President Lee’s Liberation Day Address: 

“Liberation of Peace” and a New Approach to North Korea

Seon-taek Wang

Visiting Professor

Sogang University

For the people of the Republic of Korea, Liberation Day is a solemn occasion for reflecting on the nation’s history. It marks the end of 35 years of Japanese colonial rule, during which Korea’s sovereignty was taken away and the lives, property, and dignity of its people were systematically violated. Above all, it is a day to honor the memory and sacrifices of the patriots and independence activists who gave their lives, youth, and material possessions to restore the nation’s independence. The 81st anniversary of Liberation Day carries particular significance. A country that once suffered the loss of its sovereignty has since emerged as a global leader across a range of political, economic, technological, and cultural fields.

In his Liberation Day address, President Lee Jae-myung introduced the concept of “New Liberation.” Rather than treating liberation solely as a historical event marking the end of Japanese colonial rule, he recast it as a forward-looking national vision and a set of objectives for the future. He identified four dimensions of this vision: “Liberation of Hope,” “Liberation of Opportunity,” “Liberation of Balance,” and “Liberation of Peace.”

This expansion of the meaning of liberation—from a historical achievement to a framework for the future—represents a notable shift in perspective. From the standpoint of foreign policy and national security, the concept of “Liberation of Peace” is particularly consequential. President Lee articulated the objective of eliminating the risks of war and confrontation and building a Korean Peninsula on which peace is not an exception but the prevailing condition.

Against this backdrop, this year’s message to North Korea was notably different from those of previous administrations. Past presidents have often used Liberation Day addresses to unveil high-profile initiatives intended to capture the attention of Pyongyang and the domestic and international public. These have included proposals for inter-Korean summits, large-scale economic cooperation projects, and new visions for Korean unification. Yet relatively few of these initiatives have produced sustained changes in inter-Korean relations. In some cases, the proposals appeared to prioritize political momentum or public attention over a realistic assessment of North Korea’s position and strategic calculations. Once Pyongyang failed to respond, many of these initiatives quickly lost momentum.

President Lee took a different approach this year. He did not announce a new summit or unveil a large-scale economic initiative. Instead, he reaffirmed the core principles of his North Korea policy, first articulated in last year’s Liberation Day address marking the 80th anniversary of liberation, while providing greater clarity on how those principles should be implemented. Rather than seeking immediate breakthroughs, he emphasized strategic direction, policy consistency, and a sustained commitment to clearly defined objectives. Three elements are particularly noteworthy.

First, President Lee called for dialogue without attaching it to grand political or economic concessions.

President Lee emphasized the importance of dialogue and expressed his determination to move beyond the current state of conflict and replace the unstable armistice regime with a durable peace regime. The significance of this approach lies in its sequencing. Rather than beginning with large-scale inducements or initiatives designed to secure an immediate North Korean response, it places priority on reducing the risk of conflict and establishing the foundations for peaceful coexistence.

This is a pragmatic approach that recognizes the current reality: virtually all formal channels of inter-Korean communication remain suspended. Under such circumstances, restoring communication and reducing the risk of unintended escalation may be more important than attempting to achieve an immediate political breakthrough.

Second, President Lee reaffirmed the three principles of his North Korea policy announced last year and developed them into a more concrete framework for peaceful coexistence.

Last year, President Lee identified three basic principles: respecting the North Korean regime, rejecting unification through absorption, and refraining from hostile actions against North Korea. This year, he built on those principles by articulating a framework of “inclusive peaceful coexistence” based on mutual respect, “stable peaceful coexistence” in which conflict is no longer necessary, and “responsible peaceful coexistence” that contributes to peace beyond the Korean Peninsula.

From Pyongyang’s perspective, this framework provides an additional basis for assessing whether the Lee administration’s policy represents a temporary political initiative or a long-term strategic orientation. In other words, the credibility of the policy will ultimately depend less on a single speech than on whether these principles are applied consistently over time.

Third, President Lee did not compromise on core principles simply to create an opening for dialogue.

President Lee emphasized that peace on the Korean Peninsula should ultimately contribute to the broader objective of a “nuclear-free world.” He also indicated that effective measures to halt the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities could be discussed as part of the process of establishing a peace regime.

This is a particularly important point. The nuclear issue remains one of the most sensitive issues from Pyongyang’s perspective, yet President Lee did not avoid it in an effort to make dialogue more politically attractive. Instead, he appears to have concluded that dialogue is more likely to produce durable results if both sides understand one another’s objectives, constraints, and red lines from the outset.

The history of inter-Korean dialogue provides ample evidence for this approach. Difficult issues were often deferred in order to create the conditions for meetings, only to reemerge as sources of disagreement once negotiations began. At other times, ambiguous agreements produced conflicting interpretations and ultimately contributed to renewed tensions.

Against this background, the explicit reference to the nuclear issue demonstrates that the vision of peaceful coexistence is not simply political rhetoric. It represents an effort to establish a more balanced and sustainable framework—one that clearly articulates Seoul’s own objectives and principles while leaving sufficient space for North Korea to articulate its own concerns and demands.

None of this means, however, that North Korea is likely to alter its current position simply in response to President Lee’s address. Pyongyang has already fundamentally redefined inter-Korean relations as a “hostile relationship between two states” and has substantially revised its strategic approach toward the South. It would therefore be unrealistic to expect such a strategic judgment to change on the basis of one or two speeches.

At the same time, North Korea is likely to examine the Lee administration’s policy framework carefully and assess whether it represents a durable shift in Seoul’s approach. If Pyongyang comes to believe that the administration will consistently uphold its three core principles and that peaceful coexistence and shared prosperity constitute long-term policy objectives rather than temporary political messaging, that perception could eventually influence North Korean decision-making.

Inter-Korean relations have long since moved beyond the point at which they can be transformed by a single bold proposal or dramatic political event. What is required now is a departure from policies driven primarily by short-term outcomes or by abrupt shifts in response to North Korea’s actions.

Instead, Seoul should maintain clearly defined long-term objectives and consistent principles while creating a sustained process through which North Korea can gradually assess the credibility of South Korea’s intentions.

In this respect, the significance of President Lee’s Liberation Day address lies not only in what he proposed, but also in what he deliberately chose not to propose. There were no high-profile initiatives promising immediate breakthroughs. There was no attempt to generate momentum through a dramatic new initiative. Instead, the address soberly acknowledged the current realities on the Korean Peninsula and set out the principles and policy directions that Seoul intends to pursue.

The address reaffirmed the principles articulated last year, gave greater substance to the vision of peaceful coexistence, and addressed the difficult nuclear issue without evasion. This combination of principle and pragmatism may ultimately prove more consequential than any single policy initiative.

“Liberation for Peace” remains a long-term objective. Achieving it will require patience and a willingness to resist the temptation of seeking immediate political results. Clearly articulating South Korea’s principles, maintaining policy consistency, and steadily presenting credible options for North Korea to consider may offer a more effective path forward than repeatedly pursuing dramatic short-term breakthroughs.

If sustained over time, this approach could help institutionalize South Korea’s North Korea policy—one that combines principle with pragmatism, consistency with flexibility, and deterrence with dialogue. More importantly, it could provide the foundation for a gradual transition from a cycle of confrontation and crisis toward a more stable framework of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula.