreement on the level of pressure to be applied to Pyongyang or on specific measures to address North Korea’s nuclear program.That said, the North Korean nuclear issue should not be treated as a secondary item on the summit agenda. With North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons now an established reality, efforts to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula have reached a critical juncture requiring new strategic choices. North Korea has declared its intention to continue expanding its nuclear arsenal and has rejected denuclearization negotiations altogether. While the United States continues to adhere to the principle of complete denuclearization, it has yet to establish a concrete negotiating pathway toward that objective. As international coordination on pressure against North Korea also weakens, existing approaches alone are unlikely to produce a breakthrough.Against this backdrop, Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States could provide an important opportunity to pursue a diplomatic breakthrough on the North Korean nuclear issue.The United States and China, both of which possess significant leverage that could help curb North Korea’s nuclear development, should make the issue a central component of their summit-level dialogue. In particular, they should move beyond merely reaffirming the long-term goal of complete denuclearization and establish “Halting North Korea’s Nuclear Program” as a concrete joint agenda item, prioritizing measures to prevent further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.Maintain the Principle of Denuclearization, but First Halt the Expansion of North Korea’s Nuclear CapabilitiesThe starting point for U.S.-China cooperation should be the establishment of an immediate and achievable common objective without abandoning the ultimate goal of denuclearization. A situation in which North Korea’s nuclear capabilities expand to a level that becomes increasingly difficult to manage would impose significant costs on both countries. For the United States, it would intensify direct nuclear and missile threats. For China, it would exacerbate the regional arms race and heighten military tensions in Northeast Asia.Building on these shared interests, the two countries could prioritize efforts to halt the further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. One practical approach would be to establish the following as initial negotiating objectives: halting the production of additional nuclear materials, prohibiting the export of nuclear materials abroad, and halting the development of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology. This approach would seek to prevent the existing nuclear threat from growing further without recognizing North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons as legitimate.“Stopping North Korea’s nuclear program” does not represent a retreat from the principle of denuclearization. Rather, it is a phased approach that seeks to halt the further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities while preserving the ultimate objective of denuclearization and establishing a pathway toward their subsequent reduction and dismantlement. It is an effort to create realistic conditions for resuming negotiations at a time when North Korea rejects denuclearization talks altogether.The United States could take the lead in defining the agenda for renewed dialogue with North Korea, while China could play a role in encouraging Pyongyang to engage in negotiations. If both countries use their respective influence to halt the expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, they could take an initial step toward substantially reducing the nuclear threat and moving beyond the prolonged stalemate over the principle of denuclearization.This approach is also consistent with the phased and pragmatic approach to the North Korean nuclear issue proposed by the South Korean government. In its Fifth Basic Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations (2026–2030), South Korea’s Ministry of Unification identified “substantial progress on the North Korean nuclear issue through a phased and pragmatic approach” as a key policy priority. The objective is to create conditions conducive to inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea dialogue while pursuing meaningful progress toward resolving the nuclear issue.In practical terms, this approach consists of three phases: “Stopping, Reduction, and Dismantlement” of North Korea’s nuclear program. The process would begin by halting North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, proceed to reducing its nuclear capabilities, and ultimately lead to their dismantlement. It is a realistic strategy that prioritizes halting the further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities while maintaining the ultimate objective of denuclearization.For South Korea’s plan to be effective, it must be supported by cooperation between the United States and China. Seoul should actively encourage Washington and Beijing to make halting North Korea’s nuclear program a joint agenda item. It should emphasize to the United States that, while the principle of complete denuclearization must be maintained, realistic interim objectives are necessary to facilitate negotiations. At the same time, South Korea should persuade China that halting the expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is consistent with maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and safeguarding regional security.We Must Be Wary of North Korea’s Strategy to Consolidate Its Status as a Nuclear-Weapon StateOf course, there is no guarantee that North Korea will accept a proposal to halt its nuclear program. In the results of the Workers’ Party Plenary Meeting released on June 23, Kim Jong-un emphasized the continued expansion and strengthening of North Korea’s nuclear forces and the consolidation and exercise of its status as a nuclear-weapon state. He identified U.S.-South Korea military exercises and reconnaissance activities as factors contributing to the worsening situation on the Korean Peninsula, while defining nuclear forces as the foundation of military sovereignty and war deterrence.This indicates that North Korea is treating its status as a nuclear-armed state not as a subject for negotiation, but as a precondition for negotiations. Rather than accepting South Korea’s “Stop, Reduction, and Denuclearization” framework, Pyongyang is likely to seek to redefine the negotiating framework itself around nuclear disarmament or arms control.This is also why China’s role is becoming increasingly important. The fact that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was not publicly emphasized during Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang in June suggests a shift in China’s approach. While Beijing remains concerned about the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, it appears to be managing the Korean Peninsula issue within a broader strategic context that includes the restoration of North Korea-China relations, U.S.-China strategic competition, growing North Korea-Russia cooperation, and expanding security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan.It is unrealistic to expect cooperation to emerge solely from increased Chinese pressure on North Korea. Any viable approach must take into account China’s concerns about instability in the North Korean regime and the escalation of military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. U.S.-China cooperation should not be aimed at bringing about the collapse of the North Korean regime. Rather, it should focus on halting the further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and reducing military risks on the Korean Peninsula.“Stopping North Korea’s nuclear program” could provide a realistic basis for Chinese participation. An approach that seeks to reduce the nuclear threat through dialogue and negotiations, without recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state, could align the U.S. objective of preventing further nuclear proliferation with China’s interest in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula.South Korea must pay close attention not only to whether the North Korean nuclear issue is included on the U.S.-China summit agenda, but also to the substance and scope of the discussions. The talks may be limited to reaffirming the principles of denuclearization and regional stability. However, they could also address China’s potential role in facilitating the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue. If the discussions lead to follow-up negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear program, the South Korean government should consult closely with the United States to ensure that South Korea’s interests, policy objectives, and role are adequately reflected.Even if the North Korean nuclear issue is discussed during Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States, Washington and Beijing are unlikely to reach an immediate agreement on a common policy toward North Korea. The United States will continue to call for complete denuclearization, while China is likely to emphasize a political resolution and stability on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea, for its part, is likely to maintain its claim to nuclear-weapon-state status and continue expanding its nuclear capabilities.These differences, however, do not diminish the need for U.S.-China cooperation. On the contrary, as international coordination on the North Korean nuclear issue weakens and North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continue to advance, identifying realistic areas for cooperation between the two countries has become increasingly important.If the United States and China establish stopping North Korea’s nuclear program as a joint agenda item at the summit and lay the groundwork for substantive cooperation, this could provide new momentum for the denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea should actively facilitate U.S.-China cooperation while working to define the scope of the proposed halt, verification mechanisms, and phased reciprocal measures. These arrangements must ensure that South Korea’s security interests are not sidelined in the negotiating process.Ultimately, the priority should not be to repeat a declaratory standoff over whether North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons should be recognized. Instead, the focus should be on establishing substantive measures to halt the further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and creating a negotiating framework that links these measures to verification, reduction, and eventual dismantlement.Stopping North Korea’s nuclear program is not a departure from denuclearization. Rather, it is a necessary step toward achieving that objective under current conditions. Xi’s visit to the United States should serve as a starting point for substantive U.S.-China cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue, moving beyond a mere reaffirmation of principles.

Why We Must Proactively Restore the September 19 Military AgreementYong-geun ChoFormer Director of North Korea PolicyMinistry of National DefenseThe Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), a critical buffer zone underpinning security on the Korean Peninsula, is once again experiencing heightened tensions. At the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, held in late December 2023, Kim Jong-un defined inter-Korean relations as “relations between two hostile states, not between fellow Koreans.” He explicitly designated South Korea as the “number one hostile country” and the “unchanging principal enemy,” calling for the abandonment of the existing concepts of peaceful reunification and “fellow Koreans” and directing that this policy shift be reflected in the Constitution.Subsequently, at the Ninth Party Congress in February 2026, Kim emphasized the need to “fortify the southern border adjacent to South Korea as soon as possible and reinforce the border defense and firepower systems.” North Korea’s amended Constitution has since incorporated territorial provisions consistent with this policy. In fact, since 2024, the North Korean military has been constructing a new “border line” along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) within the DMZ. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff estimates that the construction will be completed within two to three years.The central concern with North Korea’s designation of the MDL as a border is that, once its military border patrols become fully operational, the risk of armed clashes between the two Koreas could become structural and recurring. This is largely because the two militaries have different understandings of the MDL’s precise location within the DMZ.When the 1953 Armistice Agreement was signed, the two sides agreed to mark and manage the MDL using 1,292 boundary markers. However, following the inter-Korean armed clashes of the 1970s, these markers were neglected, damaged, or lost, and only approximately 180 remain today. Even those that remain have been displaced by natural disasters and other factors, making it difficult to determine the MDL’s precise location. In some cases, the reference lines used by the North and South Korean militaries differ by tens of meters. The possibility that such relatively minor discrepancies could escalate into armed clashes has therefore become a persistent concern.In particular, once North Korea completes its border construction, the two-kilometer-wide northern half of the DMZ—the buffer zone established under the Armistice Agreement—will effectively cease to function. Regardless of the legal validity of North Korea’s actions under international law, this would mean that the DMZ, which has served as the Korean Peninsula’s minimum security safeguard for more than 70 years, would lose much of its practical effectiveness.This situation did not emerge overnight. As the Yoon Suk-yeol administration adopted a more confrontational approach toward North Korea, the two Koreas ultimately suspended and effectively dismantled the September 19 Military Agreement. Since then, guard posts (GPs) that had been withdrawn from the DMZ have been reestablished, and North Korea has erected a barrier near the MDL. Both militaries have resumed artillery fire in areas surrounding the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea, while North Korea has demolished the inter-Korean connecting roads along the Donghae and Gyeongui lines.Drone incursions into each other’s airspace over the respective capitals, South Korea’s distribution of leaflets targeting North Korea, and North Korea’s release of balloons carrying waste have further compounded tensions. Military tensions along the border have consequently risen to exceptionally high levels.Against this backdrop, North Korea’s current efforts to fortify the MDL can be understood as an attempt to undermine the existing armistice system. The breakdown of the September 19 Military Agreement was a critical turning point in the deterioration of the security environment.Preventing the Normalization of Structural Military ConflictIn addressing the current crisis on the Korean Peninsula, our foremost concern should be the “normalization of structural military conflict.” If South Korea’s military consistently adopts a hard-line response and treats North Korea’s construction of a border line solely as a military provocation, there is a significant risk that an unintended or accidental armed clash could escalate into a full-scale local conflict. This risk is particularly acute as North Korea intensifies its hostility toward the South under its “two hostile states” doctrine. Any military confrontation between the two Koreas could therefore escalate to a level unprecedented in previous inter-Korean crises.The South Korean government must consequently develop a precise and comprehensive response strategy. Its most urgent responsibility is to fill the void left by the erosion of the existing armistice system—not with the prospect of armed conflict, but with an institutionalized framework for peace.This ultimately requires the proactive restoration of the September 19 Military Agreement. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung has already expressed his commitment to restoring the agreement in phases, both in his August 15, 2025, commemorative address and at a press conference earlier this year. Accordingly, the government should pursue a two-track approach to proactively restoring the agreement: flexibly applying the South Korean military’s warning-fire criteria to routine North Korean border patrol activities in order to reduce the risk of accidental clashes, while responding firmly and proportionately to deliberate provocations.What the September 19 Military Agreement DemonstratedThe September 19 Military Agreement, signed in 2018, represents a significant example of arms control on the Korean Peninsula and was the first agreement of its kind to be implemented by the South and North Korean militaries. In practical terms, it was also the only agreement between the two military authorities that remained operational until its suspension and subsequent breakdown.The agreement did not emerge in isolation. It carried forward the principles of ending hostilities and pursuing a peaceful resolution established in the 1953 Armistice Agreement. It also represented the culmination of decades of inter-Korean engagement and arms-control efforts under successive South Korean administrations—from the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and the Non-Aggression Supplementary Agreement under the Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam administrations, to the June 15 Joint Declaration and the October 4 Declaration under the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, as well as arms-control initiatives pursued under the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations.The agreement’s achievements were substantial. On land, it established a 10-kilometer-wide buffer zone extending five kilometers on either side of the MDL, bringing an end to artillery fire and field exercises involving units at the regimental level or above. In the maritime areas surrounding the NLL in the West and East Seas, it established buffer zones that halted naval and coastal artillery firing. It also designated no-fly zones for specified types of aircraft over the MDL, effectively prohibiting flights that had not been notified in advance.In particular, at the Joint Security Area (JSA) in Panmunjom, South Korea, North Korea, and the United Nations Command (UNC) conducted a joint on-site verification—the first of its kind since the signing of the Armistice Agreement—and completed the demilitarization of the area. This helped create the conditions for a summit among the leaders of South Korea, North Korea, and the United States to take place at Panmunjom just over 30 hours after President Donald Trump unexpectedly proposed a meeting with Kim Jong-un in June 2019.The pilot withdrawal of 22 GPs in areas where the risk of mutual confrontation was particularly high was recognized by the United Nations as a notable example of conventional arms control. The joint inter-Korean recovery of remains at Arrowhead Hill and White Horse Hill also represented a symbolic effort to address the enduring human and historical costs of the Korean War. The fact that only a very limited number of violations were confirmed following the agreement’s implementation demonstrates its effectiveness as a mechanism for reducing military tensions. In particular, the agreement established verification procedures for monitoring implementation, creating a historical precedent in which South and North Korean military personnel crossed the MDL into each other’s territory to directly inspect military facilities.A Core Element of the Korean Peninsula’s Peace Regime and a Framework That Must EvolveThe significance of the September 19 Military Agreement extends beyond its immediate contribution to reducing military tensions. It also provides a starting point for establishing the core elements of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. If the concept of a peace regime seems abstract, it becomes more tangible when considered in terms of the provisions that a future peace treaty would need to contain. Such a treaty should establish a vision for future political relations between North and South Korea, rules and norms governing economic and social exchanges, a framework for achieving the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and, above all, a military order designed to ensure that war never occurs again.An examination of these elements reveals that considerable groundwork has already been laid between the two Koreas. The 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement encompasses fundamental principles governing political and economic relations, while detailed norms and practices for economic and social exchanges have been developed over the years. The vision for denuclearization is also clearly articulated in the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.Military affairs, however, remain insufficiently developed. Although the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and subsequent declarations established important principles, their provisions were too general to effectively regulate actual military activities. Moreover, the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee envisaged in the Basic Agreement never advanced to substantive discussions of specific military issues. Subsequent initiatives, including the October 4 Declaration, likewise failed to produce the intended results.Against this backdrop, the September 19 Military Agreement is particularly significant because, building on the Armistice Agreement and the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, it established substantive and operational arms-control provisions for the first time. These provisions included concrete confidence-building measures such as the joint recovery of war remains, the withdrawal of GPs, the demilitarization of the JSA, and the removal of loudspeakers.It is important to recognize, however, that the agreement was not intended to constitute a final settlement. Rather, it established a framework designed to evolve over time, with the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee serving as the institutional mechanism for advancing that process. The committee’s establishment would not resolve every outstanding issue immediately. It would, however, provide an opportunity for the military authorities of both Koreas to place their respective concerns on the table and begin substantive dialogue through frank and open exchanges.Assessments of the September 19 Military Agreement remain divided between those who evaluate it in terms of its overall benefits and those who focus on the distribution of relative gains. Both perspectives have merit. Although the distribution of relative gains is undoubtedly important in international politics, an excessive focus on scrutinizing every aspect of how the benefits of a negotiated agreement are distributed can provoke the other party and undermine the very outcome the negotiations were intended to achieve.What is clear is that the agreement reduced military tensions in border areas and helped create conditions that enabled the two Koreas and the United States to focus on negotiations toward a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. The September 19 Military Agreement was not the culmination of inter-Korean arms control, but its first substantive step. We must now pursue the longer and more difficult process of building on the framework it established.This approach is consistent with the vision President Lee Jae-myung outlined in his August 15 commemorative address this year. Referring to “stable peaceful coexistence without the need for conflict,” President Lee expressed his commitment to establishing mechanisms for managing tensions and conflicts, developing multiple safeguards to prevent crises from escalating, and taking proactive and sustained measures to reduce military tensions in border areas. He also outlined a path toward transforming the unstable armistice regime into a peace regime and called on both Koreas to set aside their intentions to threaten one another and begin direct dialogue.For this policy direction to produce tangible results, the September 19 Military Agreement must ultimately be restored and further developed. Beginning with this agreement, South and North Korea share the responsibility of steadily building the institutional foundations for lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.Conclusion: The Starting Point of a Bold JourneyWith the breakdown of the September 19 Military Agreement, military tensions in border areas have once again reached exceptionally high levels, creating conditions in which an accidental armed clash could occur at any time. Paradoxically, this situation underscores how effectively the agreement had served as a safeguard against military confrontation and how it opened a new chapter in arms control on the Korean Peninsula. It also highlights the agreement’s role in creating conditions conducive to denuclearization and establishing a core element of a future peace regime.North Korea’s efforts to turn the MDL into a border line and thereby undermine the practical effectiveness of the armistice system further demonstrate the need to establish a new peace regime. Rather than simply returning to the status quo ante, we should use the restoration of the September 19 Military Agreement as a springboard for a bold and sustained effort to conclude a peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula, advance phased denuclearization, and establish an enduring arms-control regime.In particular, amid rapidly evolving international dynamics, including the U.S.-China summit, the parallel use of more ambitious and substantive diplomatic incentives will be essential to bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table for a U.S.-North Korea summit.Throughout this process, the role of the military authorities on both sides will become increasingly important, alongside decisions by their respective leaders and negotiations conducted through diplomatic channels. Above all, public support and trust, together with the backing of the international community, will be essential for enabling the South Korean military to restore and further develop the September 19 Military Agreement.The establishment of lasting peace between the two Koreas ultimately depends on whether military tensions in border areas can be reduced. The resumption of the Korean Peninsula peace process, including renewed inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea engagement, must begin here. What is needed now is not another new vision, but the political will and courage of South Korea and the international community to restore agreements whose practical value has already been demonstrated.

The Upcoming UN General Assembly:Pursuing Stability on the Korean PeninsulaAmid Multilateral Non-Proliferation Sanctions on North Korea Eunsook ChungEmeritus Senior Fellow, The Sejong InstituteThis September, the 81st session of the UN General Assembly will convene at UN Headquarters in New York. Founded in 1945 with 51 member states, the United Nations has grown over the past 81 years into a global organization comprising 193 member states. The General Assembly serves as a diplomatic forum in which all member states participate on the principles of universality and equality to deliberate on vital international issues. It also serves as a decision-making body that adopts resolutions on the basis of one state, one vote. Although General Assembly resolutions adopted by a two-thirds majority or by consensus are not, in principle, legally binding on member states, they carry significant political, diplomatic, and moral authority as expressions of the collective will of the international community.This stands in contrast to resolutions of the UN Security Council, which is composed of five permanent members with veto power and ten non-permanent members and bears primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Under the UN Charter, Security Council resolutions adopted under its Chapter VII authority are legally binding on all UN member states.At the beginning of each session in September, the General Assembly traditionally devotes approximately six days in late September to the “General Debate,” during which world leaders present their countries’ positions on major global challenges, typically in speeches of around 15 minutes. The General Debate provides an opportunity for all member states to articulate their views regardless of their region, size, wealth, or level of development. This year’s General Debate is scheduled to begin on September 22.President Trump’s Critique of Multilateralism and the Need for UN ReformAt last year’s General Debate, held to mark the UN’s 80th anniversary, U.S. President Donald Trump drew considerable attention by openly expressing skepticism about UN multilateralism and arguing that the organization has handled issues such as immigration, climate change, and conflict management poorly. Indeed, the United States—which has historically been the largest contributor to the UN budget since the organization’s inception—has been reluctant to make timely contributions for 2025–2026 and has decided to withdraw from or defund roughly 30 UN-affiliated bodies. The White House stated in January 2026 that these measures were prompted by concerns over activities contrary to U.S. interests, a lack of capacity to implement policies effectively, and institutional inefficiency.This approach contrasted with that of other major world leaders, who acknowledged the UN’s achievements over the past 80 years, despite periods of turbulence, and called for more effective multilateralism amid growing uncertainties in the international order. Under pressure from the Trump administration, UN Secretary-General António Guterres launched the UN 80 Initiative in March 2025, focusing on institutional restructuring and maximizing the Organization’s impact with limited financial resources.Against this backdrop, the theme of this year’s 81st General Assembly General Debate is “Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation: A United Nations that delivers for all.” For 2026, the General Assembly approved a regular budget of $3.45 billion, representing a sharp reduction from previous years, including a 15 percent cut in financial resources and an approximately 19 percent reduction in staffing levels.Twenty Years of the UN North Korea Sanctions Regime: Progress and Current StatusNorth Korea is the only country to have announced its withdrawal from the NPT and the only country to have conducted nuclear tests in the 21st century. It has repeatedly issued nuclear and missile threats, both rhetorically and through actions, against South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Following North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1718 (2006), establishing the first UN sanctions regime against North Korea under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (“Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”). All 193 UN Member States are obligated to implement the measures stipulated in the resolution. This was made possible by the ability of the five permanent members of the Security Council to reach a consensus that North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities constituted a threat to international peace and security.The objective of the sanctions regime is to compel North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program and return to compliance with the NPT and its IAEA safeguards obligations. To this end, the Security Council introduced measures restricting military trade and luxury goods, as well as targeted sanctions—including asset freezes and travel bans—against individuals and entities involved in proliferation-related activities.After 2006, North Korea conducted five additional nuclear tests and numerous launches of long-range ballistic missiles, prompting the Security Council to adopt a total of 10 sanctions resolutions on North Korea over an 11-year period through 2017. As the scope and depth of the sanctions expanded with each successive resolution, the North Korea sanctions regime became one of the most comprehensive and stringent sanctions regimes administered by the Security Council.During this 11-year period, none of the five permanent members exercised its veto. All 10 resolutions were adopted unanimously, providing the foundation for the sanctions regime that remains in place today. Despite the compromises and concessions required along the way, the five permanent members, each possessing veto power, were able to come together around a shared commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.Member States are required to submit Implementation Reports to the Sanctions Committee (the Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1718) within specified timeframes, as required by each relevant resolution. They are also expected to submit Non-compliance Reports when they identify cases of North Korean non-compliance with or violations of UN sanctions. Since 2009, a Panel of Experts, initially composed of seven and later eight experts specializing in areas such as nuclear issues, missiles, law, and finance, has supported the Sanctions Committee in fulfilling its mandate by providing guidance, gathering information, conducting analysis, and making recommendations to strengthen the effectiveness of the sanctions regime.Nevertheless, rather than abandoning its nuclear weapons program, North Korea has continued to expand its nuclear and missile capabilities while routinely evading or violating sanctions, as repeatedly documented in the Panel of Experts’ reports. In other words, the sanctions regime has not fully achieved its intended objectives. However, a close examination of the Panel’s reports suggests that the costs of non-compliance imposed on the North Korean leadership have increased over time, making it difficult to conclude that sanctions have had no practical impact.At the same time, military cooperation between North Korea and Russia since 2022 has involved numerous activities that violate or circumvent UN sanctions against North Korea, posing a major challenge to the international community and raising difficult questions about how it should respond. Furthermore, the dissolution of the Panel of Experts in April 2024 following Russia’s veto dealt a serious blow not only to the effectiveness and credibility of the sanctions regime but also to confidence in the UN’s ability to monitor and enforce its own sanctions measures as the organization enters its 81st year.According to its final report, issued in March 2024 shortly before the Panel’s mandate expired, the Panel was investigating evidence concerning North Korea’s arms transfers to Russia in connection with the war in Ukraine.“North Korea Fatigue”During last year’s UN General Assembly General Debate, substantive remarks concerning North Korea’s nuclear program came primarily from the leaders of South Korea and Japan, underscoring the fact that these two countries are directly exposed to the North Korean threat. Then-Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba stated that North Korea’s nuclear and missile development posed a grave threat to international peace and security and called for the full implementation of the Security Council’s sanctions resolutions aimed at the “complete denuclearization” of North Korea.President Lee Jae-myung introduced the idea that the denuclearization process should begin by halting the further development of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, followed by their reduction and, ultimately, their dismantlement, recognizing that “denuclearization is difficult to achieve in the short term.”On the final day of the General Debate, Kim Son-gyong, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Korea, stated that demands for denuclearization were tantamount to demanding the surrender of North Korea’s sovereignty and its right to survival.Against the backdrop of recent messages from President Trump signaling a possible resumption of dialogue with Kim Jong-un, attention is now focused on what messages will be delivered from the General Debate stage at this year’s UN General Assembly.At least during last year’s General Debate, among the leaders of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France—the North Korean nuclear issue was overshadowed by other issues regarded as more urgent. In recent years, a range of pressing global challenges has taken center stage, including the war in Ukraine, instability in the Middle East, conflicts in Africa, climate change, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), AI governance, and reform of the UN Security Council.Furthermore, intensified “great-power strategic competition” in recent years has made consensus within the Security Council increasingly difficult to achieve. The internal dynamics of the Council now reflect a widening strategic divide between the P2 (China and Russia) and the P3 (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France), compared with the situation in 2006, when the North Korea sanctions regime was established, or in 2017, when the most recent sanctions resolution was adopted. This shift was symbolically demonstrated in September 2025, when Kim Jong-un attended China’s Victory Day commemorations and appeared alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin.Future ROK Policies on International Non-Proliferation Sanctions against North Korea■ South Korea now faces two fundamental challenges in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue. First, the UN Security Council is deeply divided, and the veto power of its permanent members has increasingly paralyzed the Council’s ability to act. Despite evidence that military cooperation between Russia and North Korea involves activities that violate Security Council sanctions resolutions, the issue has not been meaningfully addressed within the Council.Second, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continue to expand. According to the Arms Control Association, North Korea was estimated to have assembled approximately 50 nuclear warheads as of January 2024.■ Considering the challenges outlined above, several suggestions can be made regarding the international sanctions regime and efforts to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.First, following the dissolution of the UN Panel of Experts in April 2024, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) was established outside the UN framework to assume some of the monitoring functions previously performed by the Panel. Eleven like-minded countries have joined the MSMT: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. South Korea should actively participate in the MSMT, working alongside its member states to encourage all 193 UN member states to faithfully implement the Security Council’s sanctions measures.At the same time, given the current deadlock within the Security Council, South Korea could work with MSMT member states to disseminate the findings of the MSMT’s reports to UN member states and seek the adoption of a UN General Assembly resolution. Although such a resolution would not be legally binding, it could serve as a significant political, moral, and normative statement reaffirming the international community’s commitment to implementing the existing sanctions regime.Second, while continuing to signal that the door to dialogue remains open, South Korea should maintain the principle of participating in international efforts to uphold sanctions against North Korea through the UN and other relevant institutions unless and until Pyongyang resolves the issues underlying the sanctions regime.Third, denuclearization presupposes highly detailed agreements specifying what is to be dismantled, when and how the process is to be carried out, and how compliance is to be verified. Hastily accepting North Korea’s stated intention to denuclearize—or, worse, offering guarantees of such an outcome to third countries—could lead to another diplomatic impasse.Fourth, South Korea must maintain a constant crisis-management posture to prevent and respond to accidental military clashes or localized armed conflict. Given that North Korea has become a de facto nuclear-armed state and has repeatedly issued threats against South Korea, a more robust deterrence posture must incorporate the nuclear dimension of the ROK–U.S. alliance. In this regard, South Korea should ensure that it receives credible extended deterrence commitments from the United States, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Because this approach is broadly consistent with Japan’s deterrence posture, South Korea should maintain close communication with Japan and draw on its experience and preparations in this area.Fifth, regarding China and Russia, South Korea and Japan could argue that they need to maintain nuclear latency if North Korean denuclearization cannot be achieved through the UN sanctions regime. Furthermore, they should be capable of gathering information on violations and instances of non-compliance arising from China’s and Russia’s dealings with North Korea, and of demanding explanations and corrective measures through both bilateral channels and multilateral platforms such as the UN General Assembly and the 2027 NPT Review Conference.Sixth, regarding North Korea’s human rights issues, the 80th UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the issue last year, marking 21 consecutive years of unanimous international solidarity in calling for improvements in the human rights situation in North Korea. The South Korean government participated as a co-sponsor alongside multiple member states, a role it should continue to undertake and actively pursue in future international forums. The resolution’s condemnatory provisions include criticism that North Korea allocates excessive resources to military buildup, including nuclear and missile development, rather than to public welfare.

South Korea’s Digital Regulation and the U.S.–South Korea Digital Alliance: Facts and Lessons from the Coupang IncidentSeong-yeob LeeProfessor, Graduate School of Technology Management Korea UniversityPresident, Korean Association of Information and Communications Law1. Background—The Shift in Digital Regulation Toward Trade and Security IssuesAs global platforms provide services simultaneously across multiple countries, digital regulations adopted by one country can directly affect foreign companies’ market access and cross-border data flows. As a result, national regulations governing personal information, platform competition, cross-border data transfers, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence (AI) are no longer merely matters of domestic law; they are increasingly becoming issues of trade and national security.In particular, the United States, home to many of the world’s leading global platform companies, increasingly views discriminatory digital-service regulations and data-localization requirements as emerging forms of non-tariff barriers to trade. For example, the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) 2026 National Trade Estimate (NTE) identifies several South Korean digital regulations—including network access fees, restrictions on the cross-border transfer of location data and personal information, public-sector cloud security certification, and online platform regulation—as significant trade-related concerns.These developments also present new challenges for the U.S.–South Korea relationship. Although the U.S.–South Korea alliance was initially established as a military alliance under the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, its economic dimension expanded significantly following the entry into force of the 2012 U.S.–South Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA). More recently, the alliance has evolved into a broader digital and technology partnership encompassing advanced technologies—including semiconductors, batteries, AI, quantum computing, 6G, cybersecurity, and space—as well as resilient supply chains. Accordingly, if the two countries continue to emphasize their strategic partnership in security and advanced technology while repeatedly encountering regulatory disputes in the digital marketplace, questions could arise regarding the long-term sustainability of the alliance.2. Current Status and Characteristics of South Korea’s Digital RegulationsSouth Korea’s digital regulatory framework can broadly be divided into several categories, including personal information and data governance, platform competition, network access fees, location information, and cloud services. First, the Personal Information Protection Act establishes certain requirements governing the cross-border transfer of personal information and authorizes the Personal Information Protection Commission to order the suspension of such transfers under specified circumstances. While the system is intended to protect individuals’ rights over their personal information, the United States has raised concerns that it could impose substantial compliance costs on companies operating global data-center networks. The 2026 NTE likewise notes that restrictions on cross-border transfers of personal information could create barriers to cross-border services that depend on international data storage and processing.Second is the regulation of online platforms. In South Korea, various legislative proposals and enforcement measures under the Fair Trade Act have been discussed to address practices by dominant platforms, including self-preferencing, tying and bundling, restrictions on multi-homing, and most-favored-nation (MFN) provisions. The stated purpose of these measures is to prevent dominant platforms from abusing their market power and to protect merchants and consumers. In the United States, however, concerns have been raised that applying quantitative criteria, such as revenue and user numbers, could bring a disproportionately large number of U.S.-based global platforms within the scope of these regulations.Third, network access fees, location-data regulations, and cloud-service requirements have also emerged as areas of contention. The United States is concerned that South Korea’s approach to network access fees could increase costs for U.S. content providers while providing a competitive advantage to domestic telecommunications and content companies. The United States has also argued that South Korea’s requirement for authorization to export high-precision maps and location-based data could place companies providing global mapping and cloud services at a competitive disadvantage. In addition, the public-sector Cloud Security Assurance Program (CSAP) has drawn criticism on the grounds that requirements such as domestic data storage and the use of locally based operational personnel could create barriers to entry for foreign cloud-service providers.Ultimately, U.S. concerns regarding South Korea’s digital regulatory framework can broadly be grouped into three areas. The first concerns the substance of the regulations themselves, particularly whether they are consistent with international standards and trade commitments. The United States has traditionally relied primarily on ex post enforcement mechanisms, including antitrust litigation and judicial proceedings, to address concerns related to dominant technology companies. By contrast, some of the platform regulations pursued by South Korea adopt a more ex ante regulatory model similar to the European Union’s (EU) Digital Markets Act (DMA), raising concerns in the United States regarding their compatibility with international trade norms.A related concern is whether such regulations could have a disproportionate impact on U.S. companies. The issue is not simply whether Korean and foreign companies are formally subject to the same rules. Rather, if regulatory thresholds are structured around particular business models or company size in ways that place a heavier burden on U.S. platforms, the resulting impact could constitute de facto discrimination. In other words, even if the statutory language does not distinguish between domestic and foreign companies, high quantitative thresholds based on factors such as revenue or user numbers could, in practice, place a disproportionate burden on major U.S. technology companies such as Google, Apple, and Meta. Concerns have also been raised about the proportionality of regulatory measures to their objectives, as well as the fairness, transparency, and predictability of regulatory enforcement.3. Recent Coupang Regulations and Bilateral TensionsThe Coupang incident illustrates how digital regulation, trade policy, and bilateral relations can intersect. Although Coupang conducts the vast majority of its business in South Korea, its parent company, Coupang, Inc., is a U.S. corporation incorporated in Delaware and listed on the New York Stock Exchange. This creates a distinctive legal and regulatory structure: in South Korea, Coupang is subject to Korean law as a major distribution and platform operator, while in the United States, regulatory actions against the company may be viewed through the lens of the interests of U.S. companies and investors.In August 2024, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) determined that Coupang had engaged in unfair customer solicitation practices by manipulating search rankings for products sold directly by the company and its private-label (PB) products, while also mobilizing employees to post reviews of PB products. The KFTC subsequently imposed a fine of approximately KRW 162.8 billion and referred the case to prosecutors for criminal prosecution. Separately, in connection with a personal-data breach that occurred in late 2025, the Personal Information Protection Commission confirmed the exposure of personal information belonging to approximately 37.55 million individuals and the unlawful collection of online activity records involving approximately 11.17 million individuals. The commission imposed total penalties of KRW 624.681 billion, reportedly the largest such sanction in South Korean history.The issue subsequently escalated into a broader trade dispute when U.S. investors argued that measures taken by the South Korean government amounted to “discriminatory” regulation. In January 2026, Greenoaks and Altimeter, investors in Coupang, filed a petition with the U.S. Trade Representative requesting an investigation under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act. The petition argued that the investigations and sanctions imposed on Coupang by multiple South Korean government agencies went beyond legitimate regulatory enforcement and constituted discriminatory treatment of a U.S. company. The investors subsequently withdrew the petition on March 9, 2026.The withdrawal of the petition, however, did not resolve the underlying policy dispute. In July 2026, the U.S. House Judiciary Committee sharply criticized South Korea’s treatment of U.S.-owned companies in a report titled “Closed for Competition: South Korea’s Discriminatory Attacks on American-owned Businesses.” The report characterized simultaneous investigations by more than 10 South Korean government agencies in the aftermath of Coupang’s data breach as a “whole-of-government assault.” It further argued that South Korea’s regulatory practices could undermine the competitiveness of innovative U.S. companies and favor domestic firms rather than promote a level playing field. The report also raised concerns about South Korean regulatory procedures, including administrative investigations conducted without warrants and limitations on attorney-client privilege.From the U.S. perspective, Coupang is a U.S. company under U.S. corporate law because Coupang, Inc. is incorporated in Delaware. Accordingly, some U.S. policymakers have characterized the broad range of sanctions imposed by South Korean authorities not simply as domestic regulatory enforcement, but as raising concerns under international trade norms, particularly with respect to potential structural discrimination against U.S. companies and investors and questions of due process. At the core of the dispute, therefore, is not whether South Korea has the authority to regulate companies operating in its market, but whether the objectives of regulation are legitimate, whether enforcement procedures and intensity are objective and proportionate, and whether the same standards are applied consistently to similarly situated domestic and foreign companies.4. The Evolution from the U.S.-Korea Security Alliance to a Digital AllianceThe U.S.–South Korea alliance has evolved through four broad stages: a military and security alliance, an economic alliance, an advanced technology and economic security partnership, and, increasingly, a digital alliance. A major turning point came with the entry into force of the U.S.–South Korea FTA in 2012. The agreement established an institutional foundation for economic cooperation covering goods, services, investment, and intellectual property rights. Following the 2022 summit meeting, the scope of cooperation expanded into what can be described as an “economic and technology alliance,” encompassing semiconductor and battery supply chains as well as critical and emerging technologies such as AI, quantum computing, biotechnology, 5G, and 6G. In 2023, this cooperation was further expanded to include trusted cross-border data flows, standards and norms for digital technologies, and strategic cooperation on cybersecurity.In 2025, the institutional foundations of the Digital Alliance were further developed. In October, the two countries signed the “U.S.–ROK Technology Prosperity Deal,” establishing a framework for cooperation in strategic science and technology sectors. Subsequently, in a joint fact sheet issued by the U.S. and South Korean leaders in November 2025, the two sides agreed not to discriminate against U.S. companies or impose unnecessary barriers in laws and policies governing digital services; to consult on digital issues, including network access fees and online platform regulation; and to facilitate cross-border data transfers involving location data, reinsurance, and personal information. They also agreed to strengthen procedural fairness in the enforcement of competition laws. These commitments indicate that the U.S.–South Korea Digital Alliance has moved beyond cooperation on AI and semiconductor development toward greater coordination on regulatory principles and rules governing digital markets.5. Future Challenges—Harmonizing Regulatory Sovereignty and the Digital AllianceFirst, South Korea should establish non-discriminatory regulatory principles consistent with international standards. This does not necessarily require abolishing or weakening existing regulations. Rather, the proposed regulatory framework should undergo rigorous ex ante review to ensure that its design is consistent with international trade rules and commitments. In particular, given the growing international debate over the legitimacy and effectiveness of the EU-style ex ante regulatory model, South Korea should exercise caution before adopting such a framework without fully assessing its potential implications.Second, South Korea should substantially strengthen the non-discriminatory character, transparency, and procedural legitimacy of regulatory enforcement. Whether a company is domestic or foreign, the same criteria for determining violations, investigative procedures, and standards for calculating penalties should apply and should be clearly disclosed. The more consequential the sanctions—including exceptionally large fines or business suspensions that could threaten a company’s continued operations—the more robust the procedural safeguards should be. These safeguards should include proportionality, appropriate judicial or legal oversight, and meaningful access to legal counsel. This is not simply a matter of accommodating foreign demands; it is essential for strengthening the credibility, predictability, and legitimacy of South Korea’s domestic regulatory system.Third, South Korea should institutionalize “trade impact assessments” when developing digital regulations. Even when a regulation is justified on grounds such as consumer protection or the promotion of fair competition, it can have significant effects on market access for global companies and on cross-border data flows. Accordingly, institutional mechanisms should be established to conduct comprehensive assessments at the legislative and regulatory drafting stages. Such assessments should examine whether proposed measures could result in de facto discrimination against foreign companies, whether they are consistent with international standards, and whether they could create conflicts with international trade obligations, including those under the U.S.–South Korea FTA.Finally, the most important lesson from the Coupang incident is that alliances in the digital era cannot be sustained through security cooperation alone. If South Korea and the United States are to become strategic partners in AI, semiconductors, cloud computing, data, and cybersecurity, they must build mutual confidence that companies from each country can operate in the other’s market under predictable, transparent, and fair regulatory conditions.This, however, should not be interpreted as a call for regulatory exemptions for U.S. companies. South Korea must retain its regulatory authority to protect personal information, consumers, and competitive markets while ensuring that its regulations are legitimate, non-discriminatory, proportionate, transparent, and procedurally fair. The United States, for its part, should not automatically characterize legitimate South Korean public-interest regulations as trade barriers and should recognize that South Korea has a distinct sociocultural context and a legal framework that differs in important respects from that of the United States.South Korea does not formally discriminate against companies on the basis of nationality or country of incorporation and applies the same laws and regulatory principles to foreign companies, including U.S. firms. South Korea’s relevant policies and regulations are not directed at particular countries or companies. Rather, they are intended to promote fair competition in the domestic market, protect consumers, and ensure the consistent application of laws and regulations. These policies also provide U.S. firms with the opportunity to compete in the Korean market on an equal footing with their Korean counterparts.Ultimately, the foundation of the U.S.–South Korea Digital Alliance is not simply deregulation, but the development of shared digital norms and mutual trust. As the U.S.–South Korea alliance evolves from its origins in military security through economic, technological, and cybersecurity cooperation toward a broader partnership grounded in digital rules and norms, the two countries have an opportunity to emerge as among the most reliable strategic partners in an increasingly competitive technological and digital trade environment shaped by the AI era.

Why the IAEA General Conference Should Launch an International Debate on “Halting” North Korea’s Nuclear ProgramBong-geun JeonVisiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute President, Korean Society for Nuclear Policy Studies“How can we resolve the issues on the Korean Peninsula? They can never be fully resolved. We can only manage them.” This is the central question posed by Tim Marshall in Prisoners of Geography (2016). Throughout the post-Cold War era, we have sought to “solve” the problems of the Korean Peninsula. Yet, because of the entrenched geopolitics of Northeast Asia and the division of the Korean Peninsula, we have remained fixated on a “complete solution”—a goal that cannot realistically be achieved in the short term—and, in doing so, have missed opportunities even to “manage” the situation.The Lee Jae-myung administration’s proposal to prioritize “halting” North Korea’s nuclear program represents a pragmatic diplomatic strategy that acknowledges the uncomfortable reality of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and seeks, above all, to prevent the situation from deteriorating further. With the possibility of resuming U.S.–North Korea summit diplomacy now being discussed, debate over the potential risks and limitations of such summits is intensifying. While a U.S.–North Korea summit in itself would not constitute a solution, it is almost certain that the North Korean nuclear issue and South Korea’s security environment will continue to deteriorate if the current trajectory persists in the absence of dialogue. At this juncture, a U.S.–North Korea summit may offer the most realistic opportunity to halt the expansion of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and improve the security environment on the Korean Peninsula.Why the “Status Quo” on North Korea’s Nuclear Program Is DangerousRecently, when President Trump expressed his intention to hold a summit with Chairman Kim Jong-un before the end of the year, concerns and criticism outweighed expectations in both South Korea and the United States. Critics have argued that “bypassing Seoul” could weaken the ROK–U.S. alliance; that negotiations could shift from denuclearization to nuclear arms control; that a “small deal” could effectively amount to recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-armed state; and that, if a “big deal” cannot be achieved, it would be preferable to have “no deal” rather than accept a bad agreement. Ultimately, the argument is that if a “big deal” involving the “Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID)” of North Korea’s nuclear program is unattainable, maintaining the status quo would be preferable to accepting a “small deal” or an unfavorable agreement.There is no disagreement that CVID remains the preferred end state for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue. However, despite the extensive use of incentives, sanctions, and pressure throughout the post-Cold War era, the South Korean and U.S. governments have been unable to achieve CVID. Following its sixth nuclear test and ICBM test launch in 2017, North Korea declared the “completion of its national nuclear forces,“ effectively establishing itself as a nuclear-armed state.Under these circumstances, we can no longer afford to allow the “status quo” of North Korea’s nuclear program to persist. As time passes, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continue to expand, while the political, economic, and security costs of denuclearization continue to rise. As the saying goes, “The cost of denuclearization is always lower today than it will be tomorrow.”This is the conclusion I have reached after observing the North Korean nuclear issue over an extended period. Through the U.S.–North Korea Geneva Agreed Framework and the Six-Party Talks, we missed opportunities when North Korea’s nuclear program might still have been stopped with a mere hoe. Today, the North Korean nuclear issue is difficult to stop even with a shovel. Even if a U.S.–North Korea summit is held, it remains uncertain whether a new opportunity for denuclearization will emerge. However, if this opportunity is missed, the North Korean nuclear crisis will only worsen, and the cost of denuclearization will continue to rise, making the problem increasingly difficult to address—even with tools far larger than a shovel.The “uncomfortable truth” we must confront is that North Korea has already acquired nuclear weapons and that complete denuclearization is virtually unattainable in the foreseeable future. In a survey conducted by Seoul National University’s Institute for Unification and Peace in October 2025, 89.7 percent of respondents said that “North Korea will not abandon its nuclear weapons.” This finding also reflects growing public recognition of the changed reality surrounding North Korea’s nuclear program. “North Korean denuclearization” is no longer viewed as the immediate objective of our North Korea policy, but is increasingly regarded as a long-term goal, much like “unification.” Ultimately, we have entered an era of “coexisting with North Korea’s nuclear weapons”—a situation we have long sought to avoid.The problem lies in the risks associated with “coexisting with North Korea’s nuclear weapons.” This is because the “status quo” of North Korea’s nuclear program is not a static condition; it does not mean that North Korea will freeze its nuclear capabilities at their current level.President Trump has stated that North Korea possesses “57 very powerful nuclear weapons.” President Lee Jae-myung also warned at a press conference in January 2026 that “North Korea’s nuclear armament is an undeniable reality” and that North Korea is producing enough nuclear material annually for approximately 10 to 20 nuclear warheads. If this trend continues, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal could be significantly larger a decade from now than it is today.If North Korea’s nuclear buildup continues over the long term, international opposition to recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state under the NPT could gradually weaken. Over the next 10 to 20 years, North Korea could increasingly come to be treated as a “de facto nuclear-weapon state,” much as India and Pakistan are today. Such an outcome would further weaken the international nuclear nonproliferation regime centered on the NPT and increase the risk that North Korea could transfer nuclear weapons, technologies, or materials abroad. In South Korea and Japan, calls for developing indigenous nuclear capabilities or redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons could also become increasingly prominent. At the same time, amid an intensifying inter-Korean arms race and persistent military confrontation, the risk of escalation, miscalculation, or even inadvertent nuclear use would increase.Given North Korea’s continued opposition to denuclearization, CVID is virtually unattainable under current conditions, and we should not accept the “status quo.” The most realistic course of action is therefore to pursue a phased denuclearization strategy that initially prioritizes achieving a “halt” to North Korea’s nuclear program.From CVID to a Phased Denuclearization Strategy Prioritizing a “Halt” to North Korea’s Nuclear ProgramThere are two broad approaches to the North Korean nuclear issue: the “clear-cut” solution and the “uncomfortable” solution. The former seeks to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue comprehensively through maximum sanctions and pressure, a “big deal” aimed at CVID, rejection of “small deals,” and, potentially, military options. If successful, this approach could resolve both the North Korean nuclear issue and the broader security challenges on the Korean Peninsula in a single decisive step. In practice, however, its feasibility is extremely limited, while the risk of military conflict is high. Under this approach, CVID and the principle of “denuclearization first, followed by the establishment of a peace regime” have often amounted to little more than aspirational slogans because the necessary means and mechanisms to achieve these objectives have been lacking. As this approach has been pursued, confrontation with North Korea has continued, while Pyongyang has used the resulting time and strategic space to further advance its nuclear capabilities.By contrast, the “uncomfortable” solution begins with the recognition that existing denuclearization strategies have failed and that some form of coexistence with North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is likely to be unavoidable for the foreseeable future. While retaining complete denuclearization as the long-term objective, this approach places immediate emphasis on urgent security priorities, including “halting” North Korea’s nuclear program to prevent further expansion, reducing the likelihood of military conflict, and mitigating nuclear risks. In other words, this approach does not abandon CVID; rather, it temporarily prioritizes preventing further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and reducing the possibility of nuclear use.This approach acknowledges South Korea’s limitations and places significant reliance on the United States. However, this does not make it a conciliatory policy toward North Korea. Rather, it maintains that economic sanctions should remain in place as long as North Korea continues to advance its nuclear program, while South Korea must strengthen its own defense capabilities and the ROK–U.S. alliance in response to the North Korean nuclear threat.The Lee Jae-myung administration has adopted this “uncomfortable” solution as part of its pragmatic diplomatic approach. The “E.N.D. (Exchange, Normalization of Relations, Denuclearization) Initiative,” announced in September 2025, also reflects this pragmatic orientation. The initiative calls for its three pillars to be pursued flexibly, beginning with what is feasible rather than assigning priority to any single pillar.Furthermore, the Lee administration has proposed a “three-step” approach to North Korea’s denuclearization: suspension–reduction–abandonment. This represents a realistic effort to focus first on “suspending” North Korea’s nuclear program—thereby preventing further expansion of its nuclear capabilities—rather than repeatedly invoking the goal of “complete denuclearization,” which has thus far produced limited results.Here, “suspension” of North Korea’s nuclear program includes halting the production of weapons-usable nuclear material, suspending the weaponization of nuclear capabilities, and refraining from nuclear tests and ICBM test launches.Above all, the Lee Jae-myung administration seeks to create a breakthrough in the denuclearization process through a U.S.–North Korea summit. To this end, at the South Korea–U.S. summit in August 2025, President Lee asked President Trump to serve as a “peacemaker” on the Korean Peninsula and offered to play the role of a “pace-maker” in support of that effort. This represented a departure from the Moon Jae-in administration’s concept of South Korea as the primary “driver” of inter-Korean diplomacy, giving the United States greater latitude in shaping its approach to North Korea.The Possibility and Expectations for a U.S.-North Korea SummitTo create a new opportunity to advance North Korea’s denuclearization, a U.S.–North Korea summit is needed to break the current diplomatic deadlock. Nevertheless, many experts believe that despite President Trump’s interest in holding such a summit, the initiative is likely to fail because Kim Jong-un may choose not to respond. There are several legitimate reasons for this pessimistic assessment. Kim clearly remembers the so-called “Hanoi humiliation” of February 2019 and is unlikely to want to repeat that experience. Moreover, unlike in the past, North Korea has substantially expanded its nuclear arsenal and deepened its security and economic cooperation with Russia and China. As a result, Pyongyang has less immediate incentive to engage in dialogue with the United States or seek sanctions relief.At the same time, recent developments in South Korea–U.S. relations suggest that the possibility of a U.S.–North Korea summit remains open. President Trump has repeatedly stated in recent years that he maintains a good personal relationship with Kim Jong-un. Notably, while President Trump has emphasized that he helped prevent a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula, he has recently placed less emphasis on the objective of North Korean denuclearization. In mid-August, President Trump announced on social media a significant reduction in ongoing U.S.–South Korea joint military exercises, describing the exercises as “totally inappropriate and hostile.” This appeared to be an effort to create conditions conducive to dialogue, taking into account North Korea’s longstanding demand for an end to what it characterizes as U.S. “hostile policy” as a precondition for talks. Subsequently, on August 19, 2026, President Trump publicly announced that he would meet with Kim before the end of the year.Kim has also not categorically ruled out the possibility of a U.S.–North Korea summit. In September 2025, he stated that there would be no reason not to meet with the United States unless Washington made denuclearization a precondition for talks. More recently, while Kim Yo-jong has sharply criticized the South Korean and U.S. governments, she has been notably restrained in her comments about President Trump, emphasizing that her brother retains positive memories of and favorable feelings toward him.From Kim Jong-un’s perspective, there is little reason to categorically reject dialogue with the United States unless such dialogue is explicitly framed as negotiations over denuclearization. In particular, a meeting with the leader of the United States—the world’s most powerful country and a key pillar of the ROK–U.S. alliance—could offer significant strategic and diplomatic benefits, both in terms of North Korea’s approach to South Korea and Kim’s efforts to enhance his international standing. Kim Jong-un attracted considerable international attention when he appeared alongside President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin at the Victory Day celebrations in Beijing in 2025. It is therefore difficult to rule out the possibility that he could travel to China for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Shenzhen this November, where he could meet with Trump bilaterally or participate in a trilateral meeting with Xi Jinping.If Xi were to invite Kim Jong-un to the APEC Summit and facilitate high-level meetings—including a U.S.–North Korea summit or a U.S.–North Korea–China trilateral summit—it would provide Beijing with an opportunity to demonstrate China’s diplomatic influence and Xi’s ability to shape the regional security environment. In particular, President Trump could ask Xi to help facilitate a U.S.–North Korea summit during his visit to the United States in late September. Trump had sought to meet with Kim Jong-un during his visit to Gyeongju in October 2025 and again during his visit to Beijing in May 2026, but neither effort materialized because Kim Jong-un declined to meet with him.Trump is expected to make a concerted effort to hold a U.S.–North Korea summit before the end of this year, potentially using the Shenzhen APEC Summit as an opportunity.While Trump is unlikely to formally recognize North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, he may also refrain from making denuclearization an explicit public precondition for talks. Even such a shift would represent a significant and welcome development from North Korea’s perspective compared with previous U.S. positions. Pyongyang could nevertheless attempt to portray such a development as amounting to de facto U.S. recognition of its nuclear status. Taking these factors into account, the possibility of a U.S.–North Korea summit in November may be greater than at any point since 2019.The evolving positions of the South Korean and U.S. governments have therefore expanded the space for North Korea to consider renewed dialogue. Although Pyongyang claims that its economy has recently improved, North Korea remains subject to extensive international sanctions and largely excluded from the global economic system, with significant economic cooperation concentrated primarily among a limited number of friendly states. Its international standing also remains far removed from that of a normal, internationally recognized state. North Korea may therefore find it difficult to simply dismiss the possibility of a U.S.–North Korea summit, particularly if such a meeting could provide an avenue for addressing sanctions relief, expanding economic exchanges, normalizing bilateral relations, and improving North Korea’s international standing.If South Korea and the United States were to present in advance a political, diplomatic, and economic package commensurate with North Korea’s participation in a summit and its concrete measures to “halt its nuclear program,” Kim Jong-un’s strategic calculations could change. Ultimately, the key to making a U.S.–North Korea summit possible is to convince North Korea that “engaging in dialogue is more advantageous than refusing to do so.” Given the potential importance of such a summit as a catalyst for restarting the denuclearization and peace process on the Korean Peninsula, which has remained stalled for years, the South Korean and U.S. governments should adopt a more proactive approach to creating the conditions necessary for such a summit to take place.

The Korean Peninsula at a Crossroads for Peace: Halting North Korea’s Nuclear Program as a Path to PeaceSeong-won Kim Chairman of the board of the Tongil Korea CoopThe Korean Peninsula once again stands at a crossroads for peace. Whether it takes a new path toward peace or moves toward prolonged confrontation will depend in large part on whether a U.S.–North Korea summit takes place and, if so, what it yields. Some argue that a summit should not be held without meaningful progress toward North Korea’s denuclearization, while others welcome such a meeting, maintaining that direct engagement between the leaders could itself send an important signal in support of peace on the Korean Peninsula.Until 2019, when the last U.S.–North Korea summit took place, the central agenda focused on the denuclearization of North Korea and, more broadly, the Korean Peninsula. Key issues included the lifting of sanctions against North Korea and the normalization of U.S.–North Korea relations, both of which were premised on progress toward denuclearization. However, the strategic landscape has changed considerably over the past seven years, during which there have been no summits between the United States and North Korea and no meaningful high-level engagement between the two Koreas. North Korea has strengthened its ties with China and Russia, while its relations with South Korea and the United States have deteriorated. Despite international sanctions, North Korea has continued to advance its nuclear capabilities while pursuing economic development. It has also institutionalized a “hostile two-state” doctrine—the notion that maintaining ties with South Korea is no longer necessary and may, in fact, be dangerous—and has increasingly embraced the view that it can pursue development without relying on the United States.Furthermore, North Korea is closely observing—through the historical example of Libya and the current situation in Iran—how states without nuclear weapons can become vulnerable and face severe pressure during negotiations. Under these circumstances, denuclearization can no longer realistically serve as the immediate basis for U.S.–North Korea talks. North Korea is unlikely to accept dialogue that is explicitly premised on, or intended to achieve, denuclearization. Does this mean that North Korea will never again engage with South Korea or the United States? Not necessarily. From Kim Jong-un’s perspective, as he seeks to consolidate North Korea as a more normalized state, the most advantageous course may be to secure support from the United States while maintaining China and Russia as strategic backstops and preserving stable relations with South Korea. If so, what approach is required?Understanding “Nuclear Moratorium” and “Peace RegimeIn his speech commemorating the 81st anniversary of Liberation Day on August 15, President Lee Jae-myung outlined his approach to North Korea policy, stating, “I intend to present a blueprint for moving beyond principles to action,” and adding, “We will embark on a journey to end the war and transform the unstable armistice regime on the Korean Peninsula into a peace regime.” President Lee went on to say, “Let us set aside our mutual threats and begin discussions among the parties involved to end this long-standing war,” adding, “Through this, we can also discuss effective measures to halt the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.”The discussions among the parties aimed at transforming the armistice regime into a peace regime refer to four-party talks involving South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China—the principal parties to the Korean War Armistice Agreement. If a peace treaty were eventually concluded, the framework could naturally be expanded into six-party talks involving Japan and Russia to address broader security and peace issues in Northeast Asia. This approach would entail moving from bilateral U.S.–North Korea talks to four-party talks and ultimately to six-party talks.What is particularly noteworthy is that President Lee referred to halting the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities rather than using the term “denuclearization.” This formulation could provide a more practical basis for engaging North Korea, which has consistently rejected talks premised on denuclearization. Equally important, President Lee framed the North Korean nuclear issue as part of the broader peace-regime agenda on the Korean Peninsula, a point that should not be overlooked.This reflects the view that North Korea’s nuclear development is, to a significant extent, a product of a longstanding security environment characterized by mutual distrust, hostility, and confrontation. In other words, if the Korean Peninsula were to move toward a durable reduction in confrontation, the strategic rationale that Pyongyang invokes to justify developing and maintaining nuclear weapons could gradually weaken. Ultimately, this is what genuine peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia should mean.Of course, realizing such an outcome would require the current phase of confrontation to give way to sustained dialogue and reconciliation—not only on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, but also within the broader international system. International organizations such as the United Nations must also be able to play a meaningful role as impartial mediators and facilitators of dialogue.A few hours after Lee’s commemorative address, President Trump posted a photograph from his 2019 meeting with Kim Jong-un at Panmunjom on social media, writing, “Kim Jong-un and I get along well.” The following day, on August 16, Trump stated on social media that he had instructed Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to significantly scale back the upcoming U.S.–South Korea joint military exercises. Trump stated, “Given the very good relationship between Kim Jong-un and me, I am not pleased that the U.S. agreed long ago to participate in joint military exercises with South Korea,” adding that he had ordered a significant reduction because it was too late to cancel them. In fact, the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise, which had been scheduled to take place from August 17 to 27, was terminated early on August 21—just five days after it began.Trump went further on August 19, when he told reporters at the White House that “North Korea possesses 57 nuclear weapons,” drawing significant attention. Although Trump had previously referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power” and stated that “Kim Jong-un has many nuclear weapons,” this was the first time he had publicly cited a specific number. As a result, both concern and expectations emerged that U.S. policy toward North Korea could be undergoing a fundamental shift.Trump’s repeated expressions of goodwill toward Kim and the scaling back of U.S.–South Korea joint military exercises closely align with North Korea’s longstanding demands that the United States end what Pyongyang describes as its hostile policy toward North Korea and halt joint military exercises. By publicly citing a specific estimate of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, Trump may also have created the perception in Pyongyang that Washington could be moving toward acknowledging North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. For Kim, the prospect of another summit with Trump may therefore increasingly appear to be an opportunity in which the potential gains outweigh the risks.Scenarios for a U.S.-North Korea SummitGiven the current circumstances, the following scenarios for a U.S.–North Korea summit can be anticipated.The first scenario is that North Korea remains silent, sets various conditions, and ultimately declines to participate in the summit. The U.S.–North Korea summit held in Hanoi on February 28, 2019, ended without an agreement after the United States walked away from the negotiations, leaving Kim Jong-un, who had invested considerable political capital in the meeting, with deepened mistrust toward Washington and a significant setback to his leadership. Kim subsequently resolved to pursue a “new path” centered on greater self-reliance, reduced dependence on the United States, and closer relations with China and Russia. Now that North Korea has further advanced its nuclear weapons program and achieved a certain degree of economic development, Pyongyang may conclude that it no longer needs to rely on an “untrustworthy” United States. The leaders of North Korea and the United States could continue to cultivate a cordial atmosphere, suggesting that a meeting might take place at any time, only for the summit ultimately not to materialize. In such a case, not only would the nuclear issue remain off the negotiating table, but opportunities for broader discussions on peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula could also be lost.The second scenario involves holding a summit in October—before the U.S. midterm elections—taking into account Trump’s political considerations. To make such a meeting possible, Trump would likely have to offer Kim a substantial package of concessions.This could involve the easing or lifting of sanctions against North Korea and the establishment of a liaison office, conditioned not on the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program but on a verifiable freeze of its nuclear activities. For Trump, such an arrangement could provide a diplomatic achievement ahead of the midterm elections, while Kim could effectively gain greater international recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status and secure the implementation of previously negotiated commitments, potentially creating a mutually beneficial outcome. Furthermore, if Trump were to visit Pyongyang or Wonsan-Kalma, North Korea would once again attract substantial international attention, while Trump could gain significant diplomatic and political capital from a highly visible diplomatic initiative.The third scenario, as reported by various media outlets, is that the two leaders meet again around the time of the APEC summit in November, either in Shenzhen, China—the host city—or at Panmunjom in South Korea. In this case, the U.S.–North Korea summit would be highly likely to remain a one-time event. This is because the U.S. midterm elections would have concluded, leaving Washington with less immediate political incentive to prepare a substantial package of concessions. The same would apply if the leaders were to meet after November, following prolonged negotiations over the terms of engagement. Such a meeting could amount to little more than a symbolic encounter. While Kim would have relatively little to lose by attending, from Trump’s perspective, the strategic and political rationale for another meeting could be considerably weaker. The nuclear issue might either not be addressed at all or be confined to broad and largely theoretical discussions.Of course, these three scenarios are merely analytical projections. There remains a possibility that Trump and Kim—both leaders known for their willingness to take unconventional risks—could make a surprise move that defies conventional expectations. This was demonstrated by their June 30, 2019, meeting at the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom, during which Trump made a historic crossing into North Korean territory at Kim’s invitation. The two leaders may once again seek to create a dramatic moment capable of capturing global attention. While all possibilities must remain open, I believe the time has come to make a concerted effort to make another meeting between the two leaders possible.From a Nuclear Freeze to Normalization, a Peace Regime, and Ultimately DenuclearizationThe key question is where the two leaders will begin their dialogue when they meet. While there are reports that preparations for informal working-level discussions have already begun, reaching agreement on the agenda will by no means be easy. This is because the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” has been a consistent element of previous U.S.–North Korea summit agreements. Of course, at the core of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula lies the denuclearization of North Korea.Typically, summit meetings culminate in a joint statement or communiqué that builds upon, reaffirms, and further develops previous agreements. The preamble to the June 12, 2018, U.S.–North Korea Singapore Summit Joint Statement states: “Chairman Kim Jong-un reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Furthermore, Article 1 of the joint statement commits the two sides to establishing new U.S.–DPRK relations, while Article 2 calls for joint efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.In the Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States—the first major agreement between the two countries, signed in Geneva on October 21, 1994—the goal of achieving peace and security on a “nuclear-free Korean peninsula” also featured prominently. To this end, the agreement provided for the replacement of North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor power plants, supported by international cooperation to facilitate the process.The Six-Party Talks, which began on August 27, 2003, and were held in six rounds through September 2007, also centered on the North Korean nuclear issue. The February 13, 2007, agreement provided for energy, economic, and humanitarian assistance in exchange for North Korea’s implementation of measures to shut down and disable its nuclear facilities and the return of IAEA personnel to conduct monitoring and verification. North Korea subsequently took visible steps, including the demolition of the cooling tower at Yongbyon in June 2008. However, the Six-Party Talks did not resume after 2008, as the parties failed to reach agreement on key verification measures, including the scope of inspections and procedures for obtaining samples.The more complex an issue is, the simpler it becomes once its underlying logic is understood. The fundamental question is this: Why does North Korea continue to devote substantial resources to developing its nuclear capabilities? North Korea has consistently justified its nuclear program by pointing to what it describes as the United States’ longstanding hostile policy toward Pyongyang. In other words, if the United States were to fundamentally move away from a hostile policy toward North Korea, the strategic rationale that Pyongyang invokes to justify its nuclear development could begin to erode.The October 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea included the goal of “full normalization of political and economic relations,” while the June 2018 U.S.–North Korea Singapore Summit Joint Statement identified “establishing new U.S.–DPRK relations” (normalization of relations) and “building a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula” as key objectives. The normalization of relations and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula have repeatedly featured in negotiations over the nuclear issue. This demonstrates how closely intertwined the nuclear issue and the question of a peace regime are. At the heart of the complex nuclear issue lies the hostile relationship between the two countries. Transforming that relationship—through normalization and the establishment of a peace regime—is therefore central to creating the conditions necessary for resolving the nuclear issue.Normalizing relations is more complex and time-consuming than one might assume. It is likely to involve a cycle of agreements, implementation, setbacks, and renewed negotiations. Moreover, North Korea and the United States fought a war roughly seven decades ago and have remained locked in confrontation ever since. Consequently, the process of normalization is bound to be long and arduous. The starting point for this process can only be a temporary freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program. Over the course of this extended process, the lifting of sanctions against North Korea, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and the creation of a peace regime would need to proceed in parallel, while the ultimate endpoint would be the creation of a security environment in which nuclear weapons are no longer considered necessary—that is, denuclearization.Now is the time for Trump and Kim Jong-un. From our perspective—as those who seek peace rather than continued confrontation on the Korean Peninsula—we sincerely hope that the two leaders will meet and that their meeting will take place under the full attention of the international community. We hope that the geopolitical fault lines of Northeast Asia, hardened by decades of confrontation, will begin to shift decisively toward peace. If that happens, the Korean Peninsula could become an epicenter of peace with global implications. May such a historic moment finally come to pass.

Proposals for Multilateral Discussions on Ending the War on the Korean Peninsula and Establishing a Peace RegimeJu-yeon Lee Northeast Asian History FoundationAt the ceremony commemorating the 81st anniversary of Liberation Day, President Lee Jae-myung stated, “We will embark on a journey to end the war and transform the unstable armistice regime on the Korean Peninsula into a peace regime,” thereby calling for multilateral discussions aimed at formally ending the war and establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. President Lee also explained that such multilateral discussions could lead to effective measures to halt North Korea’s nuclear development. In other words, he signaled that a multilateral framework could ultimately contribute to achieving both peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.Regarding Lee’s proposal for multilateral discussions, experts have offered both positive and negative assessments. From a positive perspective, such discussions could help break the prolonged deadlock in inter-Korean dialogue and provide a starting point for renewed engagement. Furthermore, the participation of relevant countries could help manage potential crises on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. In particular, given that recent international conflicts have tended to erupt and escalate rapidly, sometimes as a result of miscalculation or unintended developments, multilateral discussions are viewed favorably for their potential to reduce the risk of military conflict.On the other hand, a critical perspective expresses skepticism about the prospects for multilateral talks. This skepticism stems largely from the failure of the Six-Party Talks in the past to produce substantive results, with the negotiations yielding largely declaratory outcomes. Furthermore, there is concern that security instability on the Korean Peninsula could actually worsen if such talks were to face strong opposition from the United States, which has traditionally been South Korea’s principal security partner.However, despite the debate between proponents and critics, the Lee Jae-myung administration’s proposal for multilateral talks can be viewed as having more potential benefits than drawbacks. This is because, among the various approaches to bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table to address issues of peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, a multilateral dialogue framework currently appears to be one of the most promising options.Of course, judging from Unification Minister Jeong Dong-young’s assertion that four-party talks involving South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China should follow the U.S. decision to scale back South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises, and that efforts to promote such talks are necessary, it appears that these four countries would be the principal participants in the proposed multilateral discussions.So, is establishing a consultative mechanism in the form of four-party talks the right approach to advancing peace on the Korean Peninsula? Compared with the Six-Party Talks (South Korea, North Korea, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan) held in the past, the principal advantage of the four-party talks (South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China) is that, with fewer stakeholders involved, the parties would be able to focus on and address the core agenda items more effectively. For instance, organizing a six-party talks would require complex coordination of the schedules of representatives from all six countries, as well as the selection and preparation of a suitable venue, potentially resulting in substantial administrative burdens and costs. Furthermore, reducing the number of stakeholders through a four-party format could make decision-making on key issues more efficient.In particular, if issues such as Japan’s abductee problem are incorporated into the broader agenda, it could become more difficult to maintain a clear focus on peace on the Korean Peninsula. Consequently, if the multilateral discussions pursued by the Lee Jae-myung administration take the form of four-party talks, a negotiating forum could be established relatively quickly, providing a basis for institutionalizing future multilateral discussions and, above all, potentially achieving tangible results more rapidly.While it is true that the four-party format offers significant advantages, the four parties—South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China—would not be sufficient for multilateral discussions aimed at promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula and throughout Northeast Asia. In particular, conducting multilateral discussions without Russia appears inconsistent with the current geopolitical realities of Northeast Asia and the broader international security environment. Of course, as noted earlier, it is difficult to deny that the Six-Party Talks in the past failed to produce tangible results. However, given that Russia–North Korea relations have effectively reached the level of a military alliance amid the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, excluding Russia would significantly constrain efforts to engage North Korea.Furthermore, as the aftermath of the Russia–Ukraine war has deepened divisions within the international community and geopolitical tensions between the South Korea–U.S.–Japan and North Korea–China–Russia alignments have become increasingly entrenched in Northeast Asia, it is necessary to move beyond simply establishing an agenda for peace on the Korean Peninsula and consider creating a consultative mechanism dedicated to peace and stability in the broader Northeast Asian region. From this perspective, including Japan in the multilateral discussions would be more reasonable than excluding it.Of course, there are significant challenges to immediately reconvening the Six-Party Talks under the current circumstances. Above all, given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, establishing a multilateral platform that includes Russia remains highly contentious. Furthermore, with President Putin’s recent visit to the Kuril Islands, Russia–Japan relations appear to be entering an increasingly confrontational phase. In other words, as noted above, establishing a multilateral dialogue framework would itself be extremely difficult under the current circumstances.Therefore, I propose establishing multilateral talks in a phased and gradual manner. First, because restoring a channel of communication with North Korea is of paramount importance, we should initiate dialogue through a four-party format involving South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China. Then, if we succeed in institutionalizing the four-party talks as a regular forum, we should consider expanding the framework into broader multilateral formats, such as “4+1” or “4+2.” In other words, we should distinguish between the four core parties—South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China—and additional participants, such as Russia and Japan, and gradually broaden the framework.There is a Korean proverb that says, “Too many cooks spoil the broth.” In other words, even if the Six-Party Talks are reconvened, they could potentially produce undesirable or counterproductive outcomes. However, another Korean proverb says, “Even a sheet of paper is easier to lift together,” while an African proverb states, “Alone we go fast, but together we go far.” In short, from a long-term perspective, we must establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula—and, by extension, a durable peace and security framework in Northeast Asia—through the creation of a multilateral dialogue framework.

Halting North Korea’s Nuclear Program and Building a Peace Regime on the Korean PeninsulaJong-cheol ParkVisiting Research Fellow Institute for Unification Studies1. President Trump’s Signals for Dialogue and Diplomatic CalculationsWith President Trump recently sending a series of conciliatory messages to North Korea, attention is increasingly focused on the prospects for resuming U.S.-North Korea dialogue. On August 17 (local time), President Trump expressed openness to the possibility of dialogue with North Korea during a question-and-answer session with reporters at the White House. Just one day earlier, he announced that he had instructed the Department of Defense to significantly scale back U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises, citing concerns that they could send the wrong signal to North Korea.On August 15, President Trump posted on social media a photograph of his June 2019 meeting with Chairman Kim Jong-un at Panmunjom. On August 17, he posted a digitally altered image highlighting his positive relationship with Chairman Kim, sending a series of conciliatory signals toward North Korea. These actions can be interpreted as deliberate gestures aimed at creating conditions for the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue.Behind these gestures toward North Korea may also lie a broader calculation aimed at achieving a diplomatic breakthrough. Given the limited diplomatic progress the Trump administration has made in the Russia-Ukraine war and in U.S.-Iran ceasefire negotiations, President Trump may view renewed engagement with North Korea as an opportunity to secure a tangible foreign-policy achievement. In particular, with the U.S. midterm elections approaching in November, there is a possibility that the administration will seek visible diplomatic results on issues related to the Korean Peninsula.2. North Korea’s Advancing Nuclear Capabilities and Evolving StrategyAfter more than three decades of development and negotiations, North Korea is not a nuclear-weapon state recognized under international law, but it is widely assessed to have developed a de facto nuclear weapons capability. For North Korea, nuclear weapons are no longer merely a bargaining instrument but a core component of its strategy for regime survival and national security. Building on its nuclear capabilities, North Korea seeks to reinforce its national identity, enhance its international standing, and secure strategic advantages on the Korean Peninsula.North Korea’s strategy toward South Korea has also undergone a fundamental transformation. Pyongyang has institutionalized a “two hostile states” framework that defines South Korea not as a partner for dialogue and reunification but as a hostile state. This hostile posture has further severed inter-Korean relations and increased instability on the Korean Peninsula. As inter-Korean relations have deteriorated and crisis-management mechanisms have become increasingly ineffective, the risk remains that an accidental military incident could escalate into a broader confrontation.At the same time, North Korea is strengthening its international position by deepening comprehensive military and economic cooperation with Russia while maintaining and expanding its ties with China. Stronger North Korea-Russia relations and continued engagement with China help mitigate Pyongyang’s concerns about international isolation while increasing its leverage in potential negotiations with the United States. Furthermore, North Korea has adopted an approach commonly described as “Engage the U.S., Isolate the South” (tongmi, bongnam), seeking security guarantees and sanctions relief through direct negotiations with Washington while keeping the door to inter-Korean dialogue largely closed.3. Lessons and Outlook for North Korean Nuclear NegotiationsThe U.S.-North Korea summits in Singapore in 2018 and Hanoi in February 2019 provide important lessons for assessing the prospects for future nuclear negotiations. In particular, the Hanoi summit ended without an agreement because the two sides failed to bridge fundamental differences over the scope, sequencing, and reciprocal measures associated with denuclearization. While the United States sought a comprehensive approach to denuclearization, North Korea favored a phased and partial process in which the dismantlement of selected nuclear facilities would be exchanged for sanctions relief.Since the breakdown of the Hanoi summit, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have advanced significantly. Its stockpile of nuclear warheads and fissile materials has grown, its missile capabilities have improved, and the legal and institutional foundations underpinning its nuclear forces have been further developed. As a result, any future negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program will begin under conditions substantially more difficult than those that prevailed in 2018–2019.North Korea now treats its possession of nuclear weapons as an established fact and rejects negotiations premised on immediate denuclearization. At the same time, it is demanding sanctions relief, an end to what it characterizes as U.S. military pressure and hostile policies, the suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, guarantees for regime security, and the normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations.Consequently, even if U.S.-North Korea dialogue resumes, it will be difficult to pursue a comprehensive settlement aimed at immediate and complete denuclearization. A more realistic approach would be to first halt further advances in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, reduce military tensions, and then pursue a gradual process to reduce the nuclear threat.4. Phased Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issue and Transition to a Peace RegimeGiven that North Korea has, in effect, become a nuclear-armed state and that the nuclear issue is intertwined with a range of complex factors—including security concerns, sanctions, regime guarantees, U.S.-North Korea relations, and inter-Korean relations—it will be difficult to resolve the issue in the short term. While maintaining complete denuclearization as the long-term objective, a more realistic strategy would be to first halt further advances in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and then pursue a gradual reduction of the nuclear threat.To this end, a phased roadmap could begin with a suspension of nuclear and missile testing, followed by restrictions on the production of fissile materials, a phased reduction of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, and ultimately complete denuclearization. At each stage, concrete reciprocal measures should be developed that link verifiable North Korean actions with corresponding steps by the United States and other parties, including sanctions relief, reductions in military tensions, security assurances, and the normalization of relations.The key variable in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is the state of U.S.-North Korea relations. Without meaningful progress in dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang, it will be difficult to achieve a breakthrough on the nuclear issue or advance a durable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. U.S.-North Korea dialogue should serve as an entry point for broader peace-building efforts, while inter-Korean dialogue can help mediate, broaden, and institutionalize this process. South Korea should play the role of a “pace-setter” by helping create an environment conducive to U.S.-North Korea negotiations while simultaneously restoring inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation, thereby ensuring that improvements in U.S.-North Korea relations contribute to stability and peace across the Korean Peninsula.Furthermore, efforts to address the North Korean nuclear issue and transition toward a peace regime should proceed in parallel. The two processes are closely interconnected. A virtuous cycle should be established in which progress on the nuclear issue generates momentum toward a peace regime, while progress toward a peace regime reduces North Korea’s security concerns and thereby creates more favorable conditions for addressing the nuclear issue.5. South Korea’s RoleIn this context, it is noteworthy that President Lee Jae-myung highlighted the need for effective measures to halt the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and to advance the transition toward a peace regime in his August 15 commemorative address. This reflects the need for a pragmatic approach that, while maintaining the ultimate objective of complete denuclearization, first addresses the immediate and growing nuclear threat and links its reduction to the broader process of establishing a peace regime.South Korea should use major diplomatic opportunities—including the United Nations General Assembly in September and the APEC Summit in China in November—to strengthen strategic communication and policy coordination with relevant countries. By building greater consensus among major powers, including the United States and China, Seoul should seek to create a diplomatic environment conducive to halting further advances in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, facilitating the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue, and advancing discussions on a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.Ultimately, South Korea’s national strategy should pursue two complementary objectives: substantially reducing the North Korean nuclear threat and institutionalizing peace on the Korean Peninsula. Because a complete resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue will likely require a prolonged process, the immediate priority should be to manage and contain the nuclear threat while establishing institutional mechanisms to reduce the risk of military conflict and accidental escalation. Through such an approach, South Korea can reduce geopolitical risks on the Korean Peninsula and build a more stable strategic environment conducive to sustainable peace, security, and national development.

The Excellence of K-Defense: Lessons from the Ukraine CaseHyungsuk KimAdjunct ProfessorGraduate School of Defense ScienceHansung University1. IntroductionThe world is running short of interceptor missiles. Reuters reported on August 7, 2026, that the United States had already consumed roughly 65 percent of its Patriot interceptor stockpile during that year alone.[1] Conditions elsewhere are no better. The U.S. Army has nearly exhausted its stocks of long-range strike missiles, including ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) and PrSM (Precision Strike Missile), while South Korean industry reports indicate that Patriot and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) inventories have declined by more than 60 percent.[2] Armin Papperger, chief executive of Germany’s Rheinmetall, estimates that rebuilding allied inventories to normal levels will take at least two years.[2]The fact that the country with the world’s largest defense budget cannot resupply itself quickly enough is more than a procurement problem. It raises a harder question: What does modern warfare actually demand of an air defense system, and how many nations are capable of meeting that demand?This paper addresses that question using daily strike data from the Russia-Ukraine air war, covering the period from September 28, 2022, through August 14, 2026. The analysis proceeds in four steps. It first establishes what a sustained war of attrition requires of air defenses. It then identifies which types of attacks defeat those defenses. Next, it explains why so few countries can supply what is needed. Finally, it shows how Korea has already demonstrated, in practice, that it can.2. The Math of AttritionThe figures used throughout this paper come from a publicly available dataset that compiles the daily engagement reports issued by the Air Force Command and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.[8] These are operational reports rather than audited statistics, and the author has reorganized them by weapon type, year, and individual salvo. They should therefore be understood as indicative of scale and trends rather than as official accounting.On that basis, more than 134,000 missiles and drones have been launched against Ukraine since the war began, and the annual volume has risen steeply. Ukraine recorded 1,157 launches in 2022, 4,815 in 2023, and 14,112 in 2024. By 2025, the figure had reached 58,777—roughly 50 times the 2022 total—and the 2026 count stood at 55,579 by mid-August. Figure 1 plots this growth against the intercept rate achieved specifically against ballistic missiles, and the divergence between the two lines is the central finding of this paper.Figure 1. Attack Volume and Ballistic Missile Intercept Rate: 2022-2026Volume alone, however, understates the problem because intercept performance varies enormously by threat type. Table 1 sets out the cumulative record. Ukrainian defenses stopped 76.5 percent of Shahed-type loitering munitions and 72.0 percent of cruise missiles, but only 21.1 percent of ballistic missiles. In other words, these defenses cope reasonably well with cheap, high-volume threats but remain structurally weak against the fastest and most demanding ones. The final row of the table exceeds the sum of the rows above it because several minor categories, including guided bombs and a small number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, are not listed separately.Table 1. Intercept Rates by Weapon Type: September 28, 2022 - August 14, 2026Nor has this weakness eased over time. As Figure 1 shows, the ballistic missile intercept rate fell from 46.2 percent in 2023 to 16.8 percent in 2024, recovered modestly to 24.0 percent in 2025, and slipped again to 9.6 percent in 2026. Over a period in which attack volume grew nearly fiftyfold, performance against the most dangerous class of weapon did not improve; it merely fluctuated. One conclusion follows directly: current interceptor supplies cannot keep pace with sustained, high-intensity warfare.3. What Kinds of Attacks Defeat Air DefensesThe aggregate figures conceal a sharper pattern that emerges only when individual salvos are examined. The dataset separately records fourteen attacks involving multiple missile types, and sorting these salvos by composition reveals the contrast shown in Table 2.Table 2. Intercept Rates for Combined Salvos by CompositionThe difference is striking. When Russia combined cruise and air-launched weapons such as the Kh-101, the Kalibr, and the Iskander-K, Ukrainian defenses intercepted 88.4 percent of the incoming rounds. That is a higher rate than either category achieved on its own. When ballistic missiles were added to the mix, however, the intercept rate collapsed to 37.2 percent, and in two of those salvos, not a single round was stopped.The lesson is not that combined attacks are inherently harder to defeat. Rather, it is that the presence of ballistic missiles, rather than the mixing itself, is what breaks through a defense. Fourteen salvos is admittedly a small sample, and the percentages should be interpreted with that in mind, but the direction of the result is consistent with the cumulative figures in Table 1.A second pattern reinforces the point. Ballistic missiles fired in ones and twos were intercepted only 8.5 percent of the time, whereas salvos of eleven or more were intercepted at a rate of 34.5 percent. This may appear counterintuitive, but the likely explanation is straightforward: large salvos are typically directed at Kyiv and other population centers where interceptor batteries are concentrated, while isolated launches often strike locations outside dedicated ballistic missile defense coverage. Capability alone, therefore, does not determine outcomes. Coverage and magazine depth do.The identity of the missiles involved gives this analysis particular significance for the Korean Peninsula. Table 3 breaks down the ballistic missile total by type, and the third and fourth rows deserve close attention. Ukrainian reporting uses the compound designation Iskander-M/KN-23 when Russian and North Korean short-range ballistic missiles cannot be distinguished from one another, and the KN-23 is a North Korean weapon. Taken together with the rounds identified as KN-23 outright, 372 of the 1,204 ballistic missiles fired at Ukraine—roughly three in ten—belong to a category in which a North Korean weapon may be involved. Against a defense network built around Patriot, those rounds were intercepted about a quarter of the time.Table 3.  Ballistic Missile Intercept Rates by TypeThat table describes the same class of weapon that Korean air defenses were built to counter, and this is where South Korea’s position differs from that of most other producers. For other countries, defeating short-range ballistic missiles is one requirement among many. For Korea, it has been the organizing principle of air-defense development for decades. Cheongung-II, Cheongung-III, and L-SAM were not designed for an export market and later adapted to address this threat. They were designed specifically to counter this threat, and the market followed.4. The Bottleneck Is Industrial, Not FinancialIf the demand is now clear, the obvious response would be to build more interceptors. The Patriot shortage shows why that is harder than it sounds—and why the constraint is industrial rather than financial.In September 2025, the U.S. Army awarded Lockheed Martin a multi-year contract worth $9.8 billion for 1,970 PAC-3 MSE (Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement) interceptors, the system’s principal interceptor, and followed it in April 2026 with a further $4.7 billion to accelerate production. Together, these awards aim to more than triple annual production capacity, from roughly 600 missiles to about 2,000. Yet Lockheed Martin increased production by only 60 percent over the preceding two years, reaching a record 620 missiles in 2025. At that rate, the new target remains distant.[1]Efforts to widen the industrial base have encountered the same obstacle. A plan to raise U.S. interceptor production from about 500 to more than 750 missiles a year by expanding licensed production in Japan stalled because of a shortage of seeker units supplied by Boeing. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries builds roughly 30 PAC-3 rounds a year and could, in principle, double that figure, but it was unable to do so while the seeker bottleneck persisted.[3]The implication is uncomfortable. When the country with the world’s largest defense budget and deepest industrial base cannot expand output on demand because of a single constrained component, the capacity to build advanced weapons quickly, reliably, and at scale is genuinely scarce. Competitiveness in air defense is therefore not a matter of technology alone. It requires design capability, stable production lines, a resilient supplier network, and close coordination among government, the military, and industry, all operating together and at speed. Few countries possess all four.5. What South Korea Has Demonstrated: Precision, Speed, and ScaleSouth Korea is one of the few countries that has recently demonstrated that it can.Precision. In March 2026, an assessment by Ahmed Sharif, a military analyst in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), attracted wide attention. Sharif reported that during the opening days of the U.S.-Iran conflict, Iran launched 137 missiles at targets in the UAE, including American bases, and that the country’s layered air defense network destroyed 132 of them, an intercept rate of 96 percent. Including drones, the network stopped 327 of 346 incoming weapons, or 95 percent.[4]That network comprises Patriot, THAAD, Israel’s Arrow, and South Korea’s Cheongung-II, a medium-range system also designated M-SAM (Medium-range Surface-to-Air Missile). The 96 percent figure therefore describes the combined performance of all four systems, not that of Cheongung-II alone, although some South Korean outlets have since reported it as a measure of the Korean system’s performance by itself.[5] The distinction matters for accuracy, but it does not diminish the underlying point. This marked the first combat employment of a South Korean-exported weapon system, and evidence from actual combat carries a weight that no brochure can match.South Korea is building on that result. Cheongung-III, a successor designed to engage ballistic missiles at higher altitudes, entered development under a 2025 contract with the Defense Acquisition Program Administration,[5] while L-SAM (Long-range Surface-to-Air Missile) is being fielded as the upper tier of a layered architecture. Read against Section 3, the purpose of that architecture is unmistakable: the layer South Korea is now building is precisely the one that failed in Ukraine.Speed. South Korea’s K9 howitzer program in Poland offers the clearest illustration. Poland signed an initial contract for 212 K9A1 howitzers with Hanwha Aerospace in August 2022, and the first 24 units arrived just four months later, in December of that year.[7] Meeting that schedule owed less to factory capacity than to the ability of government, the military, and industry to operate as a single team.[6] Poland has since expanded its order to 364 units across two contracts, establishing the K9 as a mainstay of its artillery force, with provision for as many as 672 units under the original framework agreement.[7]Scale. Cheongung-II has generated approximately $9.5 billion in cumulative export orders for South Korea.[5] The UAE signed the first major contract in January 2022, worth about $3.5 billion for ten batteries, followed by Saudi Arabia and Iraq with agreements worth roughly $2.9 billion and $2.6 billion, respectively.[4] Negotiations with Qatar and Kuwait could add close to $2 billion more.[5] Taken together, these are not the marks of a single fortunate sale but evidence of a durable industrial capability.Precision, speed, and scale—each demonstrated in combat or delivery records rather than in projections—are capabilities that few countries can claim to possess.6. Beyond Arms Sales: Toward Genuine PartnershipThe logical next step for South Korea is not a series of one-off transactions but lasting partnerships, and the Poland program already indicates the form they should take. Immediate requirements are met with finished systems built in Korea. Local production, MRO (maintenance, repair, and overhaul) cooperation, and progressive supply-chain localization then follow in sequence.[6][7]This model does more than serve the customer. It addresses the structural problem identified in Section 4 because distributing production across more countries reduces the risk that a single national bottleneck can leave the world short of air defense systems.Such partnerships complement the U.S.-led alliance supply system rather than competing with it. Where American industry cannot meet demand in sufficient volume or within the required timeframe, Korea can, drawing on proven performance and rapid production. The benefit extends beyond any single buyer, since a more diversified supplier base makes allied deterrence more resilient as a whole.7. ConclusionThree findings converge. Modern attrition warfare demands volume, speed, and precision simultaneously, and the Ukrainian record shows what happens when that demand goes unmet—above all against ballistic missiles and where coverage is thin. Very few countries can close that gap. Even the world’s largest defense budget is currently constrained by an industrial base that cannot be expanded on demand.South Korea belongs to that small group, and not merely by an accident of timing. The systems now drawing interest abroad were developed to address the most demanding version of the problem described by the Ukrainian data, and they are produced by an industrial base that has repeatedly delivered at speed and scale. Combat performance in the Gulf, deliveries to Poland within four months of the initial contract, and a $9.5 billion order book are three independent measures of the same underlying capability.What follows is a question of role rather than capacity. The world is not short of air defense designs; it is short of producers able to build them in the quantities and on the timelines that sustained conflict now requires. Korea has demonstrated that it can. For allied nations seeking to strengthen and diversify their air defense capabilities, the partner they are looking for is already in the field.[1] "Patriot Missile Shortage Deepens As Global Demand Outpaces Interceptor Production," TheDefenseWatch.com, August 8, 2026 (citing Reuters, August 7, 2026; includes PAC-3 MSE contract values and production-capacity figures). https://thedefensewatch.com/military-ordnance/patriot-missile-shortage-interceptor-production/[2] Kim Hyun-jung, "US Missile Stockpiles Running Low: Korean Defense Firms Fill the Global Supply Gap," MTN (Money Today Broadcasting), August 11, 2026. https://v.daum.net/v/20260811060706009[3] Vadim Kushnikov, "U.S. Patriot Missile Production Hampered by Boeing Component Shortage," Militarnyi, July 21, 2024 (citing Reuters). https://militarnyi.com/en/news/u-s-patriot-missile-production-hampered-by-boeing-component-shortage/[4] Jung Han-gyeol, "Korean-Made Cheongung-II, Exported to the UAE, Intercepts Iranian Missiles in First Combat Use," Money Today, March 3, 2026. Won-denominated contract values converted at approximately 1,450 won to the dollar. https://www.mt.co.kr/politics/2026/03/03/2026030319073899508[5] Kim Ji-hyun, "'A Surprising Hit Rate': Cheongung-II Draws Growing Interest After $9.5 Billion in Exports," Money Today, June 27, 2026 (updated August 11, 2026). https://www.mt.co.kr/industry/2026/06/27/2026062613402352093[6] Kang Eun-ho (Professor, Jeonbuk National University; former Commissioner, Defense Acquisition Program Administration), "Poland Surprised by Rapid K9 Deliveries: 'A True Defense Partner'," Hankook Ilbo, August 11, 2026. https://www.hankookilbo.com/news/article/A2026081014290002438[7] Yoon Tae-hee, "'364 Korean K9s': Poland's Emergency Purchase Becomes Its Main Artillery," Now News (Seoul Sinmun), July 6, 2026. https://nownews.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20260706601006[8] Petro Ivaniuk, "Massive Missile Attacks on Ukraine" (Kaggle dataset, compiled from daily reports of the Air Force Command and General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine), version accessed August 15, 2026. https://www.kaggle.com/datasets/piterfm/massive-missile-attacks-on-ukraine 

North Korea’s Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Peace on the Korean Peninsula: AI, Asymmetric Strategy, and Deterrence Stability                    Hee-soo YoonSenior ResearcherInstitute for Unification and PeaceSeoul National UniversityFrom Declaration to Plan: The Legacy of the 9th Party CongressAt the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in February 2026, North Korea identified intelligent weapons systems—including “various AI-enabled unmanned attack complexes”—as key priorities under its five-year national defense development plan. The regime also claimed that artificial intelligence had been incorporated into the 600-millimeter multiple rocket launcher unveiled shortly before the Party Congress. These developments are difficult to dismiss as a one-time demonstration of technological capability. In 2024, Kim Jong-un ordered the integration of artificial intelligence into unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). During his inspection of the Unmanned Aerial Technology Complex in March 2025, he designated unmanned systems and artificial intelligence as “sectors that must be given top priority and developed” as part of the modernization of the armed forces. Since 2024, Rodong Sinmun has repeatedly cited foreign assessments characterizing artificial intelligence as the “third revolution” in military affairs, following gunpowder and nuclear weapons.The key issue is the degree of institutional and strategic consolidation that has already taken place. As political discourse, institutional arrangements, and defense planning have advanced at different rates, the 9th Party Congress effectively formalized these developments within the framework of national planning. The fact that these ambitions have been incorporated into a formal plan suggests that they will be accompanied by resource allocation and organizational restructuring. It also means that progress over the coming years is likely to become increasingly observable.How this development is interpreted will shape the parameters of the policy response. If North Korea’s efforts are viewed primarily as an attempt to close a technological gap, the response may focus largely on managing that gap. But North Korea’s militarization of artificial intelligence is better understood as the latest technological manifestation of a strategic logic that has evolved over decades to compensate for its structural inferiority in conventional military power. If that assessment is correct, the appropriate response must be strategic rather than merely technological.Why AI? The Technological Extension of Asymmetric StrategyA central principle of asymmetric warfare is that material superiority does not, by itself, determine the outcome of a conflict. A weaker state can offset an adversary’s superior capabilities by targeting its vulnerabilities, increasing the costs of military action, and employing strategies that exploit asymmetries in the way each side conducts warfare. North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, missiles, and cyber capabilities as the Korean People’s Army’s three principal asymmetric capabilities is broadly consistent with this logic.It is important, therefore, not to misunderstand the role of artificial intelligence in this context. For a relatively weaker state, AI does not necessarily represent an entirely new category of military capability. Rather, it functions as a “force multiplier” that can improve the effectiveness of existing asymmetric capabilities while increasing operational ambiguity. This amplification operates through at least three mechanisms.The first is cost-effectiveness. Low-cost unmanned systems can generate favorable exchange ratios when employed against much more expensive conventional platforms. The second is greater accessibility. The proliferation of commercial drones, sensors, and open-source AI models enables states to develop capabilities in selected areas without possessing a sophisticated indigenous defense-industrial base. The third is a potential shift in the escalation threshold. AI-enabled cyber operations and unmanned aerial systems can complicate attribution and make it more difficult to determine an adversary’s intent, thereby creating greater opportunities for low-intensity activity in the gray zone.Debates over autonomous weapons systems have traditionally focused on the capabilities and risks associated with technologically advanced states. Yet similar concerns arise when actors seek to maximize asymmetric effects by combining relatively inexpensive commercial technologies. Recent scholarship has increasingly shifted its focus from the question of “who possesses the most advanced models” to the question of “who can select and combine the most effective capabilities under resource constraints.” This dynamic is particularly relevant to North Korea, where severe resource limitations may actually encourage the selective adoption of low-cost, high-efficiency technologies.Cyber, Unmanned Systems, and Nuclear Command and Control: Three Dimensions of IntegrationIn the cyber domain, North Korea maintains a substantial operational force distributed across organizations such as Unit 121 of the Reconnaissance General Bureau and the Command Automation Bureau of the General Staff Department. Its strategic objectives can broadly be understood as compensating for conventional military weaknesses, generating coercive leverage at relatively low cost, and earning foreign currency in an environment of international sanctions.The qualitative dimension of these capabilities is changing as they become increasingly integrated with artificial intelligence. Numerous reports have documented the use of generative AI to automate phishing content, create deepfakes for identity spoofing, facilitate fraudulent remote IT employment schemes, and provide real-time AI assistance during infiltration attempts. The $1.5 billion in cryptocurrency reportedly stolen in the February 2025 Bybit hack, together with estimates that North Korean cyber operations generate approximately $2 billion annually in cryptocurrency-related theft, suggests that these activities should not be viewed simply as isolated criminal enterprises. Rather, they appear increasingly integrated into a broader system for generating revenue outside the formal international financial system—a kind of “shadow state treasury” designed in part to circumvent sanctions.AI can further enhance the efficiency of what lies at the core of asymmetric cyber strategy: exploiting vulnerabilities. It can expand the scale of attacks, make it easier to evade detection, and increase the credibility and sophistication of social-engineering operations.In the domain of unmanned systems, progress has continued since the 8th Party Congress in 2021, when the intelligent transformation and unmanned modernization of military equipment were identified as priorities under the Five-Year Plan for the Development of Defense Science and Technology. In March 2025, North Korean state media reported that Kim Jong-un had observed performance tests involving “AI-enabled” suicide and reconnaissance drones. Publicly released footage showed suicide drones striking simulated targets resembling South Korean L-SAM launchers, K1 tanks, and U.S. Stryker armored vehicles. This raises the possibility that some of these systems incorporate rudimentary target-recognition capabilities based on visual or shape recognition.The asymmetric value of AI-enabled drones lies partly in the unfavorable cost-exchange ratio they can impose on the defender. Large-scale deployment of relatively inexpensive drones can force the defending side to expend substantially more expensive interceptor systems. If autonomous navigation and target recognition become feasible even in environments where satellite navigation is degraded or jammed, some of the U.S.-Korea alliance’s advantages in electronic warfare could be partially offset. North Korea’s reported acquisition of counter-drone and electronic-warfare tactics through its involvement on the Ukrainian battlefield adds another variable to this assessment.The area with potentially the most serious strategic implications is nuclear command and control (NC2). According to an internal North Korean military directive reportedly obtained in August 2025, the General Staff instructed the Strategic Forces to develop a phased plan for an AI-based integrated management system covering the storage, deployment, and command of nuclear weapons, as well as nuclear counterstrikes.Such a concept is rational within the logic of asymmetric deterrence. One of the principal vulnerabilities of North Korea’s nuclear posture is its potential exposure to decapitation strikes. If a retaliatory capability could be exercised without direct intervention from the leadership, the regime could strengthen its confidence in the credibility of assured retaliation. At the same time, however, such automation introduces a classic “out-of-the-loop” risk: a communications failure, sensor malfunction, or erroneous warning could be misinterpreted as evidence of a decapitation strike and potentially trigger premature nuclear use.These three areas are closely connected to a fourth dimension: internal political control. The collection of behavioral data through the Kwangmyong Network, the deployment of facial-recognition systems at airports and railway stations, and the accumulation of biometric information across the population as North Korea moves toward electronic identification systems rely on technological foundations similar to those supporting the regime’s external intelligence and military operations.This convergence suggests that North Korea’s AI strategy may serve a dual purpose: strengthening the regime’s internal resilience and expanding its asymmetric military capabilities externally. The same data, algorithms, and technological infrastructure can potentially support both functions.Between Intent and Capability: Neither Overestimating nor Underestimating the ThreatOverestimating North Korea’s capabilities can itself generate policy errors. Of the three basic components of AI development—algorithms, data, and computing resources—North Korea faces particularly significant constraints in computing capacity and electricity supply. Export controls on advanced semiconductors restrict its access to high-performance computing resources, while its limited domestic ICT manufacturing capacity means that it remains dependent on external sources for servers, networking equipment, and other critical infrastructure.As of 2020, North Korea’s total electricity generation was less than 5 percent of South Korea’s, making it difficult for the country to maintain the reliable power infrastructure required for sustained large-scale AI training. Accordingly, publicly reported North Korean AI research appears to place considerable emphasis on algorithmic optimization as a means of reducing the impact of infrastructure constraints. Examples include multi-object tracking, lightweight speech synthesis, and intonation recognition.This approach reflects an effort to convert structural constraints into asymmetric technological adaptation. At the same time, it makes external assessment more difficult because the actual performance and operational maturity of these systems are often difficult to independently verify.At this stage, it is therefore reasonable to characterize North Korea’s military AI capabilities as entering a phase in which strategic intent is being formalized while partial capabilities are being accumulated. Yet the incompleteness of those capabilities should not be mistaken for an absence of risk.The very articulation of an intention to integrate AI into nuclear command and control can function as a strategic signal. It has implications for how North Korea perceives the ROK-U.S. alliance’s Kill Chain concept and can complicate allied deterrence calculations even before such systems achieve full operational deployment.Moreover, the potential transfer of automation, deception, and unmanned-systems technologies from Russia, combined with North Korea’s ability to exploit logistics, financial, and technology channels through China and other intermediaries, could accelerate the transition from experimentation to operational capability.The central policy challenge, therefore, is to avoid two opposing errors: underestimating North Korea’s ability to adapt emerging technologies for asymmetric purposes and overestimating the maturity of its underlying AI capabilities. The more consequential question is not whether North Korea can immediately match the most advanced AI powers. It is whether Pyongyang can selectively integrate relatively inexpensive AI-enabled technologies into its existing nuclear, cyber, and unmanned-warfare capabilities in ways that alter the strategic balance.If the answer is yes, the implications for deterrence stability on the Korean Peninsula are substantial. The policy response should consequently focus not only on maintaining technological superiority but also on preserving crisis stability, strengthening resilience against AI-enabled attacks, establishing clear communication mechanisms, and ensuring that greater automation does not inadvertently lower the threshold for military escalation.In this sense, North Korea’s military adoption of artificial intelligence should be understood less as an isolated technological development than as an extension of its longstanding asymmetric strategy. The central challenge for South Korea and the United States is to ensure that technological innovation does not undermine the fundamental objective of deterrence: preventing conflict while preserving the ability to manage crises before they escalate beyond control.How Is Deterrence Being Undermined?The challenges posed by North Korea’s integration of artificial intelligence into its military capabilities can be summarized in three distinct but mutually reinforcing ways. The most immediate challenge is the growing uncertainty surrounding attribution. If AI enables the automation of critical stages of an attack while minimizing identifiable human involvement, the “cost-benefit calculation of a rational actor”—a fundamental premise of retaliatory deterrence—can break down when attribution becomes uncertain or impossible.The second challenge is the destabilization of the escalation ladder. When the pace of military decision-making accelerates beyond the capacity of human decision-makers to fully assess available information, the risk that an accidental or unintended incident will rapidly escalate to higher levels increases. This risk is particularly acute on the Korean Peninsula, where limited strategic depth leaves decision-makers little time to distinguish between deliberate attacks, accidents, and false alarms. Moreover, excessive reliance on advanced technologies could gradually alter perceptions of nuclear weapons, which have traditionally served primarily political and psychological deterrent functions, by making them appear more usable as military instruments. Such a development could progressively weaken the normative barriers against nuclear use.The third challenge is a deepening asymmetry in deterrence. South Korea and the United States may be required to develop increasingly sophisticated and costly defensive capabilities, while North Korea could impose significant pressure on those capabilities through relatively inexpensive technologies. Under such conditions, the possibility of an “attacker’s advantage” cannot be dismissed. It is important to recognize, however, that these three challenges do not operate independently. Uncertainty over attribution can undermine the ability to manage escalation, while escalation risks can increase the costs of defense and thereby further deepen the asymmetry in deterrence. This structural interdependence lies at the core of the challenge posed by North Korea’s military adoption of AI.A Timeline for Response: Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term PrioritiesIn the short term, the most urgent priorities are to rebalance the cost-exchange ratio and expand the range of early-warning indicators. The current model of relying on high-cost interceptor systems to counter relatively inexpensive drones is unlikely to be sustainable over the long term. South Korea and the United States should seek to lower the cost of defense through a layered combination of lower-cost interception capabilities, AI-enabled detection and identification, electronic warfare, and directed-energy systems.At the same time, the allies should establish mechanisms for identifying emerging capabilities before they reach operational maturity. North Korea’s research and development trends in video and audio AI, advances in lightweight algorithms, and efforts to secure computing resources and critical components through alternative procurement channels could serve as early-warning indicators for adjusting sanctions enforcement, export controls, and supply-chain monitoring.In the medium term, the analytical and policy focus should shift from individual weapons systems to the underlying functions they perform, while attribution capabilities appropriate to the AI era should be institutionalized. As long as North Korea’s AI-enabled capabilities rely on common functions across cyber operations, unmanned systems, and command and control—including target identification, automated intrusion, and decision-support functions—a response architecture divided strictly by operational domain will leave significant structural vulnerabilities.What is required is an integrated assessment framework capable of treating these capabilities as interconnected components of a broader threat ecosystem. Moreover, effective retaliatory deterrence depends on rapid, credible, and reliable attribution. Expanding ROK-U.S. joint cyber exercises, strengthening real-time intelligence- and information-sharing mechanisms, and deepening cooperation with the private cybersecurity sector would help strengthen the technical foundations of credible deterrence.In the long term, two broader questions will become increasingly important: South Korea’s role in shaping international norms and the degree of strategic autonomy it can realistically maintain. Although an international consensus is emerging that human judgment should not be displaced in decisions concerning the use of nuclear weapons, the more subtle and systemic risks created by integrating AI throughout command-and-control architectures have received comparatively less attention. These risks include the possibility that AI-mediated information flows could distort a national leader’s situational awareness or compress the time available for deliberation during a crisis.South Korea therefore has an opportunity to participate in these debates not merely as a rule-taker or beneficiary of emerging norms, but as an agenda-setter. At the same time, strategic autonomy in AI should be understood realistically. For middle powers that cannot fully secure independent access to data, computing capacity, advanced semiconductors, and critical digital infrastructure, pursuing technological self-reliance can easily become another form of external dependence.Just as North Korea is developing asymmetric capabilities while relying to varying degrees on Chinese and Russian technology, infrastructure, and procurement networks, South Korea is also embedded in—and therefore exposed to—the technological ecosystems of major powers. Strategic resilience will consequently require not isolation from those ecosystems, but greater diversification, redundancy, and the capacity to make independent decisions within them.From Managing the Environment to Shaping ItNorth Korea’s militarization of AI is not simply a question of the performance of individual weapons systems. It represents a potential challenge to the underlying structure of deterrence itself. Because AI-enabled capabilities may begin to alter an adversary’s strategic calculations before they achieve full operational maturity, there is little justification for waiting until these technologies are fully deployed before developing an appropriate response.At the same time, an excessive response based on an inflated assessment of North Korea’s capabilities could lead to inefficient resource allocation, unnecessary escalation, and an avoidable arms competition. What is required instead is a calibrated approach that continuously assesses the gap between North Korea’s strategic intentions and its actual capabilities and adjusts the intensity of the response accordingly.More fundamentally, however, the nature of the response must evolve. A reactive, management-oriented strategy that responds to technological developments only after they emerge will struggle to address the next generation of capabilities developing in the gray zone between conventional conflict and peacetime competition.South Korea should therefore move beyond simply managing the technological environment created by others. It should acknowledge the realities of external technological dependence while developing its own clearly defined response frameworks, operational guidelines, and long-term roadmaps. At the same time, Seoul should seek to contribute actively to the development of international norms governing deterrence, crisis management, human control, and the responsible use of AI in military affairs.Only by combining technological resilience with strategic initiative can South Korea move from managing the emerging security environment to helping shape it.

The San Francisco AI Declaration: New Horizons for the U.S.-Korea Alliance in an Era of Technological Competition                    Eui-haeng ChoSeoul Theological UniversityThe global economy is undergoing a profound structural transformation. Free trade and market-driven efficiency—once the defining principles of globalization—are being reshaped by fragmented value chains, geopolitical tensions, and intensifying competition among nations for leadership in critical and emerging technologies. Today, economic security is inseparable from national security, while securing strategic technology supply chains and shaping global technology standards have emerged as critical challenges with direct implications for national resilience and competitiveness.Amid intensifying U.S.-China competition over leadership in the global artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced technology ecosystem, the recently announced “San Francisco AI Declaration” carries significant strategic, economic, and geopolitical implications. The declaration goes beyond articulating a vision for future technologies. It points toward a new economic paradigm for the AI era in which technology, industry, data, energy, and international cooperation are increasingly interconnected within a single, complex global supply-chain ecosystem.The relationship between the United States—which remains at the forefront of global technological innovation—and South Korea—which possesses formidable manufacturing and production capabilities—must now move beyond its traditional focus on defense and security, as well as conventional trade and investment. The U.S.-Korea alliance should evolve into a comprehensive economic security and digital-industrial partnership that jointly strengthens supply chains for strategic industries—including semiconductors, shipbuilding, and AI—while promoting greater interoperability among digital regulations, infrastructure, and industrial ecosystems.1. The Limits of Catch-Up Strategies in Frontier Technologies: The Case for a Real-World AI HubIn the global AI ecosystem, the United States and China enjoy substantial advantages based on their access to massive pools of capital, proprietary frontier AI models, vast amounts of data, and highly skilled technical talent. Against this backdrop, if middle powers focus primarily on quantitative catch-up strategies—such as attempting to replicate large language models (LLMs) or competing solely on algorithmic development—they risk incurring enormous costs while potentially undermining the areas in which they possess genuine comparative advantages.The distinctive value of the San Francisco AI Declaration lies in its effort to connect South Korea’s world-class manufacturing capabilities and advanced semiconductor production base with its broader AI strategy. The AI revolution extends well beyond software development. Its success will increasingly depend on access to large-scale computing capacity, the integration of data centers and energy infrastructure, and the ability to deploy AI rapidly across the physical economy.The most pragmatic and effective economic strategy is therefore to position South Korea as a global AI collaboration platform and hub capable of developing and supplying “Physical AI” technologies and the hardware infrastructure required to support next-generation AI. This can be achieved by leveraging Korea’s world-class memory semiconductor capabilities, high-speed digital infrastructure, and extensive advanced manufacturing base.South Korea’s institutional agility and highly developed digital environment also provide an attractive testbed for global companies seeking to validate AI technologies in real-world commercial and public-sector settings. A demand-driven strategy that accelerates AI adoption across society—including manufacturing, logistics, public administration, education, healthcare, and social services—could substantially increase the dynamism and scale of Korea’s AI ecosystem.2. Preventing the Concentration of AI-Driven Growth and Building a Sustainable AI-Based SocietyThe productivity gains and economic benefits generated by AI also carry the risk of creating new forms of economic concentration, particularly if the gains from technological development accrue disproportionately to a small number of dominant platform companies or other market incumbents. Excessive economic concentration can weaken institutional checks and balances, exacerbate social inequality, and create conditions that undermine political pluralism and democratic resilience. If the benefits of AI are not broadly distributed across society, the long-term social and economic value generated by technological progress will inevitably be diminished.Accordingly, the concept of an “AI-Based Society” emphasized in the declaration can serve as an important institutional framework for mitigating the adverse effects of economic concentration and ensuring that the benefits of AI-driven growth are broadly shared. An “AI-Based Society” should function as a universal framework that ensures that differences in access to AI technologies—and in the ability to use and benefit from them—do not become new sources of discrimination or inequality.This requires robust guarantees of basic rights and opportunities, including access to education and healthcare, while ensuring that no segment of society—including small and medium-sized enterprises, small business owners, and vulnerable populations—is left behind. Such an approach is essential not only for preventing excessive economic concentration but also for preserving political pluralism, social cohesion, and democratic resilience.This framework is also consistent with the broader goal of international cooperation to develop responsible, trustworthy, and human-centered AI. The international community must guard against the excessive concentration of AI capabilities in the hands of a small number of countries or large corporations, which could create significant asymmetries of power. It must also address the risks associated with the use of automated systems in high-stakes decision-making, including military operations. Establishing international norms grounded in the principle of the common good will therefore be essential to ensuring that AI remains subject to appropriate human oversight and accountability.3. U.S.-Korea Strategic Partnership for Revitalizing Manufacturing and Integrating Technology EcosystemsThe United States needs reliable technology and manufacturing partners as it seeks to revitalize its advanced manufacturing base and realign global supply chains to enhance resilience and strategic security. By combining U.S. strengths in basic science, research and development (R&D), and software with South Korea’s manufacturing and production capabilities, the two countries can build more resilient supply chains capable of withstanding geopolitical and economic shocks.In the semiconductor sector, technological security should be strengthened by establishing mutually reinforcing production and supply chains for high-performance memory and AI semiconductors, both of which are essential to AI data centers and advanced computing infrastructure. In advanced manufacturing sectors such as shipbuilding and steel, cooperation with South Korea—given its highly developed industrial infrastructure, engineering expertise, and advanced manufacturing capabilities—can contribute to the revitalization of U.S. manufacturing capacity while strengthening broader economic and national security.At the same time, meeting the enormous energy requirements of AI will require parallel cooperation in next-generation nuclear power, clean energy, and critical-mineral supply chains, with a particular emphasis on diversification and resilience.However, there are clear limitations to an approach that measures U.S.-Korea industrial cooperation primarily in terms of headline investment figures or the number of production facilities established in the United States. Genuine supply-chain resilience and industrial competitiveness require a comprehensive operational framework that extends beyond investment to include the exchange of specialized personnel, technological interoperability, data and certification systems, and stronger linkages between the defense and commercial industrial bases.At the same time, both governments should work to minimize the policy uncertainty and compliance costs that companies face during the restructuring of global supply chains. As trade and investment rules become increasingly complex—including local-content requirements, rules of origin, subsidy eligibility criteria, and restrictions on foreign investment—close U.S.-Korea policy coordination will be essential to reducing business risks. The two governments should also promote greater transparency and nondiscriminatory treatment of cross-border data flows.4. Expanding the U.S.-Korea Alliance into a Comprehensive Industrial and Digital PartnershipThe ROK-U.S. alliance has historically functioned primarily as a military and defense partnership designed to preserve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. In an era defined increasingly by technological competition, however, the alliance must expand beyond its traditional role and evolve into a broader framework for cooperation in AI, digital infrastructure, and strategic industrial technologies.Consistent with the vision outlined in the San Francisco AI Declaration, South Korea should not remain merely a consumer of advanced technologies or a contract manufacturing base. Rather, it should position itself as an indispensable provider of critical infrastructure for the global AI ecosystem and as a global testbed for demonstrating and validating the real-world value of emerging technologies.The United States, for its part, should recognize South Korea’s manufacturing capabilities and broader technology ecosystem as those of a trusted, strategic, and increasingly indispensable partner. This will require reducing unnecessary regulatory barriers and developing a digital cooperation framework that facilitates the movement of talent, data, technology, and investment between the two countries.If South Korea and the United States establish close strategic cooperation across the full spectrum of digital and strategic industries—including AI, semiconductors, shipbuilding, and energy—while maintaining the alliance’s traditional security foundation, the two countries can better withstand global supply-chain disruptions while advancing the shared objectives of economic prosperity and technological security.Strengthening a U.S.-Korea digital and industrial alliance by combining the complementary capabilities of both countries is not simply an economic opportunity. It is a strategic imperative in an era of global value-chain restructuring and intensifying technological competition.

In an Era of Two Koreas, Coexistence Must Precede UnificationJin-Tae HwangProfessor of North Korean StudiesDongguk UniversityNorth Korea’s “hostile two-state theory” has fundamentally challenged a long-standing premise of inter-Korean relations. In late 2023, Kim Jong Un defined inter-Korean relations not as a special relationship between compatriots pursuing unification, but as a relationship between “two hostile states, two states at war.” Since then, North Korea has reorganized institutions and policies related to unification and has increasingly defined South Korea as a hostile state, reshaping its national identity and inter-Korean policy accordingly. This should be understood not simply as a tougher policy toward South Korea, but as a broader effort to institutionalize relations with South Korea as those between two separate states.How, then, should South Korea respond? This does not mean that Seoul should simply accept North Korea’s hostile two-state doctrine. Nor is it sufficient to continue repeating the unification paradigm of the past. What is needed instead is to prepare for coexistence between the two Koreas, taking seriously the possibility that their separation into two states may persist for the foreseeable future. In this regard, the experience of Romania and Moldova offers a useful point of reference.Cooperation Without UnificationRomania and Moldova share a history, language, and cultural traditions. Yet following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moldova became an independent state, and the two countries developed as separate sovereign states. Political separation, however, did not mean a complete rupture of their historical and cultural ties.Romania quickly recognized Moldova’s independence and established diplomatic relations. Since then, the two countries have built institutional foundations for cooperation in areas including investment, transportation, aviation, and railways. At the same time, they have maintained their historical and cultural connections through Romanian-language education, scholarships, and cultural programs.What is particularly noteworthy is that the two countries did not have to resolve the question of unification before developing cooperation. Political debate over unification with Romania continues in Moldova. Yet regardless of whether unification occurs, the two countries have expanded cooperation in areas such as the economy, infrastructure, energy, and education. Following Romania’s accession to the European Union, their relationship further evolved, with Romania supporting Moldova’s European integration. In the energy sector, the two countries have also worked to connect their gas infrastructure, helping Moldova reduce its dependence on Russian energy.The important lesson is that sharing a common history and identity does not necessarily require two countries to become one. Conversely, being separate sovereign states does not make cooperation impossible. A shared identity and separate statehood can coexist. This is an important point for rethinking inter-Korean relations.Until now, inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation have largely been understood as steps toward unification. Inter-Korean dialogue, economic cooperation, and humanitarian exchanges have often been justified as stages in the broader process of national reunification. But as North Korea rejects this very paradigm of unification and emphasizes its separate statehood, it is becoming increasingly difficult to envision the future of inter-Korean relations through the existing framework alone.Does cooperation become impossible if unification is no longer the ultimate goal? The experience of Romania and Moldova suggests otherwise. If political and constitutional questions are separated from functional cooperation, it is possible to build a dense network of cooperation between two states even without agreement on unification.South Korea’s North Korea Policy Should Treat Coexistence as a Goal in Its Own RightThis offers a first lesson for South Korea: unification and coexistence do not necessarily have to be placed on the same timeline. Unification can remain one possible long-term future for Korean society. But when and how it might occur is difficult to predict. By contrast, the possibility that the two Koreas will continue to exist as separate political communities for a considerable period is one that policymakers must realistically take into account. The task, therefore, is not to do nothing until unification becomes possible, but to manage relations between the two Koreas and reduce the risks of war and conflict in the meantime.Peaceful coexistence should therefore be established as a distinct policy goal, rather than treated merely as a subordinate objective of unification.Coexistence does not mean recognizing or endorsing North Korea’s political system, nor does it mean accepting its hostile two-state doctrine. Rather, it is a pragmatic strategy for managing conflict and preventing confrontation so that two political communities with different political systems and state identities can coexist over an extended period.From this perspective, the success of inter-Korean relations need not be measured solely by how much closer the two Koreas have moved toward unification. It should also be measured by how effectively they have reduced the risk of military conflict, addressed humanitarian issues, cooperated on environmental and disaster-related challenges, and established institutions capable of maintaining communication during times of crisis.Institutionalizing Practical Areas of CooperationA second priority is to institutionalize practical forms of cooperation that can continue to function regardless of changes in political relations. One reason inter-Korean relations have repeatedly swung between engagement and rupture is that cooperation itself has been overly dependent on the broader political relationship. When summits and political agreements have led to improvements in relations, cooperation has expanded; when relations have deteriorated, most exchanges have been suspended.The experience of Romania and Moldova points to a different possibility. Even while political disagreements and differences over history and identity have remained unresolved, the two countries have steadily developed practical institutions for cooperation in education, infrastructure, energy, the economy, and culture. The key is not that their disagreements have disappeared, but that they have managed, to some extent, to separate areas of conflict from areas of cooperation.A similar approach is needed between the two Koreas. Climate change and natural-disaster response, forests and the environment, infectious diseases and public health, food security, and humanitarian assistance are areas in which both sides have tangible interests while remaining relatively removed from ideological and systemic competition. Floods and droughts in North Korea and the degradation of its forests, for example, are not problems that can be regarded as entirely unrelated to South Korea. Cooperation in these areas should not be treated as an agenda to be pursued only after inter-Korean relations improve. Instead, the necessary institutional infrastructure should be prepared in advance so that cooperation can function even when political relations are strained.When direct political dialogue between the two Koreas is difficult, international organizations and multilateral frameworks could also provide alternative channels. The suspension of bilateral relations does not necessarily mean that all possibilities for cooperation must disappear.In the Era of the Hostile Two-State Doctrine, South Korea Needs a New Grammar of RelationsOf course, the experience of Romania and Moldova cannot simply be transplanted onto the Korean Peninsula. The historical processes through which the two countries became separate states and the international environments in which they developed are very different from those of the two Koreas. The Korean Peninsula remains divided after more than seven decades of military confrontation, while North Korea’s nuclear weapons program adds another layer of complexity. The strategic interests of major powers, including the United States, China, Russia, and Japan, are also deeply intertwined with inter-Korean relations. For these reasons, the Romanian-Moldovan experience should not be replicated as a policy model for the Korean Peninsula.Its importance lies elsewhere: it expands the range of possibilities through which we can think about the future of inter-Korean relations.Until now, the future of the two Koreas has often been presented as a choice between two alternatives: unification or confrontation. Yet there is a third possibility—two states that remain separate for an extended period while developing practical forms of cooperation. This is institutionalized coexistence.North Korea’s hostile two-state doctrine poses a serious challenge to the traditional unification paradigm. But it need not necessarily be interpreted as a declaration of permanent hostility. North Korea’s current policy does not determine every possibility for the future. Its approach toward South Korea has changed in response to domestic politics and the international environment. There is therefore no reason to assume that the current state of hostility will last forever. The more important question is what we prepare for in the meantime.Preparing for unification and preparing for coexistence are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, building institutions for long-term coexistence may also be essential for preserving the possibility of future unification. If channels of communication remain open, mechanisms for crisis management are in place, and the two sides accumulate experience in addressing shared problems, they will have greater room to respond to future political changes.South Korea’s North Korea policy should therefore move beyond the binary of unification and division in the era of the hostile two-state doctrine. It should acknowledge the reality of two separate states without normalizing hostility; recognize different political systems without closing the door to cooperation; and keep the possibility of unification open without treating coexistence merely as a waiting period on the road to it.The most important lesson that Romania and Moldova offer South Korea is not a model for achieving unification, but a way of managing separation while building institutions for coexistence.In an era of two Koreas, that is what South Korea must prepare for before unification.

An Assessment of the “Prioritize Halting North Korea’s Nuclear Program” Approach                    Seung-hyun LeeDankook UniversityUnification Minister Chung Dong-young recently proposed a “peace-first” approach and a strategy that prioritizes halting the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear program as the guiding direction for the South Korean government’s North Korea policy. At a press conference held shortly before the first anniversary of his appointment, Minister Chung stated, “We have effectively moved away from the previous administration’s ‘denuclearization first’ approach and CVID (Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Denuclearization) and shifted toward a ‘peace-first’ approach,” adding that “we are working to develop a strategy that prioritizes halting North Korea’s nuclear program under a peace-first framework.”Emphasizing the reality that North Korea’s nuclear buildup continues, he asked, “Can we afford to keep postponing action and losing valuable time?” Minister Chung’s central concern is that, with dialogue with North Korea currently suspended, making denuclearization a precondition for dialogue could make it difficult for negotiations to begin in the first place. He has argued that both the United States and China have, in practice, moved away from a strictly “denuclearization first” approach and that restoring dialogue with North Korea should be the immediate priority.President Lee Jae-myung’s proposed phased approach of “suspension–reduction–elimination” is consistent with this framework. President Lee has advocated a pragmatic approach that would first halt further advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, followed by a process of reduction and, ultimately, elimination. He has noted that simply preventing the further production of nuclear materials and the continued development of ICBM technology would itself represent a meaningful contribution to international security.This proposal raises an important question: If complete denuclearization of North Korea is not realistically achievable in the near term, can halting the further expansion of its nuclear capabilities serve as a practical starting point on the path toward denuclearization? This question lies at the heart of the debate over an approach that prioritizes halting North Korea’s nuclear program.Between the Goal of Denuclearization and RealityThe international community’s stated long-term objective regarding the North Korean nuclear issue remains complete denuclearization. There is, however, a significant gap between this objective and the current reality. North Korea views its nuclear weapons not as temporary bargaining instruments but as a core component of its national security and regime-survival strategy. It is also intensifying efforts to institutionalize its status as a nuclear-armed state. At the same time, the international community, including the United States and South Korea, continues to uphold the principle that North Korea cannot be formally recognized as a nuclear-weapon state.The fundamental problem is that, while these positions remain deeply at odds, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continue to expand. In the past, the international community largely pursued a framework of “rewards in exchange for denuclearization.” Under this approach, economic and diplomatic benefits would be provided in return for the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program. Yet North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continued to advance even during periods when negotiations were suspended or had stalled.What may therefore be required is not a change in the ultimate objective of denuclearization, but a reconsideration of the sequencing and strategy for achieving that objective. The central question is which approach is more realistic: continuing to demand complete dismantlement while North Korea’s nuclear weapons and fissile-material stockpiles grow in the absence of negotiations, or first halting the further expansion of its nuclear capabilities and then proceeding incrementally toward reduction and dismantlement. The argument for prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program begins from this premise.To properly assess this approach, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by “halting” North Korea’s nuclear program. It cannot simply mean refraining from conducting additional nuclear tests. The central objective would be to constrain the further production of nuclear weapons and fissile material and prevent both the quantitative and qualitative expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.In practical terms, the proposal would involve resuming negotiations with immediate objectives such as suspending further nuclear tests, halting additional production of fissile material, preventing the transfer or export of such materials, and constraining further development of ICBM capabilities. In other words, “suspension” should not be understood as a single measure, but rather as a set of measures designed to halt the ongoing expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and thereby contain the growth of the nuclear threat.The principal practical advantage of this approach is that it could prevent the problem from becoming more severe. Even if the complete elimination of North Korea’s existing nuclear arsenal is not immediately feasible, it may still be possible to limit the amount of fissile material and the number of nuclear warheads that North Korea can produce in the future.If the production of fissile material continues unchecked, the number of North Korean nuclear warheads is likely to increase. If the development of delivery systems proceeds unchecked, North Korea’s nuclear strike capabilities will likewise become more sophisticated. Conversely, if further production of fissile material and the continued development of nuclear weapons systems can be constrained, the pace at which the threat expands can at least be slowed.This is also significant from a military perspective. If the growth of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities can be halted, South Korea and the United States would gain greater visibility into the scale of the future threat they face. Greater predictability could reduce the risk of miscalculation, inadvertent escalation, and disproportionate responses. From this perspective, prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program should be viewed not simply as a diplomatic compromise, but as a strategic risk-reduction and stabilization measure.At the same time, this approach raises a critical question: What should be done with the nuclear weapons and fissile materials North Korea already possesses? Critics argue that simply halting further production while allowing North Korea to retain its existing arsenal could amount to tacitly accepting its status as a nuclear-armed state.This concern cannot be dismissed. If North Korea were to treat “suspension” as an end in itself rather than as a temporary measure leading toward denuclearization, the outcome could actually be counterproductive. The suspension of North Korea’s nuclear program therefore cannot be regarded as the ultimate objective.Instead, suspension must be explicitly linked to subsequent steps. Once the production of fissile material is halted, declaration and verification should follow. Thereafter, the reduction of fissile-material stocks and nuclear warheads should begin. Ultimately, the process should lead to the dismantlement of nuclear facilities and the elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, clear policy objectives and timelines must be established for what constitutes “suspension.” Suspension should be a condition for advancing to the next stage, rather than an endpoint in itself.Another critical question concerns North Korea’s willingness to accept such an approach. North Korea has repeatedly stated that it will not accept denuclearization as a precondition for negotiations. Instead, it has defined its nuclear forces as a core element of national security and has increasingly sought to consolidate its status as a nuclear-weapon state. Against this backdrop, it remains uncertain whether Pyongyang would accept the concept of “suspending its nuclear capabilities as the first step toward denuclearization.” Even if North Korea were to agree to a suspension, it would likely interpret such an arrangement not as the first step toward denuclearization, but as the beginning of an arms-control process based on mutual nuclear constraints.This is precisely where the greatest challenge in negotiations with North Korea lies. If South Korea and the United States envision a sequence of “suspension → reduction → elimination,” while North Korea envisions “recognition of its nuclear status → arms control → improved relations,” the two sides could sit at the same negotiating table while pursuing fundamentally different end states. Accordingly, if the South Korean government intends to pursue a strategy that prioritizes halting North Korea’s nuclear program, it must also carefully consider how Pyongyang is likely to interpret and respond to the proposal.Simply persuading North Korea will not be sufficient. The objective should be to create conditions under which North Korea calculates that halting the expansion of its nuclear capabilities at a defined level and improving relations with the international community would better serve its interests than pursuing an open-ended nuclear buildup.A central concern within the international community is whether “a freeze would effectively amount to recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status.” This question, however, should also be considered from another perspective. The realistic choices facing the international community are not necessarily limited to “immediate and complete denuclearization” on the one hand and “a prior suspension of North Korea’s nuclear program” on the other. If the current negotiating deadlock continues, North Korea may continue expanding its nuclear capabilities without any agreement, verification mechanism, or meaningful constraints. In that circumstance, the practical choice may increasingly be between a verifiable limitation on the growth of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and their continued unchecked expansion. It is difficult to argue that the latter would produce a safer Korean Peninsula or a more stable international security environment.If North Korea’s nuclear arsenal continues to grow, pressure on South Korea and Japan to strengthen their own military capabilities will increase. The United States would face growing demands to reinforce extended deterrence, while China and Russia could also adjust their security postures in response. The result could be an intensifying arms race across Northeast Asia. The strategic significance of prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program lies precisely in its potential to interrupt this cycle of action and reaction.We should also broaden our perspective on the North Korean nuclear issue. It is no longer solely an inter-Korean issue. The expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is closely connected to the ROK-U.S. alliance, the U.S.-Japan alliance, China’s regional security strategy, and Russia’s strategy in the Far East. In particular, as military cooperation between North Korea and Russia deepens, North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities are becoming increasingly relevant to both European and Indo-Pacific security.Accordingly, the argument for prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program should be developed not merely as a proposal for improving security on the Korean Peninsula, but as a broader strategy for reducing international nuclear risks and strengthening strategic stability. Halting the further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities could reduce military risks on the Korean Peninsula, limit incentives for nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia, mitigate potentially destabilizing arms competition among regional powers, and help preserve the credibility of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.From this perspective, prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program becomes a policy approach of broader international significance, rather than simply another North Korea policy. For such an approach to succeed, a strong strategic consensus between South Korea and the United States will be essential. Seoul must maintain the ultimate objective of denuclearization while working with Washington to establish a shared understanding of a phased and realistic pathway toward that objective. This is why recent discussions between South Korean and U.S. leaders on the North Korean nuclear issue are particularly important.The United States, too, cannot ignore the reality that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have already reached a significant level. A new approach is needed to determine how negotiations can be restarted while preserving the principle of complete denuclearization. South Korea’s role should not be to dilute the U.S. commitment to denuclearization, but to propose a negotiating framework within which that principle can be pursued in practice.A strategy that prioritizes halting North Korea’s nuclear program is unlikely to succeed through U.S.-North Korea negotiations alone. China retains considerable influence over North Korea, while Japan possesses important potential economic leverage through the prospect of normalizing relations with Pyongyang and expanding economic engagement. South Korea should therefore leverage a broad range of diplomatic channels, including those with China and Japan, while anchoring these efforts in close coordination with the United States.Seoul should explain to Beijing that an unconstrained North Korean nuclear buildup could accelerate an arms race and increase the risk of nuclear proliferation across Northeast Asia. With respect to Japan, South Korea can emphasize that improved Japan-North Korea relations and expanded economic cooperation could provide additional incentives for Pyongyang to modify its behavior.Viewed from this broader perspective, prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program is not merely a proposal for U.S.-North Korea negotiations. It can serve as a regional risk-reduction strategy designed to improve strategic stability across Northeast Asia.The argument for prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program is not an argument for abandoning denuclearization. Rather, it reflects a practical consideration of how to make the goal of denuclearization viable once again under current conditions. For the sake of peace on the Korean Peninsula, strategic stability in Northeast Asia, and the integrity of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, what is needed now is not to wait for a perfect solution, but to prevent risks from escalating further. First, halt; then verify; then reduce; and ultimately, dismantle. A serious consideration of the “priority halt” approach to North Korea’s nuclear program should begin with this premise.

The $950 Billion Digital Agreement and the U.S.-ROK Digital Alliance               Ki-ho HanResearch professorAjou Institute of Unification StudiesThe New Geopolitical Landscape of Big Tech: The G2 BifurcationThe global technology ecosystem is no longer governed primarily by market mechanisms; instead, it has become a central arena for geopolitical and macroeconomic competition. At the heart of this systemic shift lies the multidimensional rivalry between the United States and China. Driven by the imperative to secure its industrial and defense supply chains and preserve technological primacy, Washington has deployed a formidable array of stringent export controls, domestic manufacturing incentives and requirements, and exclusive minilateral frameworks. Concurrently, Beijing is pursuing a strategy of extensive vertical integration through state-backed initiatives, directing substantial public capital toward the development of indigenous large language models, quantum computing, and mature-node semiconductor technologies.This G2 technological bifurcation has fundamentally altered the strategic calculations of middle-power technology economies. Artificial intelligence and advanced semiconductor technologies are no longer merely commercial commodities; they have become dual-use technologies and foundational pillars of contemporary national power. In this increasingly fragmented and nationalistic digital landscape, isolation has become increasingly synonymous with strategic obsolescence. For an advanced technology hub like South Korea, navigating this volatile environment requires an unprecedented degree of diplomatic agility—specifically, the capacity to leverage existing transpacific frameworks while avoiding becoming caught in the geopolitical crossfire. It is within this precarious context that the bilateral relationship must be fundamentally redefined, moving beyond a traditional military deterrence framework toward a comprehensive, legally grounded economic-security partnership.The San Francisco AI Declaration: A $950 Billion MilestoneThe recent state visit to the United States by South Korean President Lee Jae-myung culminated in a significant development that could reshape the global digital landscape for years to come. Anchored by the “San Francisco AI Declaration,” Seoul and Washington unveiled an unprecedented $950 billion framework for cooperation in AI and semiconductors. This strategic initiative would deepen the two countries’ longstanding military partnership by expanding cooperation into a more integrated and forward-looking technological relationship. Far from being a symbolic memorandum of understanding, the accord brings together substantial private-sector commitments and government-supported initiatives designed to strengthen both countries’ positions across the global AI supply chain.The scale of this industrial mobilization encompasses multiple layers of the digital economy. In the semiconductor and foundry sectors, Samsung Electronics and Broadcom formalized a strategic $200 billion framework focused on next-generation memory integration and advanced foundry development. At the same time, SK hynix secured a historic $500 billion long-term agreement with NVIDIA, establishing a substantial pipeline for high-bandwidth memory (HBM) and next-generation AI accelerators.This hardware cooperation is complemented by major investments in infrastructure and applications. Consortia from both countries pledged to develop more than 5 gigawatts of aggregate data-center capacity, deploying approximately 2 million advanced NVIDIA B200 GPUs. Within this framework, SK Telecom is partnering with NVIDIA and Amazon Web Services to accelerate the development of regional gigawatt-scale computing centers, while Naver secured a $10 billion joint initiative, backed by Brookfield Asset Management, to develop global “AI factories” expanding from Asia into Europe. In addition, Hyundai Motor Group and NVIDIA announced the creation of a standardized Robot Reference Platform to support physical-AI innovation, alongside collaborations with Waymo on autonomous-vehicle technologies. To strengthen the talent pipeline, Samsung SDS and Anthropic entered into a strategic partnership to jointly develop thousands of enterprise-grade AI engineers capable of supporting the growth of next-generation enterprise software markets.The Strategic Calculus of InterdependenceFor the United States, this broad partnership could help address a critical, long-standing strategic vulnerability: the separation of software innovation from hardware manufacturing. While Silicon Valley remains a global center of algorithmic innovation, software development, and venture capital, the United States faces constraints in the domestic manufacturing capacity needed to support the hardware-intensive expansion of generative AI. By integrating South Korea’s substantial semiconductor fabrication capabilities and advanced foundry expertise more closely into its technology ecosystem, Washington can strengthen the resilience of its hardware supply base and reduce its exposure to external supply disruptions.Conversely, the agreement could provide South Korea with enhanced access to the world’s largest technology market, expanded sources of capital, and advanced AI software and computing technologies. This deeper integration could help Korean companies secure more reliable access to critical computing resources, including high-performance GPUs, while reducing their exposure to supply-chain bottlenecks. By participating in the development of next-generation chips and shared gigawatt-scale data centers, South Korea could move further up the global value chain—from a major component and manufacturing base toward a more integrated role in the global AI ecosystem. This would create a mutually reinforcing relationship in which American AI software and Korean semiconductor manufacturing capabilities become increasingly interconnected.The Pitfalls of Asymmetry: Avoiding Technological SubjugationHowever, any rigorous analysis of this landmark agreement requires an objective assessment of its inherent systemic risks. While the narrative of a shared digital partnership may be diplomatically appealing, the significant asymmetry in power between a global superpower and a middle-power technology economy cannot be ignored. Historically, when a middle-sized technological power integrates its core industrial capabilities too closely with those of a dominant superpower, it risks becoming vulnerable to the transactional dynamics of great-power competition. For South Korea, the ultimate concern is that the $950 billion agreement could inadvertently evolve into a source of excessive economic dependence, gradually constraining the autonomy of domestic companies and limiting Seoul’s strategic room for maneuver.The primary area of risk lies in the potential erosion of South Korea’s hard-earned “digital sovereignty” and its domestic AI capabilities. South Korea is among the relatively small number of countries that have developed and maintained indigenous search engines, localized large language models, and major digital platforms that operate independently of U.S.-based technology companies. If cooperation with American technology companies is structured without appropriate legal and institutional safeguards, Korean firms could risk becoming increasingly concentrated in lower-margin manufacturing roles—effectively becoming the “foundry workers” of the AI era—while the higher-margin, intellectual-property-intensive algorithmic layer becomes increasingly dominated by U.S. companies.Furthermore, the principles of genuine economic security require that South Korea’s corporate expertise and accumulated industrial capabilities not be systematically transferred under the guise of “joint R&D” or supply-chain transparency requirements. There is a very fine line between reciprocal technology exchange and the gradual erosion of a country’s core industrial competencies. If Seoul accommodates Washington’s expanding regulatory requirements or export-control measures without adequate safeguards, Korean companies could see their strategic autonomy constrained. This could limit their ability to engage freely with alternative global markets and pursue an independent technological trajectory consistent with South Korea’s national interests.Conclusion: Charting a Path Toward True ReciprocityThe U.S.-Korea digital partnership, catalyzed by President Lee Jae-myung’s San Francisco AI Declaration, represents a significant opportunity to deepen bilateral cooperation and reshape the countries’ roles in the global technology ecosystem. It could help both countries strengthen the resilience of their technology supply chains, accelerate innovation in areas such as physical AI, and contribute to the development of shared standards for safe and equitable technological development. Yet the long-term success of this partnership will depend on how it is implemented. It should be governed by clear principles of mutual respect, reciprocal benefit, and appropriate safeguards for each country’s technological capabilities and strategic interests.To prevent this relationship from evolving into a condition of structural technological dependence, South Korean policymakers and corporate leaders should pursue a sophisticated dual-track strategy. They should deepen cooperation with U.S. capital markets and software ecosystems while simultaneously safeguarding the country’s proprietary data, domestic AI capabilities, and supply-chain resilience. Washington, too, should recognize that a strong, independent, and economically vibrant South Korea is a more valuable and sustainable partner than one that becomes excessively dependent on U.S. technology and markets. Only when both countries engage as mutually indispensable partners, with their respective interests and strategic autonomy respected, can this digital partnership fulfill its potential as a foundation for long-term stability and innovation.

The Evolution of Freedom Shield and the Future of the ROK–U.S. Alliance: Lessons from the Past Two Years and Future Challenges               Euilim JinAssociate Research FellowKorea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA)1. IntroductionOn July 1, the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that preparations for the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise, scheduled for August, were proceeding as planned.⑴Although the announcement was brief and issued in response to reports that a high-level meeting between ROK and U.S. military officials had been postponed, its message was clear: preparations for the annual combined exercise remain on schedule, and close coordination between the two allies continues.ROK–U.S. combined military exercises are a cornerstone of the alliance’s deterrence posture, serving both to prevent conflict on the Korean Peninsula and to maintain the readiness required to conduct combined military operations in the event of a contingency.⑵ By integrating computer-simulated Command Post Exercises (CPX) with Field Training Exercises (FTX), these exercises enable the ROK–U.S. Combined Forces to validate their capability to conduct theater-level operations across multiple domains, including land, maritime, air, space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum. Ibid. As recurring alliance activities, they demonstrate the credibility of the combined defense posture while strengthening alliance cohesion and enhancing interoperability.In particular, Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS), conducted during the second half of each year, integrates the ROK government’s national emergency preparedness exercise, Ulchi, with the ROK–U.S. combined military exercise, Freedom Shield (FS). Over time, both the scale and operational complexity of UFS have steadily expanded. This year’s UFS is scheduled to begin with a Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) on August 11, followed by the main exercise phase.⑶ Against this backdrop, this paper examines the evolution of ROK–U.S. combined exercises—including UFS—over the past two years, evaluates their key achievements, and explores the role of UFS in shaping the future development of the ROK–U.S. alliance.2. Assessment and Recent Changes in ROK–U.S. Joint ExercisesA review of ROK–U.S. combined exercises over the past two years indicates that these activities have evolved beyond routine annual training events, adapting systematically to a changing security environment. Rather than relying on fixed exercise structures, the allies have continuously refined exercise objectives, scenarios, and operational priorities to address emerging threats and strengthen combined readiness.The 2024 UFS exercise focused on responding to North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities by incorporating scenarios involving missile attacks, GPS jamming, cyber operations, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Field training exercises were significantly expanded, while the participation of additional United Nations Command (UNC) member states further strengthened the exercise’s multinational dimension. Overall, the 2024 UFS enhanced operational proficiency through expanded field maneuver training and improved the allies’ ability to respond comprehensively to complex, multidomain provocations. In addition, monitoring by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) reaffirmed that the exercise was conducted in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, underscoring its longstanding annual and defensive nature.⑷The 2025 UFS further enhanced operational realism by incorporating lessons from recent conflicts into its exercise scenarios while conducting integrated combined and joint operations across the land, maritime, air, space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum domains. In addition, the United Nations Command facilitated the direct participation of personnel from several member states. The exercise strengthened the alliance’s combined deterrence and defense posture by validating its ability to conduct multidomain operations in response to evolving security challenges. Although the overall scale of the exercise remained comparable to previous years, 20 of the 40 planned field training exercises were postponed and conducted at a later date.⑸Most recently, the 2026 Freedom Shield (FS) exercise emphasized enhancing operational realism by incorporating lessons learned from ongoing conflicts into exercise scenarios while validating combined operational readiness. ROK and U.S. military authorities assessed that the exercise marked an important milestone in advancing preparations for the conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) in accordance with bilateral agreements between the two governments.⑹Taken together, recent combined exercises reveal several notable trends.First, the scope of these exercises has expanded significantly. Emerging operational domains—including space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum—have become integral components of exercise planning, while evolving battlefield challenges, such as unmanned aerial systems, have been incorporated into training scenarios. This reflects a sustained effort to align alliance training with the increasingly multidomain character of modern warfare.Second, the participation of United Nations Command member states, together with oversight by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, demonstrates that UFS has evolved beyond a purely bilateral ROK–U.S. exercise into one with a broader multinational dimension. At the same time, these mechanisms reinforce the exercise’s longstanding annual schedule and its fundamentally defensive character.Third, recent combined exercises have increasingly incorporated procedures to assess and validate progress toward the conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control. This development reflects the evolution of alliance exercises from merely demonstrating combined defensive readiness to serving as a practical mechanism for preparing and validating the future ROK–U.S. combined defense architecture.3. The Evolution of the ROK–U.S. Alliance and UFSROK–U.S. combined exercises constitute one of the alliance’s most enduring institutional mechanisms, supporting a security partnership that has been sustained for more than seven decades. Through decades of recurring combined training, the allies have developed and reinforced critical capabilities, including operational interoperability, institutional trust, and combined readiness. As discussed above, Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) has not remained a static exercise; rather, it has continuously evolved in response to changes in the regional security environment and the growing complexity of North Korea’s military threats, while strengthening deterrence and defense on the Korean Peninsula.The evolution of UFS has been driven primarily by shifts in the strategic environment both on and beyond the Korean Peninsula. Recent changes in U.S. strategic guidance, together with lessons drawn from contemporary conflicts, have further highlighted the importance of ROK–U.S. combined exercises and the need for their continued adaptation. Historically, the primary mission of the ROK–U.S. Combined Forces has been to deter North Korean aggression and defend the Korean Peninsula. However, as recent U.S. strategic guidance places greater emphasis on broader regional missions—including strategic competition with China, potential contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, and the protection of critical maritime lines of communication—policy discussions have increasingly examined whether the operational role of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) could expand accordingly.⑺At the same time, preparations for the conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) have entered a more advanced phase. As this process progresses, the ROK and the United States are entering a new period of alliance adaptation, requiring both governments and their militaries to adjust their combined defense posture in response to an evolving strategic environment while preserving the alliance’s core mission.These developments also present new challenges for UFS. As U.S. defense strategy continues to evolve and the transition toward conditions-based OPCON proceeds, future exercises will need to adapt their operational scenarios, force employment concepts, and training objectives accordingly. At the same time, UFS must remain firmly anchored in its fundamental purpose: maintaining a credible combined deterrence and defense posture on the Korean Peninsula.Looking ahead, it is important to emphasize that the ultimate purpose of UFS is not to prepare for war for its own sake, but to prevent conflict through credible deterrence and sustained military readiness. Strong deterrence and effective tension management on the Korean Peninsula are complementary—not competing—objectives. As the strategic environment continues to evolve, policymakers and military planners must continue to assess how ROK–U.S. combined exercises can best adapt to emerging security challenges while remaining a cornerstone of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and a central pillar of the future ROK–U.S. alliance.⑴ Su-ju Park, “South Korean and U.S. Military Authorities: ‘Preparations for August Joint Exercise UFS Proceeding as Planned,’” Yonhap News TV, July 2, 2026.⑵ Su-on Choi, “The Strategic Value and Policy Considerations of ROK–U.S. Joint Exercises,” Security Strategy FOCUS, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, January 15, 2026.⑶ Gyu-jin Shin, “ROK–U.S. ‘Freedom Shield’ Exercise Set to Proceed with Reduced Field Maneuvers,” Dong-A Ilbo, July 22, 2026.⑷ Jang-wook Lee, “Achievements and Future Tasks of the 2024 ROK–U.S. Joint Exercise ‘Freedom Shield (UFS),’” ROK Angle, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, September 10, 2024.⑸ Hyun-ho Lee, “ROK–U.S. Combined 2025 UFS Exercise Concludes… Some Field Maneuver Training Postponed to Next Month,” Seoul Economic Daily, August 28, 2025.⑹ U.S. Forces Korea and Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint ROK–U.S. Briefing on the 2026 FS Exercise,” February 25, 2026.⑺ Yonhap News, “Trump’s New Indo-Pacific Strategy: Selective and Focused on Taiwan… Will Demands for South Korea’s Role Intensify?” December 6, 2025.

Moving Beyond Disputes toward a Future-Oriented Partnership: Korea–U.S. Digital Trade Issues               Hongyeol KimPh.D. in Information SociologyAdjunct ProfessorDuksung Women's University IntroductionDigital technology is rapidly reshaping the global economic system and transforming the traditional paradigm of international trade, simultaneously creating vast new markets while generating increasingly complex conflicts of interest. Whereas trade disputes in the past largely revolved around tangible goods and tariff barriers, today's major conflicts increasingly concern borderless data flows, platform dominance, and control over digital infrastructure across borders and industries. These developments are unfolding worldwide and are closely intertwined with intensifying competition for technological leadership among nations, as well as a growing emphasis on advancing national interests.Countries around the world now face a critical historical moment. They must address domestic digital challenges in a forward-looking manner to protect the rights and interests of their citizens, strengthen data sovereignty, and promote the development of future-oriented strategic industries. At the same time, they must resolve sensitive digital disputes with major trading partners in ways that advance the mutual interests of all parties involved.This challenge is becoming increasingly evident in relations between South Korea and the United States, two countries that have long maintained a strong military and economic alliance. In recent years, disagreements over digital trade and regulatory issues have become more pronounced. The U.S. government has characterized certain South Korean regulatory initiatives as trade barriers that disadvantage American Big Tech companies and has ap-plied pressure through trade channels. South Korea, however, maintains that these measures represent a legitimate exercise of regulatory sovereignty aimed at protecting market fairness, consumer rights, and the security of its domestic digital ecosystem.This column examines four major digital issues between South Korea and the United States, focusing on the background of each issue, the central points of contention, the differing perspectives of the two countries, and potential areas for mutually acceptable compromise. Based on this analysis, it also offers policy recommendations on how Seoul and Washington can move beyond current disputes and build a foundation for sustainable coop-eration and shared prosperity in the digital era.Case 1. Restrictions on the Overseas Transfer of High-Precision Map DataThe first, longest-standing, and one of the most symbolically significant digital disputes between South Korea and the United States concerns South Korea's restrictions on the overseas transfer of high-precision map data. Cit-ing the unique security challenges arising from its status as the world's only divided country, the South Korean government has maintained strict re-strictions on the overseas transfer of high-precision digital map data at a scale of 1:5,000, arguing that such information could reveal the locations of sensitive national security facilities.In response, U.S. technology companies, including Google, have strongly criticized these restrictions, arguing that they constitute a major non-tariff trade barrier and represent a form of "Galápagos-style" regulation that pre-vents foreign companies from providing global-standard services in the Ko-rean market. They contend that restricted access to high-precision map data hampers the provision of services such as Google Maps-based in-vehicle navigation, advanced autonomous driving technologies, and global loca-tion-based services (LBS).Since 2007, Google has sought permission to export 1:5,000-scale high-precision map data, but the Korean government rejected the request, citing concerns that military bases and other security facilities could be exposed if the data were combined with satellite imagery. The government subsequent-ly proposed establishing servers in South Korea as an alternative, but Google declined the proposal.In 2016, Google submitted another application to export the data. The Committee for Deliberation on the Overseas Export of Surveying Results, which includes officials from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the National Intelligence Service, among others, approved the request on the condition that security facilities be blurred and the dis-play of coordinates be restricted. However, Google did not accept these conditions, and the request was ultimately denied. Later, after the Trump administration identified South Korea's restrictions on map-data exports as a non-tariff trade barrier and raised the issue in the context of reciprocal tariff negotiations, Google submitted a new application in February 2025 and filed a supplementary application in February 2026 in response to the gov-ernment's request for additional information. In February 2026, the Korean government approved the transfer subject to several conditions, citing the need to strengthen the infrastructure for future industries and reduce fric-tion in global trade.Until a final agreement was reached, the issue repeatedly appeared on the agenda of ministerial-level meetings and working-level negotiations be-tween the two countries' trade authorities, remaining unresolved for many years. Rather than allowing the dispute to escalate into a prolonged con-frontation, South Korea and the United States engaged in sustained dia-logue and close consultations to develop practical technical solutions. Ulti-mately, the two sides reached a carefully negotiated compromise that ad-dressed security concerns while accommodating technological innovation.Under the agreement, a domestic partner operating under Korean law would first process the data on servers located in South Korea. Only after this process would map information deemed free of security concerns be exported for navigation purposes, subject to review and approval by the South Korean government. The parties also agreed that sensitive locations and imagery, including military bases and other major national security fa-cilities, would be thoroughly obscured through measures such as mosaick-ing when South Korean territory is displayed on global services such as Google Maps and Google Earth.Ultimately, this case illustrates how technical safeguards can provide a prac-tical compromise in situations where national security concerns intersect with the demands of global digital services, avoiding both the unconditional relaxation of regulations and a blanket ban on data exports.Case 2. The Debate over Network Usage Fees for Global Big Tech CompaniesThe second case concerns the ongoing domestic and international debate over whether global Big Tech companies should contribute to the costs of the digital infrastructure necessitated by the enormous volumes of traffic they generate. This issue has become a major global controversy, not only in South Korea but also within the European Union (EU). The European Commission has formally examined whether Big Tech companies that gen-erate substantial network traffic should share the costs of network invest-ment to ensure the sustainability of digital infrastructure, and it has explored the possibility of establishing an institutional framework for this purpose through public consultations. However, the legislative process has faced challenges due to differing views between telecommunications-oriented countries, such as France and Italy, which support such measures, and other member states that oppose them.The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the use of video streaming and online services, resulting in a significant increase in traffic generated by global content providers (CPs) such as Netflix and YouTube. In response, Korean Internet service providers (ISPs) and members of the National Assembly began actively pursuing legislation that would require foreign Big Tech companies to pay network usage fees, arguing that these companies gener-ate substantial revenues while contributing little or nothing to the costs of expanding and upgrading network infrastructure.South Korea's three major telecommunications operators—SK Telecom, KT, and LG Uplus—have argued that global Big Tech companies effectively benefit from domestic infrastructure without adequately sharing the associ-ated costs. Given that YouTube and Netflix account for a significant share of internet traffic in South Korea, they contend that these companies should also contribute to the costs of maintaining and upgrading telecommunica-tions networks. Domestic content providers such as Naver and Kakao, meanwhile, already bear substantial network-related costs, leading to con-cerns that exempting global Big Tech companies from comparable obliga-tions creates market distortions and places domestic firms at a competitive disadvantage. Rather than imposing a uniform legal obligation through leg-islation, the Korean government has emphasized voluntary negotiations among the relevant parties while continuing policy discussions aimed at mediating disagreements over network usage fees.The U.S. side, meanwhile, has strongly opposed such proposals in defense of the interests of American companies. The U.S. government and major technology companies argue that Korean consumers already pay Internet service providers (ISPs) legitimate fees for Internet access, and that impos-ing additional network usage fees on content providers would amount to double charging, potentially undermine the principle of net neutrality, and create an unfair digital trade barrier in violation of the non-discrimination principles of the Korea–U.S. Free Trade Agreement. South Korea, by con-trast, argues that telecommunications infrastructure constitutes critical pub-lic infrastructure and that it is fair and reasonable for major global compa-nies that generate massive volumes of traffic and place substantial demands on network capacity to bear at least part of the costs of maintaining and up-grading that infrastructure.Although the two sides hold sharply divergent views, practical solutions ex-ist that could prevent the dispute from escalating into a broader trade con-frontation. Rather than creating diplomatic friction by unilaterally imposing network usage fee requirements through legislation, more pragmatic ap-proaches could be explored. One option would be for global CPs to expand their CDN and caching infrastructure in South Korea, enabling content to be delivered closer to end users while reducing traffic burdens on interna-tional networks and certain domestic network segments and allowing com-panies to directly share the costs of the necessary infrastructure. Another possibility would be to encourage companies from both countries to jointly establish a "Digital Infrastructure Co-Growth Fund" and make voluntary contributions to next-generation 6G and network infrastructure projects, thereby creating a more sustainable foundation for compromise.Case 3. Online Platform Regulation (Online Platform Act and the Ex Post Presumption Approach)The third case concerns online platform regulation, including the proposed Online Platform Act and amendments to the Fair Trade Act adopting an ex post presumption approach. These measures are intended to prevent abusive conduct by dominant platform companies and foster a fairer digital ecosystem. The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) and the National Assembly initially considered introducing a "prior designation" system, similar in some respects to the European Union's Digital Markets Act (DMA), under which major platform companies would be designated in advance and subjected to special regulatory obligations. However, amid strong opposition from various stakeholders, the policy direction shifted toward amendments to the Fair Trade Act that would allow a company's market-dominant status to be presumed after certain legal violations have occurred.Nevertheless, major U.S. technology companies and business organizations immediately expressed strong concerns. The Office of the U.S. Trade Rep-resentative (USTR) argued that, even after the shift toward an ex post pre-sumption approach, the proposed thresholds based on factors such as reve-nue and user numbers would effectively target leading U.S. technology companies, including Google, Apple, and Meta, raising concerns about dis-criminatory regulation and prompting broader opposition from the United States. In particular, U.S. stakeholders argued that the measures could con-stitute a non-tariff trade barrier targeting American companies and poten-tially conflict with the non-discrimination principles of the Korea–U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), warning that the legislation could lead to in-creased trade friction between the two countries.Interestingly, the regulatory proposal has also generated diverse perspec-tives and competing interests within South Korea's political and business communities. Some domestic civil society organizations, small-business groups, and opposition politicians argue that prompt legislative action is necessary to protect small businesses and consumers from abuses of market power by dominant platforms. By contrast, some segments of South Ko-rea's technology industry and academic community have expressed con-cerns that such regulations could constrain domestic platforms such as Nav-er and Kakao, weaken incentives for innovation, and ultimately produce the unintended consequence of allowing large foreign e-commerce compa-nies—including Chinese platforms that may circumvent or otherwise avoid the regulatory framework—to gain greater market share in South Korea.Although the controversy has generated strong criticism and opposition both domestically and internationally, it also presents an opportunity to reach a more sophisticated compromise through sustained and substantive dialogue. The U.S. administration, Congress, and antitrust authorities are themselves engaged in significant antitrust litigation, regulatory actions, and legislative debates aimed at addressing concerns over the market power and potential abuses of major technology companies in the United States. Therefore, if the Korean government avoids adopting an overly broad pre-sumption that effectively shifts the burden of proof, enhances procedural transparency in developing the regulatory framework, and demonstrates a clear commitment to enforcing the law fairly and objectively without dis-criminating against companies from either country, it may be possible to minimize trade friction while establishing a balanced regulatory framework that promotes fairness in the domestic digital market.Case 4. Privacy and Consumer Regulation of Platform Companies (The Coupang Case and Related Issues)The fourth case concerns privacy and consumer protection regulation of platform companies, including the Coupang case, which has recently emerged as one of the most sensitive and contentious digital trade issues af-fecting the governments and industries of both countries. South Korean regulatory authorities have conducted intensive investigations into Coupang, a U.S.-incorporated company listed on the New York Stock Exchange, over allegations involving the manipulation of search rankings, the use of employees to post product reviews, and practices that allegedly encourage consumers to subscribe to paid memberships while making cancellation more difficult—commonly referred to as "dark patterns."The authorities have imposed fines amounting to hundreds of billions of won and pursued criminal referrals, leading to heightened tensions and concerns regarding regulatory disputes between the two countries. In par-ticular, the U.S. House Judiciary Committee issued an interim report char-acterizing the Korean government's investigations and sanctions against Coupang as discriminatory treatment of an American company. More re-cently, in late July 2026, Republican Representative Michael Baumgartner of Washington State introduced legislation that would restrict entry into the United States for foreign government officials who discriminate against American companies or potentially impose removal measures against such officials, further intensifying concerns over the issue. The lawmakers spe-cifically cited the KFTC's investigations into Coupang, alleging that Korean authorities had discriminated against an American-linked company through numerous investigations and thousands of requests for documents.The issue initially arose from legitimate domestic policy objectives: protect-ing consumer rights in South Korea's e-commerce market, preventing un-fair commercial practices, and establishing a fair competitive market order. However, when viewed from the U.S. perspective, the development of the issue and its major points of contention have led to the perception that the Korean government targeted an innovative company with substantial U.S. capital investment and imposed excessive and opaque domestic regulations that allegedly diverge from global standards.The issue is increasingly evolving beyond a matter of domestic competi-tion-law enforcement into a potentially significant diplomatic and political dispute between South Korea and the United States, with possible implica-tions for the investment environment affecting South Korean companies operating in the United States. Looking objectively at possible future devel-opments, it cannot be ruled out that the U.S. administration may raise plat-form regulation issues, including the Coupang case, as formal agenda items in future negotiations concerning reciprocal tariffs or broader trade ar-rangements. Such issues could potentially be used as leverage to pressure South Korea to substantially revise or reconsider digital regulations that Washington views as excessive.The most realistic and sustainable way to address such a highly sensitive and contentious issue is for South Korean regulatory authorities to substan-tially strengthen the procedural legitimacy, transparency, and predictability of regulatory enforcement in accordance with international standards. South Korean competition and administrative authorities should transparently dis-close regulatory guidelines, investigative procedures, and criteria for calcu-lating fines, thereby demonstrating that enforcement measures are not dis-criminatory actions targeting foreign-invested or U.S.-listed companies, but rather universal consumer-protection measures applied consistently and equally to all businesses.At the same time, South Korea should consider establishing a permanent public-private consultative mechanism to encourage platform companies to voluntarily correct potentially deceptive practices and strengthen consumer protection measures. Such a mechanism could help reduce regulatory un-certainty and mitigate political and diplomatic concerns in the United States regarding legal sanctions and regulatory enforcement.ConclusionThe four major digital issues examined above vividly demonstrate the com-plexity, dynamism, and potential volatility of the digital economic relation-ship between South Korea and the United States today. Depending on the nature of each issue and the maturity of the dialogue surrounding it, some cases have reached mutually acceptable compromises and can be regarded as largely resolved, while others remain unsettled and continue to evolve amid significant disagreements.The issue of restrictions on the overseas transfer of high-precision map data provides a positive precedent in which national security concerns were carefully balanced against the needs of technological innovation, ultimately leading to a resolution through dialogue and the implementation of tech-nical safeguards. By contrast, ongoing issues such as network usage fees for global technology companies and online platform regulation, including the Online Platform Act, remain unresolved because the industrial interests and regulatory approaches of the two countries continue to diverge, creat-ing significant challenges for trade authorities in both countries.Nevertheless, issues such as network usage fees and the Online Platform Act may ultimately be addressed through constructive policy coordination and carefully designed legislation consistent with global standards and emerging regulatory trends, particularly as concerns over the social respon-sibilities and market power of major technology companies are also receiv-ing increasing attention among economists and policymakers in the United States.By contrast, privacy and consumer regulation involving U.S.-listed plat-form companies, including the Coupang case, is closely intertwined with broader concerns in the United States regarding the regulatory treatment of American companies and trade-related issues, including reciprocal tariff ne-gotiations. Addressing such issues therefore requires a high degree of polit-ical and diplomatic judgment, as well as substantial time and sophisticated diplomacy to reconcile competing interests and reduce tensions.Nevertheless, as noted above, the two countries should seek common ground by demonstrating that the essence of the Coupang case lies not in discriminatory treatment of a U.S.-listed company, but in the consistent ap-plication of universal consumer protection principles. The key point that should not be overlooked is that the expansion of the digital economy should not become a source of conflict between the two countries, but ra-ther a new engine of growth and cooperation for both the Korean and U.S. economies in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.Given the structure of global value chains, South Korea and the United States cannot build a sustainable digital economy by excluding one another. South Korea should avoid both unconditional deregulation and an uncom-promising pursuit of narrow national interests. Instead, it should adopt a balanced approach that firmly protects technological capabilities and legiti-mate national interests while actively leveraging the foundations of "mutual prosperity": transparent institutional governance and sustained high-level strategic dialogue. By using these tools to address U.S. concerns while safeguarding the fairness and integrity of South Korea's domestic market, the two countries can create the conditions for a genuine win-win partner-ship and shared prosperity in the expanding digital economy.