Trust Before Pressure: Digital Regulation, Nuclear-Powered Submarines, and the Future of the U.S.–ROK Alliance                    Jung KimUniversity of North Korean StudiesWhy Alliance Trust Matters NowThe U.S.–ROK alliance has long been sustained by a shared commitment to deterrence, democracy, and regional stability. For decades, its central purpose was clear: preventing war on the Korean Peninsula and deterring North Korean aggression.Today, however, the alliance must operate in a far more complex strategic environment. Military threats, technological competition, digital regulation, supply-chain security, and economic statecraft have become increasingly interconnected. As a result, the future of the alliance will depend not only on military readiness but also on the ability of both governments to manage economic and regulatory disputes without undermining strategic trust.It is in this context that two issues deserve particular attention: digital regulation, including disputes involving Coupang, and South Korea's pursuit of conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines. At first glance, these appear to be unrelated issues. One falls within the realm of platform governance, competition policy, data protection, and trade.The other concerns maritime deterrence, undersea capabilities, and nonproliferation. Yet both ultimately raise the same fundamental question: whether the United States is prepared to treat South Korea as a mature strategic partner whose domestic governance and defense modernization merit respect, meaningful consultation, and forward-looking support.The alliance should therefore be guided by a clear principle. The United States should defend fairness, but it should not seek privilege. It should address proliferation concerns, but it should not deny South Korea the conventional capabilities necessary to respond effectively to a rapidly evolving security environment.Digital Regulation and the Need for Fairness Without PrivilegeSouth Korea's digital regulatory debates should not be dismissed as protectionism. Like other advanced democracies, South Korea faces genuine challenges in governing large digital platforms. These include consumer protection, data security, fair competition, labor standards, market concentration, and the vulnerability of small merchants. Such concerns represent legitimate public policy priorities. No democratic government can remain passive when digital platforms wield extensive influence over markets, data, logistics, and everyday life.The controversy surrounding Coupang has made these questions especially sensitive. Coupang is deeply embedded in South Korea's consumer economy, yet it is also a U.S.-listed company with a global investor base. Its regulatory treatment in South Korea is therefore no longer viewed solely as a domestic matter. Recent reporting has linked the company's data breach, regulatory investigations, investor concerns, and broader U.S. scrutiny of South Korea's digital regulatory environment to wider tensions in U.S.–ROK economic relations.The United States is justified in asking whether South Korea's digital regulations are transparent, proportionate, and non-discriminatory. If regulatory standards are vague, applied retroactively, enforced selectively, or shaped by political considerations, they risk undermining confidence not only in South Korea's regulatory system but also in the economic foundation of the alliance. Regulatory predictability is essential for investment, innovation, and bilateral trust.At the same time, Washington should be careful not to portray every Korean regulatory action affecting a U.S.-linked firm as inherently anti-American. Such an approach would be strategically counterproductive. It would reinforce the perception that the United States supports rule-based governance only when its application does not disadvantage American companies. It would also weaken the credibility of legitimate U.S. concerns by making them appear less about fairness than about seeking exemption from rules that apply to others.The better approach is not political pressure but disciplined consultation. The United States should advocate due process, legal clarity, and equal treatment for all firms, regardless of nationality. It should encourage South Korea to distinguish clearly among three distinct issues: data-security failures, abuses of market power, and ordinary commercial success. A company should not be penalized simply because it is large, foreign-linked, or politically prominent. Nor should it receive immunity because it has American investors or is listed on a U.S. stock exchange.The alliance needs a dedicated digital trust mechanism. Such a mechanism could be established within the KORUS framework or through a parallel bilateral channel. Its purpose would not be to weaken South Korea's regulatory sovereignty but to prevent regulatory disputes from escalating into broader alliance tensions. It could provide for advance consultation on major platform legislation, regulatory impact assessments, cybersecurity cooperation, data-breach notification standards, and a neutral forum for discussing competition-law concerns.The guiding principle should be straightforward: South Korea should regulate digital platforms through general, transparent, and consistently enforced rules, while the United States should defend procedural fairness without seeking special treatment for U.S.-linked firms.Nuclear-Powered Submarines and Responsible DeterrenceThe second issue concerns South Korea's pursuit of conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines. This initiative should be understood not as a symbolic quest for prestige but as an important element of alliance modernization.The security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula is evolving rapidly. North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities, while undersea operations and maritime domain awareness are becoming increasingly important to deterrence. In this evolving strategic environment, South Korea's ability to monitor, track, and deter maritime threats will become an increasingly important component of the alliance's overall effectiveness.A South Korean nuclear-powered submarine should therefore be viewed not as a step toward nuclear armament but as a conventionally armed strategic capability powered by nuclear propulsion. Its principal advantages lie in greater endurance, survivability, persistent undersea presence, and enhanced maritime deterrence.Diesel-electric submarines remain highly capable, but they face inherent operational limitations in endurance and sustained submerged operations. Nuclear propulsion would enable South Korea to operate underwater for extended periods, enhancing its ability to monitor and track North Korean submarine activity while contributing to regional maritime stability.Washington has begun to recognize this strategic logic. Recent reporting and official statements suggest that South Korea's pursuit of conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines is increasingly being viewed as a potential alliance capability rather than merely a national procurement project. The Changbogo-N program has been presented as aiming to field a first nuclear-powered attack submarine by the mid-2030s. South Korean and U.S. officials have also highlighted its potential contribution to allied maritime capabilities and long-term alliance modernization.The question now is whether the United States will move from cautious acceptance to constructive enablement. Approval in principle is not sufficient. If Washington recognizes South Korea's strategic requirements but delays implementation through bureaucratic caution, export-control uncertainty, fuel-cycle concerns, or industrial constraints, the consequences could be significant. Seoul may conclude that U.S. support is rhetorically strong but operationally uncertain.A forward-looking U.S. policy should rest on four guiding principles.First, Washington should publicly recognize a South Korean nuclear-powered submarine as a conventionally armed strategic capability that is compatible with both the alliance and the global nonproliferation regime. It should make clear that the issue concerns nuclear propulsion, not nuclear weapons.Second, the two governments should establish a dedicated bilateral working group bringing together experts in defense, energy, law, shipbuilding, and nonproliferation. This effort should not be left to fragmented bureaucratic channels but should be managed through a coordinated institutional framework.Third, the United States should support a transparent nuclear fuel-management framework grounded in rigorous safeguards, comprehensive material accounting, and close cooperation with international verification standards. The objective should be to build confidence before mistrust takes hold.Fourth, Washington should integrate the submarine initiative into a broader framework of alliance industrial cooperation. South Korea's world-class shipbuilding industry, robust defense-industrial base, and growing investment in U.S. maritime infrastructure can make significant contributions to allied resilience. Cooperation on conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines should therefore be understood not as a concession to Seoul but as an investment in strengthening allied maritime capability and long-term strategic integration.Not a Transaction, but Alliance ModernizationThe United States should avoid treating these two issues as transactional bargaining chips. It should not imply that support for South Korea's pursuit of conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines depends on favorable regulatory treatment for Coupang. Nor should South Korea suggest that legitimate concerns about digital regulation can be set aside because it contributes more to alliance defense. Such linkage would reduce alliance management to transactional bargaining and erode the strategic trust on which the alliance depends.Yet these two issues are connected at a deeper level. Both speak to the meaning of a mature alliance. In the economic domain, maturity means accepting that allies may regulate their markets differently while insisting that such regulation remains transparent, predictable, and fair. In the security domain, maturity means recognizing that a capable ally should assume greater responsibility while remaining firmly anchored in shared norms and nonproliferation commitments.For the United States, the central task is to combine firmness with restraint. It should be firm in defending non-discrimination, due process, and open digital markets, while exercising restraint in avoiding coercive pressure that could make legitimate regulation appear incompatible with alliance solidarity. It should also be firm in upholding the global nonproliferation regime, while taking a forward-looking approach to helping South Korea develop advanced conventional capabilities that strengthen deterrence without crossing the nuclear threshold.Trust as the Alliance’s Most Important CapabilityThe future of the U.S.–ROK alliance will not be determined by military exercises alone. It will also depend on whether the two countries can manage difficult disagreements without turning them into tests of political loyalty. Digital regulation and conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines are not peripheral issues. They represent the emerging terrain of alliance politics, where economic governance, technological policy, and strategic deterrence increasingly intersect.Washington should therefore send a clear and consistent message. In the digital domain, it should seek fairness, not privilege. In the security domain, it should support responsible deterrence, not nuclear armament. Across both domains, it should treat South Korea as a trusted strategic partner capable of assuming greater responsibility within a transparent, rules-based framework.A credible alliance requires more than extended deterrence. It requires confidence that each side understands the other's domestic constraints, strategic concerns, and long-term responsibilities. For South Korea, this means regulating digital markets through transparent, predictable, and even-handed rules. For the United States, it means supporting South Korea's defense modernization with strategic vision and sustained commitment.Trust is not built by avoiding disagreement. It is built by managing disagreement through shared principles, mutual respect, and institutionalized cooperation. That is the standard by which the next phase of the U.S.–ROK alliance should be judged.

South Korea Is Not Turning Away from the United States: Alliance Continuity, Strategic Adaptation, and the Limits of Ideological Interpretation                    J.R. KimPresidentKorea Council for Peace and Cooperation1. IntroductionAs the Lee Jae-myung administration marks its first year in office, assessments of changes in South Korea’s foreign policy and the future trajectory of the ROK–U.S. alliance have become increasingly active. Since President Lee’s election in June last year, a central question among both domestic and international policy communities has been how the new administration would manage its alliance with the United States and recalibrate its relationship with China.Among the more pessimistic arguments in this debate is an article by Nicholas Eberstadt and Lawrence Peck, “South Korea Takes a Hard Left Turn Against America,” published in the Wall Street Journal. The authors characterize the Lee administration as fundamentally unfriendly toward the United States and argue that its policy direction could ultimately lead to a weakening of the ROK–U.S. alliance.However, such an assessment does not adequately reflect the actual policies of the South Korean government or the current state of the alliance. While legitimate criticism and disagreement may exist regarding specific policies of the Lee administration, the conclusion that South Korea is drifting away from democracy and the ROK–U.S. alliance is not sufficiently supported by observable policy behavior or by the institutional realities of the alliance.Rather, the analysis by Eberstadt and Peck relies heavily on ideological labeling and selective evidence, failing to account for the complex and multifaceted nature of South Korean politics and foreign policy, thereby reducing it to an overly simplified interpretation.2. Alliance Continuity and Historical ContextAt the core of their argument is the claim that the Lee administration is inherently anti-American and ultimately seeks to weaken the ROK–U.S. alliance. However, the evidence presented to support this broad conclusion is limited.Policy differences between allies are not unusual, nor do such differences necessarily imply strategic divergence. Indeed, a review of the history of the ROK–U.S. alliance shows that successive South Korean governments, regardless of their progressive or conservative orientation, have repeatedly differed with Washington on issues such as North Korea policy, China policy, and defense cost-sharing. Nevertheless, such disagreements have largely been managed within the framework of the alliance and have not fundamentally undermined its continuity or stability.Moreover, policy disagreements on specific issues do not equate to opposition to the alliance itself. Such differences are common among sovereign democratic allies and should not be interpreted as evidence of hostility or strategic realignment.Since the Korean War, South Korea has maintained close military cooperation with the United States and continues to rely heavily on U.S. security commitments and extended deterrence in responding to North Korea’s evolving threats. In addition, the two countries have developed deeply institutionalized cooperation in defense, intelligence, advanced technology, economic security, and supply chain resilience.Given these structural realities, it is difficult to conclude that South Korea is undergoing an anti-American shift or moving away from the alliance on the basis of a change in administration or limited policy disagreements. Several former U.S. diplomats and Korea specialists similarly emphasize that political change in South Korea does not automatically translate into alliance weakening, highlighting instead the institutional resilience of South Korean democracy and the structural durability of the alliance.3. The Empirical Reality of the AllianceIn practice, South Korea remains one of the United States’ most important allies. The two countries maintain extensive military cooperation and intelligence-sharing mechanisms and continue to expand collaboration in areas such as advanced technology, supply chain stability, and economic security. In the face of North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities, South Korea continues to rely on U.S. extended deterrence, while the United States regards South Korea as a key pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy.Most importantly, the actual policies pursued by the Lee administration merit careful attention. Since taking office, the administration has repeatedly reaffirmed that the ROK–U.S. alliance constitutes the cornerstone of its foreign and security policy. President Lee, shortly after his inauguration, held a phone call with U.S. President Donald Trump, emphasizing the importance of the alliance and the need for close cooperation. The two countries have since maintained regular high-level consultations through diplomatic and national security channels.More concretely, the administration’s policies are broadly consistent with this official stance. South Korea has not called for the reduction or withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea and has maintained the existing combined defense posture. It has continued large-scale joint military exercises with the United States and sustained cooperation on extended deterrence and nuclear consultation mechanisms. In other words, the core institutional and security architecture of the ROK–U.S. alliance has remained intact under the current administration.The Lee administration has also maintained trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan. It has not sought to terminate the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), and the real-time missile warning data-sharing mechanism has been preserved. Despite domestic political sensitivities surrounding relations with Japan, the administration regards trilateral security cooperation as an important policy asset for strengthening regional deterrence and reinforcing the ROK–U.S. alliance.Furthermore, strategic cooperation is expanding beyond traditional military security into economic security. South Korea continues to deepen collaboration with the United States in shipbuilding, semiconductors, batteries, and artificial intelligence, while also exploring cooperation in naval maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO). This reflects not alliance contraction, but rather modernization and functional expansion.4. U.S. Policy Assessments and Alliance StabilityThis reality is broadly consistent with official assessments issued by the U.S. government. Washington has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to the ROK–U.S. alliance while emphasizing alliance modernization and the expansion of its cooperative scope. Public statements by U.S. foreign and security officials indicate that current U.S. priorities lie less in concerns over alliance weakening and more in strengthening deterrence, expanding economic security cooperation, and deepening Indo-Pacific strategic coordination.While external commentators may offer varying interpretations of the alliance’s future, the U.S. government’s assessment—responsible for formulating and implementing alliance policy—should also be treated as a critical analytical reference point. If South Korea’s policies were perceived as undermining the alliance, U.S. officials would likely have expressed concern through public statements or policy adjustments. However, the prevailing U.S. position continues to emphasize continuity, modernization, and expanded cooperation rather than decline or disengagement.5. China Policy and Strategic ComplexityEberstadt and Peck tend to interpret South Korea’s greater diplomatic flexibility as evidence of strategic realignment away from the United States. Yet South Korea, like many U.S. allies, operates within a complex strategic environment in which it must maintain a security alliance with the United States while managing deep economic interdependence with China. Accordingly, efforts to maintain stable relations with China cannot automatically be equated with strategic distancing from the United States.Unlike during the Cold War, most U.S. allies today pursue dual-track strategies: maintaining security cooperation with the United States while sustaining significant economic ties with China. Japan, Australia, and major European states all exhibit this pattern. The United States itself has adopted a “de-risking” approach rather than full decoupling, focusing on semiconductors, advanced technologies, and critical supply chains. Diplomatic engagement with China therefore cannot automatically be interpreted as evidence of strategic alignment.International alliance politics today operate on a more complex logic than Cold War-era assumptions that security and economic relations must align. Reducing interstate behavior to zero-sum logic risks oversimplifying reality. South Korea’s approach reflects geopolitical and economic constraints rather than ideological alignment. Pursuing differentiated policies in security and economic domains is a common pattern among middle powers.6. Domestic Politics and Democratic ResilienceThe portrayal by Eberstadt and Peck of South Korean domestic politics also relies on exaggerated interpretations. The authors characterize the Democratic Party as “radical left” and suggest that constitutional reform could lead to authoritarian rule. However, such claims are largely speculative and fail to reflect the resilience of South Korea’s democratic institutions.South Korea remains a competitive multiparty democracy with an independent judiciary, free press, vibrant civil society, and high political participation. Constitutional revision requires approval by both the National Assembly and a national referendum, ensuring strong institutional constraints. While democratic backsliding is a legitimate concern in any democracy, current evidence does not support the conclusion that South Korea is undergoing authoritarian transformation.7. Historical Interpretation and Alliance FrictionsThe authors also selectively interpret historical and policy issues. Participation in 1980s democratization movements does not determine contemporary foreign policy orientation, as such backgrounds exist across both progressive and conservative camps. Linking decades-old activism to present-day anti-Americanism involves a significant analytical leap.Similarly, legal disputes involving foreign firms, USFK facilities, and intelligence issues are typical institutional frictions within alliances. Comparable cases exist among U.S. alliances in Europe. These should be understood as managed disagreements within institutional frameworks rather than evidence of strategic rupture.8. The Limits of Ideological InterpretationUltimately, the most fundamental limitation of Eberstadt and Peck’s analysis is its tendency to reduce diverse policy choices to ideological categories. Engagement with China becomes “pro-China alignment,” policy divergence becomes “anti-Americanism,” and constitutional debate becomes “authoritarian drift.” This framework fails to capture the complexity of South Korea’s strategic environment and democratic politics.Such an approach underestimates South Korea’s capacity to simultaneously maintain its alliance with the United States while advancing its own security and economic interests. Policy flexibility among allies is a normal feature of international politics and does not, in itself, indicate strategic defection.9. ConclusionThe ROK–U.S. alliance has endured for more than 70 years not because it reflects the preferences of any single government, but because it is grounded in shared strategic interests, institutionalized cooperation, and broad public support in both countries. Despite changes in political leadership and periodic policy disagreements, the alliance has remained structurally stable.South Korea is not turning away from the United States. Rather, it is pursuing its national interests within a complex strategic environment while maintaining democracy and the alliance as core foundations. Interpretations of democratic collapse or strategic realignment lack sufficient empirical support.Ultimately, assessments of South Korea’s foreign policy and the future of the ROK–U.S. alliance should be grounded in observable policy behavior, institutional continuity, and shared strategic interests rather than ideological inference. The evidence to date supports not alliance erosion or strategic defection, but alliance adaptation and development in response to evolving strategic conditions.

The Historical Significance of the June 15 Joint Declaration and the Lee Jae-myung Administration’s Efforts to Promote Peace on the Korean Peninsula                    Seunghyun LeeVisiting ProfessorInstitute for Unification Studies, Yonsei UniversityFor the South Korean people, June is a month marked by profound historical wounds. The designation of Memorial Day as a national holiday in June—a month most closely associated with the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25—can be understood as a national effort to honor the patriotic martyrs and fallen heroes who sacrificed their lives during times of national crisis, including the Korean War, while also helping to heal the nation’s collective historical trauma.Against this backdrop, the June 15 Joint Declaration, announced at the dawn of the twenty-first century, represented the first occasion in the 55 years since the division of the Korean Peninsula that the principal parties to the Korean War—North and South Korea—met directly and jointly declared their commitment to reconciliation and cooperation before both domestic and international audiences. Its significance is particularly profound because it marked the first historic summit meeting between the leaders of the two Koreas.Twenty-six years have passed since the adoption of the June 15 Joint Declaration, providing more a substantial historical record from which to assess its significance and impact. Although this may be difficult to imagine from today’s perspective—particularly in light of North Korea’s adoption of the “two hostile states” doctrine—the declaration served as the foundation for major inter-Korean cooperation initiatives, including the Mount Geumgang tourism project and the Gaeseong Industrial Complex. In this regard, it can be argued that the declaration made a significant contribution to the promotion of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.Over the past 26 years, the framework established by the June 15 Joint Declaration has generated a rich body of inter-Korean experiences, ranging from the “visitor certificate” system used in the Mount Geumgang tourism program to the passport presentation procedures implemented during exchanges involving North Korea’s Naegohyang (“My Hometown”) Women’s Football Club. The fundamental spirit of the June 15 Joint Declaration lies in building upon these accumulated experiences and using them as a foundation for generating new momentum and shaping future change.Must North and South Korea remain two hostile states, as characterized by Chairman Kim Jong-un? Following the June 15 Joint Declaration, the two Koreas entered a period of engagement during which they cooperated as partners in the pursuit of national reunification and the promotion of peace on the Korean Peninsula. This process culminated in a series of landmark agreements, including the October 4 Declaration, the April 27 Panmunjom Declaration, and the September 19 Pyongyang Joint Declaration, each of which built upon the foundation laid by the June 15 Joint Declaration.Following the collapse of the U.S.–North Korea summit process, however, North Korea fundamentally recalibrated its policy toward South Korea. It erected both physical and psychological barriers between the two Koreas and amended its constitution to incorporate territorial provisions, thereby formally asserting—to domestic and international audiences alike—that it is a sovereign state separate from the Republic of Korea.In 2026, confronted with this reality, South Korea is compelled to reconsider how peace can be established on the Korean Peninsula and how inter-Korean relations might be restored. Is there any viable alternative to accepting North Korea’s official position and allowing the two Koreas to coexist simply as neighboring states divided by a border—and, more specifically, as hostile neighbors?If no immediate alternative is available, the fundamental orientation of the current administration’s policy may be understood as a commitment to creating such an alternative for the future and preserving or restoring it whenever it is disrupted. That alternative is a pathway to peace between the two Koreas, one that may reasonably be regarded as an aspiration shared by the Korean people as a whole.South Korea must address the challenge of establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula from multiple perspectives and formulate practical policy alternatives. First, it is essential to consider the broader international environment. Armed conflicts continue to persist across various regions of the world. The Russia–Ukraine war and the conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran have underscored the immense and often incalculable human costs of war and geopolitical confrontation.Should the “two hostile states” doctrine become the prevailing framework governing inter-Korean relations and tensions continue to intensify, the potential consequences of such confrontation are not difficult to anticipate. To envision a future for the Korean Peninsula founded on anything other than peace would risk imposing profound suffering on future generations of Koreans.Second, both challenges and opportunities exist at the East Asian regional level. Despite North Korea’s adoption of the “two hostile states” doctrine, South Korea must continue pursuing peace on the Korean Peninsula by cultivating stable and cooperative relations with the region’s major powers, including the United States, China, Japan, and Russia. The highest priority should be the strengthening of the ROK–U.S. alliance and the maintenance of close strategic cooperation with Japan.At the same time, South Korea should pursue a balanced and pragmatic policy toward China in order to preserve strategic equilibrium. With respect to Russia, Seoul should seek to preserve opportunities for future economic cooperation and prepare for the eventual resumption of engagement with the Russian market following the end of the Russia–Ukraine war. More broadly, efforts should be directed toward preventing the entrenchment of a “new Cold War” order in East Asia characterized by the polarization of a U.S.–Japan–South Korea grouping on one side and a North Korea–China–Russia grouping on the other.Third, both challenges and opportunities exist at the level of the Korean Peninsula itself. In pursuit of peace, the Lee Jae-myung administration has established “a peaceful two-state relationship oriented toward eventual reunification” as the minimum framework for managing inter-Korean relations. It has further articulated a set of guiding principles, including respect for the North Korean regime, a commitment not to pursue absorption-based reunification, and a pledge to refrain from hostile actions.Together, these principles are intended to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. This approach may be understood as a pragmatic strategy that recognizes reunification as a long-term objective while placing greater emphasis on the preservation of peace and stability than on the pursuit of reunification at the risk of provoking conflict.The restoration of inter-Korean relations constitutes the first step toward preventing conflict and reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and the fundamental spirit guiding this endeavor is embodied in the June 15 Joint Declaration. At its core, the declaration affirms the principle of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas.The two Koreas have experienced decades of antagonistic relations. Nevertheless, successive South Korean governments have consistently sought to move beyond a state of unmitigated hostility and toward a relationship characterized by the coexistence of both hostile and non-hostile elements. Notably, the two Koreas have repeatedly demonstrated an ability to achieve significant paradigm shifts toward peaceful coexistence, even amid periods of heightened tension and confrontation.Historical experience demonstrates that periods of heightened tension need not preclude meaningful inter-Korean engagement. For example, despite serious incidents such as North Korea’s submarine infiltration operations and the First Battle of Yeonpyeong in 1999, the two Koreas were ultimately able to reach the June 15 Joint Declaration. A similar precedent can be found in the July 4 North–South Joint Statement.In the late 1960s, North Korea dispatched special operatives, including Kim Shin-jo, to South Korea in an attempt to assassinate President Park Chung-hee. Yet, by the early 1970s, the two Koreas had moved beyond this period of acute confrontation and adopted the July 4 North–South Joint Statement. At that time, inter-Korean relations were no less tense and volatile than they are today, and the peninsula appeared perilously close to military conflict. Nevertheless, the two sides succeeded in reopening dialogue and laying the groundwork for improved relations.A similar pattern emerged prior to the restoration of inter-Korean relations in the wake of the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics. At the time, the security environment on the Korean Peninsula was highly unstable, and concerns about a potential military confrontation were widespread due to North Korea’s nuclear tests and missile activities. Historical experience also demonstrates that the two Koreas have been capable of overcoming periods of profound hostility.Following the Rangoon (Aung San) terrorist bombing, for example, the two sides eventually restored relations, leading to the first reunions of separated families. Likewise, they succeeded in creating a new momentum for dialogue that contributed to the conclusion of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement in the aftermath of the Cold War and the collapse of the socialist bloc. The common thread running through these developments was the shared recognition that the two Koreas must coexist peacefully on the Korean Peninsula.Against this backdrop, what course is the Lee Jae-myung administration seeking to pursue? Its objective is to transform the current hostile relationship between the two Koreas into a non-hostile one and, ultimately, into a genuinely peaceful relationship. This objective is clearly articulated in the recently published White Paper on Unification. The document emphasizes that the government will not passively accept North Korea’s “two hostile states” doctrine as the defining framework for the future of inter-Korean relations, but will instead work to ensure that a discourse of peace prevails.The National Community Unification Formula, which provides a framework for the coexistence of the two Koreas, envisions an intermediate stage of inter-Korean confederation in the form of a loose confederative arrangement. The underlying rationale is that mutual recognition, peaceful coexistence, and the restoration of a sense of national community are essential prerequisites for advancing toward such a stage. In this regard, it is worth recalling the foresight embodied in the June 15 Joint Declaration, which recognized the common ground between South Korea’s proposal for a confederation and North Korea’s proposal for a low-level federation.However, the Lee Jae-myung administration’s commitment to reunification and peace-building should extend beyond these initial efforts. Over the years, a variety of concepts—including “mediator,” “facilitator,” “leader,” “steerer,” and, more recently, “pace-setter”—have been employed to characterize South Korea’s role in promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula.Although South Korea has urged President Trump to act as a “peacemaker” amid the current impasse in both inter-Korean and U.S.–North Korea relations, lasting progress will ultimately require South Korea itself to assume a more active role in overcoming these challenges. In this respect, Seoul must be prepared not only to support peace-building efforts but also to share responsibility for shaping and sustaining peace on the Korean Peninsula.

The Evolving ROK–U.S. Alliance: Expanding Trust Through Understanding and Cooperation                    Jongchul Parkadjunct professor of Daejeon UniversityThe Evolving ROK–U.S. Alliance: From Military Alliance to Comprehensive Strategic PartnershipToday’s international environment is defined by increasingly complex and interconnected challenges, driven by intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition, the restructuring of global supply chains, and the growing salience of economic security issues linked to advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductors.Against this backdrop of geopolitical transition, the ROK–U.S. Alliance—which has served as the cornerstone of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia for more than seven decades—is evolving into a comprehensive strategic partnership that extends beyond traditional military and security cooperation to include economic security, advanced science and technology, and strategic industries.In recent years, the South Korean government has sought to broaden the scope of the alliance through closer cooperation with the United States in areas ranging from supply chain resilience and advanced technology development to defense-industrial collaboration. This evolution reflects more than a traditional security relationship between two allies; it signifies a model partnership in which countries that share the universal values of liberal democracy and market-based economies cooperate to address emerging global challenges.At the same time, some observers have interpreted policy disagreements arising from this process of alliance evolution as evidence of “cracks” in the alliance or as signs of political decline. Criticism of the ROK–U.S. Alliance recently voiced by certain conservative commentators in the United States appears to stem, in part, from a misunderstanding of both the alliance’s evolving character and the dynamics of South Korean domestic politics.The future of the alliance should be assessed on the basis of objective facts, institutional resilience, and accumulated achievements, rather than ideological assumptions or selective interpretations of individual developments.Objective Facts on Issues in the ROK–U.S. Alliance(1) Access to Information on U.S. Military Bases: Crisis Management for Joint Security, Not an Infringement on Alliance AuthorityA recent commentary in the U.S. media criticized efforts to obtain information related to U.S. military bases, characterizing such measures as reckless and arguing that they endangered sensitive military and intelligence assets.In reality, South Korea’s actions were not intended to infringe upon the sovereignty, authority, or operational security of U.S. military installations. Rather, they were aimed at addressing potential gaps in the combined defense posture through more accurate assessments of the security environment on the Korean Peninsula.Effective information-sharing and coordination are essential components of alliance management and combined military readiness. Interpreting such efforts as evidence of alliance deterioration reflects a limited understanding of how contemporary security cooperation functions between allied states.(2) Information on North Korean Nuclear Facilities: Strategic Communication Through Public Disclosure, Not a Violation of GuidelinesSome critics have argued that remarks made by Unification Minister Chung Dong-young regarding North Korean nuclear facilities constituted a violation of ROK–U.S. intelligence-sharing guidelines. Such claims, however, do not accurately reflect the facts.The information referenced at the time did not originate from classified U.S. or South Korean intelligence sources, nor did it involve military secrets. Rather, it consisted of information already available to the international community through reports issued by domestic and international research institutions, commercially available satellite imagery, and open-source media reporting.South Korea and the United States maintain one of the closest intelligence-sharing relationships in addressing the North Korean nuclear challenge. Public discussion of North Korea policy and strategic communication based on open-source information are standard practices in democratic policymaking. Characterizing such activities as intelligence leaks or violations of information-sharing agreements is therefore inconsistent with the factual record.(3) Addressing the Coupang Data Leak: Law Enforcement to Protect Citizens, Not Discriminatory Action Against U.S. CompaniesThe South Korean government’s response to the Coupang personal data breach—which some critics have cited as evidence of discriminatory treatment toward U.S. companies—was a lawful measure undertaken in accordance with domestic legal requirements and the government’s responsibility to protect citizens’ personal information.As a company conducting extensive business operations in South Korea, Coupang is subject to applicable domestic laws and regulations. When a significant personal data breach occurs, it is both appropriate and necessary for the government to investigate the incident, establish the facts, and implement measures to prevent recurrence.Interpreting such actions as discrimination against U.S. companies risks undermining fundamental principles of the rule of law. The South Korean government seeks to maintain a level playing field for all firms operating within its jurisdiction, irrespective of nationality. Applying uniform legal standards to companies from allied nations when public rights and interests are implicated is fully consistent with established legal and regulatory norms.(4) Middle East Policy and Cooperation with the United States: Multilateral Diplomacy and Shared Humanitarian ResponsibilitiesCriticism that South Korea has been insufficiently supportive of U.S. security interests related to Iran—whether through its decision not to participate directly in military operations in the Strait of Hormuz or through its criticism of Israeli military operations in Gaza—reflects an unduly narrow understanding of the role of allies in contemporary international affairs.South Korea supports peace and stability in the Middle East and has contributed to international efforts through humanitarian assistance to Gaza and diplomatic engagement with regional actors. These initiatives are consistent with South Korea’s broader commitment to international peace and conflict management.Such activities do not undermine U.S. security interests. Rather, they enable South Korea to contribute in diplomatic and humanitarian areas where alternative forms of engagement may be more effective. Expecting allies to adopt identical policy positions across every international issue does not reflect the realities of contemporary diplomacy. As a global pivotal state, South Korea seeks to contribute to regional stability through a multidimensional diplomatic approach while remaining aligned with the broader strategic objectives it shares with the United States.(5) Revisiting Constitutional Reform in South Korea: Overcoming the 1987 Framework and Advancing Democratic ReformA common misconception among some conservative commentators in the United States is the assumption that South Korea’s constitutional reform debate is primarily driven by the desire of a particular political party to secure long-term political power.In reality, discussions on constitutional reform reflect a broader recognition that the constitutional framework established in 1987 may no longer adequately address the political, economic, and social realities of contemporary South Korea. Over the past four decades, South Korea has undergone profound transformation, accompanied by increasing social diversity and increasingly complex governance challenges.Debates over constitutional reform—including proposals related to local autonomy, the expansion of fundamental rights, and the restructuring of political authority—have engaged not only governing and opposition parties but also academic institutions, civil society organizations, and policy experts. Evaluating these discussions solely through the lens of partisan political advantage overlooks the sophistication of South Korea’s democratic institutions and the vibrancy of its civil society. South Korea’s democracy continues to demonstrate a capacity for self-correction, adaptation, and institutional evolution.A Future for the Alliance Based on Shared Interests, Shared Values, and Shared FactsThe ROK–U.S. alliance has evolved successfully through diverse political circumstances and changes of government over the course of its history. This resilience reflects the fact that the alliance is not contingent upon any particular administration or ideological orientation. Rather, it is an institutionalized partnership grounded in shared interests, common values, and convergent strategic objectives.Accordingly, policy differences between allies should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of strategic divergence. Greater attention should instead be devoted to understanding how both countries continue to expand and deepen their cooperation in response to an increasingly complex international environment.The future of the ROK–U.S. alliance must rest on a foundation of mutual understanding, trust, and respect rather than suspicion or ideological prejudice. Today, the alliance is evolving beyond its traditional military foundations into a comprehensive partnership encompassing economic security, advanced technology, supply chain resilience, and strategic-industrial cooperation.To respond effectively to emerging geopolitical challenges and the changing international order, both countries should focus on expanding practical cooperation grounded in shared achievements and objective realities, rather than unnecessarily politicizing policy disagreements. As mutual trust deepens and strategic cooperation expands, the ROK–U.S. alliance will be well positioned to continue evolving as one of the most successful and enduring alliances of the twenty-first century.

Beijing’s Two Summits and the Realignment of Eurasia— U.S.–China Rivalry, China–Russia Alignment, and South Korea’s Strategic Challenges —Professor. Choi Jae dukSeoul School of Integrated Science and TechnologyIn May 2026, Beijing emerged as a symbolic venue reflecting the evolving dynamics of the international order. Just four days after the conclusion of U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to China, Russian President Vladimir Putin returned to Beijing. While the United States and China sought to manage their strategic competition, China and Russia reaffirmed their strategic partnership aimed at reshaping the international order. Although the two summits pursued different objectives, they ultimately underscored a common underlying trend.On the surface, the U.S.–China summit was primarily characterized by efforts to manage tensions and stabilize bilateral relations. The two sides sought to prevent further deterioration in their relationship by signaling limited areas of economic cooperation, including potential purchases of Boeing aircraft and expanded imports of U.S. agricultural products.However, no meaningful compromises were reached on core strategic issues such as Taiwan, semiconductor export controls, rare earth supply chains, and competition in advanced technologies. As a result, the structural differences between the two sides remain intact.Indeed, the summit further reinforced the view that U.S.–China competition has entered a prolonged and structural phase. Particularly noteworthy was China’s restrained response to indications that the United States might ease certain semiconductor restrictions. This suggests that Beijing has firmly adopted technological self-reliance as a long-term national objective, seeking to reduce its dependence on U.S. technology while developing indigenous industrial ecosystems and supply chains.The United States currently faces a range of strategic challenges. The prolonged war in Ukraine and ongoing geopolitical tensions in the Middle East continue to place significant demands on U.S. diplomatic and military resources. Simultaneously, elevated interest rates, fiscal pressures, and rising supply chain costs are exerting considerable strain on the U.S. economy.To be sure, inflationary pressures and rising Treasury yields could be partially alleviated through a reduction in Middle East tensions and greater stability in global energy markets. Nevertheless, Washington faces the complex task of managing commitments across Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific simultaneously, fueling debates over the allocation of strategic assets and the prioritization of foreign policy engagements. Over time, this trend could weaken international confidence in both the predictability of U.S. foreign policy and the durability of American global leadership.Nevertheless, the United States continues to possess the world’s most advanced technological innovation capacity, as well as unparalleled financial and military networks, while China faces structural challenges, including a prolonged real estate downturn, sluggish domestic demand, and increasing external scrutiny. Accordingly, it is more accurate to view the current international environment as a period in which major powers are competing to establish a new equilibrium of power and influence.Against this backdrop, President Putin’s visit to China carries even greater symbolic significance. The visit coincided with the 25th anniversary of the Russia–China Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation and the 30th anniversary of the establishment of their bilateral strategic partnership. During the visit, the two countries reaffirmed their “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Notably, through a joint statement, they reiterated their commitment to a multipolar world order and to the construction of a new international system.The central theme of the joint statement was a challenge to the structural foundations of the U.S.-led international order. Criticizing unilateralism, hegemonism, the expansion of military alliances, and bloc-based confrontation, the two countries emphasized the principles of a “multipolar world order” and “indivisible security.” This represents more than diplomatic rhetoric; it reflects a long-term strategic vision aimed at reshaping the rules and distribution of power in the international system.In particular, U.S. strategy toward Eurasia is viewed by both Russia and China as a critical security concern. Russia has long regarded NATO’s eastward expansion as a threat to its security interests, while China similarly interprets the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and developments in the Taiwan Strait as elements of a broader, long-term containment strategy.The war in Ukraine and tensions across the Taiwan Strait may therefore be understood as manifestations of great-power competition at opposite ends of Eurasia. Both Beijing and Moscow view these developments as extensions of efforts by the U.S.-centered order to preserve and expand its influence across the Eurasian region.Against this backdrop, China–Russia relations are moving toward deeper structural integration. Sino–Russian cooperation is characterized less by a complete convergence of values and ideology than by a realist alignment driven by a shared strategic environment.In particular, the two countries are strengthening a complementary framework of economic and strategic cooperation. Russia provides China with stable supplies of energy resources and raw materials, including crude oil, natural gas, and coal, while China supplies Russia with manufactured goods, electronics, and industrial equipment. In this arrangement, Russia serves as a supplier of energy and raw materials, while China contributes manufacturing capacity and industrial production.This cooperation carries significance beyond the expansion of bilateral trade. Given the growing importance of stable energy supplies for the development of artificial intelligence industries and advanced manufacturing, Russia’s energy exports have become an increasingly important component of China’s industrial strategy. At the same time, the two countries are expanding ruble- and yuan-denominated transactions and exploring limited alternatives to the dollar-centered international financial system.While U.S. strategic assets and diplomatic resources are increasingly absorbed by geopolitical crises such as the war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East, China has focused on strengthening industrial competitiveness, securing supply chains, and accumulating technological capabilities. In effect, Beijing has gained a degree of strategic flexibility within an international environment shaped by multiple concurrent geopolitical conflicts.A particularly noteworthy aspect of the joint statement concerns the Korean Peninsula. Both China and Russia oppose an approach toward North Korea centered primarily on sanctions and pressure, instead emphasizing the need for political and diplomatic solutions.At the same time, China and Russia have adopted a critical stance toward the involvement of external powers in Eurasian security affairs, emphasizing the importance of a regionally centered security architecture.The intensification of U.S.–China competition, the deepening of China–Russia ties, and the expansion of North Korea–Russia cooperation are all contributing to greater uncertainty in South Korea’s diplomatic and security environment. South Korea occupies a geopolitical position at the intersection of maritime and continental powers and faces simultaneous pressures arising from both U.S.–China competition and the broader realignment of Eurasia.While the ROK–U.S. alliance remains the cornerstone of South Korea’s security, Seoul must also consider maintaining constructive relations with China, preserving diplomatic channels with Russia, and diversifying supply chains through deeper engagement with ASEAN and the Global South.In particular, given the substantial differences among the United States, China, and Russia regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, diplomatic efforts aimed at narrowing these differences and promoting policy coordination are becoming increasingly important. While the United States continues to call for the complete denuclearization of North Korea, China consistently reiterates its principled position advocating a “political solution” to issues on the Korean Peninsula, including the nuclear question.Russia, meanwhile, appears to be providing de facto diplomatic support on the North Korean nuclear issue, partly as compensation for North Korea’s troop deployments and military assistance related to the war in Ukraine. Given the wide divergence in the interests and policy approaches of these three countries, achieving a common framework for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue—similar to that established during the Six-Party Talks—appears increasingly difficult.Under these circumstances, a so-called “freeze-first” approach—prioritizing the suspension of additional nuclear tests, the production of highly enriched uranium, and further advances in North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities in exchange for limited sanctions relief or measures to improve bilateral relations—may represent a realistic policy alternative at the present stage.Although such an approach would not constitute a fundamental solution to the North Korean nuclear issue, it could help prevent further deterioration of the situation while preserving space for future negotiations. This perspective underscores the need for a phased and pragmatic strategy focused on constraining further nuclear expansion rather than expecting complete denuclearization in the near term.Furthermore, in an era in which economic security and geopolitics are increasingly intertwined, strategies aimed at reducing dependence on specific countries and building diversified, multilayered networks are becoming ever more important. Such measures represent a pragmatic approach to preserving national strategic autonomy within a complex and evolving international environment.The two summit meetings in Beijing illustrate that the international order is gradually moving away from a U.S.-centered unipolar framework toward a more competitive multipolar system characterized by overlapping strategic axes. They also demonstrate that the Eurasian space is increasingly becoming the principal arena of this transformation.These shifts in the Eurasian order are having a direct impact on security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula. Looking ahead, South Korean diplomacy faces several critical challenges: how to achieve “connected peace” through “connected growth” amid the fragmentation of globalization and the rise of competing blocs; how to cultivate shared interests with as many countries as possible in order to become a nation of mutual strategic importance; and ultimately, how to foster a favorable strategic environment with like-minded partners in order to preserve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

The Importance of Security and Economic Cooperation Between South Korea and Southeast Asian Nations Following the ASEAN Summit                    Nam-eun KimProfessorChungnam National UniversityThe 48th ASEAN Summit and the Strategic Challenges Facing South Korean DiplomacyThe 48th ASEAN Summit, held on May 8, 2026, in Cebu, Philippines, reaffirmed that Southeast Asia can no longer remain on the periphery of great-power competition. The theme of the summit, “Navigating Our Future, Together,” reflected ASEAN’s determination not to remain a passive object of the regional order, but rather to establish a common direction and proactively shape the future regional cooperative order. Based on this awareness, ASEAN leaders reaffirmed the importance of ASEAN solidarity, centrality, and a rules-based regional order.Amid the simultaneous emergence of energy and food supply instability, uncertainty surrounding maritime transport routes, tensions in the South China Sea, the situation in Myanmar, financial market volatility, and the growing challenges of climate change and disaster response, this message demonstrated ASEAN’s resolve to address these practical challenges collectively.The most prominent agenda item at the summit was the issue of energy and food security arising from the Middle East crisis. ASEAN leaders discussed the impact of the deteriorating situation in the Middle East on regional trade, energy prices, air and maritime transportation, and the protection of citizens overseas, while emphasizing the need for a coordinated response. In particular, initiatives such as regional fuel stockpiling, diversification of crude oil import sources, emergency fuel-sharing arrangements, and power-grid interconnection suggest that ASEAN has begun to view supply shocks not as isolated national problems, but as a shared economic security challenge.This carries important implications for South Korea as well, given that the South Korean economy remains heavily dependent on energy imports, maritime shipping routes, and supply chains related to semiconductors, batteries, automobiles, and shipbuilding. The stability of Southeast Asia’s supply chains should therefore no longer be viewed as an issue confined to the region, but rather as a matter directly linked to South Korea’s economic security.Maritime cooperation was another major outcome of the summit. ASEAN leaders adopted a declaration on maritime cooperation and reaffirmed the importance of regional peace and stability, maritime safety, the blue economy, marine environmental protection, and respect for international law.The declaration is significant in that it approaches maritime issues not merely as matters of territorial disputes or military tensions, but as a comprehensive agenda encompassing freedom of navigation, the stability of maritime transport routes, the sustainable use of marine resources, and maritime risk management. Given that the majority of South Korea’s foreign trade depends on maritime shipping routes, stability in the South China Sea and Southeast Asian waters directly affects the country’s exports and imports, energy security, and supply-chain operations.These summit outcomes demonstrate that South Korea’s cooperation with Southeast Asia must expand beyond trade promotion and development assistance to encompass regional stability and economic security as well. Southeast Asia is not only a production base and market for South Korean companies, but also a strategic space for cooperation where South Korea’s energy security, maritime transport routes, supply-chain restructuring, and peace diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula converge.In particular, following the elevation of South Korea–ASEAN relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2024 and the adoption of the 2026–2030 Action Plan, cooperation between South Korea and ASEAN is moving beyond declaratory friendship and entering a phase of practical implementation.The Action Plan encompasses political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, connectivity, sustainability, and people-to-people exchanges, thereby providing an institutional foundation for advancing South Korea–ASEAN cooperation in parallel with both ASEAN Community-building efforts and South Korea’s broader regional strategy.Therefore, the task facing South Korean diplomacy following the 48th ASEAN Summit is clear. The challenges highlighted at the summit—energy and food security, maritime cooperation, supply-chain stability, and regional crisis management—also constitute direct strategic and diplomatic challenges for South Korea.How will South Korea utilize ASEAN as a regional base of support for peace on the Korean Peninsula? How will it build economic security partnerships capable of jointly addressing supply-chain risks? And how will it strengthen Indo-Pacific connectivity through port, rail, and digital logistics networks? The strategic challenges confronting South Korea–Southeast Asia cooperation in the aftermath of the 48th ASEAN Summit stem precisely from these three questions.Peace on the Korean Peninsula and ASEAN: Strategic Utilization of Spaces for DialogueThe first strategic challenge for South Korea–Southeast Asia cooperation is to broaden the regional support base for peace on the Korean Peninsula. This ASEAN Summit reaffirmed that ASEAN is a regional cooperative body that has consistently managed complex regional issues—such as energy and food security, maritime cooperation, the situation in Myanmar, and the South China Sea dispute—within a multilateral consultative framework. Although ASEAN is not a security alliance with coercive power, it has played an important role in keeping regional conflicts on the agenda and maintaining channels of dialogue.The issue of the Korean Peninsula should also be approached within this context. While ASEAN is not a direct party to the conflict, the fact that many of its member states maintain diplomatic relations with both North Korea and South Korea provides a foundation for expanding discussions on peace on the Korean Peninsula to the Southeast Asian level.In particular, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) holds diplomatic significance as it is virtually the only regional multilateral security consultative body in which North Korea participates. Of course, the ARF is not a negotiating framework capable of directly resolving North Korea’s nuclear and missile issues.However, it provides a channel through which the Korean Peninsula issue can be addressed not merely as a military concern confined to Northeast Asia, but as an agenda item affecting peace and stability across the broader Indo-Pacific region. Through this framework, South Korea can clearly convey the international community’s concerns regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile development while simultaneously emphasizing the need for tension reduction and the resumption of dialogue.South Korea’s cooperation with ASEAN must be pursued on the basis of the recognition that North Korea’s nuclear and missile development constitutes a challenge to international norms and UN Security Council resolutions. However, upholding these principles does not mean severing diplomatic channels.While a framework of deterrence and sanctions remains necessary in response to rising North Korean military tensions, the complete closure of channels for tension management could increase the risk of accidental conflict and miscalculation. Therefore, while maintaining a principled stance, South Korea must preserve at least a minimal diplomatic opening for the resumption of dialogue.ASEAN’s significance lies not in its direct influence over North Korea, but in its diplomatic continuity—its consistent treatment of the Korean Peninsula issue as an agenda item related to regional peace and stability. South Korea must leverage this continuity to underscore that North Korea’s nuclear and missile issues are not merely a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, but also a regional agenda item linked to the stability of Southeast Asia. Through this process, the diplomatic foundation for peace on the Korean Peninsula can be expanded beyond Northeast Asia to encompass Southeast Asia as well.The following are concrete measures to achieve this:▪ Regularization of South Korea-ASEAN Consultations on Peace on the Korean PeninsulaSouth Korea needs to regularly address issues related to peace on the Korean Peninsula and regional stability within the political and security cooperation framework of the Korea–ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. These consultations should not constitute a separate negotiating body focused solely on the North Korean nuclear issue, but rather a policy dialogue aimed at jointly assessing how developments on the Korean Peninsula affect Southeast Asia’s security environment and economic security.Through this approach, South Korea can broaden the Korean Peninsula issue beyond a narrow intra-regional security concern confined to Northeast Asia and frame it as a shared interest linked to stability across the broader Indo-Pacific region.▪ Coordinating Messages on North Korea through the ARFSouth Korea should utilize the ARF to clearly convey the international community’s concerns regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, while also emphasizing that the door to dialogue remains open should North Korea cease escalating tensions and return to the negotiating table.The key is to maintain the message that the diplomatic door has not been completely closed, without undermining the necessity of sanctions and pressure. Through this approach, South Korea, together with ASEAN member states, can consistently present the diplomatic options available to North Korea should it choose to comply with international norms.▪ Parallel Implementation of Sanctions Against North Korea and Non-Traditional Security CooperationGiven that some ASEAN countries maintain diplomatic relations with North Korea, South Korea should promote information sharing and capacity-building efforts regarding the implementation of sanctions against North Korea, while ensuring that the scope of humanitarian assistance and non-traditional security cooperation is not entirely constrained by the logic of sanctions.Areas such as food security, public health, disaster response, climate adaptation, and maritime safety can contribute to easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and building regional trust, provided that such cooperation does not conflict with the sanctions regime. Therefore, South Korea must distinguish between principled cooperation aimed at preventing sanctions evasion and limited humanitarian cooperation intended to alleviate humanitarian crises.For these measures to be meaningful, the scope and limits of cooperation with ASEAN must be clearly defined. ASEAN is not an actor with the coercive power to directly drive North Korea’s denuclearization, and its member states do not share identical perceptions of North Korea or identical strategic interests.Therefore, rather than positioning ASEAN as the primary actor in resolving the Korean Peninsula issue, South Korea should utilize it as a cooperative space for fostering a conducive environment for dialogue and expanding regional support. When this point is clearly understood, cooperation with ASEAN can serve as a practical means of complementing South Korea’s peace diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula, rather than becoming engagement without principles.Supply Chain Resilience: The Significance of Southeast Asia as an Economic Security PartnerThe second strategic task of South Korea–Southeast Asia cooperation is the strengthening of supply-chain resilience. At the ASEAN Summit, supply-chain issues were raised not merely as a general economic cooperation agenda, but as an urgent economic security priority in response to the ripple effects of the Middle East crisis. ASEAN leaders discussed the impact of the deteriorating situation in the Middle East on regional trade, energy markets, maritime and air transport, and the safety of citizens abroad, while emphasizing the need for a coordinated response.In particular, fuel stockpiling, diversification of crude oil import sources, emergency fuel-sharing arrangements, regional power-grid interconnection, and food supply stability emerged as key economic security priorities at the summit. This demonstrates that ASEAN is addressing supply-chain crises not merely as logistical disruptions or price increases, but as complex challenges involving energy security, food security, maritime transport routes, and the protection of citizens.This issue has direct implications for South Korea as well. The South Korean economy relies heavily on energy imports, maritime transport routes, and production and logistics networks related to semiconductors, batteries, automobiles, and shipbuilding. Therefore, the stability of supply chains in Southeast Asia must be regarded as a key foundation for the stable functioning of the South Korean economy.If the shock stemming from the Middle East crisis leads to higher energy prices, fuel supply disruptions, rising food prices, and increased maritime shipping costs, the production, logistics, and import–export structures of South Korean companies will inevitably be directly affected. South Korea’s supply-chain cooperation with ASEAN must therefore be designed not merely to diversify production bases for specific industries, but also to strengthen regional resilience so that access to energy, logistics, production, and markets can be maintained even during times of crisis.Southeast Asia is already a key production and investment hub, as well as an important growth market for South Korea. However, the summit demonstrated that Southeast Asia has established itself as an economic security partner connected to the stability of energy, food, logistics, and power grids, going beyond its traditional role as a production base and consumer market.Indonesia’s critical minerals, Vietnam’s electronics and components production networks, Singapore’s role as a financial and logistics hub, and the electrical, electronics, and automotive industrial bases of Malaysia and Thailand are all closely linked to the resilience of South Korea’s supply chains.What is crucial is not to limit this cooperation to the mere expansion of investment in individual countries, but to develop it into a cooperative framework that integrates production, logistics, energy, finance, human resources, and institutional arrangements. While respecting ASEAN centrality, South Korea must establish a cooperation model that simultaneously supports ASEAN’s industrial upgrading and strengthens the resilience of South Korean companies’ supply chains.The concrete action plans to achieve this are as follows:▪ Establishing a Supply Chain Risk Response SystemSouth Korea and ASEAN need to establish a consultative framework for proactively sharing risks related to energy, critical minerals, food, semiconductor components, battery materials, and logistics routes. The fact that the Middle East crisis and instability in maritime transport routes were addressed as key agenda items at the summit demonstrates that such risks can expand beyond issues affecting individual countries and evolve into economic security concerns for the entire region.Therefore, South Korea must work with ASEAN to establish a system capable of the early detection of, and response to, supply disruptions involving key commodities, port congestion, maritime transport risks, surging raw material prices, and energy supply disruptions.▪ Packaging Cooperation on Key Industrial Supply ChainsSouth Korea’s supply-chain cooperation with ASEAN must not be limited to expanding investment in individual industries. Sectors such as batteries, electric vehicles, semiconductor back-end processes, electronic components, and energy storage devices all require the coordinated functioning of raw material procurement, materials and parts production, workforce development, logistics networks, and environmental standards to ensure stability. Building on its technological expertise and industrial experience in batteries, electric vehicles, semiconductors, and the electrical and electronics industries, South Korea must develop a cooperation model that integrates these capabilities with ASEAN’s critical minerals, production bases, logistics hubs, and workforce resources. Such cooperation should go beyond mere cost reduction or resource acquisition and instead aim to simultaneously strengthen ASEAN’s industrial infrastructure and enhance the procurement and logistics stability of South Korean companies.▪ Expanding Cooperation on Food and Energy SecurityAs the summit elevated energy and food security to key agenda items, South Korea needs to expand cooperation in these areas at the level of regional public goods. Cooperation in smart agriculture, food storage and processing, cold-chain logistics, energy storage systems, renewable energy, power-grid management, hydrogen, and ammonia is directly linked to stabilizing livelihoods and strengthening ASEAN’s industrial base.This represents an opportunity for South Korean companies to expand their presence, while also serving as a means of enhancing regional supply-chain resilience amid recurring crises in the Middle East and instability in maritime transport routes.Such cooperation aligns not only with the need to ensure stable supply chains for South Korean companies, but also with ASEAN’s practical need to address vulnerabilities in energy, food, and logistics. When South Korea contributes to strengthening ASEAN’s industrial base, economic cooperation with ASEAN can evolve beyond mere investment expansion into a form of economic security cooperation through which both South Korea and ASEAN jointly mitigate risks.Infrastructure Connectivity: Concrete Cooperation on Ports, Railways, and Digital LogisticsThe third strategic task for South Korea–Southeast Asia cooperation is strengthening infrastructure connectivity centered on ports, railways, and digital logistics. The energy and food security and maritime cooperation emphasized at the ASEAN Summit are not merely crisis-response agendas.To ensure the stable movement of energy and food, and to prevent instability in maritime transport routes from escalating into actual economic shocks, ports, railways, roads, storage facilities, power grids, and customs clearance systems must function in an integrated manner. Therefore, ports, railways, and digital logistics are not merely ancillary elements of supply-chain cooperation, but rather foundational infrastructure for implementing the economic security agenda highlighted at the summit.In particular, infrastructure cooperation in Southeast Asia should not be approached solely as a matter of constructing individual facilities. Even if port capacity is expanded, logistics efficiency will be difficult to improve without effective connections to hinterland railways and roads. Similarly, even if a railway network is developed, supply-chain stability will remain limited if customs procedures and logistics data systems continue to operate in isolation.Food security, too, cannot be achieved through increased production alone; storage and processing facilities, cold-chain logistics, port handling capacity, and digital customs clearance systems must all function in an integrated manner. In this regard, cooperation in ports, railways, and digital logistics constitutes a key area that simultaneously supports the strengthening of ASEAN connectivity and South Korea’s economic security.South Korea can make a substantial contribution to this cooperation based on its experience in port operations, railway systems, smart logistics, digital customs clearance, cold-chain logistics, power grids, energy storage systems, and the shipping and shipbuilding sectors.However, South Korea’s role should not be limited to simply participating in individual infrastructure projects. By proposing a cooperation model that integrates ports, railways, logistics data, hinterland industrial complexes, and energy infrastructure, South Korea can contribute to strengthening ASEAN connectivity while also expanding a stable foundation for South Korean companies’ market entry.Therefore, infrastructure cooperation should be designed from the perspective of “connectivity” rather than mere “construction.” Port automation, rail–port integration, logistics data platforms, digital customs clearance, cold-chain logistics, eco-friendly vessels, and disaster-resilient infrastructure are areas in which ASEAN’s growth strategies and South Korea’s industrial capabilities converge. To this end, South Korea needs to consider implementation strategies in three key directions.▪ Integrated Infrastructure Cooperation Linking Ports, Railways, and Industrial ComplexesSouth Korea needs to propose an integrated cooperation model that bundles ports, railways, hinterland industrial complexes, and logistics centers into a single project framework. By leveraging ODA, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, policy finance, and private investment in combination, South Korea can simultaneously promote the strengthening of ASEAN connectivity and secure stable production and logistics bases for South Korean companies.▪ Strengthening Cooperation on Digital Logistics and Customs Clearance SystemsTo translate port- and rail-centered physical connectivity into tangible economic activity, digital logistics and customs clearance systems must be developed in tandem. South Korea can cooperate with ASEAN in areas such as electronic customs clearance, logistics data platforms, port operation systems, smart warehouses, and cargo-tracking systems.In particular, the standardization of digital logistics information and customs procedures is essential to enabling small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to participate more stably in Southeast Asian logistics networks.▪ Strengthening Maritime Safety, Disaster Response, and Operational CapabilitiesASEAN waters are a critical region for South Korea’s energy transportation and trade, but they are also vulnerable to the impacts of the climate crisis, typhoons, marine pollution, illegal fishing, piracy, and transnational crime. South Korea can cooperate with ASEAN in areas such as maritime safety, search and rescue, marine pollution response, disaster forecasting, and strengthening port resilience.In addition, there is a need to expand education and training programs in railway operations, port management, logistics data analysis, disaster response, and energy management. This is because the sustainability of infrastructure cooperation depends more on operational capabilities than on physical infrastructure alone. Such cooperation has strong implementation potential, as it constitutes regional public-goods cooperation that is more readily accepted by ASEAN than security cooperation targeting specific countries.This connectivity cooperation can serve as a pathway for translating South Korea’s ASEAN strategy into concrete policy. If South Korea promotes cooperation in ports, railways, digital logistics, and maritime safety, it can contribute to strengthening ASEAN’s capacity to respond to energy, food, and logistics crises. At the same time, this will help lay the groundwork for the stable continuation of South Korean companies’ production and logistics operations.Conclusion: Strategic Direction for South Korea-ASEAN CooperationFollowing the 48th ASEAN Summit, South Korea’s diplomacy toward ASEAN must move beyond a relationship centered primarily on trade and investment and be further developed in a direction that encompasses both peace diplomacy and economic security.Energy and food security, maritime cooperation, supply-chain stability, and regional crisis management are all issues directly linked to South Korea’s security and economy. Therefore, South Korea must expand its cooperation with ASEAN into a strategic partnership capable of jointly addressing regional crisis management and economic security.Under these conditions, South Korea’s diplomacy toward ASEAN must not treat peace on the Korean Peninsula, economic security, and infrastructure connectivity as separate issues. The Korean Peninsula issue is not merely a matter of inter-Korean relations, but must also be addressed within the broader context of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.Economic cooperation, too, must evolve beyond the expansion of production bases and consumer markets into a cooperative framework capable of jointly responding to energy, food, and logistics shocks. Infrastructure connectivity serves as the foundation for operationalizing this cooperation. When cooperation in ports, railways, digital logistics, and maritime safety is advanced in an integrated manner, South Korea and ASEAN can build a cooperative network capable of remaining stable even in times of crisis.The limitations of cooperation with ASEAN are also clear. Member states do not share identical interests, and there are inherent constraints on the role ASEAN can play regarding the North Korean issue, the situation in Myanmar, and the South China Sea dispute. However, as competition among major powers intensifies and regional crises become more complex, the significance of ASEAN—which maintains channels of dialogue and continuously manages regional cooperation agendas—becomes even greater.Ultimately, following the 48th ASEAN Summit, the core of South Korea–Southeast Asia cooperation lies in linking the crisis-management agenda raised at the summit to South Korea’s peace diplomacy and economic security strategies.Through ASEAN, South Korea must broaden the regional support base for peace on the Korean Peninsula, jointly address supply-chain risks, and strengthen Indo-Pacific connectivity through port, rail, and digital logistics networks. As these efforts accumulate, the Korea–ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership can evolve beyond declaratory cooperation into a substantive framework that supports regional peace and economic security.

South Korea’s Response to the U.S. Reassessment of Digital Regulations— The Political Economy of U.S.-Korea Digital Platform Conflicts —                    Lee MyunghoPresident, KCERN; Advisor, Korea Association for Futures StudiesThe United States is a country that constitutionally guarantees the world’s most powerful “freedom of expression.” Yet that same nation has been wielding severe sanctions against other countries’ online regulation laws. The U.S. Department of State’s “Agency Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2026–2030,” released in early 2026, declared that should foreign governments pursue content regulation legislation, the U.S. would employ coercive measures including visa restrictions, financial pressure, and trade negotiation linkages.The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) also officially classified Korea’s amendments to the Network Act and the Online Platform Act as “discriminatory trade barriers against U.S. companies” in the National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers 2026 published the same year.However, this conflict is not merely a bilateral U.S.-Korea trade dispute. It reveals that Korea is no exception to a global problem: the collision between platform capitalism and the democratic public sphere. Yet the United States is behaving differently within its own borders. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is currently pursuing antitrust litigation against Meta and Amazon.While acknowledging the need to regulate Big Tech at home, the U.S. criticizes Korea’s similar attempts as “suppression of freedom.” This article analyzes the political-economic structure of this double standard and examines the principles Korea should pursue.“Freedom of Expression” Has Become the Language of Trade CoercionThe U.S. framing of other countries’ platform regulations as “violations of freedom of expression” is not a story unique to Korea. When the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) was under discussion, and when Australia’s News Media Bargaining Code was passed, the United States resisted using the same language.When this repeated pattern is analyzed from a political-economic perspective, one clear structure emerges: the State Department’s “digital freedom” discourse and USTR’s trade pressure operate as a dual-channel mechanism that effectively functions as a diplomatic shield protecting the overseas market dominance of U.S. platform companies such as Google, Meta, and Amazon.The United States—where the FTC is pursuing antitrust litigation against Meta and where Congress is debating Big Tech regulation bills—and the United States that criticizes Korea’s similar attempts as “censorship” are the same country. This self-contradiction is not merely policy inconsistency, but rather strategic asymmetry: regulating monopolies at home while protecting the same monopolies abroad.The USTR report’s reference to the Network Act—citing “discriminatory burdens unfavorable to U.S. platform companies”—is a self-confession that the real concern is business interests, not freedom of expression.That said, there are points in the U.S. argument worth heeding. If the legal definition of “disinformation” in the amended Network Act is vague, the risk that it could be weaponized to suppress legitimate political dissent is real. How similar laws have operated in authoritarian regimes like Russia and Singapore should serve as historical cautionary tales. However, what this concern points to is not “withdraw the regulation” but rather “design the safeguards more rigorously.”Algorithms Treat Disinformation as Fuel for Profit, Not a BugLet us examine the empirical reality accumulating behind the “freedom of expression” argument. According to a study published in Science in 2018 by Vosoughi et al. at MIT Media Lab, false information spreads six times faster than true information. Platform sharing and recommendation functions structurally accelerate this speed.In 2021, Meta whistleblower Frances Haugen made a historic disclosure before the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee. Facebook’s internal research had already revealed that its algorithms prioritize the exposure of hate speech and disinformation, increasing user engagement time and advertising revenue. The company knowingly tolerated this for corporate profit.This structure is the product of intentional design. Content that provokes outrage and fear generates far higher engagement rates than neutral information, and that engagement rate translates directly into advertising revenue. In an engagement-based revenue model, disinformation functions less like a side effect or bug and more like a feature.The Oxford Internet Institute’s (OII) 2020 report found that this “computational propaganda” operates at an industrial scale in over 81 countries, with algorithms serving as amplifiers.Examples of disinformation destroying democracy are not abstract. In the Cambridge Analytica scandal exposed in 2018, a British data consulting firm illegally harvested data from 87 million Facebook users and used it for psychological targeting advertising in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The UK Parliament’s Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) Committee issued a strong warning in its 2019 final report, calling it a serious threat to democratic processes.In January 2023, Bolsonaro supporters who believed disinformation about election fraud stormed and vandalized the Brazilian Congress, Presidential Palace, and Supreme Court. It was the most vivid real-world example of algorithmic disinformation being converted into a physical democratic crisis.Regulation Is Not Suppression—It Is a Prescription to Restore Democracy and MarketsJohn Stuart Mill, the classical liberal philosopher, proposed the Harm Principle in On Liberty (1859): the only legitimate basis for the exercise of state power over individual liberty is to prevent harm to others. While frequently cited as a basis for freedom of expression, it simultaneously specifies its limits. If algorithms amplify disinformation to the point of undermining electoral fairness and inciting social violence, this falls squarely within the domain of state intervention that Mill’s principle permits. Freedom of expression is not a license to pollute.The justification for regulation is equally clear in market economy logic. In the domestic app market, the combined market share of Google and Apple is estimated at approximately 85–95%—an extremely high level of concentration. Within this oligopolistic structure, app developers have virtually no choice in matters of fees, search visibility, and terms of service. This cannot be called a free market worth protecting.The Online Platform Act’s prohibitions on self-preferencing, bundling, and multi-homing restrictions are not enemies of the free market—they are measures to restore a free market that has been undermined by monopoly. Reality has reached a point where platform regulation is necessary to uphold free market principles.Brussels, London, and Canberra Are Already on the Same PathViewing this conflict as a bilateral “Korea vs. the U.S.” confrontation is shortsighted. The actual configuration is different. It should be reframed as “the alliance of democracies pursuing digital sovereignty” versus “the U.S.-Big Tech alliance protecting domestic platform hegemony.”The EU fully implemented the Digital Services Act (DSA) in 2024, mandating algorithmic risk assessments, disinformation response reports, and external audits for very large platforms. Violations carry fines of up to 6% of global annual revenue. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) designated six companies—Google, Meta, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, and ByteDance (TikTok)—as “gatekeepers” (dominant platforms acting as gatekeepers of the market) and banned self-preferencing.The UK imposed obligations on platforms to assess harmful content risks through the Online Safety Act of 2023. Australia, through the News Media Bargaining Code of 2021, forced platforms to pay fair compensation to news publishers. At the time, Facebook responded with the extreme measure of completely blocking news sharing in Australia, only to reverse course within days amid international condemnation. It was a symbolic moment in which a giant platform retreated in its confrontation with a democratic nation.The United States has applied similar pressure even on EU officials, but this has only served to accelerate U.S. isolation on the international stage. Just as the EU’s GDPR has become the de facto global standard for personal data protection, the DSA and DMA are likely to emerge as global standards for platform regulation. For Korea, aligning with this trend—even belatedly—is also strategically necessary in terms of cooperation with other “liberal democratic” nations.On Principle, Not Fear—It Is Time to Establish Digital SovereigntyKorea’s strategy in confronting U.S. pressure should be neither capitulation nor blind confrontation. It is about making clear the democratic direction of “freedom and markets” and “checks and balances.” Maintaining the principles of regulation while making its enforcement structure more refined and transparent.An independent deliberative body should be established to prevent a government agency from monopolizing the judgment of disinformation, and transparency reporting obligations at the level of the EU’s DSA should be introduced. Procedural democracy is the path to simultaneously proving the legitimacy of institutions both domestically and internationally.The tasks at the national, corporate, and civic levels are also clear. At the national level, Korea must strengthen digital regulatory cooperation with the EU, UK, and Australia, and persuade the international community that this conflict is a matter of global democratic governance—not a bilateral trade dispute.At the corporate level, platform companies must move toward leading the way on the social responsibility of platform algorithms through self-regulation. At the civic level, citizens must become active and critical interpreters of information—grounded in digital literacy—rather than passively consuming algorithm-recommended content.Digital sovereignty in the digital age encompasses not only territorial control but also control over the cyber public sphere. If the online space where public opinion is formed is designed according to the profit logic of algorithms, that democracy is merely leased to tech capital. Protecting democracy is not about restricting freedom of expression—it is about designing a public square where expression can compete fairly. We must create the rules for a square where civic voices gather, not where hatred is discharged.[References]•  U.S. Department of State, Agency Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2026–2030 (2026)•  USTR, National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers 2026 (2026)•  Vosoughi, S. et al., “The spread of true and false news online,” Science (2018)•  Oxford Internet Institute (OII), Social Media Manipulation by Political Actors series•  Haugen, F., Testimony before the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee (2021)•  UK DCMS Committee, Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Final Report (2019)•  European Commission, Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA) (2022–2024)

Toward Peace on the Korean Peninsula: The Prospects for a Mediating Role in Inter-Korean CommunicationKeeyoung YoonAdjunct ProfessorHankuk University of Foreign StudiesPresident Lee Jae-myung’s State Visits to India and Vietnam: Advancing Diplomatic DiversificationPresident Lee Jae-myung’s state visits to India and Vietnam from April 19 to 24, 2026, marked a pivotal milestone in South Korea’s foreign policy at a time of sweeping geopoliti-cal transformation.In India, a summit with Prime Minister Modi produced a joint declaration to resume negoti-ations on upgrading the Korea–India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CE-PA), along with more than twenty MOUs and private-sector agreements covering strategic sectors such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, digital technology, energy, and critical minerals. The two sides also set an ambitious target of $50 billion in annual bilateral trade by 2030—a clear signal that Seoul is seeking to establish India as a third major hub for ex-port and supply chain diversification.The Vietnam leg of the tour carried its own symbolic weight, as it marked the first state re-ception hosted by Vietnam since Tô Lâm assumed the party leadership. At the summit with General Secretary Tô Lâm, both sides reaffirmed their goal of reaching $150 billion in bilat-eral trade by 2030, while advancing some eighty MOUs, investment agreements, and con-tracts expected to generate approximately $8 billion in export and investment opportuni-ties.Highlights included a contract involving a consortium led by Hyundai Rotem to supply roll-ing stock for Ho Chi Minh City’s Metro Line 2; collaboration between Korean and Vietnam-ese firms—GS Engineering & Construction, LG CNS, and FPT—in areas such as AI, digital infrastructure, and data centers; and a battery materials plant investment by a POSCO affili-ate. In addition, twelve MOUs in nuclear power, electricity grids, and energy, along with strengthened cooperation on critical mineral supply chains, are expected to broaden the foundation for bilateral energy security.The significance of these visits extends well beyond economic deliverables. Both leaders discussed regional and international issues, including the Korean Peninsula, and agreed that peace and stability there are essential to the prosperity of the region and the broader inter-national community.General Secretary Tô Lâm praised Seoul’s willingness to re-engage in dialogue and reaffirmed his commitment to supporting peace and stability on the Peninsu-la. This can be interpreted as reflecting South Korea’s broader strategic calculus: to weave middle powers such as India and Vietnam into its approach to the Peninsula’s security equa-tion.The Absence of Direct Communication and the Inevitability of Third-Party MediationThe paralysis of official inter-Korean dialogue channels and the highest level of military hos-tility since the armistice stand in sharp contrast to Seoul’s active diplomatic expansion abroad. The Lee Jae-myung administration’s North Korea policy is structured as a phased approach that prioritizes engagement through exchanges, the normalization of relations, and, ultimately, denuclearization.Yet Pyongyang continues to define South Korea as “the most hostile state” and has shown little interest in inter-Korean dialogue. Declarations alone cannot alter this reality. South Korea must therefore pursue the reopening of direct dia-logue while simultaneously exploring the use of third countries that maintain credible chan-nels with Pyongyang.Vietnam as Mediator: Historical Trajectory and Layered MotivationsVietnam’s support for Korean Peninsula denuclearization and dialogue is not a product of the 2026 summit alone; rather, it has deepened steadily since President Roh Moo-hyun’s visit in 2004. The 2009 summit under President Lee Myung-bak elevated bilateral ties to a strategic cooperative partnership and formally reaffirmed joint support for denuclearization and peace on the Peninsula—an indirect contribution to inter-Korean stability.During the Park Geun-hye administration, Vietnam continued to express official support for denuclearization and dialogue. The 2019 Hanoi summit between the United States and North Korea further reinforced Hanoi’s image as a country capable of hosting high-stakes diplomatic engagements, building on its accumulated diplomatic capital.The 2026 Lee–Tô Lâm summit can be seen as an effort to consolidate a forward-looking partnership that integrates Vietnam’s support for denuclearization and peace on the Peninsula with cooperation in energy, supply chains, and advanced technologies.The Role of Middle-Power Mediators and the Calculus of Self-InterestVietnam is not the only middle power seeking to position itself as a facilitator of peace on the Korean Peninsula. These mediating efforts are driven not by pure altruism but by a sophisticated alignment of national interests. A mediating role allows a country to project its presence on the global stage through diplomatic soft power rather than military might—Singapore’s consolidation of its status as Asia’s neutral hub following the historic 2018 summit offers a clear illustra-tion.Regional tensions tend to dampen investment sentiment across Southeast Asia, making contributions to peace not only normative but also a form of economic self-preservation. Moreover, should North Korea eventually open, the countries that earned its trust during periods of isolation are likely to secure the earliest economic opportunities—a long-term strategic calculation that continues to shape behavior today.This logic raises a critical question. If each of these mediators operates its own channels and assets independently, the overall effect is likely to be diffuse and vulnerable to neutrali-zation by great-power intervention.Vietnam maintains trusted channels with Pyongyang but has limited formal diplomatic lever-age with the West. Sweden possesses an institutional bridge between the West and North Korea but has limited regional influence in Southeast Asia. Mongolia can facilitate multilat-eral dialogue platforms but lacks the capacity to offer meaningful economic incentives. In effect, each country’s strengths correspond closely to the others’ weaknesses.The logical next step for Seoul, therefore, is to move beyond engaging these mediators individually and instead develop a loose coalition platform—a Korean Peninsula Mediation Network (KPMN)—to bind them together. The KPMN should be understood not as a re-placement for the Six-Party Talks, but as a supplementary mechanism for managing trust channels, hosting functions, technical expertise, and regional legitimacy in a distributed manner when formal negotiations are stalled.A functional division of labor could be structured as follows: Vietnam and Mongolia facili-tate contact channels with Pyongyang; Sweden and Switzerland provide message transmis-sion and confidence-building expertise; and Singapore and Indonesia furnish the diplomatic infrastructure and legitimacy required to host formal talks.Anchoring the Coalition: South Korea’s Role and Strategic Design PrinciplesFor this coalition platform to function, South Korea must step forward not merely as its beneficiary, but as its architect and coordinator. Three principles should guide this effort.First, institutionalize mutual benefit. Mediators will join the coalition not out of solidarity alone, but when their interests are structurally secured. Seoul should design a form of pack-age diplomacy that explicitly links each country’s stake—Vietnam’s energy and infrastructure cooperation, Mongolia’s development assistance, Indonesia’s investment attraction, and Singapore’s financial hub ambitions—to its mediating role. The clearer the returns, the more durable the coalition.Second, manage great-power inclusion rather than exclusion. The network should not be framed as a structure hostile to the United States or China, but rather as one designed to function alongside their direct involvement while drawing their consent into the final stages of any agreement. The collective credibility of the mediators should increase the political cost for any great power seeking to exercise a veto—“great-power management through minilateral solidarity” captures this core concept.Third, institutionalize Track 1.5 dialogue. Given the closure of official government-to-government channels, semi-official (Track 1.5) and civil society (Track 2) exchanges among network members should be regularized. Multilateral workshops—rotating among participating countries and bringing together former diplomats, think tanks, and academics—should be established, with their outputs feeding into official diplomatic channels through a structured, deliberate pipeline.South Korea’s “Conditional Autonomy” and Its LimitsThis was exposed during the state visits by the controversy surrounding Defense Minister Jeong Dong-young’s remarks on the Kusong nuclear facility. When he referenced the exist-ence of a weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) facility in North Pyongan Province before the National Assembly, the United States responded by immediately restricting cer-tain intelligence sharing on North Korea. On the surface, the issue concerned an intelligence disclosure and a failure to consult Washington in advance. However, reducing the episode to a diplomatic gaffe risks obscuring the deeper structural signals it carries.One interpretation is that it reflects Washington’s latent discomfort with the prospect of South Korea’s wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer. Another is that it marks a turn-ing point in which the alliance is shifting toward a more transactional relationship amid broader changes in the international order. This is not the first instance of U.S. restrictions on intelligence access, but it should be understood in the context of America’s evolving global strategy.The responses available to South Korea include leveraging its distinctive strengths, concentrating internal capacity to respond consistently to external pressures, and making strategic use of an emerging multipolar international order. Minilateral approaches such as the KPMN represent one avenue within this broader repertoire.Policy Counsel: Applying Systems Thinking and Strategic WargamingFor a strategy such as the KPMN to succeed in a complex multipolar order, strategic au-tonomy in North Korea policy must be secured—and that requires a fundamental innova-tion in how policy is formulated.First, map feedback loops through systems thinking. U.S. sanctions trigger North Korean provocations; provocations intensify pressure within the U.S.–Japan–South Korea trilateral framework; and that pressure, in turn, encourages Chinese workarounds that further freeze inter-Korean relations.In this web of complex interactions, intuition-driven policymaking risks producing unintended consequences. Applying causal loop diagram (CLD) methodolo-gy to model the interconnections among variables across multiple actors enables policy-makers to identify leverage points and anticipate side effects.Second, validate scenarios through strategic wargaming. Tabletop exercises and matrix games involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of National Defense, and the intelligence community should be institutionalized as a perma-nent feature of policy planning.Participants would be assigned roles such as North Korea (adversary), the United States (ally), and mediators including Vietnam and Sweden, and then tasked with simulating specific crisis scenarios—for example: “If South Korea seeks to bring both sides to a negotiating table in Hanoi through the Vietnam channel, what concessions would the United States and China demand?” Such exercises provide one of the most rig-orous means of overcoming groupthink and identifying structural constraints across multi-ple dimensions. Becoming an Active Rule-Maker in the International OrderPresident Lee Jae-myung’s visits to India and Vietnam were more than sales diplomacy. They marked a historic step in which South Korea meaningfully expanded its strategic au-tonomy through partnerships with rising powers amid the turbulent currents of a multipolar-izing world. That achievement must now be given purpose—channeled toward dismantling the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula.Even as the foundations of intelligence and security are strengthened, South Korea must boldly extend its diplomatic maneuverability—long constrained by great-power depend-ence—into the domain of Korean Peninsula affairs.Drawing on Vietnam’s neutral platform and the lived example of Đổi Mới as strategic reference points, Seoul should seek to bring North Korea to the dialogue table, while embedding the analytical tools of systems thinking and strategic wargaming into its national policymaking architecture. This is the only path by which the Republic of Korea, in an age of uncertainty, can lead efforts for peace on the Ko-rean Peninsula as an active rule-maker rather than a passive object of external decisions.Lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula will not be achieved through short-term crisis man-agement. Translating these ideas into concrete outcomes—reading new possibilities in a multipolar order from a limited opening such as Vietnam, designing a coalition of media-tors, and steadily building internal capacity—requires the strategic patience of a long breath. With long-term vision, significant progress becomes possible. The most urgently needed virtue in South Korean diplomacy today is precisely such an expansive, far-sighted perspective.

U.S. Pressure on Digital Trade andSouth Korea’s Strategic Response                    Chi Bum ShinProfessor of Military Science Konyang University/Director of External CooperationFuture SocietyThe 2025 Coupang crisis is not over. More precisely, “Act II” is now underway. Recently, the U.S. State Department formally expressed concerns regarding South Korea’s Act on the Eradication of False Information, while major technology firms such as Google have voiced parallel objections, intensifying tensions across the digital trade landscape.The company has argued that South Korea’s digital trade barriers and the amendment to the Information and Communications Network Act (hereinafter the “False Information Eradication Act”), which is scheduled to take effect in July, constitute regulations that disproportionately target U.S. firms.Meanwhile, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and officials in Washington have framed the Coupang crisis fundamentally as a digital regulatory issue and have formally raised the possibility of invoking Section 301 of the Trade Act. This is not merely a diplomatic expression of dissatisfaction. Rather, it is a strategic signal that the United States intends to intensify pressure even on its allies in the digital trade domain.Military strategists tend to focus less on the “first shot” than on the “second move.” If the Coupang incident represented the first shot, what we are now witnessing is a more deliberately calibrated second move. If South Korea fails to accurately interpret the significance of this move, it may once again find itself confined to a reactive posture at the negotiating table.The Misinformation Eradication Act: Tensions Between Regulatory Legitimacy and Trade RiskThe Misinformation Eradication Act currently being advanced by South Korea serves the legitimate public objective of strengthening the integrity of the information ecosystem. At the same time, however, the law contains provisions that directly intersect with the core business models of major U.S. technology companies—namely, algorithm-driven content distribution and advertising-based revenue structures. The characterization by Google and Meta of this law as a “digital trade barrier” is not merely rhetorical exaggeration, but rather a deliberate legal framing that seeks to exploit ambiguities within evolving WTO digital trade norms.This is the central issue. It is the sovereign prerogative of any state to enact regulations to protect its citizens from misinformation. However, when such regulations are applied in a manner that disproportionately affects firms of a particular nationality, or that structurally disadvantages foreign companies relative to domestic platforms, they become a source of trade friction. This reflects the underlying logic of contemporary trade disputes, in which digital sovereignty and free trade norms come into direct tension. The United States is arguably the most adept actor operating within this framework.Section 301 of the Trade Act is a potent instrument. This provision establishes a legal mechanism through which the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) may independently investigate unfair trade practices by foreign governments and impose retaliatory tariffs; it has been widely employed in efforts to counter China’s technological rise. If this mechanism is directed at South Korea, a treaty ally, the issue extends beyond a conventional trade dispute and risks undermining the foundation of trust within the ROK–U.S. alliance. This point should not be underestimated.Digital Sovereignty as Strategic High Ground in the AX EraFrom a military perspective, “strategic high ground” refers to terrain that decisively shapes the outcome of a conflict. If steel and energy constituted the strategic high ground of the industrial era, data and platform ecosystems represent the strategic high ground of the AX era. Accordingly, the digital regulatory framework that South Korea seeks to establish is not merely a matter of domestic policy, but part of a broader structural contest over control of this strategic high ground.The position held by U.S. Big Tech firms in the South Korean market corresponds, in military terms, to an asymmetric advantage. Google maintains a dominant position in search and digital advertising, while Apple and Google exercise comparable influence within the app ecosystem. When the South Korean government seeks to intervene in this ecosystem through regulatory measures such as the Misinformation Eradication Act, the U.S. response—translating these actions into trade pressure—reflects a strategic effort to preserve that asymmetric advantage.Particularly noteworthy is the timing of this pressure. Since the onset of the second Trump administration, the United States has reinforced a transactional conception of alliances that explicitly seeks economic gains even from close partners. In this context, the actions of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul should be interpreted not simply as diplomatic signaling, but as evidence that Washington’s trade strategy is increasingly embedded within alliance management. Dismissing this signal as routine diplomatic friction risks a significant strategic misreading.Communication Breakdown with the United States: The Absence of a Strategic NarrativeSince the 2010 Cheonan sinking incident, South Korea has learned—at considerable cost—that information asymmetry can produce diplomatic asymmetry. Regardless of how clear the underlying facts may be, without a compelling narrative through which to communicate them, one risks losing the contest in the domain of international public opinion. This lesson applies equally to the digital trade arena.South Korea’s current communication framework with the United States remains highly vulnerable. It remains unclear whether Washington is receiving a coherent strategic narrative explaining why the Misinformation Eradication Act does not target specific firms or why its characterization as a “digital trade barrier” constitutes a misrepresentation.While relevant South Korean agencies—including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Science and ICT, and the Fair Trade Commission—communicate through their respective channels and institutional logics, the U.S. side—comprising the USTR, the State Department, and major technology firms—has effectively coordinated a unified message of pressure.This is not merely an issue of public relations. As Carl von Clausewitz observed, the essence of conflict lies in compelling the adversary’s will; this logic applies equally to digital trade negotiations. If the opposing side successfully establishes the narrative that “Korea’s digital regulations = discrimination against U.S. companies,” South Korea will be forced to negotiate from a structurally defensive position. Once the narrative has been ceded, half the contest has, in effect, already been lost.Strategic Recommendations: Balancing Shield and SpearI propose three strategic adjustments.First, digital regulatory diplomacy should be elevated into an independent strategic domain. This requires a whole-of-government coordination mechanism capable of integrating trade negotiations, technology policy, and security cooperation.Just as the United States effectively aligns the USTR, the State Department, and major technology firms along a common strategic axis, South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Science and ICT, and Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy must be brought under a unified strategic framework. This is, in essence, strategic synchronization for the digital age.Second, South Korea must pursue proactive narrative diplomacy. A sustained public diplomacy effort is needed to clearly articulate the legislative intent, scope, and principle of non-discriminatory application of the Misinformation Eradication Act to Washington-based think tanks and congressional networks. Adequate expertise and resources should be allocated to ensure that South Korea’s position is accurately conveyed to institutions such as CSIS, the Brookings Institution, and the Heritage Foundation.Third, the design of the Misinformation Eradication Act warrants careful recalibration. Both the statutory provisions and the implementing regulations should be refined to preserve regulatory legitimacy while minimizing exposure to trade disputes.In particular, a rigorous legal review is necessary to ensure that requirements related to algorithmic transparency or mandatory content moderation remain consistent with South Korea’s obligations under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Achieving both regulatory effectiveness and trade compatibility represents the essence of sophisticated digital sovereignty.Alliances at the Intersection of InterestsThe ROK–U.S. alliance is both a blood-forged alliance and a values-based partnership. However, realist perspectives in international politics remind us that alliances are not sustained by shared values alone; they ultimately rest at the intersection of interests. U.S. digital trade pressure on South Korea should therefore be understood as part of an ongoing process of recalibrating that intersection.South Korea must position itself as an active agent rather than a passive object in this process. Before the second phase of the Coupang crisis relegates Seoul once again to a defensive role, it must proactively define the negotiating framework and articulate its own terms. Just as control of the high ground confers an advantage in military operations, the ability to set the agenda shapes outcomes in digital trade negotiations.In the spring of 2026, tensions are once again rising along the digital front lines of the AX era. What is required is not merely a defensive shield, but also a strategic spear capable of contesting adversarial narratives and projecting legitimacy. The combined deployment of shield and spear constitutes the appropriate strategic posture for a digitally sovereign state in the AX era.

An Assessment of the South Korea–Indonesia Summit: The Strategic Imperative of Continued Defense Cooperation Through the Joint Development of the KF-21                    Hyung-jun KimProfessorDepartment of Cultural AnthropologyKangwon National UniversitySouth Korea and Indonesia established diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level in 1973 and commemorated the 50th anniversary of their diplomatic ties in 2023. In parallel with the development of bilateral relations, the expansion of South Korean companies into Indonesia has also increased steadily.South Korean firms that initially entered Indonesia in the 1970s were primarily focused on utilizing the country’s abundant forest resources, followed by business activities led by general trading companies and construction firms. Beginning in the late 1980s, the entry of textile, apparel, and footwear manufacturers seeking to capitalize on Indonesia’s abundant and cost-competitive labor force accelerated significantly.From the mid-1990s onward, corporate activities in Indonesia evolved beyond simple processing and export-oriented operations to actively target the domestic market. Indonesia’s large consumer base—exceeding 200 million people—and the expansion of its middle class, driven by sustained economic growth, increasingly attracted the attention of South Korean firms.In the 2000s, the entry of Lotte Mart served as a catalyst for expanding Korean corporate presence in the retail sector. Since the 2010s, large-scale investments have been undertaken, with companies such as POSCO, Hyundai Motor, and Lotte Chemical establishing local production bases. Investment sectors have also diversified, extending beyond locally embedded industries such as finance, food services, and entertainment to include emerging strategic sectors such as artificial intelligence, the digital economy, and clean energy.In the trade domain, the cooperative relationship between South Korea and Indonesia has remained steady. Indonesia ranked among South Korea’s top ten trading partners until the mid-2010s and has since maintained a stable position within the top fifteen. More recently, tourism has emerged as a central pillar of both people-to-people and economic exchanges, with South Korea becoming a preferred destination for Indonesian travelers. The influence of the Korean Wave has also expanded, with Indonesia widely regarded as one of the leading markets for its diffusion.However, despite this long history of engagement, Indonesia does not command a commensurate level of recognition within South Korean society. This contrast is particularly evident when compared with Vietnam. Since the 2010s, Vietnam—having rapidly deepened its relationship with South Korea across trade, investment, and people-to-people exchanges—has become widely recognized by the South Korean public as a key partner. By contrast, public awareness of Indonesia, despite its comparable economic potential, remains relatively limited.Even within this context, there are notable examples of bilateral cooperation that have gained visibility in both media and public discourse. One prominent case is collaboration in the aviation sector, particularly the KF-21 fighter development project led by Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). Indonesia’s participation as a partner in this project has consistently attracted attention, with significant public interest accompanying related developments.The symbolic significance of this cooperation is reflected in the display of both national flags on the first KF-21 prototype, delivered in 2021, as well as on the first production model scheduled for delivery in 2026. Moreover, the attendance of the Indonesian president at the prototype rollout ceremony underscored the political and strategic importance of defense cooperation between the two countries.There are two principal reasons why aviation cooperation with Indonesia has attracted greater attention than collaboration in other sectors. First, there is strong domestic interest in the development of an indigenous South Korean fighter aircraft. Historically, the achievements of the so-called “K-defense” sector have been most prominent in land and naval domains.Capabilities such as submarines, surface combatants, self-propelled artillery, tanks, and guided missile systems have demonstrated global competitiveness and generated substantial export success. In contrast, achievements in the air power domain have been comparatively limited, with the FA-50 light combat aircraft representing the most notable example. In this context, the KF-21 has been viewed as a flagship project to complete the portfolio of Korean defense capabilities, thereby amplifying interest in associated cooperation with Indonesia.Second, challenges that emerged during the course of cooperation have also drawn attention. Under the 2016 agreement for joint fighter development, Indonesia committed to contributing 20% of the total development cost. However, payments did not proceed as initially planned, with delays beginning as early as 2017.Although partial payments were subsequently made, overall contributions remained in arrears. During later negotiations, Indonesia requested a revision of its contribution, resulting in a reduction to approximately KRW 600 billion, or about 7% of the total development cost. Even this adjusted contribution, however, was not disbursed according to schedule.In parallel with the reduction in financial contributions, the scope of technology transfer initially agreed upon by the South Korean side was also scaled back. These developments were further compounded by a 2024 security incident, in which an Indonesian engineer assigned to KAI was caught attempting to remove development data using an external storage device, heightening concerns over trust in bilateral cooperation.At the same time, the Indonesian government has pursued a range of defense acquisition options, raising further questions. It has explored multiple fighter platforms—including France’s Rafale, the United States’ F-15EX, China’s J-10C, and Russia’s Su-35—and has announced plans to acquire advanced trainer aircraft from Italy. Indonesia has also signaled interest in developing an indigenous fighter and participating in Turkey’s next-generation fighter program. Media coverage of these developments has contributed to increasingly skeptical perceptions of Indonesia as a reliable defense cooperation partner.Concerns about the reliability of aviation cooperation have recently resurfaced. On March 25, the rollout ceremony for the first mass-produced KF-21 was held, followed shortly by President Prabowo Subianto’s state visit on April 1. Given the proximity of these events, expectations had been high that a KF-21 procurement agreement would be finalized during the visit.Prior to the rollout, South Korean officials indicated that the export of the KF-21 would be a key agenda item at the summit, and some reports suggested a possible deal involving 16 aircraft. However, no such agreement was ultimately reached. While the summit elevated bilateral relations from a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” to a “Special Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” it did not yield tangible results in terms of KF-21 procurement, thereby reinforcing uncertainty surrounding defense cooperation.The controversies surrounding the KF-21 project may be seen as illustrative of the structural constraints inherent in defense cooperation with Indonesia. Repeated disputes over cost-sharing and contract adjustments have highlighted the opacity and volatility of the partnership, leading some to argue for a shift toward independent development.In particular, growing interest in the KF-21 from Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines and Malaysia, as well as from partners in the Middle East and Europe, has reinforced the case for a more autonomous approach. Nevertheless, despite these challenges, the strategic rationale for maintaining cooperation with Indonesia remains significant and warrants careful consideration from multiple perspectives.First, cooperation between the two countries has been built on a solid historical foundation. Indonesia was the first export destination for the KT-1 basic trainer, which South Korea developed using indigenous technology and began mass-producing in 2000. As exports later expanded to Turkey, Peru, Senegal, and other countries, South Korea was able to consolidate its position as an aircraft exporter.Indonesia was also the first buyer of the T-50 supersonic advanced trainer, which entered mass production in 2005, followed by exports to Iraq, the Philippines, and Thailand. These examples demonstrate that aviation cooperation between the two countries has evolved beyond a one-off engagement, building cumulatively on long-term experience.Second, it should be noted that the various issues that emerged during the KF-21 development process are widely recognized internationally. South Korea’s continued commitment to cooperation despite Indonesia’s unpredictability offers an opportunity to showcase the credibility and reliability of its defense industry to the global market.This could generate positive spillover effects not only for the diversification of KF-21 export markets but also for the broader “K-defense” sector. Sustained cooperation with Indonesia could, therefore, contribute to strengthening South Korea’s credibility with other prospective partner countries.Third, Indonesia’s market potential represents another critical consideration. As of 2025, Indonesia ranks 17th globally in terms of GDP, and with a population exceeding 280 million and an average annual economic growth rate above 5%, it is projected to surpass South Korea in economic size by around 2030. In this context, cooperation with Indonesia should be evaluated from a medium- to long-term strategic perspective rather than through a narrow focus on short-term outcomes.In particular, KF-21-centered cooperation has the potential to extend beyond the aviation sector to other defense domains, such as naval systems, and further into broader industrial sectors requiring government-to-government collaboration. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s reference during the summit to potential cooperation in the naval sector, in addition to aviation, can be seen as reflecting this strategic calculus.Fourth, Indonesia’s domestic context must also be considered. Although not widely recognized in South Korea, Indonesia developed and produced its own aircraft in the mid-1990s, and Indonesian-made transport aircraft remain in operation in several countries, including South Korea. Given that the aviation industry is closely tied to national prestige, Indonesia has a strong incentive to continue its participation in the KF-21 project—valued at approximately KRW 600 billion—through adjustments to the terms rather than withdrawing entirely.This position is also reflected in statements by Indonesia’s Minister of Economic Affairs following the visit. According to local reporting, while acknowledging that the KF-21 was a major agenda item between the two leaders, he noted that certain outstanding issues remain regarding procurement. He characterized these issues as primarily technical, including matters related to aircraft specifications, and indicated that engineering personnel would be dispatched to South Korea promptly to address them.He also referenced the possibility of additional financial support for the project. This represents a meaningful shift in the position articulated by a senior Indonesian official and raises expectations that a KF-21 procurement agreement could be concluded in the near term.In light of these considerations, it would be premature to conclude that bilateral cooperation has failed solely because a KF-21 export contract was not finalized during the summit. Considering the broader strategic context, the prospect of Indonesia becoming the first export market for the KF-21 remains viable.Reflecting this potential, President Lee Jae-myung characterized Indonesia during the summit as a key partner that has contributed to the development of the K-defense industry. Furthermore, in a written interview with local media, he described the joint development of the next-generation fighter as an internationally exemplary model of defense cooperation.To be sure, such an assessment may be considered somewhat optimistic. However, President Lee Jae-myung’s remarks should be understood as a strategic signal aimed at addressing the frictions that have accumulated over the past decade of cooperation and translating them into future achievements. Accordingly, defense cooperation with Indonesia should be evaluated in terms of the accumulation of long-term strategic assets and approached with a focus on sustaining partnerships rather than prioritizing short-term gains.

Assessing the South Korea–France Summit                  Ph.D. Sang-chun JungHistory of International Relations, University of Paris 1French President Emmanuel Macron visited South Korea at the invitation of President Lee Jae-myung to commemorate the 140th anniversary of bilateral relations between the two countries. The visit carries considerable significance, marking both the first state visit by a European head of state since the inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung administration and the first visit by a French president in 11 years.The relationship between South Korea and France predates the signing of the Korea–France Treaty in 1886. France had begun dispatching missionaries to Asia as early as the mid-13th century in the broader context of the Crusades.French Jesuit missionaries arrived in China in the late 17th century, and the earliest point of contact between France and the “Land of the Morning Calm” may be traced to the baptism of Lee Seung-hun (1756–1836) in Beijing in 1784, during a diplomatic mission. Around 1790, the emerging Korean Catholic community sought ecclesiastical support through Bishop Alexandre de Gouvea in Beijing, laying an early foundation for later religious and diplomatic ties between Korea and France.Subsequently, in 1831, Pope Gregory XVI established the Apostolic Vicariate of Korea, formally entrusting the Paris Foreign Missions Society (la Société des Missions Étrangères de Paris) with missionary responsibility through the appointment of Bishop Barthélemy Bruguière as its first apostolic vicar.This development marked an early phase of informal Korea–France contact. Another significant informal encounter took place in 1851, when Charles de Montigny, the French consul in Shanghai, met Lee Jeong-hyeon, the magistrate of Naju, in connection with the rescue of the crew of the French whaling ship Narval, which had been wrecked near Bigeumdo Island. Despite the absence of formal diplomatic ties, the two sides cooperated peacefully to secure the safe return of the stranded sailors.Later, in 1866, the French Far East Fleet launched an expedition against Ganghwa Island under the pretext of responding to the persecution of Catholics, resulting in an armed confrontation between the two sides—an event known as the French expedition to Korea, or Byeongin Yangyo. This incident also marked the first major military clash between the Joseon government and a Western power.The Joseon government, which had long adhered to a policy of isolation, subsequently concluded treaties of friendship and commerce with Western powers, beginning with the United States in 1882, but established diplomatic relations with France relatively late, in 1886. Owing in part to the legacy of the 1866 expedition, both Korea and France harbored residual mistrust toward one another until the establishment of formal ties.The issue of permitting the free propagation of Catholicism on the Korean Peninsula constituted one of the principal obstacles during the negotiation of the 1886 treaty. In 1905, Korea’s diplomatic sovereignty was effectively curtailed by Japan through the Eulsa Protection Treaty, and in 1910, bilateral relations between Korea and France were severed following Japan’s annexation of Korea.Diplomatic relations were subsequently reestablished with the founding of the Republic of Korea in 1948, and the French Fourth Republic formally recognized the new government in February 1949. Although relations were temporarily disrupted by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the two countries developed into close partners following France’s decision to participate in the war as one of the 16 UN member states.Over the past 140 years, a defining feature of Korea–France relations has been the relatively greater development of economic ties compared to political relations, with a particular emphasis on capital goods exchange and technology transfer rather than conventional trade. Despite steady growth in trade volume, France’s share of South Korea’s total trade has generally remained below 2% in both exports and imports, a pattern that has persisted for much of the postwar period.For example, according to 2025 trade statistics, France ranks as South Korea’s 25th largest trading partner, and bilateral trade, valued at approximately $15 billion, accounts for only 1.12% of its total trade volume of $1.3412 trillion, indicating a relatively modest scale. Three principal factors help explain the limited scope of bilateral trade relations.First, as South Korea’s economy and trade volume have expanded, its network of economic partners has diversified significantly. Second, South Korea–France economic relations have been characterized more by large-scale contracts—such as nuclear power plant construction and high-speed rail projects—than by the exchange of general merchandise, resulting in a concentration on capital goods and technology-intensive sectors. Third, France’s commercial presence in Asia has historically been less pronounced than that of other major European economies, while South Korea has likewise faced constraints in expanding its footprint in European markets.In 1993, the French government launched the Initiative française vers l’Asie, a strategy aimed at strengthening France’s industrial and commercial presence in Asia, particularly in Northeast and Southeast Asia. In February 1997, then-Minister of Finance and Foreign Trade Yves Galland designated eight priority partner countries—South Korea, South Africa, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Russia—within this framework.The Economic and Commercial Section of the French Embassy in South Korea further identified three structural factors underlying the relatively limited scale of bilateral trade: first, the substantial share of energy imports in South Korea’s total imports; second, the exclusion of defense-related transactions from official trade statistics; and third, the omission of financial sector activities—where France maintains a significant presence—from such statistics.Against this backdrop, it is appropriate to assess the key agenda items of the current Korea–France summit within the broader historical and structural context of bilateral relations. It is also important to recall that, during President Roh Moo-hyun’s state visit to France in December 2004, the two countries defined their relationship as a “comprehensive partnership for the 21st century” (partenariat global pour le XXIe siècle). This concept entails expanding bilateral relations beyond the economic and cultural domains to include political cooperation, thereby promoting a more integrated and multidimensional partnership.Four priority areas were identified: first, deepening political dialogue on major international issues, including those in the Indo-Pacific region; second, strengthening cooperation in security and defense, particularly with regard to the North Korean nuclear issue; third, enhancing economic ties through investment and innovation; and fourth, expanding cooperation in fields such as science, education, culture, and sports.To date, most South Korea–France cooperation has been carried out within this overarching framework. The elevation of bilateral relations at this summit from a “Comprehensive Partnership for the 21st Century” to a “Global Strategic Partnership”—the first such upgrade in 22 years—signals a substantial expansion in both the breadth and depth of bilateral cooperation.French President Emmanuel Macron, who is currently visiting South Korea, previously visited the country in November 2014 as Minister of the Economy, Industry and Digital Affairs to attend the South Korea–France ministerial-level economic dialogue. At the time, he was a 37-year-old rising political figure, noted for his fluency in English and his reform-oriented agenda. As a centrist political newcomer appealing to both the left and the right, he was elected as the 25th President of France in May 2017, less than three years after his visit to Seoul.The principal agenda items discussed during the 2014 ministerial dialogue included: (1) cooperation in the creative economy and emerging industries, (2) the expansion of trade and investment, including through the South Korea–China and South Korea–EU free trade agreements, and (3) issues of concern to French companies operating in South Korea. At the conclusion of the meeting, the two sides signed a Joint Declaration on South Korea–France cooperation in research and development.The principal agenda items discussed at this summit included: (1) the expansion of trade and the promotion of investment; (2) cooperation in advanced industries and future-oriented technologies; (3) coordination on international issues, including developments on the Korean Peninsula—particularly the North Korean nuclear issue—as well as broader regional dynamics, the U.S.–Iran conflict, and the war in Ukraine, including security and global governance issues, notably the invitation extended to South Korea to attend the G7 Summit and the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting to be held in France in June 2026; and (4) the expansion of exchanges in science and technology, education, culture, and people-to-people engagement.The leaders of both countries agreed to raise bilateral trade, which stood at $15 billion last year, to $20 billion by 2030. South Korea’s principal exports to France include ships, automobiles, and pharmaceuticals, while imports from France consist of leather goods and apparel, aerospace products, and uranium. From an investment perspective, the France 2030 Investment Plan constitutes a major area of interest for South Korean firms.Launched in 2021 under President Macron, this large-scale initiative is designed to address structural weaknesses in France’s industrial base, invest in cutting-edge technologies, and facilitate the ecological transformation of industry, with a total investment envelope of €54 billion (approximately KRW 95 trillion).The plan is closely aligned with the broader France Relance initiative, which aims both to modernize traditional industries and to promote the emergence of new industrial and technological sectors. Accordingly, trade, investment, and technological cooperation between the two countries are expected to expand further through follow-up measures undertaken by the Korean and French business communities.The second agenda item—cooperation in advanced industries and emerging technologies—has historically been a central pillar of South Korea–France collaboration. Notable examples include the construction of the Paldang Dam in the 1960s using French capital and expertise; the introduction of Airbus aircraft in the 1970s; the construction of Uljin and Kori Nuclear Power Plant Units 9 and 10 by France’s Framatome in the 1980s; the adoption of the French high-speed rail system (TGV) in the 1990s; and the integration of Eurocopter platforms into South Korea’s helicopter development program in the 2000s. Going forward, bilateral cooperation is expected to concentrate on artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and quantum technologies; space and aviation; defense; decarbonization and energy; and biotechnology.As a core member of the European Space Agency (ESA) with extensive launch vehicle expertise, France is well positioned to expand cooperation in satellite and launch vehicle technologies through structured collaboration between the Korea Aerospace Administration (KASA) and the French National Centre for Space Studies (CNES). In the field of decarbonization and energy, the planned expansion of collaboration in nuclear power and offshore wind is particularly significant.France derives over 70% of its electricity from nuclear energy, compared with approximately 30% in South Korea. Looking forward, joint research and development in small modular reactors (SMRs) and hydrogen energy could enable coordinated entry into the global nuclear energy market. According to 2024 data, South Korea imported €710 million worth of uranium from France—a figure likely to grow as SMR deployment expands.With respect to the third agenda item—coordination on international issues encompassing the Korean Peninsula (particularly the North Korean nuclear program), regional security dynamics, the U.S.–Iran conflict, and the war in Ukraine—South Korea and France demonstrate broad alignment. Both parties maintain that North Korea’s nuclear program is unacceptable, and France, in its capacity as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, has consistently advocated for the suspension of North Korea’s nuclear activities and for progress on human rights issues.These considerations have also contributed to the absence of formal diplomatic relations between France and North Korea. France’s core policy on the North Korean nuclear issue consists of: (1) complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID); (2) the maintenance and reinforcement of sanctions; and (3) the non-recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state under any circumstances. In pursuing a policy of engagement toward North Korea, the Lee Jae-myung administration will need to operate within this framework while seeking France’s support through a calibrated and flexible approach.The French government has consistently endorsed South Korea’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula. Regarding the U.S.–Iran conflict and the war in Ukraine, the two countries—whose positions are broadly aligned—agreed to maintain close coordination. In particular, substantive discussions focused on cooperation in energy security and supply chain resilience, both affected by instability in the Middle East, as well as on coordinated responses to broader economic challenges.Both parties also agreed to cooperate in securing maritime routes through the Strait of Hormuz. Importantly, France has invited South Korea to the G7 Summit and Foreign Ministers’ Meeting scheduled for June 2026. South Korea was likewise invited to last year’s G7 Summit in Canada.France’s invitation should be seen not merely as a diplomatic formality, but as a signal that it regards South Korea as a partner capable of contributing meaningfully to discussions on global governance. This reflects South Korea’s elevated international standing as a “global pivotal state,” underpinned by its critical role in global supply chains, advanced military capabilities, and position among the world’s ten largest economies.On the final agenda item—expanding cooperation in science and technology, education, culture, and people-to-people exchanges—both countries discussed measures to institutionalize collaboration in research, development, and innovation. They agreed to continue regular exchanges and researcher support programs through frameworks such as the Korea–France Joint Committee on Science and Technology, the Korea–France Joint Coordination Committee on Nuclear Energy, and the Korea–France Science and Technology Cooperation Program (STAR).By combining France’s strengths in fundamental science with South Korea’s expertise in applied industrial technologies, bilateral cooperation is expected to generate significant synergies and elevate the scientific and technological capacities of both nations. Historically, French cultural influence predominated in the exchange, but contemporary interactions have become increasingly reciprocal, with Korean cultural exports—including K-pop, K-dramas, and K-beauty—achieving notable success in France.Currently, approximately 7,000 South Korean students study in France, while around 3,000 French students learn Korean across 32 primary and secondary schools in eight major French cities. In November 2016, South Korea became the first country in Northeast Asia to join the International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF) as an observer. The OIF encompasses roughly 80 member states and represents approximately 274 million French speakers worldwide.In 2017, Korean was introduced as an elective foreign language in the French baccalauréat, and Korean-language instruction was incorporated into primary and secondary school curricula. Looking forward, exchanges among younger generations are expected to expand further, building on the historical foundations of bilateral ties. To this end, both leaders have reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening educational and cultural cooperation, aiming to usher in an “era of one million people-to-people exchanges.”The 140th anniversary of diplomatic relations between South Korea and France is marked by the slogan “Creativity, Opportunity, Solidarity,” which captures the essence of bilateral engagement. It highlights innovation and imagination across culture, the arts, and science and technology; the potential for shared growth through cooperation in education, academia, and industry; and a joint commitment to universal values such as peace and prosperity.This may also be interpreted as a modern reflection of the principles of “peace, friendship, and the protection of life and property” enshrined in Article 1 of the 1886 Korea–France Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Le traité d'amitié et de commerce entre la France et la Corée). Against the backdrop of intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition, both countries—as middle powers—must strengthen their partnership and pursue pragmatic diplomacy to navigate a more complex international environment.The effective implementation of agreements reached at this summit is expected to consolidate the newly elevated “Global Strategic Partnership” and position South Korea and France as partners capable of jointly shaping the next phase of their bilateral relations.

The South Korea–Indonesia Summit (April 1, 2026) and the KF-21:Exploring the Potential of a Strategic Partnership Model for Defense Exports                    Seok-jeong YoonKorea National Diplomatic Academy1. The South Korea–Indonesia “Special Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” and the KF-21On April 1, 2026, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung met with Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto during the latter’s state visit to South Korea. The two leaders agreed to elevate bilateral relations to a “Special Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” signaling a significant deepening of cooperation across political, economic, and security domains.In his opening remarks, President Lee highlighted the strategic significance of the bilateral relationship amid heightened global uncertainty, emphasizing Indonesia’s role as a stable supplier of key energy resources—including liquefied natural gas (LNG) and coal—which provides important reassurance to South Korea. The two sides subsequently signed memorandums of understanding on a Special Comprehensive Strategic Dialogue and “Economic Cooperation 2.0,” and agreed to expand collaboration in critical sectors such as strategic minerals, infrastructure, and artificial intelligence.President Prabowo, for his part, stressed that rising global instability has amplified the importance of Indonesia’s partnership with South Korea. As a leading regional actor—hosting the ASEAN Secretariat, possessing the world’s fourth-largest population, and abundant natural resources—Indonesia occupies a pivotal position in the Indo-Pacific. The summit thus formalized Indonesia’s status as a key strategic partner for South Korea in promoting regional peace and prosperity.A particularly notable outcome was the conclusion of an export agreement for the KF-21 fighter aircraft, jointly developed by South Korea and Indonesia. Defense cooperation has emerged as a central pillar of the upgraded partnership. President Lee described the KF-21 program as a “global model” of defense collaboration grounded in mutual trust. Significantly, Indonesia’s dual role as both co-developer and launch customer reflects the parallel evolution of bilateral relations, highlighting a potential model for sustaining the global competitiveness of South Korea’s defense industry.2. South Korea’s Defense Exports to Indonesia: From the T-50 to the KF-21South Korea’s defense export relationship with Indonesia began in 2011 with the sale of the T-50 advanced trainer aircraft, developed by Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). Known as the “Golden Eagle,” the T-50 was the product of a decade-long development effort that began in 1997. Its export marked a milestone, making South Korea the sixth country in the world to export supersonic aircraft.The Indonesian deal served as a critical entry point for South Korea into the global defense market. Building on this foundation, Indonesia became a key partner in the K-Defense ecosystem when it joined the KF-21 joint development program in 2010. Although the project faced challenges—particularly due to Indonesia’s fiscal constraints—it ultimately moved forward following renegotiations that included reduced financial contributions and in-kind support.Through the KF-21 program, South Korea has become the eighth country to develop a 4.5-generation or more advanced supersonic fighter. The KF-21 is designed to strike a balance between cost-efficiency and advanced combat capabilities, positioning it as an attractive option for emerging air forces seeking modernization without the high costs associated with fifth-generation stealth platforms.Indonesia’s role as both co-developer and first operator is strategically significant. As with the T-50, the KF-21 is expected to leverage its initial export to Indonesia as a springboard into broader global markets, potentially extending beyond Southeast Asia.3. Strategic Implications for South Korea’s Defense Export ModelThe joint development and export of the KF-21 to Indonesia exemplify an emerging strategic model for South Korea’s defense industry amid a rapidly evolving global market. Intensifying geopolitical competition has fueled sustained growth in global defense spending. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), global military expenditures reached $2.718 trillion in 2024—an increase of 9.7 percent year-on-year and 37 percent compared to 2015.This surge reflects a broad spectrum of geopolitical risks, including the war in Ukraine, China’s military expansion and tensions over Taiwan, and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East. As a result, the defense sector is increasingly characterized by structural excess demand, creating expanded opportunities for exporters such as South Korea across multiple regions.At the same time, protectionist dynamics are intensifying. The United States has prioritized strengthening defense supply chain resilience, while the European Union has advanced initiatives to increase intra-regional procurement and joint acquisition. Under the EU’s European Defence Industrial Strategy, announced in March 2024, member states aim to significantly expand collaborative procurement by 2030.These trends pose structural challenges for the K-Defense sector. South Korea’s competitive advantage has historically rested on its ability to deliver high-performance systems quickly and at relatively low cost. However, a shift toward regionally closed defense markets could constrain these advantages.In this context, South Korea’s defense export strategy must evolve. Future success will likely depend not only on cost and speed, but also on deeper forms of industrial cooperation, including local production, technology sharing, and financial arrangements. More fundamentally, defense exports need to be embedded within broader strategic partnerships—integrating political, economic, and societal dimensions—rather than remaining purely transactional.The elevation of South Korea–Indonesia relations to a “Special Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” together with the KF-21 program, provides a compelling case study of this evolving model. It underscores the importance of aligning defense cooperation with a comprehensive, long-term strategic framework—an approach likely to define the next phase of South Korea’s defense export strategy.

South Korea’s Three-Stage Solution: A Realistic Alternative to the North Korean Nuclear Issue                    Dong-soon ParkProfessorGraduate School of Defense StudiesHansung UniversityCurrent Status and Perspectives on the North Korean Nuclear IssueAt the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, convened in Pyongyang in February 2026, North Korea reaffirmed what it termed its “irreversible status as a nuclear-weapon state” and explicitly articulated a policy of comprehensively expanding and strengthening its nuclear forces. In his Report on the Summary of Work, Chairman Kim Jong-un characterized the national nuclear force as the “backbone” of the state’s war deterrence strategy and outlined plans to further increase the size of the nuclear arsenal while advancing its operational capabilities.Kim Jong-un further assessed that “drawing an unyielding line so that our nuclear weapons cannot be bargained away under any circumstances constitutes a historic development.” In particular, he highlighted the enactment of the Nuclear Force Policy Law (2022) and its subsequent incorporation into the Constitution following the Eighth Party Congress in 2021 as measures of “the utmost gravity and strategic significance.”Re-elected as General Secretary, Kim asserted that the country’s defense posture is centered on nuclear capabilities, stating, “Our nuclear forces are now physically capable of robustly deterring any war of aggression, and we have completed all necessary preparations to respond immediately in the event of an attack.”The principal elements of North Korea’s nuclear posture, as articulated at the Ninth Party Congress—which sets the strategic direction of governance for the next five years—are as follows:First, North Korea reaffirmed its commitment to strengthening and expanding its nuclear forces. It defined its status as a nuclear-armed state as “irreversible” and expressed confidence in further enhancing its national defense capabilities on that basis.Pyongyang announced plans to increase the number of nuclear weapons and to continue developing advanced strategic systems, including submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), in accordance with a forward-looking, phased annual plan for nuclear force development. It also indicated an intention to institutionalize nuclear use beyond sole reliance on the supreme leader’s discretion, suggesting the possible establishment of a “nuclear trigger” mechanism capable of automatic retaliation in response to an external nuclear threat.Second, North Korea appears to be adopting a differentiated approach toward the United States and South Korea on nuclear-related issues. With respect to the United States, Pyongyang signaled conditional openness to dialogue, suggesting the possibility of more stable relations if Washington acknowledges its status as a nuclear-armed state and abandons what it characterizes as hostile policies.By contrast, with regard to South Korea, North Korea declared that it would “permanently exclude it from the category of fellow Koreans” and designated it as “the most hostile entity,” thereby effectively foreclosing prospects for improved inter-Korean relations.In sum, the outcomes of the Ninth Party Congress indicate that North Korea intends to prioritize regime security through its nuclear capabilities while consolidating a dual-track posture of engagement with the United States and confrontation with South Korea. Within this context, the policy orientation of the United States and the range of proposals under consideration in South Korea for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue can be outlined as follows.U.S. Perception and Approach to the North Korean Nuclear IssueThe Trump administration, which assumed office in 2025, has approached the North Korean nuclear issue under the rubric of “America First,” framing it less as a question of “complete denuclearization” and more as one of “threat management” and “unconditional dialogue.” First, a review of statements and policy positions articulated by President Trump and senior officials in his second administration suggests a consistent underlying recognition that North Korea is a nuclear-armed state.President Trump has referred to Kim Jong-un as a “nuclear power,” reflecting a pragmatic perspective that seeks to negotiate on the basis of acknowledging North Korea’s nuclear capabilities rather than denying them. Furthermore, in March 2025 at the White House, President Trump remarked, “My relationship with Kim Jong-un was very good, and we’ll see what happens,” signaling the potential resumption of top-down summit diplomacy.The recently released U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) also exhibit a degree of strategic ambiguity distinct from prior approaches, including the absence of explicit references to North Korea and the omission of any reference to denuclearization. The NSS, issued in December 2025, makes no mention of North Korea and omits the phrase “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Meanwhile, the NDS, released in January 2026, characterized North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities as a “clear and present danger to the U.S. homeland” and identified it as a major threat alongside China, Russia, and Iran.However, although the NDS explicitly recognized North Korea as a direct military threat to South Korea and Japan, it did not formally codify a U.S. commitment to provide a “nuclear umbrella” (extended deterrence). This may be interpreted as indicating that the United States has either lowered the priority of the North Korean nuclear issue or implicitly acknowledged the limitations of its previous denuclearization policy.In summary, the White House appears to be maintaining a position of openness to dialogue without preconditions, even as North Korea demands recognition as a nuclear-armed state and the withdrawal of hostile policies. It can be assessed that the Trump administration, in its second term, is treating North Korea’s nuclear status as a de facto reality. On this basis, it is either deprioritizing or effectively setting aside the objective of complete denuclearization, instead pursuing a strategy aimed at managing the nuclear threat through high-level negotiations with Kim Jong-un.Accordingly, the key issue for South Korea is how to prepare for the possibility that future negotiations—given the difficulty of achieving full denuclearization—may take the form of arms control or “disarmament” arrangements aimed at limiting North Korea’s nuclear capabilities under the assumption that it possesses such weapons.An Assessment of the Effectiveness of President Lee Jae-myung’s Phased RoadmapThe Lee Jae-myung administration, which took office in June 2026, has advanced its own proposals to address the North Korean nuclear issue and establish a durable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula amid shifting international dynamics and deeply strained inter-Korean relations.In August 2025, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung formally introduced the “Three-Stage Denuclearization Framework (Freeze–Reduction–Elimination)” in his Liberation Day address, presenting a concrete roadmap for denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.This initiative reflects a strategic determination to reopen a pathway to denuclearization through a phased and pragmatic approach, grounded in the assessment that the traditional “comprehensive settlement” model is no longer viable in light of North Korea’s advanced nuclear capabilities. Subsequently, during a summit with President Trump, President Lee articulated a division of roles in which Trump would serve as the “Peacemaker” and Lee as the “Pacemaker,” jointly pursuing denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime.The “Policy for Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula,” announced in 2026, further operationalizes this three-stage framework and introduces a new variable into the regional strategic environment. The first stage entails a “freeze” on North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, including a halt to the production of fissile materials and missile testing, as well as acceptance of inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).The second stage involves the “reduction” and dismantlement of nuclear capabilities, while the third stage aims at complete denuclearization, defined as the full elimination of nuclear weapons. This phased approach reflects the assessment that, given North Korea’s existing nuclear arsenal, a step-by-step process—first preventing further advancement, then reducing capabilities, and ultimately eliminating them—is more feasible than an all-or-nothing approach.This framework is rooted in a realist perspective that maintains the ultimate objective of denuclearization while pursuing achievable intermediate goals. Accordingly, the Lee Jae-myung administration’s three-stage approach does not constitute a unilateral concessions to North Korea. Rather, its core lies in a “two-track strategy” that combines robust coordination with the United States with the creation of favorable conditions through inter-Korean dialogue.A New Approach: The Arduous Journey Toward Peace and Future ProspectsNotwithstanding its strategic rationale, significant obstacles remain to the successful implementation of this plan. The most immediate challenge is North Korea’s dismissive posture. Pyongyang has sharply criticized President Lee Jae-myung’s three-stage denuclearization proposal as a “futile delusion.” Moreover, given its firm position that nuclear weapons constitute the foundation of the state and that its nuclear status is irreversible, North Korea is unlikely to accept even the initial “freeze” stage.At the same time, the administration must address concerns among domestic conservative constituencies that a first-stage freeze could effectively amount to tacit acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. Accordingly, a central policy task for the Lee administration is to clearly establish that the “freeze” phase is an intermediate step toward dismantlement and to demonstrate substantive confidence-building measures that go beyond symbolic reductions in inter-Korean tensions.The three-stage denuclearization framework advanced by the Lee Jae-myung administration is significant insofar as it represents a pragmatic and credible effort to break the longstanding impasse over North Korea’s nuclear program.It has the potential to serve as a catalyst for reopening dialogue between the United States and North Korea. The broader vision of “peaceful coexistence,” rooted in the East Asian peace philosophy advocated by Ahn Jung-geun, may provide an initial pathway for prioritizing peace over confrontation and dialogue over mistrust in Northeast Asia, with the Korean Peninsula at its center.The remaining challenge lies in designing concrete implementation mechanisms for each phase, particularly in developing reciprocal measures capable of eliciting North Korea’s participation in the initial “freeze” stage. The path forward will be complex, as the Lee Jae-myung administration seeks to achieve the objective of a “nuclear-free Korean Peninsula” through a combination of U.S.–ROK alliance coordination and calibrated inter-Korean engagement.For decades, denuclearization negotiations on the Korean Peninsula have oscillated between a “big deal” approach and a phased framework. North Korea has consistently demanded step-by-step compensation based on its perceived security needs, while the international community has adhered to the principle that no meaningful concessions should be granted in the absence of complete and verifiable dismantlement. This divergence has produced a protracted and deeply entrenched stalemate. The “Three-Stage Denuclearization Framework” proposed by the Lee Jae-myung administration represents a practical effort to overcome this enduring “dilemma of mistrust.” It neither reflects the idealism of demanding immediate denuclearization nor the defeatism of tacitly accepting North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Rather, it constitutes a framework of “conditional commitments” that clearly delineates reciprocal obligations and seeks their parallel implementation.Peace is neither granted unconditionally nor sustained by force alone. The Lee Jae-myung administration’s three-stage denuclearization plan embodies both a principled stance—that South Korea will not act unilaterally in the absence of corresponding measures from North Korea—and a commitment to provide tangible incentives should Pyongyang choose to alter its course.A durable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula must ultimately serve as a practical foundation for improving the well-being of its people and ensuring long-term stability and opportunity for future generations, rather than resting on purely rhetorical appeals to unification.

Resumption of North Korea–China Economic Cooperation and New Opportunities for Inter-Korean Relations                    So-yeon KimDirector and Principal Research FellowChina and Korean Peninsula CenterSungkyun Institute of China StudiesNorth Korea’s Strategic Watch and the Resumption of China–North Korea CooperationAmid an evolving multipolar international order marked by intensifying great-power competition, North Korea appears to be positioning itself as a strategic asset within this competitive landscape in order to enhance its bargaining leverage. Pyongyang perceives that the effectiveness of sanctions imposed on the country has weakened considerably compared with earlier periods, and that it has partially mitigated its diplomatic and economic constraints through expanded cooperation with Russia and China. As a result, the regime sees little immediate incentive to rush into negotiations. North Korea’s so-called “strategic wait-and-see” approach should therefore not be interpreted as a complete rejection of dialogue, but rather as a transitional posture aimed at waiting for a more favorable moment to pursue new negotiation opportunities.Even within the context of this strategic posture, North Korea–China trade—sharply curtailed during the COVID-19 pandemic— has been steadily recovering. The volume of bilateral trade in 2024 is estimated to have reached approximately $2.2 billion, approaching pre-pandemic levels.Notably, the scope of cooperation appears to be expanding beyond conventional trade to encompass areas such as technology transfer, industrial upgrading, and personnel exchanges. For instance, recent visits by North Korean delegations from the livestock sector and the Ministry of Education to China suggest Pyongyang’s interest in pursuing industrial technological innovation, the digitalization of educational content, and the localization of artificial intelligence technologies through cooperation with Beijing. These developments suggest that North Korea is seeking pathways for industrial upgrading and long-term competitiveness even under the constraints of international sanctions.Although the expansion of North Korea–Russia cooperation following the war in Ukraine has helped sustain the North Korean economy, it remains limited in its ability to restore pre-sanctions economic levels or generating sustained growth. Moreover, the long-term sustainability of North Korea–Russia cooperation after the eventual conclusion of the Russia–Ukraine war remains uncertain. Even as Pyongyang seeks to expand its strategic maneuvering space by leveraging its relationship with Russia, its relationship with China remains indispensable to regime stability. North Korea’s efforts to pursue technological cooperation and modernization in sectors such as livestock production, education, and artificial intelligence through engagement with China highlights both the limitations of relying solely on the doctrine of self-reliance and the persistence of latent demand for external technology and capital.The Need to Bring North Korea to the Negotiating Table and to Build a Foundation for Cooperation with ChinaChina represents a cooperation partner that is structurally difficult to replace in supporting a reward structure that North Korea might view as genuinely beneficial in reentering dialogue, as well as in ensuring the credible and sustained implementation of such arrangements. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, China also has the capacity to influence both the enforcement and the potential easing of sanctions. At the same time, as a major economic actor capable of providing tangible benefits—such as trade, investment, tourism, and humanitarian assistance—China can generate incentives that lead Pyongyang to anticipate a meaningful compensation framework worth negotiating for. Consequently, North Korea may come to view negotiations as a pathway to tangible sanctions relief and economic rewards if China’s participation becomes visible alongside a potential agreement with the United States.Incorporating China into the initial design and implementation of negotiations in a way that reflects its interests and role could create conditions in which North Korea simultaneously strengthens both its security and economic environment by leveraging relationships with South Korea, the United States, and China through renewed dialogue.To move North Korea’s current wait-and-see posture toward engagement, the necessary incentives and strategic framework should be embedded within a multilateral structure that includes China. South Korea’s strategy for advancing inter-Korean relations should similarly focus on building a cooperative foundation with China, alongside the continued reinforcement of the ROK–U.S. alliance.Reconfiguring China’s Role as Co-Manager and StakeholderTransforming the resumption of North Korea–China economic cooperation into a catalyst for inter-Korean cooperation represents a key task for South Korean diplomacy. Achieving this objective requires a realistic reconfiguration of China’s role.Historically, much of the international community’s effort has focused on urging China to rigorously enforce sanctions against North Korea. However, Beijing has increasingly expressed skepticism regarding both the effectiveness and the costs of sanctions, gradually viewing the North Korean nuclear issue not as a problem that can be readily resolved, but as a reality that must be managed.Under these circumstances, it is important to redefine China’s role—not primarily as an instrument for applying pressure on North Korea, but as a co-manager of regional risks and a stakeholder in stability. China’s primary concern lies less with North Korea’s nuclear capabilities themselves and more with the secondary effects that may arise, including regional security instability, strengthened trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan, and the potential rise of public support for nuclear armament in South Korea and Japan.Accordingly, South Korea and China should seek to develop a shared understanding that the North Korean nuclear issue must at least be managed to prevent further deterioration beyond the current level of threat. Building on this foundation, the two countries could establish a “Korean Peninsula Strategic Dialogue,” a consultative framework dedicated to discussing peninsula issues.Such a mechanism could facilitate regular discussions on coordinating responses to North Korea’s nuclear program, reviewing crisis management hotlines, expanding cooperation on non-traditional security issues, and establishing joint protocols for potential contingencies.Practical Approaches to Inter-Korean and North Korea–China CooperationInter-Korean cooperation may become more feasible if framed as complementary to North Korea–China cooperation rather than as a competing initiative. From a practical perspective, several approaches can be considered.First, a pilot trilateral cooperation model involving South Korea, North Korea, and China could be pursued in humanitarian assistance and livelihood sectors that fall outside the scope of international sanctions. Issues such as North Korea’s deforestation, limited healthcare infrastructure, and declining agricultural productivity fall within the category of humanitarian assistance exempted from United Nations sanctions. Under a trilateral framework, South Korea could provide financial support, China could supply materials and logistical assistance, and North Korea could identify local needs. Such a model would remain feasible under the current sanctions regime and could serve as an initial step toward rebuilding inter-Korean trust.The United States also provides sanctions exemptions for humanitarian assistance and projects aimed at improving basic living conditions in North Korea. By incorporating initiatives in areas such as healthcare, food security, and agriculture—alongside non-traditional security cooperation in fields like public health, climate response, and disaster management—into this exemption framework, and by coordinating closely with the United States to avoid the risk of secondary sanctions, it would be possible to establish safe channels for Chinese local governments and businesses to expand cooperative engagement.Second, tourism cooperation along the North Korea–China border may offer a realistic avenue for expanding trilateral engagement. If the resumption of tourism to Mount Kumgang proves challenging in the near term, the concept of a Northeast Asia tourism belt linking Dandong, Kaesong, Mount Kumgang, and Wonsan could be explored through bilateral consultations between South Korea and China. Under such a model, tourism products in North Korea could be developed primarily for Chinese visitors, while South Korean companies participate in investment and operational management.North Korea’s gradual opening and increased stability would likely generate positive spillover effects on logistics, energy, and industrial development in China’s northeastern provinces. Moreover, presenting a mid- to long-term vision that integrates railway, port, and energy infrastructure under the broader framework of “North Korean stability – revitalization of Northeast China – peace on the Korean Peninsula” could stimulate interest not only at the central government level but also among local governments and private sector actors.Constraints and Opportunities for CooperationAt the same time, it is important to acknowledge the practical constraints surrounding South Korea–China cooperation aimed at bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table and promoting peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.Although both countries share an interest in maintaining stability on the peninsula, denuclearization itself is not a top strategic priority for China. Consequently, while China’s influence over North Korea may exceed that of most other countries, its willingness to actively exercise that influence for purposes of pressure or persuasion may be more limited than South Korea might hope.Moreover, North Korea is not entirely subordinate to Chinese influence, and China itself faces what might be described as an “influence dilemma.” For this reason, it is unrealistic to assume that China’s participation alone would directly produce meaningful changes in North Korea’s behavior.Rather than placing excessive expectations on China, it is more prudent to first establish a strategic consensus and cooperative foundation between South Korea and China. Such a foundation should position China as a key partner both in encouraging North Korea’s return to dialogue and in shaping the broader design of future negotiation frameworks.

President Lee's State Visits to Singapore and the Philippines and the Internationalization of the Korean Peninsula Peace Initiative                    Keeyoung YoonAdjunct Professor, Hankuk University of Foreign StudiesDirector, Future Strategy Research Institute, FNS ConsultingHistory is often shaped by the timing gap between those who knock on the door and those who choose to lock it. In March 2026, President Lee Jae-myung visited Singapore and Manila in succession, repeatedly signaling to the international community his intention to resume inter-Korean dialogue. Yet North Korea, the prospective dialogue partner, chose silence rather than issuing an official response. This silence is not merely the absence of a reply. Rather, it represents a strategic pause rooted in the logic of regime survival, and at the same time, serves as a precursor that may determine the direction in which the future of the Korean Peninsula ultimately diverges.A. From the Inaugural Address to March 1: The Consistent Language of Peace and “Dialogue”President Lee’s to North Korea has followed a single, consistent trajectory since his first day in office. From his June 2025 inaugural address calling to “restore communication and dialogue,” to his August Liberation Day speech outlining three principles—“respect for the regime, no pursuit of unification by absorption, and cessation of hostile acts”—and finally to his 2026 March 1st Movement Day address declaring the need to “lower tensions through actions, not words,” the overall direction has remained unwavering. What merits attention is precisely this consistency. The more frequently a policy signal is repeated, the lower the other side’s cost of calculation becomes; over time, the threshold for entering negotiations correspondingly declines.This overseas tour follows the same trajectory. In Singapore—at the very site of the 2018 North Korea–U.S. summit—President Lee called for support in advancing peace on the Korean Peninsula. In Manila, the joint press statement with the Philippines reaffirmed international solidarity for “efforts to resume dialogue.” This initiative should be understood not merely as a routine diplomatic itinerary, but rather as a medium- to long-term strategic effort to return the Korean Peninsula peace process to the international agenda.B. North Korea’s Silence: “Strategic Pause” or “Permanent Rejection”?North Korea’s response thus far has been silence. Neither state media nor senior officials have issued official commentary regarding the March 1st anniversary address or the remarks delivered during this overseas tour. Earlier this January, however, Kim Yo-jong, vice department director of the Workers’ Party of Korea, dismissed expectations for improved inter-Korean relations as “delusions” and directly criticized Lee’s overseas trip as an attempt to solicit international support.Yet this silence can also be interpreted in a different light. From an analytical perspective that characterizes the North Korean system as a “Confucian socialist monarchy,” the regime’s foremost priorities are regime security and the authority of the leader.These are followed by the practical recognition of its status as a nuclear-armed state, sanctions relief, a reward structure designed to consolidate elite cohesion, and negotiations that do not place the regime within a surrender framework. In this sense, North Korea’s refusal may not represent a rejection of dialogue itself, but rather a rejection of unfavorable conditions and timing.A degree of economic confidence may also underpin North Korea’s hardline posture and continued silence. Estimates suggest that the regime has secured annual economic benefits of approximately $10–20 billion through the deployment of troops and the provision of weapons and ammunition in connection with the Russia–Ukraine war. Some analyses further indicate that, following three consecutive years of economic contraction from 2020 to 2022, the North Korean economy achieved growth of roughly 3 percent in 2023–2024. From Pyongyang’s perspective, there may be little immediate incentive to rely on South Korea.However, a locked door and the absence of a door altogether signify entirely different futures.C. The Korean Peninsula in a Multipolar World: The Slowing Clocks of Major PowersOne of the variables most frequently cited in analyses of the Korean Peninsula issue is the “allocation of attention” among major powers. As the international system moves deeper into a multipolar phase, the United States, China, and Russia are simultaneously committing strategic resources to the Middle East, Europe, India, and the Pacific. Within this context, the Korean Peninsula can easily be pushed down the priority list of major powers at any given moment. The Trump administration’s emphasis on allied “burden-sharing” reflects one dimension of this broader trend. From South Korea’s perspective, an era has already begun in which it cannot predict when—or to what extent—the United States will intervene in Korean Peninsula affairs.The Middle East variable further compounds this situation. U.S. military action against Iran delivered a powerful message to North Korea: “Countries that abandon their nuclear weapons are ultimately attacked.” This perception reinforces North Korea’s determination to retain its nuclear arsenal while simultaneously raising the threshold for entering negotiations. For both symbolic justification and practical benefits related to regime preservation, North Korea has little choice but to persist in its nuclear development and advancement.The gap between Washington and Pyongyang remains substantial. The White House repeatedly reiterates its willingness for “unconditional dialogue” while maintaining the goal of denuclearization. North Korea, by contrast, has signaled a willingness to negotiate only on the premise of its “nuclear weapons state status.” While this gap slows the pace of negotiations, it simultaneously leaves open the possibility of an intermediate pathway: phased management focused on a verifiable freeze.D. Four Potential Scenarios for the Korean Peninsula Peace InitiativeThe future remains open and full of multiple possibilities. At certain moments, history reaches turning points where trajectories begin to diverge. The analytical method that anticipates such branching paths is known as scenario planning. From this perspective, four potential trajectories for future inter-Korean relations can be broadly outlined.The first scenario is a “long-term freeze.” In this scenario, military conflict is narrowly avoided, yet relations repeatedly stall whenever friction points—such as loudspeakers, leaflet campaigns, or drone incidents—become flashpoints. If U.S. strategic attention continues to be dispersed and North Korea maintains its disregard for the South, inter-Korean relations may gradually drift along this path. This scenario is governed largely by the force of inertia.The second scenario is “limited transactions.” This approach would involve expanding sanctions exemptions in areas such as humanitarian cooperation, disaster relief, and public health, while reducing the risk of accidental clashes through technical agreements—for example, the restoration of military communication lines. Although its political symbolism may be limited, it holds practical value by establishing repeatable and institutionalized procedures.The third, and worst-case, scenario is an “escalating crisis.” If accidental clashes, rapid escalation in information and psychological warfare, and excessive domestic political reactions occur simultaneously, dialogue channels could close abruptly, returning the situation to a one-sided focus on arms competition and military deterrence.Historically, inter-Korean relations have swung sharply between extremes whenever South Korea’s government has changed. There remains a meaningful possibility that hardliners in both South and North Korea could exploit crisis escalation for domestic political advantage.The fourth, and most feasible, best-case scenario is the “stepwise expansion of common ground.” In this pathway, South Korea secures the minimum objective of reducing the risk of war and halting the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. North Korea preserves its dignity while gaining a measure of economic breathing space.The United States manages proliferation risks without incurring significant costs. When these three conditions converge, a sequence of small agreements—exchanging a “verifiable freeze” for “conditional sanctions exemptions and economic cooperation”—could begin to take shape. Third-party venues, such as ASEAN, could also serve as platforms for initial trust-building.To design the most favorable future, the first priority must be the institutionalization of a functioning crisis management system. The starting point is to eliminate the structural vulnerability whereby a single incident could automatically escalate into war.This requires establishing military communication channels, maritime and aerial protocols to prevent accidental clashes, and verification procedures to ensure that incidents such as drone incursions do not recur. Such measures may lack the dramatic appeal of high-profile summits, but they constitute far more essential infrastructure.The next task is the design of “reversible support.” Within the existing sanctions framework, South Korea should prepare a package of humanitarian assistance, public health cooperation, agricultural support, and disaster response initiatives, while maintaining a strict separation between cash transfers and in-kind assistance.At the same time, careful linguistic discipline is essential. Given North Korea’s acute sensitivity to the politics of face, rhetoric implying regime change or demands for public capitulation would undermine the very foundation of negotiations.Perhaps the most critical variable is the resilience of South Korea’s domestic political system. Because even a single incident could collapse an agreement, any diplomatic initiative must be supported by sustainable explanatory capacity and at least a minimal degree of bipartisan consensus. As U.S. strategic attention becomes increasingly dispersed, Seoul must develop a more sophisticated diplomatic strategy of its own to minimize potential fractures in the ROK-U.S. approach toward North Korea.President Lee’s repeated message during this trip of “resuming dialogue” represents an act of knocking on the door. North Korea’s silence suggests that the door will not open immediately. Yet the moment the knocking stops, the door inevitably becomes thicker. What matters is not optimism or pessimism, but the steady design and implementation of a sustainable vision for peace.

Paradigm Shift and Peace on the Korean Peninsula as Reflected in President Lee’s March 1st Movement Commemorative Address                    Seung-hyun LeeVisiting ProfessorYonsei UniversityI. IntroductionThis analysis examines the significance of President Lee Jae-myung’s March 1st Movement commemorative address through the lens of paradigm shifts in historical interpretation and national strategy. It evaluates how the speech reframes the meaning of the March 1, 1919 Movement and articulates a forward-looking vision for the Republic of Korea (ROK). Furthermore, it assesses the policy instruments proposed to implement that vision and considers their broader implications for peace and coexistence on the Korean Peninsula.The address implicitly advances a reinterpretation of the March 1st Movement, which can be understood as a paradigmatic shift. Traditionally described as a “manse movement” centered on public demonstrations, the speech instead situates it as a foundational political revolution that established the normative and institutional origins of the modern Republic of Korea.In doing so, it links the contemporary democratic state—free, prosperous, and internationally engaged—to the moral and political legacy of the independence movement. This reframing represents not merely rhetorical elevation but a shift in historical consciousness, positioning March 1 as the point of origin for South Korea’s constitutional democracy and civic sovereignty.Against this interpretive backdrop, the speech articulates a strategic national vision that is grounded in historical continuity while oriented toward structural transformation.II. Articulation of a National Future VisionPresident Lee’s address presents an integrated national vision organized around three pillars: (1) the construction of a fair society, (2) the advancement of a culturally and technologically advanced nation, and (3) the realization of peace and shared prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. Each objective reflects an effort to translate the normative legacy of the March 1 Movement into contemporary governance priorities.1. Building a Fair NationAt the core of the fairness agenda is a moral recalibration of historical justice. The speech invokes a powerful social inversion: replacing the longstanding perception that participation in the independence movement resulted in generational disadvantage with the normative expectation that such sacrifice should yield generational honor and prosperity.This reframing underscores a commitment to rectifying historical inequities, in which collaborators benefited socially and economically while independence activists and their descendants often faced hardship. Policies aimed at identifying previously unrecognized independence activists and expanding state honors serve both symbolic and redistributive purposes.The proposed establishment of a national Independence Park in Yongsan—including the elevation of Hyochang Park as a central commemorative site associated with figures such as Kim Gu, Lee Bong-chang, and Yun Bong-gil—reinforces the state’s effort to embed historical legitimacy within contemporary civic identity.In this respect, fairness is understood not solely in distributive economic terms but as a restructuring of historical memory and social recognition.2. Advancing a Cultural and Scientific NationThe second pillar of the vision emphasizes cultural vitality and scientific advancement. The speech recalls the aspiration expressed in the 1919 Declaration of Independence that Korea would contribute to global civilization through originality and innovation. By juxtaposing periods of national subjugation—when Korea was excluded from global scientific and technological developments—with its current participation in advanced industries such as artificial intelligence, the address constructs a narrative of historical recovery and accelerated modernization.This framing situates contemporary achievements in science, technology, and cultural production—including the global expansion of Korean cultural influence—within a century-long arc of deferred potential now realized. The speech thus underscores the strategic importance of sustained investment in research, innovation ecosystems, and cultural industries as instruments of national competitiveness and soft power projection.3. Peace, Coexistence, and Regional StabilityThe third pillar emphasizes peace and coexistence on the Korean Peninsula. The speech advocates a shift from an adversarial security paradigm toward one grounded in mutual recognition, confidence-building, and practical cooperation. This perspective aligns conceptually with the historical advocacy of regional peace articulated by figures such as Ahn Jung-geun, whose vision of East Asian cooperation is invoked as a normative precedent.The address rejects a zero-sum logic of hostility and instead calls for a paradigm transition from distrust to trust-based engagement. This language stands in contrast to North Korea’s increasingly explicit framing of inter-Korean relations as hostile and structurally divided.III. Policy Instruments and Strategic FeasibilityA distinguishing feature of the commemorative address is its effort to link an aspirational vision with concrete and identifiable policy instruments.1. Institutionalizing Historical RecognitionConcrete measures to honor independence activists—through expanded state recognition and the development of commemorative infrastructure—form the operational foundation of the fairness agenda. These initiatives aim to embed historical legitimacy within state institutions and public spaces, reinforcing civic cohesion and ensuring normative continuity.2. Science, Technology, and Cultural PolicyIn the domain of science and technology domain, the speech emphasizes the importance of positioning the ROK among the world’s leading innovation economies. By recalling historical exclusion during pivotal moments in global scientific advancement, the address underscores the urgency of sustained strategic investment. The broader objective is to ensure that South Korea not only participates in but helps shape emerging technological paradigms.Similarly, the expansion of cultural influence is framed as both a national achievement and a policy priority. The address conveys confidence that South Korea’s cultural and technological capacities can serve as mutually reinforcing pillars of international standing.3. Managing the Korean Peninsula Security EnvironmentWith respect to inter-Korean relations, the address reiterates key principles: respect for the North Korean regime, avoidance of hostile acts, renunciation of absorption-based unification strategies, and sustained efforts to reopen dialogue. It also emphasizes the importance of preventing incidents that could escalate tensions, such as unauthorized cross-border activities.The proposed long-term objective of transitioning from the armistice framework to a peace regime reflects continuity with prior diplomatic initiatives. However, given the deterioration of U.S.–DPRK dialogue following the Hanoi Summit and North Korea’s hardened strategic posture, the near-term feasibility of such a transition remains limited.Within these constraints, the speech identifies a pragmatic maximum: strengthening trilateral cooperation among the ROK, China, and Japan; maintaining close coordination with the United States; and positioning South Korea as a facilitator in diplomatic engagement. The renewed emphasis on a “peacemaker” or “facilitator” role reflects a middle-power strategy designed to preserve agency within a constrained geopolitical environment.IV. ConclusionThe March 1st Movement commemorative address situates contemporary policy within a century-long trajectory of national transformation. By reframing March 1 as the revolutionary origin of constitutional democracy, the speech advances a paradigm shift in historical interpretation that informs present governance strategy.The resulting policy vision integrates historical justice, technological and cultural advancement, and a recalibrated approach to inter-Korean relations. While structural constraints—particularly in the security domain—limit immediate breakthroughs, the address articulates a coherent strategic orientation grounded in normative continuity and institutional reform.In this sense, the speech does not merely commemorate the past; it seeks to operationalize historical memory as a driver of future statecraft.