The Collapse of the Assad Regime in Syria 

and Implications for Our Country           

Park Hyondo

Professor, The Sogan Euro-MENA Institute, 

Sogang University, Seoul, Korea

On December 8, 2024, the Assad regime in Syria collapsed, bringing an end to 54 years of dynastic authoritarian rule. The Assad family, members of the Alawite sect of Shi’ism, came to power when Hafez al-Assad seized control of the Ba’ath Party through a “Corrective Revolution” in 1970 and assumed the presidency in 1971. Upon his death in 2000, power passed to his son Bashar al-Assad, a British-trained ophthalmologist, who initially promised reform but ultimately entrenched dictatorship.

The Assad regime’s durability rested on two pillars: an Alawite-dominated military-security apparatus and the secular, pan-Arab nationalist Ba’ath Party. Despite comprising only 10% of Syria’s population, the Alawites controlled an estimated 65% of the military and held dominant positions in the intelligence and political sectors. Their rise, facilitated during the French Mandate and consolidated after independence, allowed the Assad family to wield outsized influence despite widespread Sunni Muslim opposition.

The Ba’ath Party, which came to power in 1963, espoused socialism, secularism, and Arab nationalism, aligning closely with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It clashed repeatedly with the Muslim Brotherhood, the leading Islamist opposition force. This confrontation culminated in the brutal suppression of the 1982 Hama uprising, during which Syrian forces besieged the city for nearly a month, killing between 10,000 and 40,000 civilians—one of the most egregious instances of state violence in modern Middle Eastern history.

The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings finally shook the Assad regime. Triggered by the arrest and torture of teenagers in the southern city of Daraa for scrawling anti-government graffiti, nationwide protests rapidly escalated into civil war. Bashar al-Assad’s initial reformist image disintegrated amid state repression, mass arrests, and escalating violence.

Geopolitically, Syria occupies a linchpin position in the Middle East. Its collapse reverberated far beyond its borders, drawing in foreign powers and transforming the civil war into a regional proxy conflict. Russia and Iran backed the Assad government; the United States, Turkey, and Arab Gulf monarchies supported various rebel factions. Iran viewed Syria as vital to maintaining its "Shia Crescent" of influence, connecting Tehran to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Meanwhile, Russia’s naval facility at Tartus—the only Russian military foothold in the Mediterranean—remained a strategic priority.

On the opposing side, the United States and its allies sought to counter both Iranian expansion and Russian entrenchment. Energy geopolitics also played a role: Assad’s rejection of a proposed Qatari gas pipeline in favor of an Iran-Syria route is widely believed to have influenced external support for the opposition.

The Syrian opposition remained fragmented among secularists, Islamists, and Kurdish factions, hindering efforts to unify or effectively govern liberated areas. The war produced one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, displacing over 4.5 million people externally—3.6 million to Turkey and roughly 1 million to Europe.

In 2015, Russia’s direct military intervention turned the tide in favor of Assad. By 2020, government forces had retaken approximately 80% of the country’s territory. However, the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war in 2022 and the 2023 Israel–Hamas war shifted regional dynamics. In particular, Israel’s 2024 aerial campaign against Hezbollah supply lines along the Lebanon-Syria border diminished Iranian influence and exposed Assad’s growing isolation.

With Russia preoccupied in Ukraine and Iran reluctant to escalate further, the Turkish-backed Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) seized the strategic city of Aleppo on November 29, 2024, and captured Damascus ten days later. Bashar al-Assad reportedly fled to Russia, marking the definitive collapse of the Assad dynasty.

HTS, though claiming to be a reformed Islamist coalition, has deep roots in al-Qaeda and ideological links to ISIS. Its leader, Ahmad al-Shara’a (alias Abu Muhammad al-Julani), was once listed by the U.S. with a $10 million bounty. Although Washington recently lifted HTS’s terrorist designation, concerns persist that the group may evolve into a “second Taliban,” consolidating extremist rule under the guise of national unity.

Despite HTS’s claims of preventing broader regional conflict, the security landscape remains highly unstable. U.S.-backed Kurdish forces continue to hold territory in the northeast and are guarding prisons housing ISIS operatives. Turkey, long hostile to Kurdish autonomy, is threatening to intervene militarily—raising fears that any assault could lead to the escape and resurgence of ISIS militants. The United States, aware of this risk, is reportedly deterring Turkish advances.

Elsewhere, HTS has imposed visa restrictions on Syrians entering Lebanon and is engaged in skirmishes along the Lebanon-Syria border. Meanwhile, Russia is negotiating to retain access to its Tartus base under HTS control, and Israel is maneuvering to further entrench its hold over the Golan Heights.

Amid this geopolitical reshuffling, China has signaled interest in Syrian reconstruction, and HTS is lobbying for the lifting of Western sanctions. Iran remains cautious, and Arab states are recalibrating their positions.

For South Korea, the Assad regime’s collapse carries both symbolic and strategic implications. First, it underscores that authoritarian dynasties—particularly those based on hereditary succession—are not immune to collapse, even after decades of coercive rule. This is a critical signal to other regimes, including North Korea.

Historically, Syria and North Korea maintained close ties, particularly in the nuclear and military spheres. The most notable case was the al-Kibar nuclear reactor in Syria, destroyed by Israel in 2007. U.S. intelligence later assessed that the reactor, modeled after North Korea’s Yongbyon facility, was constructed with North Korean assistance and intended for weapons-grade plutonium production.

Given these past links, any post-Assad transition must be closely monitored to ensure there is no resurgence of nuclear or military cooperation between Syria and North Korea. Despite the end of the Assad dynasty, South Korea should avoid rushing to normalize relations with Damascus. As with the international approach to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, recognition and engagement should be contingent upon verifiable commitments to stability, denuclearization, and human rights.

Going forward, South Korea should coordinate with likeminded partners—including the United States, Japan, and European allies—while engaging constructively with influential regional actors such as Turkey, Qatar, and the UAE. The goal must be to prevent Syria from becoming a renewed epicenter of terrorism or a safe haven for illicit military collaboration with Pyongyang.

Ultimately, Syria’s collapse is not just a regional turning point—it is a reminder that even the most entrenched regimes can fall. What replaces them matters just as much.