Why the IAEA General Conference Should Launch an International Debate on “Halting” North Korea’s Nuclear Program
Bong-geun Jeon
Visiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute
President, Korean Society for Nuclear Policy Studies
“How can we resolve the issues on the Korean Peninsula? They can never be fully resolved. We can only manage them.” This is the central question posed by Tim Marshall in Prisoners of Geography (2016). Throughout the post-Cold War era, we have sought to “solve” the problems of the Korean Peninsula. Yet, because of the entrenched geopolitics of Northeast Asia and the division of the Korean Peninsula, we have remained fixated on a “complete solution”—a goal that cannot realistically be achieved in the short term—and, in doing so, have missed opportunities even to “manage” the situation.
The Lee Jae-myung administration’s proposal to prioritize “halting” North Korea’s nuclear program represents a pragmatic diplomatic strategy that acknowledges the uncomfortable reality of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and seeks, above all, to prevent the situation from deteriorating further. With the possibility of resuming U.S.–North Korea summit diplomacy now being discussed, debate over the potential risks and limitations of such summits is intensifying. While a U.S.–North Korea summit in itself would not constitute a solution, it is almost certain that the North Korean nuclear issue and South Korea’s security environment will continue to deteriorate if the current trajectory persists in the absence of dialogue. At this juncture, a U.S.–North Korea summit may offer the most realistic opportunity to halt the expansion of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and improve the security environment on the Korean Peninsula.
Why the “Status Quo” on North Korea’s Nuclear Program Is Dangerous
Recently, when President Trump expressed his intention to hold a summit with Chairman Kim Jong-un before the end of the year, concerns and criticism outweighed expectations in both South Korea and the United States. Critics have argued that “bypassing Seoul” could weaken the ROK–U.S. alliance; that negotiations could shift from denuclearization to nuclear arms control; that a “small deal” could effectively amount to recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-armed state; and that, if a “big deal” cannot be achieved, it would be preferable to have “no deal” rather than accept a bad agreement. Ultimately, the argument is that if a “big deal” involving the “Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID)” of North Korea’s nuclear program is unattainable, maintaining the status quo would be preferable to accepting a “small deal” or an unfavorable agreement.
There is no disagreement that CVID remains the preferred end state for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue. However, despite the extensive use of incentives, sanctions, and pressure throughout the post-Cold War era, the South Korean and U.S. governments have been unable to achieve CVID. Following its sixth nuclear test and ICBM test launch in 2017, North Korea declared the “completion of its national nuclear forces,“ effectively establishing itself as a nuclear-armed state.
Under these circumstances, we can no longer afford to allow the “status quo” of North Korea’s nuclear program to persist. As time passes, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continue to expand, while the political, economic, and security costs of denuclearization continue to rise. As the saying goes, “The cost of denuclearization is always lower today than it will be tomorrow.”
This is the conclusion I have reached after observing the North Korean nuclear issue over an extended period. Through the U.S.–North Korea Geneva Agreed Framework and the Six-Party Talks, we missed opportunities when North Korea’s nuclear program might still have been stopped with a mere hoe. Today, the North Korean nuclear issue is difficult to stop even with a shovel. Even if a U.S.–North Korea summit is held, it remains uncertain whether a new opportunity for denuclearization will emerge. However, if this opportunity is missed, the North Korean nuclear crisis will only worsen, and the cost of denuclearization will continue to rise, making the problem increasingly difficult to address—even with tools far larger than a shovel.
The “uncomfortable truth” we must confront is that North Korea has already acquired nuclear weapons and that complete denuclearization is virtually unattainable in the foreseeable future. In a survey conducted by Seoul National University’s Institute for Unification and Peace in October 2025, 89.7 percent of respondents said that “North Korea will not abandon its nuclear weapons.” This finding also reflects growing public recognition of the changed reality surrounding North Korea’s nuclear program. “North Korean denuclearization” is no longer viewed as the immediate objective of our North Korea policy, but is increasingly regarded as a long-term goal, much like “unification.” Ultimately, we have entered an era of “coexisting with North Korea’s nuclear weapons”—a situation we have long sought to avoid.
The problem lies in the risks associated with “coexisting with North Korea’s nuclear weapons.” This is because the “status quo” of North Korea’s nuclear program is not a static condition; it does not mean that North Korea will freeze its nuclear capabilities at their current level.
President Trump has stated that North Korea possesses “57 very powerful nuclear weapons.” President Lee Jae-myung also warned at a press conference in January 2026 that “North Korea’s nuclear armament is an undeniable reality” and that North Korea is producing enough nuclear material annually for approximately 10 to 20 nuclear warheads. If this trend continues, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal could be significantly larger a decade from now than it is today.
If North Korea’s nuclear buildup continues over the long term, international opposition to recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state under the NPT could gradually weaken. Over the next 10 to 20 years, North Korea could increasingly come to be treated as a “de facto nuclear-weapon state,” much as India and Pakistan are today. Such an outcome would further weaken the international nuclear nonproliferation regime centered on the NPT and increase the risk that North Korea could transfer nuclear weapons, technologies, or materials abroad. In South Korea and Japan, calls for developing indigenous nuclear capabilities or redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons could also become increasingly prominent. At the same time, amid an intensifying inter-Korean arms race and persistent military confrontation, the risk of escalation, miscalculation, or even inadvertent nuclear use would increase.
Given North Korea’s continued opposition to denuclearization, CVID is virtually unattainable under current conditions, and we should not accept the “status quo.” The most realistic course of action is therefore to pursue a phased denuclearization strategy that initially prioritizes achieving a “halt” to North Korea’s nuclear program.
From CVID to a Phased Denuclearization Strategy Prioritizing a “Halt” to North Korea’s Nuclear Program
There are two broad approaches to the North Korean nuclear issue: the “clear-cut” solution and the “uncomfortable” solution. The former seeks to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue comprehensively through maximum sanctions and pressure, a “big deal” aimed at CVID, rejection of “small deals,” and, potentially, military options. If successful, this approach could resolve both the North Korean nuclear issue and the broader security challenges on the Korean Peninsula in a single decisive step. In practice, however, its feasibility is extremely limited, while the risk of military conflict is high. Under this approach, CVID and the principle of “denuclearization first, followed by the establishment of a peace regime” have often amounted to little more than aspirational slogans because the necessary means and mechanisms to achieve these objectives have been lacking. As this approach has been pursued, confrontation with North Korea has continued, while Pyongyang has used the resulting time and strategic space to further advance its nuclear capabilities.
By contrast, the “uncomfortable” solution begins with the recognition that existing denuclearization strategies have failed and that some form of coexistence with North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is likely to be unavoidable for the foreseeable future. While retaining complete denuclearization as the long-term objective, this approach places immediate emphasis on urgent security priorities, including “halting” North Korea’s nuclear program to prevent further expansion, reducing the likelihood of military conflict, and mitigating nuclear risks. In other words, this approach does not abandon CVID; rather, it temporarily prioritizes preventing further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and reducing the possibility of nuclear use.
This approach acknowledges South Korea’s limitations and places significant reliance on the United States. However, this does not make it a conciliatory policy toward North Korea. Rather, it maintains that economic sanctions should remain in place as long as North Korea continues to advance its nuclear program, while South Korea must strengthen its own defense capabilities and the ROK–U.S. alliance in response to the North Korean nuclear threat.
The Lee Jae-myung administration has adopted this “uncomfortable” solution as part of its pragmatic diplomatic approach. The “E.N.D. (Exchange, Normalization of Relations, Denuclearization) Initiative,” announced in September 2025, also reflects this pragmatic orientation. The initiative calls for its three pillars to be pursued flexibly, beginning with what is feasible rather than assigning priority to any single pillar.
Furthermore, the Lee administration has proposed a “three-step” approach to North Korea’s denuclearization: suspension–reduction–abandonment. This represents a realistic effort to focus first on “suspending” North Korea’s nuclear program—thereby preventing further expansion of its nuclear capabilities—rather than repeatedly invoking the goal of “complete denuclearization,” which has thus far produced limited results.
Here, “suspension” of North Korea’s nuclear program includes halting the production of weapons-usable nuclear material, suspending the weaponization of nuclear capabilities, and refraining from nuclear tests and ICBM test launches.
Above all, the Lee Jae-myung administration seeks to create a breakthrough in the denuclearization process through a U.S.–North Korea summit. To this end, at the South Korea–U.S. summit in August 2025, President Lee asked President Trump to serve as a “peacemaker” on the Korean Peninsula and offered to play the role of a “pace-maker” in support of that effort. This represented a departure from the Moon Jae-in administration’s concept of South Korea as the primary “driver” of inter-Korean diplomacy, giving the United States greater latitude in shaping its approach to North Korea.
The Possibility and Expectations for a U.S.-North Korea Summit
To create a new opportunity to advance North Korea’s denuclearization, a U.S.–North Korea summit is needed to break the current diplomatic deadlock. Nevertheless, many experts believe that despite President Trump’s interest in holding such a summit, the initiative is likely to fail because Kim Jong-un may choose not to respond. There are several legitimate reasons for this pessimistic assessment. Kim clearly remembers the so-called “Hanoi humiliation” of February 2019 and is unlikely to want to repeat that experience. Moreover, unlike in the past, North Korea has substantially expanded its nuclear arsenal and deepened its security and economic cooperation with Russia and China. As a result, Pyongyang has less immediate incentive to engage in dialogue with the United States or seek sanctions relief.
At the same time, recent developments in South Korea–U.S. relations suggest that the possibility of a U.S.–North Korea summit remains open. President Trump has repeatedly stated in recent years that he maintains a good personal relationship with Kim Jong-un. Notably, while President Trump has emphasized that he helped prevent a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula, he has recently placed less emphasis on the objective of North Korean denuclearization. In mid-August, President Trump announced on social media a significant reduction in ongoing U.S.–South Korea joint military exercises, describing the exercises as “totally inappropriate and hostile.” This appeared to be an effort to create conditions conducive to dialogue, taking into account North Korea’s longstanding demand for an end to what it characterizes as U.S. “hostile policy” as a precondition for talks. Subsequently, on August 19, 2026, President Trump publicly announced that he would meet with Kim before the end of the year.
Kim has also not categorically ruled out the possibility of a U.S.–North Korea summit. In September 2025, he stated that there would be no reason not to meet with the United States unless Washington made denuclearization a precondition for talks. More recently, while Kim Yo-jong has sharply criticized the South Korean and U.S. governments, she has been notably restrained in her comments about President Trump, emphasizing that her brother retains positive memories of and favorable feelings toward him.
From Kim Jong-un’s perspective, there is little reason to categorically reject dialogue with the United States unless such dialogue is explicitly framed as negotiations over denuclearization. In particular, a meeting with the leader of the United States—the world’s most powerful country and a key pillar of the ROK–U.S. alliance—could offer significant strategic and diplomatic benefits, both in terms of North Korea’s approach to South Korea and Kim’s efforts to enhance his international standing. Kim Jong-un attracted considerable international attention when he appeared alongside President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin at the Victory Day celebrations in Beijing in 2025. It is therefore difficult to rule out the possibility that he could travel to China for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Shenzhen this November, where he could meet with Trump bilaterally or participate in a trilateral meeting with Xi Jinping.
If Xi were to invite Kim Jong-un to the APEC Summit and facilitate high-level meetings—including a U.S.–North Korea summit or a U.S.–North Korea–China trilateral summit—it would provide Beijing with an opportunity to demonstrate China’s diplomatic influence and Xi’s ability to shape the regional security environment. In particular, President Trump could ask Xi to help facilitate a U.S.–North Korea summit during his visit to the United States in late September. Trump had sought to meet with Kim Jong-un during his visit to Gyeongju in October 2025 and again during his visit to Beijing in May 2026, but neither effort materialized because Kim Jong-un declined to meet with him.
Trump is expected to make a concerted effort to hold a U.S.–North Korea summit before the end of this year, potentially using the Shenzhen APEC Summit as an opportunity.
While Trump is unlikely to formally recognize North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, he may also refrain from making denuclearization an explicit public precondition for talks. Even such a shift would represent a significant and welcome development from North Korea’s perspective compared with previous U.S. positions. Pyongyang could nevertheless attempt to portray such a development as amounting to de facto U.S. recognition of its nuclear status. Taking these factors into account, the possibility of a U.S.–North Korea summit in November may be greater than at any point since 2019.
The evolving positions of the South Korean and U.S. governments have therefore expanded the space for North Korea to consider renewed dialogue. Although Pyongyang claims that its economy has recently improved, North Korea remains subject to extensive international sanctions and largely excluded from the global economic system, with significant economic cooperation concentrated primarily among a limited number of friendly states. Its international standing also remains far removed from that of a normal, internationally recognized state. North Korea may therefore find it difficult to simply dismiss the possibility of a U.S.–North Korea summit, particularly if such a meeting could provide an avenue for addressing sanctions relief, expanding economic exchanges, normalizing bilateral relations, and improving North Korea’s international standing.
If South Korea and the United States were to present in advance a political, diplomatic, and economic package commensurate with North Korea’s participation in a summit and its concrete measures to “halt its nuclear program,” Kim Jong-un’s strategic calculations could change. Ultimately, the key to making a U.S.–North Korea summit possible is to convince North Korea that “engaging in dialogue is more advantageous than refusing to do so.” Given the potential importance of such a summit as a catalyst for restarting the denuclearization and peace process on the Korean Peninsula, which has remained stalled for years, the South Korean and U.S. governments should adopt a more proactive approach to creating the conditions necessary for such a summit to take place.