An Assessment of the “Prioritize Halting North Korea’s Nuclear Program” Approach

Seung-hyun Lee

Dankook University

Unification Minister Chung Dong-young recently proposed a “peace-first” approach and a strategy that prioritizes halting the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear program as the guiding direction for the South Korean government’s North Korea policy. At a press conference held shortly before the first anniversary of his appointment, Minister Chung stated, “We have effectively moved away from the previous administration’s ‘denuclearization first’ approach and CVID (Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Denuclearization) and shifted toward a ‘peace-first’ approach,” adding that “we are working to develop a strategy that prioritizes halting North Korea’s nuclear program under a peace-first framework.”

Emphasizing the reality that North Korea’s nuclear buildup continues, he asked, “Can we afford to keep postponing action and losing valuable time?” Minister Chung’s central concern is that, with dialogue with North Korea currently suspended, making denuclearization a precondition for dialogue could make it difficult for negotiations to begin in the first place. He has argued that both the United States and China have, in practice, moved away from a strictly “denuclearization first” approach and that restoring dialogue with North Korea should be the immediate priority.

President Lee Jae-myung’s proposed phased approach of “suspension–reduction–elimination” is consistent with this framework. President Lee has advocated a pragmatic approach that would first halt further advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, followed by a process of reduction and, ultimately, elimination. He has noted that simply preventing the further production of nuclear materials and the continued development of ICBM technology would itself represent a meaningful contribution to international security.

This proposal raises an important question: If complete denuclearization of North Korea is not realistically achievable in the near term, can halting the further expansion of its nuclear capabilities serve as a practical starting point on the path toward denuclearization? This question lies at the heart of the debate over an approach that prioritizes halting North Korea’s nuclear program.

Between the Goal of Denuclearization and Reality

The international community’s stated long-term objective regarding the North Korean nuclear issue remains complete denuclearization. There is, however, a significant gap between this objective and the current reality. North Korea views its nuclear weapons not as temporary bargaining instruments but as a core component of its national security and regime-survival strategy. It is also intensifying efforts to institutionalize its status as a nuclear-armed state. At the same time, the international community, including the United States and South Korea, continues to uphold the principle that North Korea cannot be formally recognized as a nuclear-weapon state.

The fundamental problem is that, while these positions remain deeply at odds, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continue to expand. In the past, the international community largely pursued a framework of “rewards in exchange for denuclearization.” Under this approach, economic and diplomatic benefits would be provided in return for the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program. Yet North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continued to advance even during periods when negotiations were suspended or had stalled.

What may therefore be required is not a change in the ultimate objective of denuclearization, but a reconsideration of the sequencing and strategy for achieving that objective. The central question is which approach is more realistic: continuing to demand complete dismantlement while North Korea’s nuclear weapons and fissile-material stockpiles grow in the absence of negotiations, or first halting the further expansion of its nuclear capabilities and then proceeding incrementally toward reduction and dismantlement. The argument for prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program begins from this premise.

To properly assess this approach, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by “halting” North Korea’s nuclear program. It cannot simply mean refraining from conducting additional nuclear tests. The central objective would be to constrain the further production of nuclear weapons and fissile material and prevent both the quantitative and qualitative expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.

In practical terms, the proposal would involve resuming negotiations with immediate objectives such as suspending further nuclear tests, halting additional production of fissile material, preventing the transfer or export of such materials, and constraining further development of ICBM capabilities. In other words, “suspension” should not be understood as a single measure, but rather as a set of measures designed to halt the ongoing expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and thereby contain the growth of the nuclear threat.

The principal practical advantage of this approach is that it could prevent the problem from becoming more severe. Even if the complete elimination of North Korea’s existing nuclear arsenal is not immediately feasible, it may still be possible to limit the amount of fissile material and the number of nuclear warheads that North Korea can produce in the future.

If the production of fissile material continues unchecked, the number of North Korean nuclear warheads is likely to increase. If the development of delivery systems proceeds unchecked, North Korea’s nuclear strike capabilities will likewise become more sophisticated. Conversely, if further production of fissile material and the continued development of nuclear weapons systems can be constrained, the pace at which the threat expands can at least be slowed.

This is also significant from a military perspective. If the growth of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities can be halted, South Korea and the United States would gain greater visibility into the scale of the future threat they face. Greater predictability could reduce the risk of miscalculation, inadvertent escalation, and disproportionate responses. From this perspective, prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program should be viewed not simply as a diplomatic compromise, but as a strategic risk-reduction and stabilization measure.

At the same time, this approach raises a critical question: What should be done with the nuclear weapons and fissile materials North Korea already possesses? Critics argue that simply halting further production while allowing North Korea to retain its existing arsenal could amount to tacitly accepting its status as a nuclear-armed state.

This concern cannot be dismissed. If North Korea were to treat “suspension” as an end in itself rather than as a temporary measure leading toward denuclearization, the outcome could actually be counterproductive. The suspension of North Korea’s nuclear program therefore cannot be regarded as the ultimate objective.

Instead, suspension must be explicitly linked to subsequent steps. Once the production of fissile material is halted, declaration and verification should follow. Thereafter, the reduction of fissile-material stocks and nuclear warheads should begin. Ultimately, the process should lead to the dismantlement of nuclear facilities and the elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, clear policy objectives and timelines must be established for what constitutes “suspension.” Suspension should be a condition for advancing to the next stage, rather than an endpoint in itself.

Another critical question concerns North Korea’s willingness to accept such an approach. North Korea has repeatedly stated that it will not accept denuclearization as a precondition for negotiations. Instead, it has defined its nuclear forces as a core element of national security and has increasingly sought to consolidate its status as a nuclear-weapon state. Against this backdrop, it remains uncertain whether Pyongyang would accept the concept of “suspending its nuclear capabilities as the first step toward denuclearization.” Even if North Korea were to agree to a suspension, it would likely interpret such an arrangement not as the first step toward denuclearization, but as the beginning of an arms-control process based on mutual nuclear constraints.

This is precisely where the greatest challenge in negotiations with North Korea lies. If South Korea and the United States envision a sequence of “suspension → reduction → elimination,” while North Korea envisions “recognition of its nuclear status → arms control → improved relations,” the two sides could sit at the same negotiating table while pursuing fundamentally different end states. Accordingly, if the South Korean government intends to pursue a strategy that prioritizes halting North Korea’s nuclear program, it must also carefully consider how Pyongyang is likely to interpret and respond to the proposal.

Simply persuading North Korea will not be sufficient. The objective should be to create conditions under which North Korea calculates that halting the expansion of its nuclear capabilities at a defined level and improving relations with the international community would better serve its interests than pursuing an open-ended nuclear buildup.

A central concern within the international community is whether “a freeze would effectively amount to recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status.” This question, however, should also be considered from another perspective. The realistic choices facing the international community are not necessarily limited to “immediate and complete denuclearization” on the one hand and “a prior suspension of North Korea’s nuclear program” on the other. If the current negotiating deadlock continues, North Korea may continue expanding its nuclear capabilities without any agreement, verification mechanism, or meaningful constraints. In that circumstance, the practical choice may increasingly be between a verifiable limitation on the growth of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and their continued unchecked expansion. It is difficult to argue that the latter would produce a safer Korean Peninsula or a more stable international security environment.

If North Korea’s nuclear arsenal continues to grow, pressure on South Korea and Japan to strengthen their own military capabilities will increase. The United States would face growing demands to reinforce extended deterrence, while China and Russia could also adjust their security postures in response. The result could be an intensifying arms race across Northeast Asia. The strategic significance of prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program lies precisely in its potential to interrupt this cycle of action and reaction.

We should also broaden our perspective on the North Korean nuclear issue. It is no longer solely an inter-Korean issue. The expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is closely connected to the ROK-U.S. alliance, the U.S.-Japan alliance, China’s regional security strategy, and Russia’s strategy in the Far East. In particular, as military cooperation between North Korea and Russia deepens, North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities are becoming increasingly relevant to both European and Indo-Pacific security.

Accordingly, the argument for prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program should be developed not merely as a proposal for improving security on the Korean Peninsula, but as a broader strategy for reducing international nuclear risks and strengthening strategic stability. Halting the further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities could reduce military risks on the Korean Peninsula, limit incentives for nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia, mitigate potentially destabilizing arms competition among regional powers, and help preserve the credibility of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

From this perspective, prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program becomes a policy approach of broader international significance, rather than simply another North Korea policy. For such an approach to succeed, a strong strategic consensus between South Korea and the United States will be essential. Seoul must maintain the ultimate objective of denuclearization while working with Washington to establish a shared understanding of a phased and realistic pathway toward that objective. This is why recent discussions between South Korean and U.S. leaders on the North Korean nuclear issue are particularly important.

The United States, too, cannot ignore the reality that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have already reached a significant level. A new approach is needed to determine how negotiations can be restarted while preserving the principle of complete denuclearization. South Korea’s role should not be to dilute the U.S. commitment to denuclearization, but to propose a negotiating framework within which that principle can be pursued in practice.

A strategy that prioritizes halting North Korea’s nuclear program is unlikely to succeed through U.S.-North Korea negotiations alone. China retains considerable influence over North Korea, while Japan possesses important potential economic leverage through the prospect of normalizing relations with Pyongyang and expanding economic engagement. South Korea should therefore leverage a broad range of diplomatic channels, including those with China and Japan, while anchoring these efforts in close coordination with the United States.

Seoul should explain to Beijing that an unconstrained North Korean nuclear buildup could accelerate an arms race and increase the risk of nuclear proliferation across Northeast Asia. With respect to Japan, South Korea can emphasize that improved Japan-North Korea relations and expanded economic cooperation could provide additional incentives for Pyongyang to modify its behavior.

Viewed from this broader perspective, prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program is not merely a proposal for U.S.-North Korea negotiations. It can serve as a regional risk-reduction strategy designed to improve strategic stability across Northeast Asia.

The argument for prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program is not an argument for abandoning denuclearization. Rather, it reflects a practical consideration of how to make the goal of denuclearization viable once again under current conditions. For the sake of peace on the Korean Peninsula, strategic stability in Northeast Asia, and the integrity of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, what is needed now is not to wait for a perfect solution, but to prevent risks from escalating further. First, halt; then verify; then reduce; and ultimately, dismantle. A serious consideration of the “priority halt” approach to North Korea’s nuclear program should begin with this premise.