In an Era of Two Koreas, Coexistence Must Precede Unification

Jin-Tae Hwang

Professor of North Korean Studies

Dongguk University

North Korea’s “hostile two-state theory” has fundamentally challenged a long-standing premise of inter-Korean relations. In late 2023, Kim Jong Un defined inter-Korean relations not as a special relationship between compatriots pursuing unification, but as a relationship between “two hostile states, two states at war.” Since then, North Korea has reorganized institutions and policies related to unification and has increasingly defined South Korea as a hostile state, reshaping its national identity and inter-Korean policy accordingly. This should be understood not simply as a tougher policy toward South Korea, but as a broader effort to institutionalize relations with South Korea as those between two separate states.

How, then, should South Korea respond? This does not mean that Seoul should simply accept North Korea’s hostile two-state doctrine. Nor is it sufficient to continue repeating the unification paradigm of the past. What is needed instead is to prepare for coexistence between the two Koreas, taking seriously the possibility that their separation into two states may persist for the foreseeable future. In this regard, the experience of Romania and Moldova offers a useful point of reference.

Cooperation Without Unification

Romania and Moldova share a history, language, and cultural traditions. Yet following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moldova became an independent state, and the two countries developed as separate sovereign states. Political separation, however, did not mean a complete rupture of their historical and cultural ties.

Romania quickly recognized Moldova’s independence and established diplomatic relations. Since then, the two countries have built institutional foundations for cooperation in areas including investment, transportation, aviation, and railways. At the same time, they have maintained their historical and cultural connections through Romanian-language education, scholarships, and cultural programs.

What is particularly noteworthy is that the two countries did not have to resolve the question of unification before developing cooperation. Political debate over unification with Romania continues in Moldova. Yet regardless of whether unification occurs, the two countries have expanded cooperation in areas such as the economy, infrastructure, energy, and education. Following Romania’s accession to the European Union, their relationship further evolved, with Romania supporting Moldova’s European integration. In the energy sector, the two countries have also worked to connect their gas infrastructure, helping Moldova reduce its dependence on Russian energy.

The important lesson is that sharing a common history and identity does not necessarily require two countries to become one. Conversely, being separate sovereign states does not make cooperation impossible. A shared identity and separate statehood can coexist. This is an important point for rethinking inter-Korean relations.

Until now, inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation have largely been understood as steps toward unification. Inter-Korean dialogue, economic cooperation, and humanitarian exchanges have often been justified as stages in the broader process of national reunification. But as North Korea rejects this very paradigm of unification and emphasizes its separate statehood, it is becoming increasingly difficult to envision the future of inter-Korean relations through the existing framework alone.

Does cooperation become impossible if unification is no longer the ultimate goal? The experience of Romania and Moldova suggests otherwise. If political and constitutional questions are separated from functional cooperation, it is possible to build a dense network of cooperation between two states even without agreement on unification.

South Korea’s North Korea Policy Should Treat Coexistence as a Goal in Its Own Right

This offers a first lesson for South Korea: unification and coexistence do not necessarily have to be placed on the same timeline. Unification can remain one possible long-term future for Korean society. But when and how it might occur is difficult to predict. By contrast, the possibility that the two Koreas will continue to exist as separate political communities for a considerable period is one that policymakers must realistically take into account. The task, therefore, is not to do nothing until unification becomes possible, but to manage relations between the two Koreas and reduce the risks of war and conflict in the meantime.

Peaceful coexistence should therefore be established as a distinct policy goal, rather than treated merely as a subordinate objective of unification.

Coexistence does not mean recognizing or endorsing North Korea’s political system, nor does it mean accepting its hostile two-state doctrine. Rather, it is a pragmatic strategy for managing conflict and preventing confrontation so that two political communities with different political systems and state identities can coexist over an extended period.

From this perspective, the success of inter-Korean relations need not be measured solely by how much closer the two Koreas have moved toward unification. It should also be measured by how effectively they have reduced the risk of military conflict, addressed humanitarian issues, cooperated on environmental and disaster-related challenges, and established institutions capable of maintaining communication during times of crisis.

Institutionalizing Practical Areas of Cooperation

A second priority is to institutionalize practical forms of cooperation that can continue to function regardless of changes in political relations. One reason inter-Korean relations have repeatedly swung between engagement and rupture is that cooperation itself has been overly dependent on the broader political relationship. When summits and political agreements have led to improvements in relations, cooperation has expanded; when relations have deteriorated, most exchanges have been suspended.

The experience of Romania and Moldova points to a different possibility. Even while political disagreements and differences over history and identity have remained unresolved, the two countries have steadily developed practical institutions for cooperation in education, infrastructure, energy, the economy, and culture. The key is not that their disagreements have disappeared, but that they have managed, to some extent, to separate areas of conflict from areas of cooperation.

A similar approach is needed between the two Koreas. Climate change and natural-disaster response, forests and the environment, infectious diseases and public health, food security, and humanitarian assistance are areas in which both sides have tangible interests while remaining relatively removed from ideological and systemic competition. Floods and droughts in North Korea and the degradation of its forests, for example, are not problems that can be regarded as entirely unrelated to South Korea. Cooperation in these areas should not be treated as an agenda to be pursued only after inter-Korean relations improve. Instead, the necessary institutional infrastructure should be prepared in advance so that cooperation can function even when political relations are strained.

When direct political dialogue between the two Koreas is difficult, international organizations and multilateral frameworks could also provide alternative channels. The suspension of bilateral relations does not necessarily mean that all possibilities for cooperation must disappear.

In the Era of the Hostile Two-State Doctrine, South Korea Needs a New Grammar of Relations

Of course, the experience of Romania and Moldova cannot simply be transplanted onto the Korean Peninsula. The historical processes through which the two countries became separate states and the international environments in which they developed are very different from those of the two Koreas. The Korean Peninsula remains divided after more than seven decades of military confrontation, while North Korea’s nuclear weapons program adds another layer of complexity. The strategic interests of major powers, including the United States, China, Russia, and Japan, are also deeply intertwined with inter-Korean relations. For these reasons, the Romanian-Moldovan experience should not be replicated as a policy model for the Korean Peninsula.

Its importance lies elsewhere: it expands the range of possibilities through which we can think about the future of inter-Korean relations.

Until now, the future of the two Koreas has often been presented as a choice between two alternatives: unification or confrontation. Yet there is a third possibility—two states that remain separate for an extended period while developing practical forms of cooperation. This is institutionalized coexistence.

North Korea’s hostile two-state doctrine poses a serious challenge to the traditional unification paradigm. But it need not necessarily be interpreted as a declaration of permanent hostility. North Korea’s current policy does not determine every possibility for the future. Its approach toward South Korea has changed in response to domestic politics and the international environment. There is therefore no reason to assume that the current state of hostility will last forever. The more important question is what we prepare for in the meantime.

Preparing for unification and preparing for coexistence are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, building institutions for long-term coexistence may also be essential for preserving the possibility of future unification. If channels of communication remain open, mechanisms for crisis management are in place, and the two sides accumulate experience in addressing shared problems, they will have greater room to respond to future political changes.

South Korea’s North Korea policy should therefore move beyond the binary of unification and division in the era of the hostile two-state doctrine. It should acknowledge the reality of two separate states without normalizing hostility; recognize different political systems without closing the door to cooperation; and keep the possibility of unification open without treating coexistence merely as a waiting period on the road to it.

The most important lesson that Romania and Moldova offer South Korea is not a model for achieving unification, but a way of managing separation while building institutions for coexistence.

In an era of two Koreas, that is what South Korea must prepare for before unification.