“From Washington and Tokyo to Pyongyang”:

Now Is the Time for a “North Korea–U.S. First, Inter-Korean Second” Strategy

Jeong Se-hyun

Former Minister of Unification

The Lee Jae-myung administration has expressed a strong commitment to improving inter-Korean relations—a welcome gesture. However, this is not a moment for haste. The strategic landscape has shifted, and North Korea has already redefined the framework for engagement.

On June 28, Kim Yo-jong, vice department director of the Workers’ Party of Korea, issued a statement sharply criticizing the South Korean government, claiming that its “blind faith in the U.S.-ROK alliance and its confrontational posture are no different from the previous administration.”

Yet just one day later, she shifted her tone—emphasizing the importance of “normalizing relations between nuclear powers” and noting that the personal relationship between Chairman Kim and President Trump was “not bad.”

This signals a critical reality: the starting point for diplomacy is no longer Seoul, but Washington—just as it was in 2018.

North Korea has made clear that normalization with the United States is its primary objective. Pyongyang understands better than anyone that without U.S. engagement, sanctions relief, security guarantees, and meaningful economic cooperation—especially for achieving its five-year economic plan and “20×10 regional development policy”—are unattainable.

Since its adoption of the “two-state theory,” North Korea no longer sees South Korea as a primary interlocutor. This is the cold strategic calculus.

Nonetheless, this is not a cause for resignation. On the contrary, it is precisely in this context that South Korea can play a vital role—not as a protagonist, but as a facilitator. The priority should not be to lead the process, but to create the right diplomatic conditions. Seoul must help lay the groundwork for renewed U.S.–North Korea dialogue in a way that enables both sides to return to talks without losing face.

North Korea has consistently signaled that inter-Korean relations are not a priority. Ignoring that message and acting unilaterally risks damaging Seoul’s credibility without yielding tangible progress.

What is now needed is a strategy of “circumvention.” Mao Zedong famously took control of the countryside before surrounding the cities—a lesson that applies to diplomacy as well. Instead of heading directly to Pyongyang, a more viable route may run through Washington and Tokyo.

Japan has its own political rationale for engagement—most notably, resolving the abduction issue—and would also be motivated by the prospect of establishing diplomatic ties and economic cooperation with North Korea.

To bring Pyongyang back to the table within the broader framework of denuclearization, a realistic roadmap must be presented—starting with a freeze and eventual reduction of the nuclear arsenal, paired with phased incentives such as limited sanctions relief, humanitarian assistance, and the establishment of liaison offices.

This kind of “conditions-based diplomacy” was effectively practiced by the Kim Dae-jung administration. At that time, a breakthrough was achieved through a dual-track approach: people-to-people exchanges led by Hyundai, and U.S.-driven diplomacy under the Perry Process. That experience offers a useful precedent for today.

Pyongyang now explicitly rejects the term “denuclearization,” and Washington is well aware of this. President Trump effectively acknowledged North Korea as a de facto nuclear state and adopted a posture closer to arms control than denuclearization. If dialogue between North Korea and the United States resumes, it will likely take the form of “disarmament talks.” Restoring mutual trust will be the first step—and in this, South Korea’s role as a diplomatic catalyst could prove essential.

Some may raise concerns about marginalizing South Korea in favor of U.S.–North Korea engagement. But it is time to move past this anxiety. A meaningful path toward inter-Korean engagement will only reopen once U.S.–North Korea dialogue resumes and tensions de-escalate. Seoul should position itself as a credible facilitator and mediator in U.S.–DPRK talks.

The road to engaging Pyongyang need not begin in Seoul—it may start in Washington, Tokyo, or even Vladivostok. The detour may seem long, but it could ultimately prove to be the shortest path to sustainable peace.

What the Lee Jae-myung administration needs now is not an urgent push for inter-Korean breakthroughs, but a deliberate strategy to support U.S.–North Korea engagement and foster a broader diplomatic environment conducive to progress on the Peninsula.

This means adopting a calibrated approach: strengthening cooperation with Japan, supporting conditions for renewed dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang, and guiding inter-Korean engagement within that broader framework.

Peace on the Korean Peninsula rarely comes in a straight line. It often arrives through curves and detours. Now is the time to embrace this reality—and to take strategic, patient steps toward durable peace.