The Second Trump Administration and North Korea
Jihwan Hwang
University of Seoul
I. Trump 2.0 and U.S. Foreign Policy
The inauguration of the second Trump administration in the United States, the prolonged Russia–Ukraine war, the bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities, and the strengthening of trilateral cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia have all accelerated the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar international order. Amid these shifts, the Korean Peninsula faces a new wave of security uncertainty.
The return of Donald Trump to the White House signifies more than a mere change of administration; it represents the resurgence of “America First” (MAGA) diplomacy. This approach raises the likelihood of instability within the U.S.–ROK alliance, neglect of the North Korean nuclear issue, and growing asymmetry in regional order.
At the same time, North Korea seeks to capitalize on this evolving environment by deepening its relations with Russia and China and expanding its strategic space within the emerging multipolar order. Against this backdrop, it is necessary to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the Trump administration’s North Korea strategy, Pyongyang’s diplomatic approach toward Washington, and the broader implications of the deepening North Korea–China–Russia alignment.
The Trump administration’s North Korea policy appears inherently contradictory. While Trump has at times made remarks suggesting de facto recognition of North Korea as a “nuclear power,” he has simultaneously reiterated calls for the “complete denuclearization of North Korea,” revealing a lack of consistency. This incoherence seems to stem from poor coordination with the State Department, an impulsive diplomatic style, and a transactional conception of foreign policy.
At the 2018 Singapore Summit, Trump declared that even adversaries can become friends, momentarily raising expectations for a shift in U.S.–DPRK relations. However, his policy actions failed to meet such expectations. His approach has been characterized by what might be described as “unstrategic impatience.” Driven by a desire for personal achievement but inattentive to structural solutions, Trump’s diplomacy yielded little substantive progress on the North Korean nuclear issue.
Similar tendencies are likely to persist in his second term. Although Trump may once again pursue summit diplomacy with Kim Jong Un to showcase his foreign policy achievements, meaningful progress in negotiations remains unlikely. Unless the U.S. national interests are clearly served, Trump is unlikely to prioritize the North Korea issue—potentially producing adverse effects on the U.S.–ROK alliance.
Moreover, trilateral cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Japan remains fragile. Although security coordination temporarily strengthened following the 2023 Camp David Summit, domestic political transitions and leadership changes in each country have since eroded its momentum. As a result, regional mechanisms to counter shifts in the Indo-Pacific order and North Korea’s increasingly assertive posture appear to be weakening.
II. North Korea: From Heads-on Breakthrough to Multipolar Diplomacy
In contrast, North Korea’s foreign strategy remains an extension of its so-called “heads-on Breakthrough campaign.” Since the failure of the Hanoi Summit, Kim Jong Un has harbored deep mistrust toward the United States, declaring that there is nothing left to explore through negotiations with Washington. This sentiment has significantly reduced the likelihood of renewed U.S.–DPRK dialogue.
Yet Kim’s approach goes beyond mere criticism of the United States. He perceives the global order as fundamentally multipolar, viewing American hegemony as already in decline. On this basis, Pyongyang seeks to expand cooperation with Russia and China and to craft a new external strategy suited to the evolving multipolar structure.
North Korea’s support for Russia during the Ukraine war, including personnel or logistical assistance, has elevated bilateral relations to what some analysts describe as a quasi-security alliance, symbolizing a transformation in the strategic landscape of the Korean Peninsula.
However, this North Korea–Russia partnership is unlikely to be permanent. Once the war ends and Russia’s strategic need for North Korea diminishes, Pyongyang’s relative importance may also decline. Anticipating this, North Korea is attempting to reestablish a long-term safety net through rapprochement with China. Kim Jong Un’s attendance at China’s Victory Day celebrations reflects this strategic calculation—a move aimed at recalibrating North Korea–China relations and pursuing a form of “balancing diplomacy” within the emerging multipolar order.
The joint appearance of Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un at the Victory Day event reignited speculation about a North Korea–China–Russia trilateral alignment. Nevertheless, its long-term prospects remain uncertain. China continues to maintain an image of neutrality on the Korean Peninsula, while Russia appears to treat North Korea primarily as a strategic instrument. Consequently, the so-called “new Cold War” configuration—pitting the United States, South Korea, and Japan against North Korea, China, and Russia—has yet to solidify into a durable structure.
Nonetheless, these developments have further intensified security instability on the Korean Peninsula, narrowing South Korea’s strategic maneuvering space. The convergence of U.S. diplomatic inconsistency, North Korea’s multipolar diplomacy, and China’s calculated regional strategy is collectively driving Northeast Asia toward a state of “unstable multipolarity.”
Recently, North Korea has also sought to redefine inter-Korean relations—from the traditional conception of a “special relationship aimed at unification” to that of two mutually hostile, belligerent states. The Kim regime’s policy evolution—from the Byungjin line (pursuing simultaneous nuclear and economic development) in 2013, to the declaration of nuclear deterrence completion in 2017, the heads-on breakthrough campaign in 2020, and the “state of war” doctrine in 2024—illustrates a decisive shift away from the discourse of unification toward a more assertive, security-oriented national strategy.
Since the collapse of the Hanoi Summit in 2019, Pyongyang has ceased to regard Seoul as a negotiation partner, designating it instead as its “principal enemy.” It now treats the rhetoric of “national unity” and “reunification” as empty slogans devoid of practical utility. Within the evolving multipolar context, this transformation represents an active strategic response by North Korea—one that seeks to exploit the competition among the United States, China, and Russia to enhance its regime survival, strategic autonomy, and military leverage.
III. South Korea’s Strategic Choice in an Unstable World Order
The Trump administration’s second-term policy toward North Korea can be summarized in two words: uncertainty and impulsiveness. North Korea seeks to exploit these tendencies to expand its strategic space; however, excessive dependence on Russia and China could in turn create new risks. The weakening of U.S. leadership and the growing alignment among North Korea, China, and Russia together pose new security threats to the Korean Peninsula, presenting South Korea with a fundamental challenge in crafting its diplomatic and security strategy.
South Korea must now develop a strategy that simultaneously strengthens its independent deterrence capabilities and advances a diplomacy suited to the emerging multipolar order. Seoul should seek to expand its diplomatic maneuvering space within this order—mitigating the cohesion of the North Korea–China–Russia bloc—while strengthening the U.S.-ROK alliance.
The ongoing transition toward multipolarity thus constitutes both a crisis and an opportunity. If South Korea can secure strategic flexibility amid these transformations, it will be better positioned to maintain a balance between peace and security in an increasingly unstable regional environment.
With regard to North Korea policy, South Korea should uphold the constitutional commitment to peaceful unification and the spirit of the 1991 Basic Agreement, even as Pyongyang abandons its own unification discourse. At the same time, Seoul must pursue a long-term strategy aimed at inducing gradual change within the North Korean system. This requires an approach that emphasizes public diplomacy for unification—one capable of earning the support and trust of the North Korean people.
Furthermore, while reinforcing extended deterrence through the U.S.–ROK alliance, South Korea must also craft a calibrated and sophisticated diplomatic strategy that avoids unnecessarily provoking the North Korea–China–Russia alignment. In the short term, stabilizing inter-Korean relations and fostering conditions for sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula should remain central to South Korea’s strategic priorities.
O This commentary was originally presented at the KINU International Conference, “The END Initiative and the Future of the Korean Peninsula,” held on November 10, 2025.