A Country Where ‘Freedom at 55’ Becomes a Dream – The Hidden Lives of North Korean Women

Lee Jong-woo

former North Korean judicial official

On November 16, North Korea observed its official Mother’s Day, during which Rodong Sinmun, the Workers’ Party newspaper, published multiple articles highlighting Chairman Kim Jong-un’s interest in motherhood and childcare policies. The newspaper emphasized slogans such as “A Mother’s Love” and “The State’s Embrace for Children.” However, testimonies from inside the country reveal that North Korean women are not treated primarily as mothers, but rather as a controlled labor force and as executors of state-assigned tasks.

In Pyongyang, Women’s League offices are established at the dong (neighborhood) and ri (village) levels and are responsible for managing residents. Women under the age of 55 who are not formally employed are required to participate in Women’s League activities. 

These units function as a grassroots system of compulsory mobilization. Among residents, it is widely known that reaching the age of 55 is the only way to be exempted from Women’s League duties, which has led to a common expression that while people elsewhere generally wish to remain young, many North Korean women instead hope to turn 55 as soon as possible.

Women affiliated with the Women’s League are assigned a series of annual obligations. These include gathering medicinal materials such as apricot pits and peach seeds, submitting recyclable goods such as scrap metal, glass, and paper, and providing support items for state construction projects, including gloves, clothing, foodstuffs, and other necessities. 

Although such quotas are formally distributed to all households, Women’s League members are held to stricter standards. Failure to meet these requirements results in mandatory attendance at weekly life review meetings, where individuals are subjected to public criticism. These sessions function as a mechanism of political pressure.

In addition to collection quotas, Women’s League members are often mobilized into construction projects under the title of “shock brigades.” It is not uncommon for women to be away from their homes for extended periods of time.

Around the anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army, additional assignments are imposed under the name of “supporting the army.” These tasks include providing donations ranging from school supplies to rabbit meat. During agricultural seasons, women are mobilized to participate in rice planting, weeding, and harvesting. Local railway and road maintenance are also assigned to the Women’s League.

Testimonies indicate the existence of informal “avoidance fees,” which allow individuals to pay money to avoid mobilization. This practice is reflected in a common saying that states that if one does not have money, labor must be offered instead.

Despite these obligations, most women must simultaneously engage in trading or private business activities to support their household income. Residents indicate that life within the Women’s League is busier than formal employment and that the organization functions less as a housewives’ association and more as a labor-oriented system.

Daily life for many North Korean women is described as one in which they must manage domestic responsibilities, earn income, and fulfill state-imposed duties until they reach the age of 55, when they may be released from the system.

North Korea officially declares that children represent the nation’s future. Yet the reality for mothers who care for those children remains largely unaddressed in state policy. These women hold dual responsibilities as both the center of their households and as state-mobilized labor required to meet ongoing quotas and mobilization schedules. While Mother’s Day may bring flowers and celebratory rhetoric, many women report that their daily lives are instead defined by “gadu,” a term describing the burdens they are forced to bear.

For many, the age of 55 is not perceived as a milestone of aging but rather as a symbolic moment of liberation. The question of when that age will become a genuinely celebratory moment remains a pressing issue that North Korea must confront in both policy and practice.