China’s Taiwan Invasion and Kim Jong-un’s Potential Provocation
Kim Yeolsoo,
Director of the Security Strategy Office, Korea Institute for Military Affairs
◯ Rising Likelihood of a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan
Tensions over a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan have intensified, especially after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit in August 2022, which angered Beijing. While the U.S. normalized relations with China in 1979 under the “One China” policy, it maintained unofficial ties with Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act, allowing arms sales. As China’s influence grew, so did U.S.–China rivalry, spotlighting the risk of China using force to unify Taiwan. In response, the U.S. passed the TAIPEI Act in 2019 to support Taiwan diplomatically, followed by the Taiwan Assurance Act in 2020 to reinforce its strategic importance and boost its asymmetric defense.
Despite repeatedly calling Taiwan a core interest under the “One China” principle, China responded to Pelosi’s visit with a show of force. Within hours of her departure, it launched four days of large-scale drills encircling Taiwan, including live-fire exercises and coordinated air and naval operations. Eleven Dongfeng (DF) missiles were fired, one of which flew over Taipei.
In 2024, China conducted similar encirclement drills under the codenames “Joint Sword-2024A” and “2024B.” Again, in April 2025, it mobilized army, navy, air force, and rocket units for another blockade simulation. This time, no codename was released—hinting that such exercises may now be standard practice.
Taiwan has continued its annual “Han Kuang Exercise,” first launched in 1984 to test its readiness against a potential Chinese attack. In 2025, a senior-level war game was held in March, with a command post drill planned for May and a live-force exercise set for July. Notably, Taiwanese media reported that this year’s drills are based on a scenario of a Chinese invasion in 2027—the 100th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army and the end of Xi Jinping’s third term—fueling speculation that Xi may use force to achieve unification and solidify his extended rule.
◯ The Second Trump Administration’s Defense Strategy
As China ramps up its exercises and Taiwan strengthens its defenses, a report outlining the Trump administration’s second-term defense priorities was leaked in late March. The “Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance,” drafted by the Pentagon, classifies China as the sole pacing threat and identifies one core objective: deterring Beijing from forcibly taking Taiwan while simultaneously protecting the U.S. homeland. The report also notes that the U.S. would be willing to “accept risk in other theaters,” expecting allies to play a bigger role in containing threats from nations like Russia, North Korea, and Iran.
To bolster regional strength, the U.S. plans to deploy submarines, bombers, unmanned vessels, and special forces to the Indo-Pacific. It will also use high-impact weapons, such as bunker-busting bombs designed to destroy hardened targets.
This strategic shift has significant implications for South Korea. It could redefine the role of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), increase South Korea’s responsibility in deterring North Korea, and lead to higher defense spending and cost-sharing. While USFK has traditionally focused on defending South Korea and maintaining regional stability, the new guidance suggests a possible role in Taiwan’s defense as well.
Under the concept of “strategic flexibility,” U.S. forces stationed in Korea could be redeployed in times of crisis. Beyond just a change in mission, this may involve structural realignments, such as relocating air assets or altering the rotation of the 2nd Infantry Division’s brigade. This raises concerns that a Taiwan crisis could expose South Korea to instability, creating a window of opportunity for North Korean aggression.
◯ China’s Invasion and Kim Jong-un’s Possible Military Provocations
South Korea’s stance on cross-strait relations has gradually evolved. After cutting ties with Taiwan in 1992 to establish relations with China, Seoul maintained the “One China” policy while expanding informal cooperation with Taipei in the 2000s. As U.S.–China tensions grew, South Korea took a pragmatic, ambiguous approach—but China’s strong backlash to THAAD deployment and its pro-North Korea stance pushed Seoul toward value-based alliances.
South Korea’s shift in policy stemmed from its opposition to China’s revisionist stance on Taiwan. This was reaffirmed in February during a trilateral meeting with the U.S. and Japan at the Munich Security Conference. Their joint statement stressed peace in the Taiwan Strait, called for a peaceful resolution, opposed unilateral changes by force, and backed Taiwan’s international participation. The message was clear: if China invades, South Korea will coordinate its response with the U.S. and Japan.
If China does invade Taiwan, two scenarios are plausible. One involves a limited strike focusing solely on Taiwan. The other—more likely—entails China provoking North Korea to simultaneously initiate aggression against South Korea to divide U.S. and allied military resources. Even if China wishes to limit the war to Taiwan, it may find it hard to resist the tactical advantage of fragmenting allied responses. Thus, the second, more complex scenario seems more probable.
Whether backed by China or acting on its own, North Korea may exploit the redeployment of U.S. forces to Taiwan to pursue its goal of unifying the peninsula under its rule. Its actions could range from limited provocations to a full-scale invasion. A Taiwan conflict is unlikely to stay localized—it could escalate into a broader U.S.–China clash or even a world war. If North Korea launches a major offensive, South Korea would likely respond independently and possibly seek unification, leaving it no choice but to focus entirely on national defense rather than intervening in the Taiwan crisis.
Even a limited provocation is possible. North Korea could go beyond past acts like the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan or the shelling of Yeonpyeong and attempt to occupy parts of the five western border islands. The attacker always has the advantage of selecting the time, location, and means of assault, making defense harder. At the mere sign of an attack, South Korea would likely prioritize defending its territory over participating in any regional defense effort for Taiwan.
Ultimately, the best way to prevent a Chinese invasion is through strong deterrence—both diplomatic and military. The second Trump administration’s “peace through strength” strategy, outlined in the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance, puts Taiwan’s defense at the core of U.S. planning. Likewise, South Korea’s priority should be deterring North Korean aggression under its own leadership. If deterrence fails and conflict breaks out, South Korea must focus on defending the peninsula rather than becoming involved in the Taiwan crisis.